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The present study sets out to challenge a common assumption  that Green politics is 
virtually non-existent in Spain. This assumed state of affairs has been attributed to a 
number of  factors including  a materialist society which prioritises economic 
growth, Spain’s political culture and, finally, the country’s electoral system. The 
result, according to the few scholars who include Spain in their studies, is a country 
with a weak political ecology social movement (PESM) and a Green party that 
enjoys only ‘trivial support’ (Mair 2001:103).  
As will be demonstrated, such assumptions are based on an insufficient knowledge 
of political ecology in Spain. The lack of knowledge has resulted in Spain’s green 
movements and parties being routinely misinterpreted and, indeed, overlooked. The 
first and most glaring misconception is many scholars’ persistence in referring to the 
‘Spanish Green party’ as if a single party existed. In fact, the ‘Spanish Greens’ 
comprise not one national party but a variable and variegated number of different 
political parties, a few of which have certainly achieved a measure of electoral 
success (depending, of course, on how success is define ). Furthermore, it will be 
shown that reasons often given for the failure of the Green parties  – such as the 
country’s alleged lack of interest in environmental matters – overlook other more 
pertinent factors such as, for example, tensions between the Spanish Greens and the 
environmental movement organisations (EMO), the natio list factor and continuing 
tensions between the ‘green-greens’ and the ‘red-grens’.  Despite numerous 
problems at party level, the present study will show that Spain’s PESM  is as 
vigorous as – though different from - that of other countries which are reputed to be 
environmental leaders.  
To pursue this argument, the thesis will provide an overview of Spain’s Green 
parties, setting these within the cultural and histor cal context of the broader PESM 
to which they belong. Drawing on territorial politics literature, the thesis will, in 
particular,  demonstrate that the territorial dimensio  – that is, Spain’s division into 
17 autonomous regions –  has been one of the neglect d but determining factors 
contributing to the problems besetting the Spanish Greens.  It will also be argued 
that, in its own way, the efforts of Spanish ecologists have undoubtedly contributed 
towards the ‘piecemeal’ greening of Spain.  
The arguments are further developed through two in-depth case studies focusing on 
political ecology, and more particularly Green parties, in two of Spain’s regions, 
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THE USE OF ACRONYMS  
 
 
Given the large number of Green parties and  movements in Spain, most of which 
either contain the word ‘Green’ or ‘Ecologist’ in their title (in several languages), it 
has been difficult to find a way of introducing these in the text so that the reader’s 
job of recognising or remembering these parties is made easier.  Numerous other 
parties and organisations are also mentioned, and the fact that the names are in 
Spanish and Catalan – as well as other languages spoken in Spain – could give rise to 
obfuscation and acronym-fatigue.   
 
I have tried to anticipate problems and to be systema ic about introducing any  
organisations into the narrative for the first time. The first time a party or 
organisation is mentioned the whole title is provided in the original language, 
followed by a translation into English and the acronym which is commonly used in 
Spain. Subsequent mention of the organisation in question will just use the acronym 
but readers may consult the list of acronyms (pp. 14-17) if necessary.  In some cases, 
when the acronym stands for an excessively unwieldy title and is always  referred to 
by its acronym,  the text will use the acronym (but will, of course, list the full name 
in the list of acronyms.  
 
A number of well-known acronyms such as NATO, EP, FOE are not included on the 
list. Occasionally, a Spanish term is used instead of its English equivalent, but its 
meaning is explained and is always clear from the context.   
 
TRANSLATIONS 
Any quotation or text that has been translated from Spanish by me is clearly 
indicated. I have put an asterisk just before the author’s name when providing the 






LIST OF ACRONYMS  
 
ADENA Asociación por la Defensa 
de la Naturaleza 
 
Association for the Defense of 
Nature 
AEDENAT Asociación Ecologista de 
Defensa de la Naturaleza 
Environmental Association for the 
Defence of Nature 
AEORMA  Asociación Española para 
la Ordenación del Territorio 
y el Medio Ambiente 
 
Spanish Association for Land Use 
and the Environment 
AEPDEN Asociación de Estudios y 
Protección de la Naturaleza 
 
Association for the Study and 
Protection of Nature 
AGADEN Asociación Gaditana de 
Defensa de la Naturaleza  
 
Cadiz Nature Defence Association 
ASEED  Action for Solidarity, Equality, 
Environment and Development in 
Europe 
AV Alternativa Verda Green Alternative, a Catalan Green 
party 
 
CAN  Climate Action Network 
CANC Comité Antinuclear de 
Catalunya 
  
Catalan Antinuclear Committee 
CC OO Comisiones Obreras 
 
Workers’ Commissions, the Spanish 




The Andalusian Ecologist and 
Pacifist Confederation 
CHA Chunta Aragonesista 
 
Aragon National Party 
CIAMA Centro Internacional del 
Agua y el Medio Ambiente 
International Centre for Water and 
the Environment. Funded in 1971 
 
CIDN Consejo Ibérico para la 
Defensa de la Naturaleza 
 
Iberian Council for the Defense of 
Nature 
CIS Centro de Investigaciones 
Sociológicas  
 




Convergència i Unió Convergence and Union 




COAGRET Coordinadora de Afectados 
por los Grandes Embalses y 
Trasvases  
 
Movement for People Affected by 
Big Reservoirs and Transfers 
CODA Coordinadora de 
Organizaciones  de Defensa 
Ambiental 
 
Federation of Groups  for the 
Defense of the Environment 
CUP Candidatura d’Unitat 
Popular 
 
 Popular Unity Candidates (a 
Catalan party that only stands at 
local elections) 
CUT-BAI Colectivo de Unidad de los 
Trabajadores – Bloque 
Andaluz de Izquierdas  
 
Workers’ United Group – the 
Andalusian Left-Wing Bloc 
DEPANA Lliga Per A la Defensa del 
Patrimoni Natural 
 
League for the Defence of 
Catalonia’s Natural Heritage 
EA Ecologistas en Acción 
 
Ecologists in Action 
EAA Ecologistas en Acción de 
Andalucía 
 
Ecologists in Action of Andalucia 
EAC Ecologistas en Acción de 
Catalunya 
 
Ecologists in Action of Catalonia 
EdC Ecologistes de Catalunya Catalan ecologists. A federation of 
Catalan EMOs. More important in 
Catalonia than EA 
EEB  
 
European Environment Bureau 
EFGP  
 
European Federation of Green 
Parties (1993-2004) 
 
EGC  European Green Coordination, a 
loose alliance 1984-1993 
 
EGP  European Green Party (2004-) 
 
EM  Ecological modernisation 
EMO  Environmental Movement 
Organisation 
EP-V Europa de los Pueblos-
Verdes 
Peoples’ Europe – Greens. A 




ERC Esquerra Republicana de 
Catalunya  
 
Catalan Republican Left 
EU-EV Esquerra Unida-Els Verds United Left- Greens (Valencia) 
 
EUiA Esquerra Unida i 
Alternativa 
United and Alternative Left 
 
EV Els Verds This is often, but not always, the  
Catalan (or Valencian, or Balearic) 
variant of Los Verdes 
 
EV-AE Els Verds-L’Alternativa 
Ecologista 
Greens – The Ecology Alternative 
(Catalans) 
 
EV-GV Els Verds- Grup Verd Greens – Green Group (Catalan 
name for LVGV) 
 
FAADN Federación de Asociaciones 
Andaluzas para la Defensa 
de la Naturaleza 
Andalusian Federation of 
Associations for the Defence of 
Nature 
 
FAPAS Fondo para la protección de 
los animales salvajes 
Foundation for the Protect of Wild 
Animals 
 
FNCA Fundación Nueva Cultura 
del Agua 
Foundation for a New Water Culture 
GENET  European NGO Network on Genetic 
Engineering 
 
GOB Grup Balear d'Ornitologia i 
Defensa de la Naturalesa 
Balearic Group for Ornithology and 
for the Defense of Nature.  
 
IC Iniciativa per Catalunya  Initiative for Catalonia  
 
IC-EV Iniciativa per Catalunya – 
Els Verds 
In Catalonia, the initial alliance 
between IC and the Greens 
 
ICONA Instituto de Conservación de 
la Naturaleza 
Institute for Nature Conservancy. 
IUCN state member. Founded in 
1971  
 
ICPS Institut de Ciències Polítiques i 
Socials  
Institute of Political and Social Science 
 
ICV Iniciativa per Catalunya 
Verds 
Initiative for Catalonia Greens 
 
IdPV Iniciativa del Poble 
Valencià 
Initiative for Valencia 
 
INFORSE  International Network for 
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Sustainable Energy 
IU Izquierda Unida United Left 
IUCN    
 
 International Union for 






United Left – the Greens –  
Calling on Andalucía. IU’s name in 
Andalucia since 1993 
LVE Los Verdes Europeos The European Greens. A party that 
has presented candidates in a few 
Spanish regions. It is anti IU, pro the 
EGP and pro Greens maintaining an 
independent position.  
 
LVE Los Verdes Ecologistas Green Ecologists. A rogue party in 
the early days of the Greens 
 
LVGV Los Verdes Grupo  Verde Greens-Green Group. A statewide 
party started up in 1994 as a result 
of the creation of CLV  
 
MARM Ministerio de Medio 
Ambiente y Medio Rural y 
Marino 
Ministry for the Environment and 
Rural and Maritime Affairs 
 
PA Partido Andalucista Andalusian Nationalist Party 
 
PACMA Partido Antitaurino Contra 
el Maltrato Animal 
Anti-Bullfighting and Animal 
Cruelty Party 
 
PCA Partido Comunista Andaluz The Andalusian Communist Party 
 
PCE Partido Comunista Español Spanish Communist Party 
 
PESM  Political Ecology Social Movement 
PLI  Popular legislative initiative 
 
PSC  Partit dels Socialistes de 
Catalunya  
Catalan Socialist Party (PSOE sister 
party) 
 
PSUC Partit Socialista Unificat de 
Catalunya   
Catalan Unified Socialist Party 
SEO Sociedad Española de 
Ornitología 
The Spanish Ornothological Society 
 
SOC Sindicato de Obreros del 
Campo  
Farm-Workers’ Trade Union 
 
T&E  Transport and Environment (org) 
 





VERDE Vértice Español para la 
Reivindicación del 
Desarrollo Ecológico  
Spanish Vertex for the Demand for 
Environmental Development  
A ‘rogue’  statewide green party 
ViE Verds i Ecopacifistes Greens and Ecopacifists 
 
WWF/Adena World Wildlife 
Fund/Asociación para la 
defensa de la naturaleza 





CHAPTER 1:  ‘HARDLY  A HISTORY OF UNADULTERATED  SUCCESS?’   
  
‘Progress is the realisation  of  
Utopias’ 
                                   (Wilde 1891) 
 
1.1 INTRODUCTION  
 
The title of this introductory chapter is taken from an article by Mair (2001: 104) 
who argued in 2001 that, despite the academic interest and prominence given to 
Green parties in Europe, their electoral success had been limited and had even begun 
to recede. Citing the case of the emblematic die Grünen in Germany, Mair writes 
about their ‘relatively low levels of electoral support’ and ‘quite a poor long-term 
performance’ (Mair 2001: 100), and argues that their share of the vote is unlikely to 
increase substantially in the future. In 2001, the av rage vote polled for die Grünen, 
across the six federal elections they had contested, ood at 5.8%; since then there 
have been three federal elections (2002, 2005 & 2009) in which die Grünen have 
respectively polled 8.6%, 8.1% and 10.7% of the vote (Álvarez-Rivera 2009), thus 
refuting Mair’s gloomy prognosis. This detail illustrates the difficulty of predicting 
future outcomes whilst furthermore demonstrating that e Greens are by no means a 
flash party. This observation is further corroborated by the Green Group’s presence 
in the European Parliament (EP) where, since the 2009 EP elections, there are more 
Green MEPs (i.e. 47) than ever before1. Nevertheless, there is some truth in Mair’s 
more general contention that the considerable potential of European Green parties in 
the 1980s and 1990s failed to give rise to a new, po erful, political force: 
 
Green parties, at best, remain electorally marginal and despite almost two 
decades of electoral contestation, they have failed to emerge as major actors 
on the political stage; moreover, they are also clearly performing 
substantially below potential, with their increased acceptability in the eyes of 
voters failing to translate into any significant electoral growth (Mair 2001: 
107).  
 
                                                
1 This figure only refers to European Green Group (EGP) MEPs and does not include MEPs from the 
European Free Alliance (EFA) nationalist  group which is part of the parliamentary group EGP/EFA 
and since 2009 has  55 MEPs (Lozano 2010)  
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Mair’s study is primarily based on die Grünen, one of Europe’s more successful 
Green parties, rather than on weaker Green parties such as those found in Spain 
which Mair dismisses as enjoying only ‘trivial support’ (Mair 2001: 103). Mair’s 
brief allusion to the Spanish Greens is illustrative of the scant interest that Spain’s 
Greens have received from most scholars. 
 
The present study is therefore premised on the understanding that Green parties are a 
significant but minority option even where they are t their most successful. This 
premise helps to contextualise Spanish Green party olitics: ‘trivial support’ for the 
Spanish Greens can be seen not as an aberration but as a more pronounced version of 
the political reality elsewhere in Europe (this study will confine itself to the 
European context). Another important consideration o bear in mind is that Green 
parties are not the only ecologists seeking to change society; the grassroot, local and 
transnational work undertaken by the PE social moveent (PESM)2 also contributes 
substantially to the greening of society. This study will therefore examine the 
broader movement, not only in order to contextualise the Spanish Greens’ position, 
but also to stress the symbiotic links between these two groups of actors.  
 
 
1.2 RESEARCH QUESTIONS  
 
There is a widespread heuristic assumption that Green politics is virtually non-
existent in Spain, in contrast with the situation in other European countries. But is 
this assumption correct? The present rather negative perception of Spain’s 
engagement with Green politics is predicated on a number of factors: first and 
foremost, there is a misperception that Green politics is the primary  preserve of 
Green parties, whereas I will argue that a study of Green politics should include all 
Green actors; secondly, very little academic writing on Europe’s Green parties has 
dedicated more than a passing mention to the Spanish Greens (Los Verdes), 
consequently perpetuating their peripheral or outsider status; thirdly, there is a 
                                                
2 This is a ponderous but more accurate name for all environmental actors and groups who would 
define themselves as ‘ecologists’ – i.e. who more or l ss subscribe to the central tenets of PE or 
ecologism.   
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supposition that a low priority is accorded to post-materialist and, ipso facto, 
environmental issues in Spain (O’Neill 1997: 254; Pridham 1994: 81; Aguilar 
Fernández 2004; Jordan 2005). The value-related ‘Mediterranean syndrome’ thesis, 
although questioned by Kousis et al. (2008), is still used to explain why a country 
such as Spain lacks a viable Green party: ‘… the weakn ss of Green parties in 
Southern Europe may reflect lower levels of economic development and, 
consequently, the presence of fewer postmaterialists’ (Carter 2007: 105-106).  
 
This thesis will argue that it is incorrect to assume that Green politics is virtually 
non-existent in Spain. Despite their somewhat problematic trajectory, Spain’s Greens 
have had some successes, have lasted more than 25 years and are commonly 
acknowledged to be part of the Spanish political system. Furthermore, the Spanish 
PESM  far more influential than the Green parties  is also actively involved in 
Green politics and should be factored into a study of ‘Green politics’ or PE in Spain.  
 
The thesis also contends that Spanish PE, despite being labelled as weak by Spanish 
and other scholars, nevertheless has strengths that are only apparent when it is viewed 
from a more nuanced and more Hispano-centric perspective. It will also be argued 
that an irregular ‘piecemeal strategy’ – whereby the PESM (including the Green 
parties) adopts a series of divergent tactics which a ieve specific, if small and 
isolated, policy gains – has been arguably as succesful in greening Spain according 
to its needs and resources as strategies adopted in other supposedly ‘greener’ 
European countries. The notion of a ‘piecemeal strategy’ is taken from Dobson 
(2000: 129) who employs the term to critique Green politics, pointing to the ‘tension 
and theoretical dislocation’ that exists between the ‘radical nature of the Green 
project’ and the ‘short-term, piecemeal progress gradually notched up by Greens’. 
Whilst accepting that these small gains hardly constitute a radical shift towards a 
Green democratic state (Eckersley 2004), I argue that this piecemeal strategy at least 
constitutes a step in the right direction and helps to disseminate and promote the ideas 
and values of PE.  
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In order to analyse Green politics in Spain, the thesis will  provide an account of, not 
only the Spanish Greens, but also the PESM. This will demonstrate the complexities, 
the weaknesses but also the strengths of Green politics in Spain, and will highlight 
the need to study the Spanish case in depth before passing judgement. Once Spanish 
PE has been analysed carefully, it will be easier to answer two key questions posed 
by this thesis:  
 
1 Which key factors have hindered the consolidation of the Spanish 
Greens? 
2 Does the Spanish Greens’ weak electoral performance indicate a lack of 
interest in political ecology in Spain? 
 
Before outlining the main aims of the thesis I will briefly define my understanding of 
two key concepts included in the questions above.  
 
In the present study, PE refers to a distinct ideology3 which Dobson (2000) defines as 
ecologism, and which is synonymous with Green politics. Ecologism is an alternative 
ideology adhered to by all individuals, parties or movements who prioritise 
environmental wellbeing over and above economic growth, are seeking a shift in 
social relationships, a more participatory democracy nd a more egalitarian society; 
in short, they are seeking political changes which will result in the ‘sustainable social, 
cultural, environmental and economic development of our societies on planet Earth’ 
(European Green Party 2006). The labels ecologists and ecologism are also a literal 
translation of the Spanish term which uses the same lab l for all PE party or 
movement activists and supporters, regardless of their affiliation. 
  
The term ‘environmental politics’, with its weak, ‘reformist’ (Dobson 2000) 
overtones, will be reserved to allude to an approach that advocates the introduction 
of discrete, environmentally-friendly policies within the existing status quo. 
 
                                                
3 For arguments defending PE as a ‘distinct’ ideology, see Dobson (2000: 2).  
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The second concept requiring clarification is the id ntity of the Spanish Greens, 
often referred to as Los Verdes (the Greens) (O’Neill 1997; Holliday 1997; 
Karamichas 2004). As this study will show, the labeling of the Spanish Greens as ‘a 
party’ is a fictional (or aspirational) construct because there is no single party which 
can legitimately claim to be the principal Spanish Green Party. Over the years, as 
many as 102 different Green parties have been registered (as noted in the Spanish 
Ministry of the Interior’s register of parties [MIR 2010b]) in Spain. Consequently, 
the existing fragmentation (which will subsequently be discussed) clearly makes a 
nonsense of comparative national studies on Green parties which persist in referring 
to Los Verdes without acknowledging the fact that no such party exists. In this 
present study, the term Spanish Greens is therefore res rved for the aggregated 
Spanish Green parties.  
 
 
1.3 AIMS AND OBJECTIVES  
 
The central aim of this study is to provide an in-depth and multifaceted approach to 
the study of PE in Spain. By investigating several under-explored dimensions, I hope 
to provide a greater understanding of Green politics n Spain. To date, there has been 
little academic writing about this area, whether by Spaniards or ‘outsiders’. Spanish 
PE is scarcely documented, largely ignored and poorly understood, for a number of 
reasons which will be outlined in section 1.5.  
 
A second aim of this study is to contribute, albeit in a very minor way, to broadening 
the study of Green politics in Europe by drawing attention to a number of issues that 
are illustrated by the Spanish case, in particular the study’s focus on  the regional 
dimension of Green party politics in Spain. A greater awareness of the Greens within 
subnational politics would help to correct aberrations such as the one that follows. A 
comparative study of ‘Green parties in France and the UK’ (Spoon 2009: 615) 
stresses the achievements of the English Greens but – despite the title of the article – 
makes no mention of the Scottish Greens’ success at Holyrood (1 Green MSP  
elected to the Scottish Parliament in 1999, 7 electd in 2003, 2 seats held in 2007) – 
and, indeed, makes no differentiation between England nd the UK. This lack of 
attention to the territorial dimension of politics on the part of the author, the 
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reviewers and the editorial team, is an indication of the relative lack of importance 
accorded to this question. An examination of the Spanish Greens also revisits other 
aspects of Green politics which perhaps merit reconsideration, in particular the 
party/movement dichotomy and the constraints and opportunities afforded by 
alliances between the Greens and the left.  
 
The thesis also has a number of more specific objectives, the most important of 
which are briefly listed below: 
 
a) To provide a fuller account of the Spanish Greens, clearly differentiating 
between the different parties operating within the Spanish state as well as 
highlighting their strengths and weaknesses.  
b) To ascertain which factors have contributed to the Spanish Greens’ 
‘failure’ to organise themselves into a single, viable political party. The 
Spanish Greens’ failure to do so will be set against the success of Spain’s 
leading environmental movement organisation (EMO), Ecologistas en 
Acción (EA).  
c) To demonstrate that Green politics in Spain can only be understood if the 
importance of the regional dimension is recognised. 
d) To stress the interconnectedness of the various Green political actors and, 
consequently, the need to view ‘Green politics’ as a phenomenon which 
includes the PESM as a whole (including parties and movements). 
e) To pinpoint the distinctiveness of the Spanish PESM, which has been 
shaped by Spain’s historical and cultural specificity.  
f) To explore and question some of the key dynamics of PE in Spain and 
see whether they have a wider applicability and are us ful tools for re-
evaluating theoretical approaches to Green politics. These key dynamics 






1.4 RATIONALE OF THE PRESENT STUDY      
 
The present study will build on the research undertak n by others and will provide a 
greater understanding of Spanish PE by providing a fuller and more up-to-date 
account of this subject. The study is indebted to the contributions made by a number 
of scholars and ecologists, but wants to offer a number of correctives as well as 
providing a number of alternative interpretations to counter. or add to, the prevailing 
ones. 
 
The study takes a different starting point from other studies on Spain’s ecologists in 
two respects: firstly, it tries to show the interconnectedness between the parties and 
PESM, whereas, as Torcal et al. admit, ‘the relationship between parties and new 
social movements has been undermined by an overestimation of the distance between 
those two sets of actors’ (Montero & Gunther 2002: 6). My decision to connect the 
two was based on the realisation that most of the Spanish Green parties (at least the 
‘independent’ parties that are not in electoral alliances) are not primarily focused on 
party competition and electoral success but rather on ‘constituency representation’ 
(Kitschelt 1989), identity-building and policy-forming. Like the PESM, they help to 
‘define problems, propose solutions, aggregate citizens’ policy preferences … make 
demands of elected officials, [and] communicate information about government 
action to their supporters and the larger public’ (Burstein & Linton 2002: 380-381). 
However, despite emphasising the importance of the PESM as a whole, this study 
will focus more on the parties than the movements, largely because this is the area 
that is most problematic and has received least attention.  
 
Given that the parties are the primary focus of the study, I have only focused on some 
elements of the PESM and have omitted numerous bodies working within the 
movement For example, I will touch only tangentially on the role of  important 
environmental interest groups which operate within Spain’s two leading trade unions, 
UGT (Unión General de Trabajadores, General Union of Workers) and CC OO 
(Comisiones Obreras, Workers’ Commissions). Moreover, my study of the grassroots 
movement has largely centered on one key EMO, Ecologistas en Acción (EA), whose 
 25 
success in uniting numerous regional movements into o e statewide confederation 
could provide a model for the Green parties to follow. 
 
The second respect in which this study differs from ther studies on the Spanish 
PESM is that it places the locus operandi of the Spanish Greens at the meso-
government level. This interpretation is proposed as a corrective to the dominant 
assumption that a Green party’s success is measured by its ability to gain statewide 
representation.  
 
1.4.1 An understudied area  
PE in Spain has featured only rarely in scholarly literature for two reasons that I 
would like to address in turn. Firstly, Spain is far less represented in comparative 
studies in the political and social sciences than my other West European countries; 
as a result, Spanish Green politics has received less attention from scholars than 
other Green parties who regularly feature in comparative party studies.  
 
Spain in comparative studies and party literature 
Since the country’s transition to democracy (1975-1982), Spain has emerged from its 
political isolation and increasingly features in comparative studies on the subject of 
sub-state nationalism (e.g. Swenden 2006; Hopkin 2009), democratisation (e.g. 
Powell 1996) and Europeanisation (e.g. Featherstone & Radaelli 2003). However, in 
other areas such as party competition, the country’s late transition to democracy is 
one of the factors still cited for excluding Spain from cross-national studies (Green-
Pedersen 2007: 612). Montero and Gunther (2002: 14) coin the phrase ‘static 
conceptualization’ to refer to southern European countries’ exclusion from many 
studies, and assert that studies on party typology are based on ‘surprisingly few West 
European democracies’. The conclusion to be drawn from this is that academics tend 
to focus on familiar territory that has already been documented. Until recently 
(although this is beginning to change) most Spanish academics have tended not to 
publish in English and have failed, therefore, to disseminate their works outside 
Spain; furthermore, the language barrier makes it harder for English-language 
academics to access information on Spain.  
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Secondly, I also wish to question the scarcely contested notion in party literature that 
unless a party has passed the threshold of representation in a national parliament it is 
appropriate to consider it ‘weak’ and therefore notworthy of mention in cross-
national studies. Given the growing interest in meso-government and federal states, it 
will be argued that Sartori’s classic definition of a ‘relevant’ party  as ‘one that has 
gained parliamentary representation and has either coalition or blackmail potential’ 
(1976: 123) should be extended to include regional elections (again, there is an 
incipient trend in this direction, but most Green party literature continues to focus on 
the statewide perspective).  
 
A comparative view of Spain and the PESM 
If we look at the representation of Spain in cross-national studies on Green parties 
and movements there are further shortcomings. The first of these will be referred to 
as the Mediterranean syndrome thesis. Comparative studie  on environmental policy, 
parties and movements still tend to regard southern European countries as 
‘environmental laggards’ (Andersen & Liefferink 1997; Haverland 2003; Costa 
2006; Aguilar Fernández 2004), although a number of studies have presented a 
cogent argument that this conclusion is based on data misrepresenting Spain’s 
position (Börzel 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003). Furthermore, as Martinez Alier says 
(2003), a false correlation is made  between economically less advanced countries 
and the emergence of post-materialism, which many studies consider an essential 
variable for the existence of a PESM as the following statement demonstrates.  
 
Until the late 1990s, the development of an environme tal consciousness in 
Southern Europe lagged significantly behind similar processes in other 
countries that had entered into an advanced state of late modernity much 
earlier’ (Gunther et al. 2006: 344).  
 
A study of Spain’s PE movement in Chapter 4 will argue that this commonly-held 
opinion is inaccurate as are assumptions that the southern European countries are less 
environmentally conscious because of the ‘prevalence of consumerist values in these 
recently modernised countries’ (Pridham 1994: 81).  
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The second misrepresentation of Spain’s PESM arises from the cultural determinism 
of the dominant north European perspective outlined above. The apparent weakness 
of Spain’s PESM – attributed to its lack of interest in environmental matters, political 
culture and deficient political opportunity structures (Rootes 2003: 9)  is again 
largely predicated on a northern European view of hw movements and parties 
operate, without recognising that there might be other constraints leading to the 
weakness of the Spanish Greens and that the EMOs may have a different repertoire 
that is, in its own way, relatively successful and vigorous.   
 
This study therefore hopes to bring a different andequally valid perspective to bear 
on the subject. I contend that it is reductionist to infer that ecologism is ‘weak’ and 
believe that these perceptions are often based on inadvertent cultural determinism, on 
a misinformed or inaccurate picture of contemporary Spain and on insufficient 
awareness of the locus operandi of PE.    
 
Turning now to Spain’s PESM, a further assumption I would like to challenge is the 
notion that there is a clear separation between the s udy of Green parties and 
movements. Although the literature freely admits that most Green parties originated 
from the social movements (Bomberg 1998), it nevertheless marks a clear division 
between the two. Burchell (2002), for example, believes that the movement 
perspective should be abandoned and that Green parties should be studied solely as 
parties. This position may hold in the case of a party like die Grünen, but is 
questionable in the case of less institutionalised parties. This thesis will argue that the 
main political actors of  the PE movement in Spain have historically always been the 
EMOs and the broader PESM. The different Green parties – who are the central focus 
of this study – are not the sole representatives of Green politics.  This more holistic 
approach will make it apparent that the view of Spain as ‘markedly behind’ other 
European countries when it comes to Green politics does not bear scrutiny. Spain’s 
environmental problems are different from northern Europe’s but the Spanish PESM 
has been active  and has had a significant impact on society over the years.   
 
Some of the PESM’s gains have taken place at sub-national level, and yet scholars of 
Green politics, despite the fact that a number have acknowledged the importance of 
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the regional dimension (Karamichas 2004; Müller-Rommel & Poguntke 2002; 
Rootes 2003) have been slow to explore this area.  
 
Spanish ecologism has received little attention from the environmental politics 
academic community although a number of studies on Green parties have briefly 
mentioned the Spanish Greens and have highlighted Los Verdes’ negligible electoral 
support in comparison with other European Green parties (e.g. Carter 2007). 
However, such studies often omit Spain’s most successful regional ‘Green’ party, 
Iniciativa per Catalunya Verds (ICV, Initiative for Catalonia Greens). Seminal cross-
national studies on Green parties and movements have almost all omitted Spain, 
Portugal and Greece from their studies. Whilst thiswas understandable in the early 
days, when these recently democratised countries’ Green parties had only just been 
founded, the failure to incorporate these countries in more recent studies (i.e. Müller-
Rommel & Poguntke 2002; Burchell 2002; Frankland et al. 2008) is harder to 
understand. In their study of European Green parties Richardson & Rootes (1995) 
explain their choice of countries thus: 
 
Some countries selected themselves because of their s er size and their 
prominence within European political arrangements: Germany, Britain, 
France and Italy. Other countries have been included b cause of the 
distinctiveness and intrinsic interest of their exprience of Green party 
development; in this category we include Belgium, Sweden, The Netherlands 
and Switzerland. (Richardson & Rootes 1995: 2).  
 
Frankland et al. justify their omission of the Spanish Greens by stating that they do 
‘not really exist as an autonomous party at national level’ (2008: 259); however, the 
book carries an in-depth study on the Swiss Greens, a confederation of 26 cantonal 
parties, ‘now quite established as a political force’ (2008: 261).  
 
The almost exclusive academic focus on northern European Green parties and 
movements might misguidedly be attributed to the grater visibility and success of 
Green parties in countries such as Germany, France d Belgium. However, the fact 
that most of these studies include the UK Greens4 – a party (or rather parties) which 
                                                
4 Although some academics (e.g. Spoon 2009) and journalists (e.g. Ashmed 2009) refer to the ‘UK 
Greens’, no such party has existed since 1990. There ar  3 Green parties in the UK: the Scottish Green 
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until May 2010 had never won a seat in Parliament – illustrates the fact that Spain’s 
absence in these studies is more plausibly due to academics’ tendency to focus on 
familiar, already documented territory. Within Spain itself, very few academics have 
written on a topic which is viewed unsympathetically nd regarded as marginal – and 
only a handful of  these works are in English.  
 
This lack of interest means that this field has been insufficiently researched and that 
the comparative political scientist is at the mercy of secondary sources that may not 
always be reliable (there are instances of reliance on incorrect information in both 
Doherty 2002 & Carter 2007). For example, in his very brief account of the Spanish 
Greens Doherty states:  
 
While there have been some recent successes for Spanish Greens, gaining two 
MPs in national elections in 2000, it is too early to say whether this means 
that previous regional divisions have been overcome’ (Doherty 2002: 92). 
 
The unsuspecting reader would understand from this that two Green MPs were 
elected to the Congreso (lower chamber or parliament) in 2000, thus misconstruing 
the situation. In fact, the leader of CHA (Chunta Aragonesista, an Aragonese 
nationalist party), José Labordeta, was one of these two so-called ‘Green’ MPs. At 
the time, the Greens had a loose alliance with a number of left-libertarian parties, 
including CHA, but it is an exaggeration to state that Labordeta was a ‘Green’. 
Despite an affinity with Green ideas, CHA’s first priority is to give a greater 
progressive left-wing voice to the people of Aragón. Similarly, most Spanish 
ecologists at that time would disagree that the second ‘Green MP’, from Catalonia’s 
ecosocialist party (ICV, Iniciativa per Catalunya Verds or Initiative for Catalonia-
Greens)  represented the Spanish Greens. Finally, Doherty’s final throwaway 
observation about overcoming regional divisions betrays a very limited  knowledge 
of the Spanish situation.5  
                                                                                                                                
Party, The Irish Green Party (including Northern Ireland’s Greens) and the Green Party of England 
and Wales (within which the Welsh Greens have a semi-autonomous status).  
 
5 Is Doherty’s account based on academic ‘chinese whispers’? Karamichas (2001)  mentions the same 
election of two Spanish Green ‘representatives’ (N.B.: representatives becomes MPs in Doherty’s 
version),  in the context of  using their election t  counter Müller-Rommel and Poguntke’s failure to 
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A second example of the errors about the Spanish Greens that slip into scholarly 
literature is to be found in Carter’s textbook The Politics of the Environment. The 
first edition (2001) has a number of inaccuracies about the Spanish Greens but the 
second edition is commendably accurate apart from one fact: Carter states that ‘a 
national Green party, Los Verdes, was not founded until 1992’ (2007: 90). This 
assertion is wrong on two counts. A statewide Green party called  Los Verdes (LV) 
was founded in 1984, although less than  a year late the Catalan Greens had broken 
away from LV; 1992 was the year in which the Catalan Greens and LV briefly laid 
aside their differences and signed an alliance to contest the following elections 
together (the alliance lasted less than a year). Carter’s ‘error’ is understandable but 
misleading as he leads the reader to believe that there was no Green party in Spain 
until 1992.  
 
1.4.2 The story so far  
The present section will briefly review academic works dealing with Spanish 
ecologism, firstly by acknowledging their contribution to this area and subsequently 
by pointing out why further research is needed in th s area.  
 
Only a handful of studies have looked at Green party politics in Spain in any detail. 
One of the earliest was Aguilar Fernández’s (1994) article, ‘The Greens in the 1993 
Spanish general election: a chronicle of a defeat foretold’, an article which outlined 
the fragmentation of the Green vote in the 1993 Spanish general election and the 
Greens’ inevitable failure to capture more than a risible number of votes. Since then, 
Aguilar Fernández has written many publications relating to Spanish environmental 
policy but has not revisited the Spanish Greens, who ceased to be of interest to most 
Spanish political scientists after 19936. Another early study by Baras (1992) on the 
Catalan Greens also represents this academic’s only output on the Greens, written at 
a time when the party was potentially poised to make n electoral breakthrough. 
However, the 1993 results demonstrated the intraparty problems of the Greens and 
                                                                                                                                
include the Spanish Greens in a cross-national study because they have not passed the threshold of 
representation (Müller-Rommel and Poguntke 2002). 
6 However, in a 2005 publication, Aguilar Fernández and Ballesteros Pena focus on the PESM when 
they look at the Nunca Mais (Never Again) social movement which was set up after the sinking of the 
Prestige oil tanker in 2002 off the coast of Galici (north-west Spain).  
 31 
the electorate’s confusion. Interest (and, indeed, incipient support) for the Greens 
faded, commentators and political scientists realisd they had misjudged the apparent 
threat of this newcomer and dismissed it from further consideration (Interview with 
Baras, 10./12/ 2007). 
English-language literature that dedicates at least a chapter of a book or an entire 
article to Spanish ecologism can be divided into party nd movement literature. 
Karamichas (2004: a doctoral thesis), O’Neill (1997) and Holliday (1997) all provide 
a study of the Spanish Greens. All three stress the Gre ns’ lack of success which they 
attribute principally to party competition. Karamichas focuses on the competition 
between the Greens and Izquierda Unida (IU, United Left), both of which could be 
considered ‘left-libertarian’ parties.  One of the c ntral aims of his doctoral thesis is 
to demonstrate that it is almost impossible for twoleft-libertarian parties to succeed 
(Karamichas 2004: 38). Holliday also cites IU as the Greens’ main stumbling block 
but is only too aware of the regional dimension and, i eed, attaches so much 
importance to it that he goes so far as to suggest that ‘a weak national federation of 
strong and in many ways distinct regional parties is the correct way forward for the 
Spanish Greens’ (Holliday 1997: 171). However, his article is short and gives him 
little scope to develop his ideas more fully. Neithr he, Karamichas or O’Neill 
explore the regional dimension in any detail and, furthermore, all three give the 
impression that the Spanish Greens are a recognisable ingle party and the primary 
representatives of Green politics in Spain.  
 
If we turn to mention of the wider PESM in Spain, a number of scholars have 
included the Spanish environmental movements in their studies of movements across 
Europe (Eder & Kousis 2001; Rootes 2003; D.Snow et al. 2007; Kousis et al. 2008). 
On closer inspection, however, the chapters dedicated to Spain are the work of one 
Spanish scholar, Manuel Jiménez. Unsurprisingly, therefore, there is only one 
English language narrative on the Spanish PESM. A full account of his perspective 
on the Spanish PESM is provided by his book (2005) in Spanish which presents a 
strong corrective to commonplace assumptions about the environmental movement in 
Spain (these ideas also appear in a number of short articles in English, namely 
Jiménez 1999, 2000, 2001 & 2003). Jiménez’s book is extremely important because 
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it argues convincingly that the Spanish PESM, despit  inevitable constraints, has 
played an important role in the greening of Spain in that it has been a keen agent in 
the Europeanisation of Spain. His work analyses the PESM’s input into the 
environmental policy-making process and examines th different strategies deployed. 
These include a range of activities ranging  from protest actions to collaboration with 
different levels of government. His study corrects the usual cliché (common to not 
only foreign commentators but to Spaniards themselve ) that Spaniards are 
uninterested in environmental matters and, instead, indicates that PE is an important 
movement which manifests itself differently in Spain. The distinguishing features of 
the Spanish PESM are that it tends to be more local, more fragmented and more 
given to protests than elsewhere. Whereas northern cou tries – who set the norms – 
define a successful civil society as one that has numerous highly-subscribed 
associations, Spanish civil society is closer to the loose SM network: individuals do 
not, perhaps, belong to organisations in great numbers (although even the 
membership numbers are not as low as is generally believed) but will readily take to 
the streets and involve themselves in prolonged struggles to register their protest. 
Jiménez’s study is based on data collected between 1998-1997 when Spain’s leading 
EMO, Ecologistas en Acción, had not been formed. Consequently, although his study 
offers a theoretical framework for studying Spain’s PE, and provides an in-depth 
study of the movement that corrects some truisms or misconceptions regarding the 
PESM in Spain, the present study can hope to build on his empirical findings by 
bringing the history of the movements up to date.  
 
Before turning back to the three works on the Spanish Greens I would like to make 
one further observation on Jiménez’s study. His book is called The political impact of 
the social movements: a study of environmental protests in Spain, and it is therefore 
hardly surprising that he does not dwell on the Spanish Greens (*Jiménez 2005)7. 
However, the scant mention he makes of them is surpri ing but revelatory about the 
big divide that exists between the parties and moveents, not only on the ground but 
even in a scholarly context. Jiménez allots the Spanish Greens just three lines in the 
main text and a substantial footnote. He refers to the ‘absence of Green parties’ in 
                                                
7 If  I have translated a text or quote from the original, the citation will begin with an asterisk as in the 
present case.  
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Spain and the ‘lack of a strong Green party’ as one f the distinguishing features of 
environmental protest in Spain (*2005: 175). In thefootnote that summarises the  
fortunes of the Spanish Greens he refers to the fact th t two Green MPs were elected 
to the Congreso in 2004 as part of a ‘IU coalition’. In fact, it was a PSOE coalition. 
Given that Jiménez is Spanish and a political scientist, this lack of accuracy shows to 
what extent there is confusion, or indeed total indifference, on the subject of the 
Spanish Greens, even within Spain. 
 
Before ending this section, I will briefly highlight a number of aspects featured by 
Karamichas, O’Neill and Holliday which further show the need to re-appraise and 
correct existing accounts on the Spanish Greens.  
 
Karamichas’ (2004) analysis of Spanish Green parties is the most recent and far-
reaching work. His insights on the Spanish Greens are considerable and I am much 
indebted to his research (see, also, Karamichas 2001, 2002, 2007 & 2008) which, in 
fact, covers a crucially important area, namely the relationship between the Greens 
and IU. His principal aim resonates with mine in that he is keen to correct the 
assumption that the Spanish Greens’ electoral weakness stems from a lack of interest 
in environmental matters; instead, Karamichas attribu es the Spanish Greens’ 
electoral weakness to two key factors that render party competition particularly 
fraught: the factionalism that has arisen because of the regional issue and the tussle 
between the new left/left-libertarian parties and the Greens. His key thesis maintains 
that, in fact, the ‘new left’ (or left-libertarian parties – Karamichas neatly synthesises 
any marginal differences in nomenclature) is over-represented in Spain so that the 
political opportunities for a new party to achieve electoral success are therefore 
‘suffocating’ (Karamichas 2004: 8), particularly for a new political group which is 
poorly organised. The problem is further compounded by the fact that Spain has a 
dominant socialist party (PSOE) which may also be sel ctively open to acceding to 
post-industrial demands, thus weakening the Greens’ lectoral prospects even 
further. Karamichas therefore re-asserts Holliday’s (1997) thesis that potential Green 
voters have a number of alternative and more credibl  options to choose from and his 
data leads him to conclude that this key factor is the single biggest impediment to the 
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Spanish Greens achieving electoral success. Whilst I am wholeheartedly in 
agreement with him on most points, I would like to express a few reservations.  
 
Firstly, Karamichas’ obvious interest in the Spanish Greens as a ‘left-libertarian’ 
party led him to believe that the Spanish Greens (at the time he finished his thesis) 
had formed a new, and in his opinion, durable alliance with the left, and that the new 
Spanish Green party would now be called Los Verdes-Izquierda Verde. Numerous 
sources questioned have denied the existence of this party as anything more than an 
aspiration and, certainly, it is not listed as a party in the Spanish Ministry of 
Interior’s comprehensive list of parties despite Karamichas’ prediction that this 
formation would last: ‘it seems that the Spanish Greens are unlikely to change course 
after their first taste of success’ (2002: 183).  
 
Secondly, although Karamichas discusses the factionalism within the Spanish 
Greens, his account does not emphasise sufficiently the primordial importance of the 
regional problematic, nor does emphasise the fact that the notion of a single Green 
party in Spain is a fictional construct. 
   
Holliday (1997) and O’Neill’s (1997) studies are clarly quite dated by now but both 
provide a useful historical outline and analysis of the Spanish Greens. Holliday 
provides a very structured analysis of the different constraints preventing the Greens 
from achieving electoral success. Whilst agreeing with his narrative on the Greens, I 
would like to take issue with some of his analysis of the reasons behind the Greens’ 
lack of electoral success, in order to demonstrate how easy it is to confuse cause and 
effect.  
 
On the question of political opportunity structure (POS), Holliday’s article states that 
the d’Hondt electoral system disadvantages a small party with statewide support. 
Whilst this is undeniably true, it is not a sufficient reason to account for the Greens’ 
lack of electoral success: in the European elections, Spain only has one, statewide 
electoral district, which theoretically would offer a small statewide party a very good 
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chance of winning a seat. In spite of this, the Spanish Greens have never secured the 
necessary percentage of votes.  
 
Another problem listed by Holliday is one of ‘social penetration’ which he divides 
into three distinct areas: limited environmental commitment, a weak associational 
culture, and the importance given to leaders within e Spanish political tradition. 
The arguments he brings to bear on the first two areas have been refuted at length by 
Jiménez (2004) whilst the leadership issue needs to be developed to give it any 
sifnificance. Holliday’s determination to substantite his thesis leads him to use some 
evidence that does not stand up to closer scrutiny. For example, he states that ‘the 
fact that no free-standing Ministry of the Environment existed until the incoming 
Aznar government created one in May 1996’ is ‘possibly llustrative of Spanish 
environmental inactivity’ (1997: 172). Given that the UK has never had a ‘free-
standing Ministry of the Environment’, the charge se ms a hollow one.   
 
O’Neill’s (1997) account of Greens in 17 European countries (the old EU-15 
countries plus Switzerland and Norway) is an ambitious project which provides the 
reader with a broadly acceptable description of the Spanish Green’s trajectory. He 
provides a chronological account which also encapsul tes many of the problems that 
beset the Spanish Greens: the party fragmentation due to rogue parties, inter-regional 
tensions and the ‘multi-dimensional cleavage structure’ (O’Neill 1997: 253), a 
political opportunity structure that makes it difficult for a small new party to compete 
and an electorate that remains fairly polarised betwe n left and right.   
 
However, the account is very flawed (for example, a cursory examination of page 
260 reveals eight factual errors) and the chapter – despite many insights – sometimes 
betrays an imperfect understanding of Spain’s specificity. For example, on the basis 
of a quote by a Catalan Green, Jordi Bigas, he extrapolates the generalisation that 
Spanish Greens are antagonistically hostile to a ‘hegemonic’ nation-state (O’Neill 
1997: 257). Whilst it is true that Greens tend to be in favour of decentralisation, any 
Spaniard would question the validity of a generalisation about Spain emanating from 
a Catalan (the name Jordi is Catalan) and would realise that it cannot be used to 
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illustrate the position of all Spaniards. Elsewhere, there are factual errors which 
distort his account: for example, one of the quotes h  attributes to a Green activist is 
not made by a Green at all but by the leader of a rogue Green party (O’Neill 1997: 
266). Data about election results are also incorrect. In short, despite providing a good 
introductory account of Green politics in Spain, there are persistent errors which 
make the account less than authoritative. Worse still, an underlying negativity about 
the Spanish Greens permeates the discourse of the chapter on Spain (whilst the 
chapter on the UK Greens is markedly more sympathetic). One further example may 
help to illustrate why this account of the Spanish Greens falls short of  presenting an 
accurate picture. O’Neill comments in amazement on the fact that, in 1993,  
 
With more critical and socially relevant issues to address, the new party 
confirmed the prejudices of its establishment critics and prospective 
supporters alike by agreeing to abolish the national sport of bullfighting!  
(O’Neill 1997: 262) 
 
This comment reveals a lack of awareness of Spanish political culture and does not 
do justice to the Greens (in respect to bullfighting their position is coherent with their 
values and has remained constant). In fact, the semiotic significance of such a 
proposal signified the party’s commitment to a real break with the past and to the 
creation of a wholly new society and, in retrospect, showed much prescience given 
that bullfighting has now been banned in Catalonia.  
 
If I have dwelt on ‘errors’ in the previous section, my sole aim has been to point out 
that insufficient study has been done so far on the Spanish PESM. Given that many 
researchers are dependent on a small pool of primary sources (whether interviewees 
or documents) it is all too easy for a few facts or events (perhaps of dubious 
provenance) to acquire too much importance. Similarly, however, it has been difficult 
to piece together an objective study that is not reliant on a limited number of  
(partisan) sources. For example, an important Spanish book on ‘The Green Left’8 
(Valencia Sáiz 2006) came out a few years ago.  Whilst much of the book argues the 
case for Spain to opt for the ecosocialist path, the three chapters that analyse the 
                                                
8 La izquierda verde 
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Catalan, Andalusian and Balearic Greens are interesting, first-hand but highly 
partisan accounts. 
 
1.5 KEY DIMENSIONS   
 
The following section introduces some themes9 that characterise Spanish PE and 
therefore recur throughout the thesis. I have referd to them as dimensions in that 
each one provides another facet of Spanish ecologism, thus providing a broader 
understanding of the subject and, in particular, of key problems that lie at the heart of 
the Spanish PESM. The themes will only be introduce briefly in this section as they 
are discussed in greater detail in Chapters 2 and 3.  
 
1.5.1 The regional dimension 
One of the distinctive features of Spain’s political ulture is that there are competing 
or overlapping political cultures: in some respects, Spaniards share a common past 
and a similar polity, and are guided by a similar set of beliefs, values, and norms, but 
many regions in Spain also have their own specific political culture and a strong 
distinct identity. This thesis will examine the impact that the co-existence of different 
political cultures and identities has had on the Spanish Greens, and will establish to 
what extent it has also affected the PESM. 
 
A key concept towards understanding a perennial ‘regional’ problematic within the 
PESM is the significance accorded to the difference between a confederal or federal 
party/movement model. The Spanish understanding of these two terms will therefore 
be briefly examined, drawing on definitions provided by Swenden (2006:13) and 
Blankart (2007:100). In a confederation, each regional party/movement is wholly 
autonomous, has full sovereignty and receives no ‘orders from above’. Collective 
decisions must be unanimously agreed within the confederation, and a failure to 
agree with the confederation simply means that the party or movement in question 
can pull out of a confederal arrangement. The advantages of this model are that the 
                                                
9 These themes are by no means exhaustive. For example, one interesting perspective that has been 
largely excluded is the issue of the Europeanization of  PE in Spain. A small mention is made of this 
issue, but the issue has been covered in great detail by Jiménez (2005).  
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nationalist regions are less likely to be dominated by the centre (namely Madrid), 
every group is on an equal footing and that persistent serious disagreements with the 
majority view can be resolved by simply leaving the confederation. The federal 
model, on the other hand, recognises that there will be some central control; 
furthermore, collective decision-making is reached by achieving a majority 
consensus, sometimes to the detriment of a few regional parties within the federation.   
 
This thesis will argue that the regional dimension has been a key factor in impeding 
the development and consolidation of a viable Green party presence in Spain. 
However, this setback has to be set alongside the gains for Green politics or PE: some 
regional parties have, on occasions, benefited from the opportunities offered by 
‘second-tier’ politics and have managed to form alliances which have provided Green 
politics with an access to power (albeit constrained).   
 
1.5.2 The political culture dimension  
Spain increasingly resembles other European countries both socially and politically  
(Heywood 1999) and is no longer ‘different’10 (Subirats 1999:19), whilst ‘the last 
quarter of a century has seen the introduction and pparent consolidation of new 
institutions and processes which have succeeded in creating a modern, democratic 
state (Aja 2001). On the other hand, in spite of its metamorphosis, the legacy of 
Spain’s recent political past lives on, as Subirats (1999:19) admits, and the slogan 
‘Spain is different’ – coined in the 1960s to promote Spanish tourism and redolent of 
a country that has not quite managed to throw off its past – is still frequently invoked 
to admit to the country’s specificity in some regards. 
 
The lingering differences remain because, as Morán and Benedicto state, changing 
the mindset of an entire nation, or transforming a country’s political culture, is 
inevitably a slower process than adapting its institutions (1995:89), a viewpoint 
which is shared by many Spanish political scientists (e.g. Aja 2001). Chapter 4 will 
                                                
10 The slogan ‘Spain is different’ has  become a much- sed phrase to shrug off any customs or 
practices that distinguish Spain from other countries. Many Spaniards are very opposed to the 
concept, which they view as backward-looking; an equal number are proud of Spain’s distinctiveness.   
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examine to what extent Spain has a distinctive politica  culture and how this culture 
impacts on the evolution of PE.   
 
1.5.3 The social movement dimension 
Although most scholarly literature on Green parties emphasises that these parties 
originated from previously existing social movements, the academic sub-fields of 
Green party politics and social movement politics tend to focus either on parties 
(Bomberg 1998; Müller-Rommel & Poguntke 2002; Hines 2003) or social 
movements (Rootes 2003) and do not routinely recognise the symbiotic relation that 
still exists between these two groupings – a relation hat these two wings of PE are 
often anxious to play down, each for a good reason. The parties are anxious not to be 
categorised as a single issue party11 – a You Tube Green video for the UK 2010 
general election campaign illustrates the Greens’ determination to convey the 
message that their policies in all the key areas – health, education, employment, 
housing – are progressive and promote greater equality and justice (Scottish Green 
Party 2010). Most EMOs, on the other hand, stress their non-alignment to any 
political party and maintain their political independence, as demonstrated by the 
Introduction to Friends of the Earth’s (FOE) 2009-2010 Annual Report (FOE 2010).  
 
In the case of Spain, the party/movement dichotomy has been (and still is) one of the 
major sources of contention within the PESM: many ecologists are scornful of the 
Spanish Greens and this has undoubtedly been one of th  major contributing factors 
to the Spanish Greens’ electoral weakness. Neverthel ss, Chapters 4-6 will 
demonstrate that both of these wings of Spanish ecologism have contributed to 
influencing public policy.  
 
1.5.4 The ideological dimension: Red or Green 
The Spanish Greens face electoral competition from many quarters, but the other left-
libertarian party that has probably been most respon ible for the Greens’ failure to 
win over more voters has been IU. The relationship between IU and the Greens has 
                                                
11 A video for the UK Greens’ 2010 general election campaign illustrates the parties’ determination to 
convey the message that their policies in all the key areas – health, education, employment, housing – 
are progressive and promote greater equality and justice (Greens UK 2010) 
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been a tense, complex and close one from the outset. Almost since their inception, the 
Greens have been split into two camps: those who are in favour of closer alliances 
with IU and those who are opposed. Karamichas (2004) refers to this as the 
Realo/Fundi divide of the Spanish Greens, but I feel that – although it is a useful 
recognisable label – it also misses the distinctiveness of the Spanish situation: the 
divide is not purely an ideological one, but varies from one region or province to 
another, depending on three main factors: whether t Greens of that area have 
managed to maintain good relations over the years with their local IU party, whether 
an alliance between the Greens and IU really increases the likelihood of both parties 
winning a seat and, finally, whether the territorial aspect favours or complicates the 
alliance, perhaps by introducing yet another potential coalition partner or rival. 
 
Interestingly, over the years and for historical reasons more related to regionalism 
than to the Green parties themselves, gradually a ‘relevant’ and, by now, stable 
ecosocialist party has become part of the Catalan political system whereas, elsewhere 
in Spain, ad hoc alliances or coalitions with IU are p ovisional.  
 
1.5.5 The personal dimension: a family at loggerhea ds 
Kitschelt  and Hellemans contend that exogenous factors are not enough to understand 
a party’s position and that one also needs to look at the internal dynamics of the party, 
because  
 
Party politics is also based on the political biographies and experiences of 
party activists, a set of coherent ideas shared and debated within a party, and 
an organizational practice that is related to these ideas and activists (Kitschelt 
& Hellemans 1990: 7). 
 
There is a general consensus that small parties, and p rticularly weak parties, are 
plagued by ‘personalism’12, strife and ill-feeling.  
 
                                                
12 In this work, the word personalism will be used to denote the much-used Spanish concept of  
personalismo, which broadly speaking means ‘cult of personality’ as well as a culture in which 
everything becomes excessively personal.  
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In the case of the Spanish Greens, this intraparty ill-will is further compounded by 
regional tensions and by divergent ideological positi ns as to whether they consider 
themselves to be Green-Greens or Red-Greens. Although many of the most active 
militants continue to exude optimism about their party’s potential, underlying tensions 
persist. This topic will be further explored in the two chapters dedicated to Andalucia 
and Catalonia but clearly acts as a constraint on the Spanish Greens.  
 
1.5.6 The pragmatic dimension: the piecemeal approa ch  
Scholars are generally agreed (Mair 2001; Frankland et al. 2008) that the Greens will 
remain minority parties in the foreseeable future; consequently, a new ecological 
society will not be achieved through the ballot box. Given this situation, the present 
‘piecemeal’ arrangement – whereby Green parties, EMOs, NGOs, interest groups 
and the wider PESM all push for incremental change from their respective corners – 
is a real world response from PE activists who accept that a step in the right direction 
is better than no step at all.  
 
Although this multimodal approach has only brought about limited policy changes in 
the case of Spain (a situation which applies elsewhere with no exceptions), this thesis 
will argue that there has undeniably been a shift in Spanish society’s attitude towards 
ecologism, and that this has been brought about by he work of the country’s 
ecologists. Proponents of PE are part of an environmental vanguard which, I argue, is 
gaining in credibility and putting forward specific proposals which are increasingly 
being taken up by more dominant forces in society.  
 
Because the mainstream parties and wider society have coopted many of the specific 
proposals put forward by ecologists, some scholars h ve questioned the survival of 
ecologism as a movement (Diani 1995) and have pointed to a decreasing interest in 
the movement (Blühdorn 2000). However, the Spanish case does not appear to 
support these claims and this thesis argues that ecologism in Spain has, if anything, 
increased in importance over the last fifteen years.  
Spanish ecologism is likely to survive – albeit as a minority ideology – because, 
although all European governments are now legally ob iged to tackle environmental 
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problems and have therefore co-opted some Green policies and assumed a green 
mantle of environmental responsibility, the solutions proposed by mainstream politics 
clearly do not attack the root of the problem, but only some of its immediately visible 
consequences. In other words, although ecologists have achieved incremental, 
piecemeal gains through their efforts, they are only too aware that these represent 
only a small step forward. Their real challenge is to bring about a turnaround in 
values and to persuade more people that the ecologist ‘utopia’ provides a rational 
blueprint towards finding a solution to the world’s problems.  
 
1.6 METHODOLOGY AND METHODS  
 
Before outlining the methodology used by this study, it is worth drawing a distinction 
between methodology and methods. If methodology consists of ‘a study of the 
principles and theories which guide the choice of method’ (Burnham et al. 2004: 4) 
then the choice of method or methods will be determined by the researcher’s 
epistemological and ontological stance which I would like to make explicit. This 
thesis is unapologetically penned by someone who, ontol gically speaking, supports 
the philosophical position held by ecologists, although this belief is tempered by a an 
epistemology which is post-modernist and relativist. Although I have been 
painstaking in attempting to produce an objective and ccurate account of the Spanish 
PE movement, I am wholly in agreement with the contention that a value-free 
approach may be ‘logically unassailable’ but is ‘absurd’ because it appeals to reason 
but ignores experience (Gouldner 1961: 198). My starting point is based on the 
premise that a close adherence to the tenets of PE is the, for me, logical and desirable 
way to build a ‘better’ society; however, I am well aware that most people do not 
share this belief and view ‘ecologists’ as little short of cranks. This awareness 
provides a useful check.  
 
Additionally, I appreciate that, although I may strive my utmost, there may well be 
some inadvertent misinterpretation of the facts and events at my disposal. Although I 
have always crosschecked my sources (written but also oral accounts), and been 
meticulous in respecting the ‘facts’, it has been ncessary at times – given conflicting 
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accounts or versions – to make an informed choice as to the most likely 
interpretation. My account cannot match the ethnographic and highly detailed written 
(and oral) narratives provided by some Spanish ecologists; however, the latter are 
very partisan, and usually only deal with either the party or the movement. The 
possible merit of the present study is that it setsout to be objective and offers some 
broad empirical and conceptual insights.  
 
Above all, I am extremely conscious of the provisional nature of my research and 
concur with Lincoln and Guba in their belief that ‘… the conventional texts of 
scientific method … may lead us to believe the world is rather simpler than it is’ 
(2000: 184) and that no method can deliver the ultimate truth (Lincoln & Guba 2000: 
178).  
 
The considerations outlined above are responsible for my decision to reject ‘grand 
theories’. For example, although I know that previous studies on the Greens and the 
PESM have made extensive use of political opportunity structure (POS) theory as a 
tool for analysing these phenomena I have avoided  an explicit focus on POS (a 
position which I will elaborate on at the end of Chapter 2). Similarly, whilst 
conscious of numerous studies on party competition, I have not wanted to focus 
exclusively on that. The conceptual framework develop d in this thesis is more 
holistic and consists of analysing PE in Spain by looking at a number of key 
dimensions (as outlined in 1.5) This approach aims to provide a more nuanced and 
fuller understanding of PE in Spain  
 
1.6.1 A case study approach 
The thesis provides an account of Spanish ecologism fro  1970-2010, focusing 
primarily on Green parties in Andalucia and Catalonia, though also presenting the 
statewide context as well as situating the parties within the broader setting of the 
PESM. The decision to carry out a case study of PE in two regions requires 
justification. I was interested in providing a rich description of PE in Spain in order to 
address the scant attention the subject has been giv  to date and realised that a 
qualitative study including all of Spain’s green parties and movements would be an 
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excessively Gargantuan task, far exceeding the word and time constraints of this 
research.   
 
I therefore decided to examine and compare Green parties and movements in two 
different Spanish regions. I established that the usual case study research design of 
choosing two ‘most similar’ or ‘most different’ cases (Burnham et al. 2004: 77) was 
unsuitable for my purpose and opted instead to choose two cases using criteria 
described by Flyvbjerg as ‘information-oriented' (2006: 230). This study therefore 
simply provides an in-depth study of two different regions, thus highlighting the 
regional dynamic and the impact which this has on subnational political systems, 
political opportunities and hence the different Green actors. 
 
As Lijphart states, ‘comparability can … be enhanced by focusing on intra-nation 
instead of inter-nation comparisons’ (1971: 689). The use of two ‘intra-nation’ cases 
sets up a comparison which allows one to identify shared statewide variables as well 
as those which differ between the two regions. The emerging picture will help to 
refine existing theories about green parties and move ents whilst also building up a 
more complete picture of the Spanish Greens.  
 
The two cases chosen are in some respects ‘most similar’ and in others ‘most 
different’. I chose to study PE in Andalucía and Catalonia because they are ‘most 
similar’ in that they are demographically important regions, together accounting for 
33.8% of Spain’s population, with an important role to play as important sub-
national actors. However, they are also dissimilar in many ways: Catalonia is a 
prosperous northern region, industrialised, fiercely nationalistic and proud of its 
distinct identity; Andalucía, on the other hand, was traditionally the land of 
emigrants: it was – and to a great extent remains –  a, poor, predominantly 
agricultural southern region which shows few inclinat ons to sever its links with the 
Spanish state although – in keeping with recent regionalist trends in Spain – it also 
has a strong sense of its distinctiveness as a region and as a people.   
 
On the Green party front, the two regions are similar n that they have well-
established Green parties and many of Spain’s leading ecologists come from these 
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two regions. However, Greens from these two regions have historically represented 
the two sides of an ideological and strategic divide and relations between the Greens 
in these two regions are historically problematic.  
My empirical approach employs the usual case-study repertoire: observation and 
interviews; historical, interview-based and documentary analysis; and, finally, a 
secondary analysis of others’ data. I am conscious of the fact that a case study 
approach is often viewed as being subjective (Yin 1989), ‘unique and not 
representative’ (Burnham et al. 2004: 54) but have taken heart from Flyvbjerg’s 
article, Five Misunderstandings About Case-Study Research, which justifies the 
validity of case studies: he defends the need for ‘c ntext-dependent knowledge’ and, 
quoting Eysenck, argues that ‘sometimes we simply have to keep our eyes open and 
look carefully at individual cases—not in the hope of proving anything, but rather in 
the hope of learning something!' (Eysenck 1976: 9 quoted in Flyvbjerg 2006: 224). 
The case-study is also well-suited when it comes to identifying 'black swans', in 
accordance with Popper's 'falsification' thesis that you only need to find ONE black 
swan to falsify the assumption that all swans are white (Flyvbjerg 2006: 228). 
Flyvbjerg also points out that case-studies are, in fact, more likely to result in the 
falsification of preconceptions precisely because they are in-depth studies and set out 
to learn rather than to prove. In short, the case-study demonstrates 'the complexities 
and contradictions of real life' (Flyvbjerg 2006: 237) 
 
1.6.2 Data collection   
The present thesis is mostly based on qualitative data rawn from a number of 
different sources, although a quantitative element is also present, with the inclusion 
of election results that are used to track the fortunes of the different Green parties. 
 
 Primary sources  
Given this study’s central aim to observe and understand Spain’s PESM, I have made 
use of many different primary sources to collect information and  to check the 
reliability of sources by repeatedly cross-checking data and secondary accounts. The 
primary sources on which I have drawn include a number of Spanish newspaper 
archives, principally El País, which publishes daily regional editions in Andalucia 
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and Catalonia13 but also Público, El Mundo and a number of regional papers. I have 
also drawn on online newsletters and web pages published by a number of Green 
parties and movements including the Andalusian Greens, ICV, EA, Greenpeace 
Spain and other parties and movements. I also subscribe to EA’s monthly magazine, 
El Ecologista, which publishes factual and discursive articles, mostly focusing on 
Spanish ecologism and have also read each edition of the yearly ‘Annual of Social 
Movements’ which regularly carries first hand accounts by PESM activists on a 
number of campaigns (Betiko Fundazioa 2010).  I have circumspectly explored blogs 
and discussion fora which provide a fascinating insight  into the views of Spain’s 
ecologists. Although some points raised may prove t be unreliable when examined 
in greater detail, the fora provide a good opportunity to crosscheck on details and 
gain access to ongoing campaigns. In recent years I have also subscribed to the 
Facebook pages of the main Green parties and organisations I have been studying.  
 
A number of activists  have also published first-hand ccounts of their own particular 
corner of ecologism (Varillas & Da Cruz 1981; Garcí, Reixac & Vilanova 1979; 
Piulats 1992; Campomanes 1993 Marcellesi 2008). Much seful information is 
available in these works – particularly Cabal’s14 detailed albeit highly partisan history 
of the Greens (1996) – although care has been taken to crosscheck information by 
accessing various newspaper or government online sources, checking against other 
accounts or by asking a number of people interviewed to corroborate particular 
events, facts or positions. Further useful works, as yet unmentioned, are a collection  
of articles edited by Valencia Saiz (2006) on the “Green Left” – with articles about 
the Greens in Andalucia and Catalonia (amongst others) – and a very useful book on 
Andalusian ecologism (Fernández Reyes, 2005).  
 
Data has been gleaned from official government websit s – not only the Spanish 
Government Ministry of the Interior website, which has recorded general, European 
and local election results since 1977, but also the websites of regional governments. I 
                                                
13 It also publishes editions based in Madrid, the Basque Country, Galicia and Valencia.  
14 Cabal was originally in Los Verdes but left  the party in 1993 when it became a confederation. He 
formed a new party,  Los Verdes-Grupo Verde (The Greens – the Green Group), which since then has 
been the second largest group of Greens in Spain, fielding numerous candidates at each election.  
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have also frequently consulted the European Green Party Website, the European 
Environment Agency website, and have been in  e-mail and Facebook 
correspondence with a number of ecologists. Finally, I also conducted 17 interviews 
with party and movement activists or elite (listed at the end of this thesis) as well as 
having less formal chats with numerous  activists or, indeed, critics. I also had the 
opportunity to attend a couple of major meetings: the first was Ecologistas en 
Acción’s annual 2007 conference (December, Basque Country), an occasion which 
allowed me to gain first-hand experience of the organisation’s grass-roots, 
participatory structure. I observed a weekend of debates which culminated in the 
organisation’s policy decisions with respect to a wide range of issues. On the 
weekend of October 16th-17th, 2010, I also attended a weekend seminar on ecologism 
in Madrid (this brought together IU, two different Green parties, FOE, EA and 
numerous academics and trade unionists and was the beginning of a major 
rapprochement between IU and two groups of Greens).  
   
Secondary sources  
As previously mentioned, in keeping with the scarce attention which Spanish 
ecologism has attracted, academic literature in this specific area is limited. 
Admittedly, a good number of works on PE have been written since the early 1970s 
in Spain, most of them written by Spanish academics who are also ecologists (e.g. 
Garrido, Martinez Alier, Reichmann); however, by and large, these books focus on 
ecologism as  political theory and practice, but without alluding to the specifics of the 
Spanish situation; they are principally of interest a  evidence of the number of 
academics who have been writing about ecologism in Spain for some years now.   
 
Additionally, several Spanish academic ‘green’ or ‘left-libertarian’ journals have 
published quite a number of relevant articles over th  last 30 years, the most useful 
being Ecología Política (a twice-yearly journal which has been published  since 
1991) and Mientras Tanto (a Catalan-based  journal, founded in 1979. It is ‘new left’ 




1.7 THESIS OUTLINE 
The thesis consists of seven substantive chapters, which are briefly summarised in the 
next few paragraphs. Chapter 1 has provided an introduction to the thesis, and has 
established why this particular approach to PE in Spain can make a small but valid 
contribution to research and has also reviewed the few scholarly works which already 
exist on this topic. This introductory chapter has also posited two research questions, 
has outlined the aims and objectives of the thesis and has discussed  the methodology 
that will be employed.  
 
Chapter 2 focuses on the literature that underpins this study and helps to map the 
terrain that will be returned to later. The first part of the chapter looks at competing 
definitions of ecologism, determines that it is a specific if broad ideology and 
examines some of the different strands which co-exist w thin the PESM. The second 
part of the chapter looks at social movement (SM) and party theory and discusses 
some of the concepts usually employed to study parties and movements. 
 
Chapter 3 will explore several issues relating to Spain’s political culture: some of 
these are relatively unknown and require explanatio in order to understand the 
political and social life of the country. In some cases a corrective will be provided to 
generally held assumptions about Spain. Lastly, the chapter will examine territorial 
politics in Spain, firstly outlining Spain’s development from a centralist to a  quasi-
federal state. The chapter will then discuss the tensions which persist regarding the 
territorial configuration of the Spanish state and the question of national identity (in 
this context, the word national15 could refer to ‘subnational’, minority national 
identity or to ‘Spanish’ identity and therein lies much of the acrimony). The chapter 
will discuss the way in which regional identity issue  and the consolidation of each 
region’s marked political culture and distinctive institutions has impacted on the 
development and trajectory of Spain’s Green parties.  
 
                                                
15 In order to distinguish between statewide Nations a d subnations or regions that consider 
themselves to be ‘nations’, this thesis will capitalise the word Nation when referring to the statewide 
nation and will, in fact, generally use the synonym ‘statewide’. Consequently, any references to 
‘nations’, from now on, refer to regions that consider themselves to have a distinct national identity.  
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Chapter 4 outlines the history and most distinctive features of PE in Spain, focusing 
on the Spanish Greens and the environmental movements from a statewide 
perspective. This general overview will summarise th chief characteristics of the 
Spanish Greens and will set these within the context of the broader PESM. The 
chapter will outline the factors which make it hard for the Greens to be electorally 
successful but will also show that the Spanish Greens have made greater inroads than 
the literature allows. Above all, the chapter argues that the strongest proponents of 
Green politics in Spain are not the Green parties th mselves but the EMOs and the 
wider PESM.  
 
Chapters 5 and 6 focus on PE in just two Spanish regions, Catalonia and Andalucia. 
The in-depth study of both these cases uses the region as the unit under scrutiny and 
starts from the premise that, given that each region has its own Green party, each 
region needs to be studied separately in order to understand the divisions but also the 
affinities that exist between the many Green movements and parties that exist in 
Spain. The different variables outlined in Chapter 1 will be explored at regional level, 
and by the end of Chapter 6 it will be clear to what extent Andalucía's PE is in many 
ways different from its Catalan counterpart. It will be shown that PE in each region 
has been marked by the region’s own history and development, a key factor that also 
impacts on the PESM of both regions. 
 
Chapter 7 The first two sections of this concluding chapter review some of the points 
raised in previous chapters to ensure that the questions and objectives set out at the 
outset have been satisfactorily addressed and met. Section 7.3 will examine how 
some of the issues raised by the present study could have wider applicability or might 
be of interest to other scholars. In conclusion, the chapter focuses on recent 
developments within the Spanish Greens which may, perhaps, herald great changes in 
the near future. and environmental indicators 
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CHAPTER 2:  SPANISH ECOLOGISM - KEY CONCEPTS AND ACTORS  
 
One of the key aims of this thesis is to examine political ecology (PE) by focusing on 
the actors, parties and movements who subscribe to this ‘ideology’ in Spain. The 
term ideology is used, in this instance, as defined by Freeden, namely  as a system of 
‘broadly held political beliefs’ (1998: 552). The present chapter therefore examines 
some of the theories and concepts which will inform this thesis and which relate to 
PE, parties and movements.  It will begin by establishing the parameters of what this 
thesis means by PE, a term which has been defined and understood in many different 
ways by academics and ecologists (and, indeed, their detractors).  
 
Secondly, and in order to justify yet another empirical study about green politics in 
what some consider to be the end of environmentalism (Wissenberg & Levy 2004) or 
a ‘post-ecologist’ era (Blühdorn 2007), the chapter will argue that green politics has 
by no means burnt itself out: its failure to make gr ater political inroads at electoral 
level is hardly surprising given the radical nature of the Green parties’ demands and 
its marginal status, but this by no means invalidates the message or means that it  
lacks relevance. As Rootes states, the ‘increasingly impressive edifice of 
institutionalised environmentalism’ (1999:9) fails to respond to the fundamental 
demands of ecologism and the need for a PE movement has therefore not been 
superseded.   
 
The third part of this chapter draws on academic writing from an entirely different 
field –  social movement, party and green party litera ure – and uses this to two ends. 
The first subsection builds a typology of the different groups of actors who are part 
of the Spanish PESM; the second subsection looks at the Spanish Greens in the light 
of academic literature on green parties and small parties alike.   
 
 
2.1 MANY SHADES OF GREEN AND COMPETING CONCEPTS  
 
Although ‘the driving idea behind green politics – the ecological imperative that we 
need to save the planet’ (Carter 2007: 42) – has been apparently embraced by 
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governments and international organisations, the ongoing social and political 
activism of ecologists is evidence of the latter’s conviction that the present 
environmental commitment is inadequate and that more ‘radical and transformative’ 
(Barry 1999: 6) changes are needed. Greens stand for ‘the need to live within our 
ecological means’ and the belief  ‘that our present pat ern of economic development 
is unsustainable, … putting the planet and its inhabitants in grave environmental, 
social and economic dangers’ (European Green Party 2006). They also abide by 
‘three main subsidiary principles that have become the hallmark of green politics but 
are borrowed from other political (left-libertarian) traditions: participatory 
democracy, decentralisation and social justice’ (Carter 2001: 63). These principles 
underpin not only green party politics but also environmental movement 
organisations (EMOs) such as Ecologistas en Acción (EA), as the latter’s ‘Ideological 
Principles’ attest (Ecologistas en Acción 2005).  
 
However, despite a common-sense understanding of what green politics entails, there 
are many different philosophical approaches to contend with as evidenced by the 
extensive body of literature relating to PE. For some scholars (including Dobson 
2000, Eckersley 1992 and Vincent 1992), ecologism i a distinct ideology whereas 
others see it as ‘ a critical perspective’ (Connelly & Smith 1999: 54). Barry prefers to 
label it a ‘theory’, and therefore  less ‘marked bya Utopian style of critique’ 
(1999:2). This rejection of ecologism as too Utopian s also taken up by Blühdorn 
(2000), who considers ecologism to be too idealistic and no longer relevant. He adds 
that ecological discourse is ‘based on unashamedly value-laden statements about how 
the world should be organised’ and appears sometimes ‘entirely oblivious to the 
world as it actually is’ (2000: 4). 
  
Blühdorn’s position appears to overlook the fact that  the iteration of political ideas is 
routinely based on a set of normative values that advocate a particular vision of how 
the world should be. Wall, for example,  argues that it is ‘vital to have some vision of 
the future’ (1990) whilst Pepper states that ‘ecotopianism’ helps us to sharpen our 
critique of existing society and potentially acts as a catalyst for social change (2005: 
4). As de Geus points out, there is no reason to think that postulating a different 
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future is any more incoherent than, for example, Marx’s socialist vision, though it 
does go against the present zeitgeist, ‘characterized by pragmatism, postmodernism, 
and a lack of faith in … idealistic political visions’ (1999: 19). 
 
In Spain, different positions on PE also abound. A Spanish report on Spaniards’ 
citizenship and environmental awareness, Ciudadanía y conciencia medioambiental 
en España (Valencia Sáiz et al. 2010) appears to espouse a reformist approach to 
ecologism which believes that it can be accommodated within the liberal tradition 
(2010: 14-15). According to the report, an ecologist is ‘any citizen with a variable 
degree of commitment who is likely to engage variously on a number of different 
levels (moral, private and public) … and who is willing enough to help to bring 
about some form of sustainable society’ (*2010: 61).  
 
Other Spanish ecologists, however, consider PE a distinct ideology which postulates 
a more radical vision of an alternative society: in the words of a Spanish Green party 
and Ecologistas en Acción activist (*Marcellesi 2008), PE is ‘a distinct and global 
system of political thought’ which is clearly differentiated from other ideologies 
because of its anti-productivist stance and its rejection of human beings’ exploitative 
relationship with nature. Marcellesi’s insistence on PE being an ideology is 
particularly interesting given that, in the same article, he stresses the close links 
between PE and ecosocialism. In fact, he asserts that these links are so close that it is 
hard to know whether ecosocialism is a sub-movement within PE or socialism. In 
practice, there is more of a sliding scale than a gap between Valencia Sáiz et al.’s 
position and Marcellesi’s. This is one of many examples of the semantic or 
conceptual fuzziness which is part of PE.  
 
Differing opinions abound on numerous other issues. Many scholars admit to 
problems in reconciling conflicting ideas and theori s within ecologism (Dobson 
2000; Humphrey 2001; Carter 2007; Soper 1995; Blühdorn 2000). Bryner (2001), for 
example, highlights the dilemma of attempting to achieve a green society within the 
constraints of a democracy. As Goodin (1992) points out:  
 
 53 
To advocate democracy is to advocate procedures, to advocate 
environmentalism is to advocate substantive outcomes; what guarantee can 
we have that the former procedures will yield the latter sort of outcomes? 
(1992: 168)   
 
Because of such discrepancies, green politics is often accused of being incoherent 
(see Freeden 1998: 546), although this criticism ignores the fact that other ideologies 
have always included competing versions and anomalous p sitions. Ultimately, and 
in spite of (or thanks to) remorseless self-critique, a flawed but serviceable 
understanding of PE has been reached, as this chapter will demonstrate. Hajer refers 
to environmental discourse as ‘fragmented and contradictory … an astonishing 
collection of claims and concerns brought together by a great variety of actors. Yet 
somehow we distil seemingly coherent problems out of this jamboree of claims and 
concerns’ (1995: 1).   
 
The predominant view expressed by the literature is that these differences are less 
significant than they appear to be and should be viewed as the healthy and open 
debate of an ideology which is practising the deliberative democracy it believes in 
(Dryzek 2005: 112). Smith acknowledges that ‘judgements about the environment 
pull us in different, and at times competing, directions’ (Smith 2003: 3) and therefore 
also defends the need for value pluralism. This pluralist approach accepts that 
conflicts will arise because of incompatible values which can only be accommodated 
by negotiating an acceptable compromise (Smith 2003: 26-27). Carter, meanwhile, 
holds that ‘the differences between opposing wings of the environmental movement 
are more apparent than real’ (2001:34) in that their goals are somewhat similar whilst 
Freeden, who is critical of green ideology in many respects, acknowledges that there 
is ‘a distinct green ideological family’, in which he includes the eco-socialists (1997: 
526).   
 
The following sub-sections will flesh out what this study understands by political 
ecology, and will explore the different strands of this ideology, highlighting the 
position of Spanish ecologists in this respect. The analysis of some of the key 
theories and concepts will result in some working definitions which will be used in 
the course of this thesis.  
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2.1.1 Ecologism versus environmentalism 
One of the simplest ways of establishing what is meant by ecologism or PE is to 
distinguish it clearly from ‘environmentalism’: this study adopts a number of 
scholars’ (including Dobson 2000  and Bookchin 1991) use of these terms to denote 
the ideological distance separating these concepts.  The following definitions are an 
adaptation of Dobson’s ‘rough and ready distinction’ (2000: 2), first formulated in 
1990.   
  
Environmentalism argues for a managerial approach to environmental 
problems, and believes that new technology and a market-driven approach 
can solve these problems without fundamentally changing our belief in 
economic progress as the way to maximise the prospeity and well-being of 
the greatest number of people.  
 
Ecologism holds that a sustainable existence presupposes radical changes in 
our values and in our relationship with the non-human natural world, in order 
to tackle the environmental crises which threaten the survival of the planet.  
These changes can only be accomplished by a transfomati n in our social 
and political life.  
 
Table 2.1 sets out some of the binary opposites comm nly used to categorise the 
differences between ecologism and environmentalism. The most frequent 
dichotomies include the notion of a reformist (environmental, weak) perspective as 
against a radical (ecological, strong) one. Environmentalist positions are on the left 
side of the table in contrast to the ecologist position which generally coincides with 
concepts in the right-hand column; however, this simple binary table demonstrates 
that it is possible to be predominantly ‘radical’ and yet hold some reformist views. It 
would, for example, be possible to be anti-industrialist  and anti-capitalist whilst 
retaining a belief that non-human nature has a value to human beings which is more 
instrumental than intrinsic (for discussions on intrinsic versus instrumental value see 







Table 2.1: Green Binary Opposites  
Reformist (Environmentalist) Radical (Ecologist) 
Ecological Modernisation Anti-industrialism 







Instrumental value of non-human nature Intrinsic value of non-human nature 
Pro enlightenment Anti-enlightenment 
Capitalist Anti-capitalist 
Sustainable Development I (EU model) Sustainable Development II (maintain 
replacement levels) 
Shallow ecology Deep ecology 
Conservationist Preservationist 
Environmental responsibility Environmental justice 
Social responsibility Social justice 
  Light green Dark green 
Value pluralism Ethical monism 
 
For the purposes of this study, any organisation or individual that identifies with at 
least half of the categories in the right-hand column is likely to consider themselves 
an ‘ecologist’ rather than an ‘environmentalist’. This pragmatic, approximate 
approach corresponds to definitions of PE provided by many academics. For 
example, Dobson accepts the ‘real-world’ definition of a leading Spanish ecologist, 
Riechmann, who writes that PE is conditioned on a belief in the ‘limits to growth and 
a questioning of strong anthropocentrism’ (Riechmann 1997: 10 quoted in Dobson 
2000: 5).   
 
This approach ties in with Carter’s (2001: 13) view of ecologism which, along with 
many others (e.g. Dryzek 2005; O’Riordan 1981; Smith 2003 and Barry 1999), also 
emphasises the de facto pluralism of this ideology.  
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Ecologism is, and perhaps should be, informed by a wide range of value 
theories – a form of value eclecticism – each of which can contribute 
constructively to the development of an ethical framework to guide human 
behaviour towards the environment. (Carter 2001: 13) 
 
Consequently, although the terms ‘environmentalism’ and ‘ecologism’ are frequently 
used interchangeably, there is a clear difference between the two, and this needs to be 
borne in mind when looking at a PESM. Environmentalis s and ecologists often 
collaborate towards achieving a specific outcome (pr venting the building of a new 
motorway or promoting organic farming) but, whereas the first are motivated by 
discrete issues, the latter have a worldview and philosophy which touches every area 
of social, political and economic life. Whereas theimportance of environmentalism is 
now widely acknowledged by most national governments and international 
organisations, ecologism – with its call for radical v lue-changes and social and 
political transformations – remains a political vision, a Utopia that has only been 
implemented on a small (and hence insufficient) scale, either by individuals or eco-
communities. However, there are many different interpretations of this Utopian 
vision which all feed into present-day PE. The following sub-sections explore some 
of these.  
 
2.1.2 Deep ecology 
Deep ecology entails a deep respect for nature, not because of consequences that 
might otherwise impact on humans, but out of concer fo  the intrinsic value (see 
Hayward 1998) of all species and habitats as interconnected  parts of the ‘biotic 
community (Leopold 1968)’. Deep ecology holds that there is no hierarchy of value 
and that humans are no more important than animals, plants or even minerals 
(Hayward 1994: 107).  
 
This philosophical position represents the most radical end of the green ideological 
spectrum and merits consideration for a number of reasons. Firstly, it acts as a useful 
corrective to the dominant, anthropocentric view that most environmental measures  
have instrumental value and serve our interests. As Naess states, many environmental 
measures are undertaken chiefly for the benefit of ‘the health and affluence of people 
in the developed countries’ (1989: 28). Naess’ prioritisation of the ecological 
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diversity of the natural world extends to according habitats equal value to humans. In 
Spain, this view is only held by a small minority of ecologists. Arne Naess (1912-
2009), the leading early exponent of this movement, is the best-known deep ecologist 
in Spain but his work has not been translated into Spanish although a certain amount 
has been written about his philosophy (see Iglesias 2009). Nevertheless, his 
profoundly biocentric ideas mark the extreme end of a biocentric scale which does 
have some influence in Spain. In a chapter discussing environmental ethics, Garrido 
(2007: 262-263) – Spain’s first ‘Green’ MP (2004-2008) as well as a scholar – 
describes three levels of biocentrism and advocates th  least radical version, one 
which accepts self-interest and recognises the need for a slight anthropocentrism, 
alongside a respect for the biosphere and a commitment to avoid the suffering of 
other living creatures. Garrido states that most ecologists fall within this least radical 
group: in his words, the very deep ecologists are just a small sect whilst those who 
believe that all sentient beings have equal rights form a small group of animal lovers 
or animalistas, as pro-animal rights ecologists are called in Spain. Within the Spanish 
ecology movement there is certainly a fairly influential current of animalistas in 
some green parties. The following example illustrates he tensions that can arise 
because of a different level of commitment to the biocentric approach.  
 
The brown bears native to the Spanish Pyrenees werealmost on the point of 
extinction and a decision was made to re-introduce them (El País 21/11/2009). This 
decision has been controversial, leading to a number of conflicts in different areas, 
including a stand-off between two groups of ecologists in Ansó, Aragón: the local 
green party, Los Verdes de Aragón (The Greens of Aragon), are in favour of the re-
introduction of the bear whereas Ecologistas en Acción and a number of other EMOs 
are against the move (Periódico de Aragón 2010).  
 
This divergence of opinion reflects the tussle within PE between competing claims 
for biodiversity protection and social justice. Deep, biocentric ecologists such as 
Sessions (2006) are in favour of setting aside vast‘wilderness areas’ which are 
untouched by humans, whereas more anthropocentric ecologists such as Martinez-
Alier prioritise social justice (Martínez Alier 2003). Guha, for example, opposes the 
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‘portentous consequences of this obsession with wilderness’ (Guha 1994: 283) and 
cites India’s  Project Tiger which has set up  vast wildlife reserves, leaving many 
small farmers without lands or the right to use common land. Those who have 
benefited from the project are wealthy locals and rich tourists who can enjoy nature 
as yet another consumer good (Guha 1994: 287).   
 
The values of deep ecologism and biocentrism which form part of the repertoire of 
ideas embedded in many Green parties or movements co ribute to the mistrust felt 
by the general public in Spain towards ecologists. The Spanish Greens attracted 
considerable attention – largely negative – when Garrido put forward a motion in the 
Congreso in 2006, allegedly asking for gorillas to be given ‘human rights’. This 
incident exemplifies inaccurate media reporting16 which sparked a flurry of sarcasm 
and hostile responses in the public sphere, with bis ops holding forth in their pulpits 
against ‘green’ ideas. In fact, Garrido had spoken up in the Spanish Parliament about 
introducing a law in support of the Great Ape Project (GAP), which defends the 
rights of the ‘non-human great primates’, namely: ‘the right to life, the protection of 
individual liberty and the prohibition of torture’ (GAP 2010).  
 
Another position adopted by deep ecologists but which, again, is not part of the 
Spanish repertoire of PE ideas is the neo-Malthusian belief in reducing the world 
population drastically. This particular position, which has even led some deep 
ecologists to state that deaths caused by AIDS or by starvation are just Nature’s way 
of balancing the ecosystem (quoted in Bookchin & Foreman 1991: 108), led to a 
bitter counter-attack on deep ecology from a number of social ecologists, amongst 
them Murray Bookchin (1994), founder of the social ecology movement, a branch of 
political ecology which is particularly important in Spain and represented by EA, 
some other EMOs as well as a number of Spanish Green parties.  
 
                                                
16 Garrido had in fact called for gorillas to be granted certain ‘rights’. The media outcry led him to 
abandon his proposal. It was presented once again by ICV and Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya 
(The Catalan Republican Left, ERC) two years later, supported by PSOE and passed in parliament (El 
País 25/06/2008).   
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One idea associated with deep ecology which has had considerable impact in Spain is 
the notion of bioregionalism. This theory, whose principal exponent is Kirkpatrick 
Sale (1983), holds that regions should follow naturl, geographical boundaries where 
people should live in small, self-sufficient, sustainable communities. Although the 
idea is associated with deep ecology, in Spain it has been embraced by ecologists to 
support their econationalist17 position (Interview with Vilanova 2007; Garrido Peña 
& González de Molina 1997). The argument posited by these ecologists (the first 
Catalan, the latter Andalusians) is that a minority nation  constitutes the most feasible 
means of achieving a polity based on the principles of sustainability and justice. They 
contend that these nations, linked by a shared history and identity and sharing the 
same physical environment, are more likely to create n open, democratic 
government and society, based on principles of cooperation and fraternity. This in 
turn would enable them to manage their resources for the common good and to adapt 
policies to meet the specific circumstances and  needs of the territory18.  
 
Although this section has discussed deep ecology as one end of a scale that has 
shallow ecology (or anthropocentrism) at the other end, the econationalist approach 
(combining deep ecology principles of bioregionalism with nationalist claims) 
highlights the complexity of the various ideas included in PE. As Carter points out, 
the ‘attempt to draw a sharp conceptual distinction between anthropocentrism and 
ecocentrism is at best misguided, at worst, untenabl  … this simple twofold typology 




2.1.3 Ecosocialism and social ecology 
There is sometimes a certain degree of confusion when it comes to distinguishing 
these two variants of PE, perhaps because their names both stress the ‘societal’ 
                                                
17 Econationalism is similar to bioregionalism but emphasises the ‘nation’ whereas bioregionalism is 
less concerned with political matters.   
18 Garrido and González de Molina’s article on econati lism acknowledges inherent contradictions 
in this argument but considers it to be the most viable attempt to create an ecological polity, which 
would of course retain links to supranational bodies and would subscribe to the ideal of universal 
citizenship (1997).  
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(Eckersley 1992: 146), and yet they stand for two different traditions. Both versions 
are of particular interest to this thesis as a large majority of Spain’s ecologists could 
loosely be said to belong to one of these two camps. The fundamental differences 
between the two are easily defined: ecosocialism – defended by scholars such as 
David Pepper (1993, 1996, 1998 & 1999), Joel Kovel (2002) Derek Wall (1994, 
2005) and Kovel & Lowy (2001) – represents the ‘red-green’ option, and is the 
socialist variant of ecology as the name implies. It remains centred on the idea that 
capitalism is the most important contributory factor  society’s ills and that the 
capitalist system must be overthrown by political means.   
 
The deepest shadow that hangs over us is neither terror, environmental 
collapse, nor global recession. It is the internalized fatalism that holds there is 
no possible alternative to capital's world order (Kovel & Lowy 2001).  
 
 
However, unlike traditional socialism, ecosocialism largely accepts (though there are 
dissenters) that economic growth is not achievable giv n the planet’s finite resources 
as well as the need for North/South and intergeneration l justice (Riechmann 2006).  
 
In Spain, Catalonia’s leading ‘Green’ party, Iniciativa per Catalunya Verds (ICV), 
proclaims itself to be an ecosocialist party19. At statewide level, a sizeable but 
minority faction within the Eurocommunist party, Izquierda Unida (IU), claims to be 
ecosocialist and would like the party to move towards ICV’s position.    
 
On the other hand Social ecology, or eco-anarchism as it is sometimes referred to 
(Doyle & McEachern 1998), focuses principally on the need for grassroots social 
interaction to change societal patterns of destructive behaviour (EA 2005),  and 
rejects socialism as being anti-libertarian. In Spain, the main proponents of social 
ecology are Spain’s leading EMO, Ecologistas en Acción, who openly declare their 
affiliation to social ecology. Spanish Greens from the Green-green parties also 
consider themselves to adhere to the ideas of social ecology (Marcellesi 2008).  
 
                                                
19 Their slogan states in Catalan: ‘ICV, d’esquerres i ecologistes de debò’ (ICV, left-wing and real 
ecologists).   
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Naturally, the differences between social ecology and ecosocialism are not always 
clear-cut and there is no clear divide between these two positions which, in practice, 
share many beliefs and a similar de facto position on many issues. For example, the 
notion of ecocentrism  is anathema to ecosocialists, who are anthropocentric and 
identify humans, and the many societal problems which beset them, as their primary 
concern (Pepper 1993: 224). This does not preclude ecosocialists from attaching 
value to nature (Pepper 1998:2) but the value they attach is unashamedly 
instrumental. They are hostile to what they regard as the quasi-mystical overtones of  
deep ecology which are much in evidence within  some Green parties. On this 
particular issue, ecosocialism takes a similar position to social ecology.  
 
Both eco-socialism and social ecology constitute anthropocentric … strong 
sustainability: being essentially humanistic but also embracing stewardship of 
nature, environmentally benign but centred on social justice (Pepper 1998: 1) 
 
  
Both social ecologists and eco-socialists – in other words, all of Spain’s ecologists –  
agree on the need to prioritise the environment but otherwise hold varying  stances. 
The following pages try to illustrate the multiplicity of diverging opinions by 
examining two sets of binary concepts – Marxism/anarchism and anti-capitalism/anti-
industrialism – that help to differentiate ecosocialists from social ecologists. 
 
Anti-capitalism versus anti-industrialism  
According to ecosocialists, a truly environmental society will only come about by 
defeating capitalism (Riechmann & Fernández Buey 2006), which will always act in 
the interests of the few, exploiting both labour and the planet’s resources in the 
pursuit of financial gain (Wall 2005). Many social ecologists concur: ‘Capitalism can 
no more be persuaded to limit growth than a human bei g can be persuaded to stop 
breathing’ (Bookchin, 1990: 93–4).  
 
However, some social ecologists reject this stance and are reluctant to lay the blame 
at the door of capitalism, citing the appalling environmental situation in the former 
Eastern European Soviet satellite states to illustrate the fallacy of thinking that 
abolishing capitalism is the answer.  These ecologists therefore prefer to point the 
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finger at industrialism (Dryzek 2005). Garrido, an cademic and a leading figure in 
Los Verdes, concurs with the ecosocialists in blaming western industrial capitalism 
for the environmental crisis (2007: 31) but his criti isms are more muted, and he 
simply denounces a capitalism which promotes ‘infinte growth’ (Garrido 2007: 36) 
without ruling out the transformation of capitalism.  
 
The rationale for taking an anti-industrialist stance varies. Some ecologists  are 
anxious to demarcate themselves clearly from the Marxist, anti-capitalist stance.  
Others have reluctantly accepted the fact that capitalism is an inherent part of a 
liberal democracy and is here to stay (Carter 2007: 76). They consequently believe 
that the only way to achieve policy changes is by meeting the capitalists on their own 
territory and persuading them that it is in their own interest to change tack (Porritt 
2005: 96). This approach, which accepts that capitalism and sustainability are not 
mutually exclusive is the realpolitik, ‘piecemeal’ position taken by many Green party 
activists who are seeking  office and (frequently) an accommodation with other 
parties.  Ecologists who  are reconciled to capitalism therefore prefer to be anti-
industrialist, a position which allows them to be against nuclear power, for example, 
as well as the despoiling of natural surroundings. This position can easily lay its 
proponents open to the accusation that they are merly conservationists, although if 
their anti-industrialism is extreme it would be more accurate to say that they are deep 
ecologists.  
 
The anti-industrialist stance is therefore inimical to ecosocialists and social ecologists 
because of its consonance with deep ecology. It places the preservation of  nature 
over and above the need to create a sustainable but also fairer society for the human 
beings who should be the primary actors.  
 
In Spain, the two most influential organisations working within the PESM, ICV and 
Ecologistas en Acción (EA), are avowedly anti-capitalist: the first, ICV, is an 
ecosocialist party (Gomà & Rius 2006) whilst the second is a movement that 
subscribes to social ecology. An example of their anti-capitalist stance is the fact that 
both ICV and EA called on their members to vote against the EU’s Constitutional 
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Treaty, on the grounds that it was enshrining neo-liberalism as a core value of the 
European Union. This logical line of action, in keeping with the anticapitalist 
founding principles of both organisations, was not adhered to by the Spanish Green 
parties which followed the European Green Party’s pro-Constitution line, albeit for 
pragmatic reasons.  Whilst both ICV and EA explicitly refer to their anticapitalist 
ideals,  the Andalusian green party, Los Verdes de Andalucía (LVA) , does not 
explicitly denounce capitalism:  
 
Work and production must be adapted to meet the real n eds of the 
population, avoiding the exploitation of people and of nature.  (Article 1, 
LVA Statutes 1989) 
 
Although the Spanish Greens regard themselves (and are regarded) as being ‘left-
wing’, their reluctance to take an explicitly anti-capitalist stance leaves them open to 
criticism (the same is true of numerous other Green parties) and leads critics like 
O’Connor (1994) to suspect ‘many or most greens’ who, according to him, ‘dimiss 
socialism as irrelevant’ or ‘attack it as dangerous’ (1994: 163-164).  
 
However, the dividing line between strong and mild opponents of capitalism is less 
hard to ascertain: ICV and EA collaborate routinely with different bodies and operate 
within capitalist parameters whilst many Greens are opposed to capitalism. A good 
example of this convergence of opinions on the matter is illustrated by a relatively 
recent movement which has taken Spanish ecologism by storm. This is the “de-
growth” movement (Latouche 2004; Taibo 2009) which advocates a scaling down of 
the industrialised world’s economy, production and consumption as an urgent 
measure to address the problem of sustainability and social justice and is much 
debated in ‘alternative left’ circles in Spain. Both he social ecologists and the 
Spanish Greens subscribe to this movement and elements within ICV and IU are also 
sympathetic to the notion.  
 
Socialism versus anarchism   
A deep-seated tension which exists between ecologists and eco-socialists is the 
anarchist/socialist divide.  Many eco-socialists are suspicious of social ecologists and 
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view them as nimby-ish liberals whilst social ecologists are suspicious of the eco-
socialists’ ‘water-melon’ hues (green on the outside and red inside).  However, the 
differences are not just about where to position oneself on the right/left axis.  
 
Eco-socialists retain a strong belief in the power of states and government control. 
Their view is that transnational environmental problems can only be tackled on a 
world scale, and that this requires careful global coordination, something which 
bioregional, local communities would be unable to organise (Pepper 1993: 227):  
 
However, they also concede that the ultimate aim – once ‘coordination has been 
achieved – is to create a more decentralised society’ (Pepper 1993: 51).  For 
example, another ecosocialist, Kovel, wants to promote collective ownership of the 
means of production as well as restoring the commons (Kovel 2002).  Ecosocialists 
are environmentally committed but nevertheless continue to see politics as being 
essentially about the class struggle. In other words, they are still using the tools of 
Marxist critique.  
 
 Social ecologists are essentially anarchist in their outlook and call for a libertarian 
approach in which government is kept to a minimum –  people are perceived as 
being better able to live a satisfactory and fulfilling life the more autonomy, 
decision-making powers and grassroots government they have. Social ecology 
promotes direct democracy, confederal politics, rejects hierarchy and wants to move 
towards a world in which people reconnect with nature, and live freer and more 
creative lives (ISE 2009). They are opposed to large governments elected through the 
party system, though they are prepared to go along with local politics as this can 
enable local communities to govern themselves.  
 
Ecologists such as Eckersley (2004) and Naess (1989) do not subscribe to either the 
Marxist or anarchist view of ecologism: although they welcome decentralisation and 
grassroots action and decision-making wherever possible, they strongly believe that 
the nation state retains an important role in establi hing a green governance. 
Furthermore, the last ten years have seen the growing importance of the concept of 
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‘ecological citizenship’ (Dobson 2003) which also transcends either approach, 
calling for both a societal ‘rights-based’ approach and an ecological commitment 
from individuals in order to achieve a sustainable society.  
 
The Marxist/anarchist dichotomy within Spanish PE springs from the origins of the 
environmental movement in the late 60s. As Karamichas states, when they started 
out there was ‘both a Marxist and an anarchist current in Spanish ecological thought 
and praxis’ (Karamichas 2007: 283). Both of these trends persist within both the 
PESM and the Green parties and, despite the distinction between these two 
ideologies becoming very blurred in practice, the two labels are routinely used by 
one faction to voice disagreement of an opposing faction within the broader PESM.   
 
The following section examines sustainable development (SD) and ecological 
modernisation (EM), two concepts and strategies that are now firmly embedded as 
environmental policy-making tools within the EU and beyond. However, despite the 
existence of these environmental tools, this section will demonstrate why Green 
politics remains relevant.    
 
 
2.2 IS THE GREEN IDEA POLITICALLY DEAD ?  
 
This question, taken from an article by The Guardian’s environmental correspondent 
(Vidal 2005), voices the widespread perception thatecologism has perhaps run its 
course. Although ‘no one doubts that green thinking has changed the face of 
European and international politics since it joined the political arena 40-odd years 
ago’ (Vidal 2005), critics of Green politics argue that the major parties’ co-optation 
of some of the PE agenda means that there is no further role for Green parties.   
 
However, ecologists contend that green ideas have been subverted and diluted by 
governments who have embraced a light green environmentalism through their 
“commitment” to sustainable development and ecological modernization (Giorgi & 
Redclift, 2000). A number of ENGOs and EMOs are increasingly collaborating with 
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the administration, providing know-how to implement vironmental policy changes, 
but this does not obviate the need for a more radical political approach. As van der 
Heijden states (1997), ecologists’ collaboration with the authorities merely adds a 
few green touches but has no impact on a society tha  continues to pursue economic 
growth and increased material prosperity.  
 
Vidal argues that minority support for PE is hardly surprising given that its ‘stated 
intention is not just to achieve power but to totally reform human governance to fit 
the constraints of the biosphere … the point of green politics is to challenge the status 
quo, and question what traditional parties might term "progress", or "growth" or 
"prosperity"’ (Vidal 2005). Because no other ideology advocates this radical 
message, green politics is still relevant.  
 
The following two sections will look at ecological modernisation (EM) and 
sustainable development (SD), two environmental theories which perfectly illustrate 
the tension between ecologism and environmentalism as it plays out in the 
environmental strategies promoted by governments and organisations. An analysis of 
EM and SD will demonstrate why ecologists contend that environmentalism (the co-
optation of a few environmental ideas, often originati g from the pioneering work of 
ecologists themselves) is insufficient and why ecologism still needs to push for a 
radical transformation of society.  
 
2.2.1 Ecological modernisation 
The term ecological modernisation (EM) ‘is used to refer to the pragmatic, policy-
oriented and anti-ideological approach to environmetal issues that superseded the 
anti-modernist as well as the leftist-revolutionary (ecologist) approaches typical of 
the 1970s and early 1980s’ (Blühdorn 2000: 191). EM is the cornerstone of many of 
the ‘sustainable development’ measures implemented by governments and industry, 
and is based on the notion that economic growth is not only compatible with 
environmental protection but that there are synergies between the two. It is seen as a 
win-win situation, offering an industrial rather than an anti-industrial solution. As 
one of the early scholars of  this theory enthused:  ‘the dirty and ugly industrial 
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caterpillar transforms into an ecological butterfly’ (Huber 1985 cited in Mol & 
Sonnenfeld 2000: 236).  
 
The theory is that this transformation can be achieved by developing new, 
environmentally-efficient technologies along with a range of policy instruments such 
as voluntary agreements, eco-audit and management systems and environmental 
fiscal measures (Baker 2007: 299). However, the insufficiency of the EM approach 
has been demonstrated repeatedly. In their study on New Labour’s  incursions into 
this area,  Barry and Paterson demonstrated that EM strategies were only considered 
viable as a tool to enhance the competitiveness of the UK economy  (2004: 779). 
 
Despite the transformative aspirations and ecological motives of some EM 
advocates, EM has been welcomed by governments as an innovative income 
generator.  The result is ‘green capitalism’ with no ‘fundamental reassessment of the 
need for the products of these processes’ (Connelly & Smith 1999: 58).  
 
The introduction of  EM – a prime example in the Spanish case being windpower – 
falls short of satisfying most ecologists because of the way in which it is 
implemented, premised on the need to be competitive rather than to be ecologically-
driven. As Hajer says (1995: 4), ‘Is ecological modernization to be understood as the 
materialization of the original ideas of the environmental debate in its early stages, or 
does it signify the collapse of critical discourse?’ The question is not rhetorical, and 
has no easy answer. Many ecologists are promoting EM, and providing the necessary 
expertise to further its development. In many cases, the outcomes certainly constitute 
a ‘step in the right direction’.  However, others ague that this ‘massive surrender to 
ecological modernisation’ (van der Heijden 1999: 203) is so shallowly reformist that 
it hardly qualifies as pertaining to ecologism.   
 
The Spanish authorities have been quick to seize upon EM as a way of optimising 
the country’s economic position, obtaining EU financi l help and gaining credibility 
for their efforts. One simple example of the benefits of EM is the authorities’ 
widespread promotion of  drip irrigation systems which minimise water use. Spain 
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has also seen the market benefits of organic produce and now leads organic farming 
in Europe in terms of the number of hectares given over to organic farming (SINC 
2010). However, Spain’s record on organic farming is contradicted (ecologically-
speaking) by the fact that more GM crops are grown in Spain than in any other EU 
country. 80% of the EU’s 2009 GM maize was grown in Spain (CECU 2010). 
Furthermore, Spain is by no means Europe’s ‘leading or anic producer’ when 
measured by different criteria: 7% of Spain’s farming land uses organic methods, a 
percentage that compares favourably with the UK (4%) but unfavourably with a 
number of East European countries and, particularly, Austria (18.5%) and Sweden 
(12.8%) (Eurostat 2010).  
 
A report in the Observer by Tremlett (2009) also illustrates EM’s use as an economic 
instrument rather than an environmental one. A small town in northern Spain is now 
wealthy as a result of numerous concessions granted to landowners to set up wind 
farms. This resulted in bribes to the town council and a boom in the construction 
industry so that the ‘5,000 residents now share thre museums, a theatre, a bull-ring 
and a gleaming sports and swimming centre’ (Tremlett 2009). This case is an 
extreme one, but by no means an isolated one, and exemplifies the present 
disconnection between EM and a ‘real’ ecological soluti n which would entail a 
‘stronger’ form of EM, such as that advocated by Connelly and Smith (1999). Whilst 
critical of EM as presently applied, they propose a form which would include a 
process of political, economic and social change called ‘reflexive modernisation’ 
(Beck 1992:162). This would comprise measures to reduc  consumption, to 
encourage deliberative public engagement, and would entail a critique and cultural 
transformation of society (Christoff 1996).  
 
Pepper (1999) also acknowledges that EM is a technocratic project but believes that 
at least it sets a few ground rules for business. The discourse surrounding EM 
advocates a climate of dialogue, partnership and shared responsibility, with industrial 
self-regulation, and these are all to be welcomed. However, he points out that while 
these measures have been progressively introduced under the auspices of the EU, the 
EU has concurrently been promoting the Trans-European Network System, a model 
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of unsustainability with increased capacity in all forms of transport, road-building 
programmes, more high-speed trains, and increased energy demands.  
 
As the above considerations demonstrate, the concept of EM exemplifies the gap 
between an environmental and an ecological approach. Despite its potential to 
contribute towards a more sustainable society, at present EM provides partial, 
technological solutions to a few areas in order to increase competitivity and profit. 
There is, however, no commitment to addressing enviro mental problems 
holistically: the problems are seen as merely technological, whereas ecologism views 
them as part of a broader political and social problem.  
 
2.2.2 Sustainable development 
The other concept which exemplifies the difference between environmentalism and 
ecologism is sustainable development (SD). Bryner highlights the difficulty of 
knowing what is meant by SD by pointing out that there are 70 competing definitions 
( 2001:22). This ubiquitous concept took root in 1987 when the Brundtland report 
defined SD as ‘development that meets the needs of the present without 
compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs’ (WCED 
1987). The report is in favour of strong EM and of economic growth, but with 
provisos. Economic growth is welcomed as long as it does not involve the 
exploitation of others or the overexploitation of finite resources (WCED 1987:). The 
report enshrines five core principles of SD (Carter 2007: 218-225): equity within and 
between nations; democracy and participation; the precautionary principle; policy 
integration; planning.  
 
 Susan Baker (2007) describes the report as ‘authoritative’ but accepts that the 
policies promoted in the European Union (EU), a world ‘champion’ of SD,  cannot be 
considered ‘sustainable’: this is because the majority f the EU’s policy makers 
(apart from the Environment Directorate) are still engaged in ‘business as usual’, 
promoting policies that will maximise the EU’s economic growth.  SD is  therefore 
‘an essentially contested concept’ (Hayward 1994: 97) that has become increasingly 
devoid of meaning because of the co-optation of the term.  
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[SD] is a political fudge: a convenient form of words which is sufficiently 
vague to allow conflicting parties, factions, and interests to adhere to it 
without losing credibility (Richardson 1997: 43).  
 
Richardson’s own view of SD is based on the belief that ‘the pursuit of wealth 
through industrial expansion and economic growth is ultimately incompatible with 
the Earth’s finite resource base. Consumption should be based on human need rather 
than on human greed’ (Richardson 1997: 45).  
 
Although the institutionalisation of SD could be said to have eviscerated the radical 
potential inherent in the term SD, there is also a more nuanced argument which 
should be considered. Baker (2007) acknowledges that the EU’s commitment to SD 
is merely a ‘declaratory commitment’ (2007: 298) but argues that this has a symbolic 
purpose: by constantly reiterating its commitment to SD, the EU is forging an identity 
of how it perceives itself and wishes to be perceived by others. This, in turn, opens up 
the possibility of social change and moving the EU towards a position on SD which 
is more ecologically sustainable. Carter (2007: 213) recognises the ‘ambiguity 
surrounding the meaning of sustainable development’ but, after some deliberation, 
opts to ‘celebrate’ the ‘fluidity of the concept’. He considers that ‘its “all things to all 
people” quality has helped the message to resonate around the world and to attract 
followers to the flag’(2007: 217).  
 
Ecologists’ cooperation with EM and SD projects is a double-edged sword: on the 
one hand,  both present opportunities to introduce more environmental measures; on 
the other hand, these discrete measures cannot deliver the new society which 
ecologists are striving towards. 
 
The first two parts of this chapter have drawn on academic literature to examine 
competing notions of what is meant by ecologism, as political theory and praxis. The 
following section looks at Spain’s ecologists and, once again, makes use of scholarly 





2.3 ENVIRONMENTAL ACTORS  IN SPAIN   
 
The following section provides a typology of the different groups which make up the 
environmental movement (EM) in Spain and briefly examines some key concepts of 
social movement theory which have informed this thesis. There  is no attempt in this 
thesis to generate new theory about social movements and green parties but rather to 
make use of multiple theories which can co-exist and help towards increasing one’s 
understanding of Spain’s PESM. For example, Rootes’ thesis (2003: 8) that countries 
with flourishing EMOs tend to have weak Green parties and vice versa in no way 
contradicts Kitschelt’s (1988: 219) finding that there is a negative correlation 
between successful new left parties and Green parties: in other words, that a country 
is highly unlikely to have both a ‘significant’ (4% at national or presidential 
elections, according to Kitschelt) Green party as well as a new left party. Kitschelt’s 
theory ignores the impact of movements on parties whereas Rootes’ ignores the fact 
that Green parties and movements both contribute to he dissemination of PE. The 
compartmentalisation of both these theories presents a  incomplete picture of the 
situation. In fact, Rootes’ and Kitschelt’s theories complement each other and point 
towards a third micro-hypothesis that will be explored in this present study: namely, 
that the success of Spanish EMOs is linked to the fact that there is a sizeable pool of 
left-libertarians who share much of the Spanish Greens’ ideology but are unable to 
identify with the strategies and organisation of the Green parties.    
 
 
2.3.1 The Spanish environmental movement  
The term environmental movement (EM)20 is used here to refer to everyone who is 
actively interested in environmental matters: it includes ‘broad networks of people and 
organisations engaged in collective action in the pursuit of environmental 
benefits’(Rootes 1999: 2). The interest may be confined to one or several issues only, 
and may or may not include adherence to ecologism as an ideology or set of beliefs. In 
short, all ecologists are environmentalists but not all environmentalists are ecologists.  
 
                                                
20 Depending on context, EM can denote ecological modernisation or environmental movement.  The 
acronym will be avoided wherever the meaning is unclear or ambiguous.  
 72 
The link between the PESM – a smaller group of activists and supporters of PE – and 
the broader movement should not be disregarded. As Jordan and Maloney (1997:28) 
point out, ecologists welcome fellow travellers in order to swell their numbers in 
support of specific campaigns. As a result of their involvement with a PESM 
network, a number of these fellow travellers may learn more about PE and gradually 
make the transition from environmentalism to ecologism. 
 
Table 2.2  categorises the different organisations which, between them, cater for all 
of Spain’s environmentalists and ecologists.   
 
 Table 2.2 A typology of the different components o f the Spanish EM 






Policy change often 
concentrated on  




and non-conventional; may 
include direct action 
All ecologists and 
environmentalists 
including, for 
example, trade union 
groups, members of 
non-green parties 
etc) 






(spontaneous protest and 
demos; direct action) 
The ecologist NSM : 
an ad hoc collective  




partisan; conventional  and 
non-conventional (lobbying 
media, government and 
direct action). Participatory  
Ecologistas en 
Acción  






Policy change often 
concentrated on  
single or limited 
issues 
Non-parliamentary; non-
partisan; conventional  and 
non-conventional (lobbying 
media, government and 
















elections whilst maintaining 
grassroots links 
All of Spain’s Green 
parties 
  Source: Adapted from typologies by Bomberg (1999: 22), and della Porta &  
  Diani    (1999: 14)  
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Clearly, such a typology works with theoretical constructs to provide an approximate 
interpretation that ignores the considerable overlap between the different groups. An 
approximate representation of the different actors is therefore set out in  Figure 2.1.  
 
Figure 2.1  Environmental Movement (EM) Actors 
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                                                                            Green Parties 
                                                                            EMOs    
                                                                            ENGOs 




2.3.2 The PESM 
The term PESM will be used to denote the ecological str nd of what are commonly 
termed the new social movements (NSM). Within the ext nsive literature on NSMs, 
there is some consensus about the key characteristics of  these movements: they are 
generally defined as post-1960s grassroots movements advocating a new set of 
values and lifestyles that could be labelled ‘progressive’ (as opposed to, for example, 
a racist movement, which could be classified as a social movement but not as an 
NSM). They call for change through direct action – this includes not only public 
collective action but also a personal commitment to changes in lifestyle (Jordan and 
Maloney 1997: 48). The emphasis on lifestyle contributes to the sense of collective 
identity which is one of the key features of NSMs. They are a ‘collectivity of people 
united by common belief which is shared by core memb rs and represents their 
ideological bond’ (Dalton & Kuechler 1990: 278).  
 
NSMs focus on problems linked to  industrialisation (della Porta & Diani 1999), are 








rise in postmaterialist values (Inglehart 2008). However, the NSM’s links to 
postmaterialism have been contested by many (e.g. Carter 2007: 95; Martell 1994: 
125) who disagree with Inglehart’s methodology; others argue that concern for the 
environment could be considered a materialist issue. In the case of Spain, whilst it is 
true that a ‘postmaterialist’ attitude (associated with greater self-expression, freedom, 
acceptance of non-conformity, tolerance) is one of the hallmarks of the PESM, a 
sizeable minority of followers are arguably not ‘postmaterialists’ but simply anti-
materialist. The reasons for this are twofold: on the one hand,  both catholic and 
anarchist traditions in Spain were arguably partly esponsible for the nascent 
ecologism of the 1970s:   
 
those who have cut themselves loose from religious moorings search for a 
new sense of community and social organisation that goes beyond modern 
liberal individualism’ (Kitschelt & Hellemans 1990: 107).   
 
On the other hand, the many years of economic hardsip which followed the Spanish 
civil war meant that in the early 1970s, when the PESM began to take root, most of 
the population still had material needs. Their ecologism was, in fact, more akin to 
what Martinez Alier has termed ‘the ecologism of the poor’ (1995) (this ‘materialist’ 
approach to ecologism is dealt with more fully in Chapter 3). Whilst this situation 
has changed substantially over the last 30 years, quite a number of Spain’s 
‘ecologists’ either belonged to this earlier generation or have been influenced by the 
same perspective.  
 
NSMs are further characterised as ‘informal action networks’ of people with ‘shared 
beliefs and solidarity’ (della Porta & Diani 1999: 14). They are complex and informal 
networks which do not constitute a single ‘organisation’ (della Porta & Diani 1999: 
14) but rather an amorphous collection of (sometimes inter-related) individuals who 
share a collective ideology or impulse, and in many instances are not even formal 
members of any group.  Social movement activists or adherents often belong to a 
number of distinct groups which are part of the same (or related) social movement  
(della Porta & Diani 1999: 120). This of course contributes to the interconnected 
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network of shared people/ideas/events and  is why it is possible to talk of a single 
‘social movement’.  
 
These ‘networks’ are so informal, so diffuse and in co stant flux that they defy any 
attempt to provide an accurate portrayal of the movement in its entirety. However, an 
analysis of the interconnections between discrete groups within the network can 
provide a partial picture of the whole movement.  Pacifism, anti-nuclear activism, 
feminism, gay liberation and environmentalism are some of the movements 
described as NSMs. Each of these has a distinct identity and sphere of interest, 
although there is likely to be considerable overlap between the different NSMs. 
(della Porta & Diani 1999). 
 
In the context of this thesis, therefore, the Spanish PESM represents a collective with 
a shared identity, shared values, and a commitment to political ecology that will lead 
them to undertake collective action as a form of sel -expression, consciousness-
raising and an attempt to bring about specific changes. Some of this collective action 
may involve protest action, but much of it will invol e signing petitions, writing 
letters and even engaging in internet activism. There is no obligation to belong to an 
organisation. The term therefore includes not only many ‘freelance’ greens, members 
of alternative collectives, ‘de-growth’ advocates and anti-globalisation movements 
but also the supporters or members of EMOs and Green parties. In the words of a 
Spanish ecologist who, on occasion, has aligned himself to a Green party:  
 
The Greens and the ecologist movement are two of the actors who must help 
to give birth to a new era characterised by sustainability, equity, gender 
freedom and equality, an era that looks after present and future generations of  
both the industrialised and the developing world (Santamarta et al. 2003).   
 
The PESM also includes many ENGO actors, particularly in the case of an 
organisation such as Greenpeace. Although the organizational structure of the latter 
and its instrumental aims do not fit in with the core principles of political ecology, in 
practice the overlap between many Greenpeace supporters and EMO supporters is 
considerable. A similar situation applies, for example, to ecologists working within 
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the Spanish trade unions, often in charge of the union’s policies relating to climate 
change and the environment. In both these cases, th question of whether one 
chooses to include the organisation within the PESM is irrelevant; certainly, there are 
individuals working within both these types of organisations who would consider 
themselves – and are acknowledged to be – ecologists. A well-known example of 
this is Jorge Riechmann who has written numerous books n ecology. He is actively 
involved in many different networks relating to the environment, collaborates with 
the communist trade union CC OO on environmentally-re ated matters, is on the 
board of Greenpeace Spain, and an activist in both EA and a movement called 
Izquierda Anticapitalista (the Anticapitalist Left) (Riechmann 2011).   
 
Like many Spanish ‘ecologists’, Riechmann has maintained a distance from the 
Green parties. This is also the case with many other w ll-known or respected 
ecologists some of whom, at one time or another, stood on the Greens’ electoral lists 
but have ceased to align themselves with such a problematic party. In short, the 
Greens’ strategies are often viewed with mistrust by the wider movement even 
though their legitimacy as ecologists is unimpeachable, as Chapters 4-6 will 
demonstrate. Despite this mistrust between the Spanish Greens and the EMOs, in 
practice the informal links are considerable because ‘ecologists’ tend to collaborate 
on numerous issues, and frequently belong to the same social networks.  Any 
analysis of the Spanish Greens therefore needs to understand their role as part of the 
PESM.  
 
However, the Spanish Greens should not be seen as symbolising Green politics in 
Spain, which is more accurately represented by the PESM with its clear political as 
well as  social function.  An increasing number of academics (and citizens) are 
questioning, or have already rejected, the notion that politics is the domain of 
politicians and parties. Increasingly, social movements are seen as ‘an essential 
element of normal politics in modern societies’, given ‘that there is only a fuzzy and 
permeable boundary between institutionalized and non-i stitutionalized politics’ 
(Goldstone 2003: 2).  The importance of social movement politics is widely 
recognised (Castells 1998; Guibernau 1999; della Porta & Tarrow 2005) with 
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protests, lobbying and playing to the media becoming increasingly routine. In short, 
in the pursuance of a more democratic, empowered grass-roots approach, and given a 
general disenchantment with professional politicians, movements can be an effective 
– or alternative – way of bringing about incremental changes or shifts in policy.  
 
In Spain, the importance of the EMOs as political actors overshadows that of the 
Green parties, which are generally considered to have a negligible presence or impact 
(though, it will be argued, this heuristic approach overlooks some of the evidence)21.  
 
It is also important to bear in mind the changing nature of the PESM since the 
movement first started. As Grau and Ibarra state whn talking about the work of the 
Spanish PESM (2006), whereas the role of the movement 30 years ago was to alert 
society and governments to their lack of environmental awareness,  that moment is 
long gone. Governments and civil society are only too aware of the ecologists’ 
message, and have indeed adopted a similar discourse themselves. The ecologists’ role 
has therefore changed: instead of raising awareness, their role is to remind society to 
fulfil the commitments they have undertaken.  
 
Although the Spanish PESM generally conforms to characteristics advanced by 
scholars (Dalton & Kuechler 1990; della Porta & Diani 1999; Carter 2007; Kriesi 
1995) when describing NSMs,  it has followed a different pattern in terms of its 
evolution, thus resulting in a movement which is sui generis.  
 
For example, Bryner refers to the fact that ‘movements typically last 20 to 30 years’ 
(2001: 13) before losing their freshness, dissipating their energy and becoming 
increasingly institutionalised. Bryner’s statement does not hold true in the case of 
Spain where the PESM has been operating for over 30 years. Ecologistas en Acción, 
the country’s leading EMO,  has certainly become a more structured organisation but 
retains its freshness and energy.  
 
 
                                                
21 Müller-Rommel’s review of the fortunes of European Green parties cites 12 countries, without 
mentioning Spain (2002: 1) 
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2.3.3 EMO or ENGO 
The term EMO is used by a number of environmental scholars (e.g. Rootes; Jiménez) 
as a synonym of NGO but referring to organisations that are specifically focused on 
environmental issues. However, the term ENGO is also used, apparently to define 
the same kind of organisation. This thesis will, however,  draw a distinction between 
ENGOs and EMOs. 
 
Diani and Donati’s analytical framework (1999) highl ts two key issues that help 
to categorise NGOs (the only organisation they refer to): resource mobilisation and 
political efficacy (Diani & Donati 1999: 15-17). In their view, an organisation has to 
either mobilise financial resources (this requires fund-raising activities and 
professional management) or mobilise support from vlunteers/activists. Secondly, it 
must also choose the most efficacious route to bring about policy change: it will do 
so by favouring the use of either conventional or dis uptive tactics. A combination of 
these variables leads to a simple typology, as outlined in Table 2.3, that helps to 
characterise most NGOs (and EMOs):  
 
  Table 2.3 Diani and Donati’s four types of  socia l movements 
 
The public interest 
lobby 
WWF managed by professional staff. Has 
low participation and uses 
traditional pressure tactics. 
The participatory protest 
organisation 
Earth First! emphasises participatory action, 
sub-cultural structures and 
disruptive protest. 
The professional protest 
organisation 
Greenpeace combines professional activism and 
mobilisation of financial resources 
with use of confrontational tactics 
alongside conventional ones. 
The participatory 
pressure group  
Friends of the 
Earth 
involves rank and file members and 
supporters but uses conventional 
pressure techniques.   
Source: table based on Diani & Donati 1999  
 
Rucht also provides a typology of social movements’ strategies and further 
differentiates between power-oriented and identity-oriented groups (1999:163). 
Given the many different types of organisations, and the fact that the dividing line 
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between them is hard to determine, the present study has opted to simplify the 
categories even further, with the view that an impressionistic simple categorisation is 
perhaps more useful. It will therefore allocate theerms ENGO and EMO two 
distinct meanings which are particularly valid when describing Spain’s 
environmental organisations: the term ENGO will refe  to non-participatory, 
professional, power-oriented organisations with a top-down management structure 
(such as Greenpeace or WWF) whereas EMO will refer to participatory, identity-
oriented, bottom-up organisations. Whereas the first could be an interest or pressure 
group which focuses on one specific area (e.g. WWF’s remit is confined to animals 
and their environment) and is not necessarily part of he political ecology social 
movement, EMOs are driven by ecologism and are therefore at the core of the 
PESM.  
 
In Spain, there are a number of groups which fit into one or other of these two 
categories, the two main ones being Greenpeace and Ecologistas en Acción. The 
latter will be discussed in Chapter 4, and will be shown to epitomise a participatory 
pressure group which combines conventional and non-conventional tactics and 
largely focuses on problems within Spain. Greenpeace, on the other hand, is a 
decidedly professional and international organisation, with the characteristics of a 
‘protest business’ (Jordan & Maloney 1997) rather than a movement. However, the 
differences should not be exaggerated. Greenpeace Spain has recently set up 
networks of local activists in order to increase it connection with sympathisers.  
 
2.3.4 Green Parties 
The present section outlines some of the party and Green party literature that has 
informed this thesis. Focus on the regional dimension of party politics – a central 
theme of this thesis – is not entered into here but will be discussed in Chapter 3.  
 
Sartori’s classic definition states that ‘a party is any political group identified by an 
official label that presents at elections, and is capable of placing through elections, 
candidates for public office’(Sartori 1976: 64). This denies the legitimacy of many 
parties which never, or hardly ever, gain representation and consequently the present 
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study prefers to adhere to Pedersen’s (1982) lower bar ier as to what should be 
considered a ‘party’:  
 
an organization – however loosely or strongly organized – which either 
presents or nominates candidates for public elections, r which, at least, has 
the declared intention to do so’ (Pedersen 1982: 5).  
  
Spain’s Green parties will therefore be considered parties despite the fact that many 
of them have never won a seat: they are, after all, registered as such, compete in 
order to win votes, seek office and influence policy – and occasionally enjoy a 
modicum of success, as will be discussed in Chapter 4. Furthermore, their status as 
part of a recognisable family of parties strengthens their claim to be regarded as bona 
fide parties.    
 
Inglehart declares (2002: vii) that there is a ‘virtually limitless’ amount of literature 
on Green parties, a view corroborated by Deschouwer (2008: 2). Certainly, 
environmental scholars (including Bomberg 1998 and 2002; Carter 2007; Doherty 
2002; Kitschelt 1989 1990; Müller-Rommel 2002; Richardson & Rootes 1995; 
Frankland et al. 2008) have provided a useful analysis of Green parties in different 
European countries. Their studies demonstrate that European Green parties share a 
recognisably common ideology, identity and repertoire of strategies as well as a 
similar approach to the internal organisation of the party. These similarities are 
hardly surprising given that many Green parties modelle  themselves on the German 
Greens and belong to the EGP. 
 
Briefly, Green parties arose out of grassroots enviro mental movements coupled 
with a new left-libertarian or ‘new’ politics (see Poguntke 1987 & 1993; Kitschelt 
1989) which was pacifist, anti-nuclear, ‘feminist’, called for global justice, the 
elimination of poverty and a fair distribution of the planet’s finite resources. Green 
parties’ origins were defined as post-materialist (Inglehart 1981), and rejected the 
relentless pursuit of economic growth. On the party political front, the Greens called 
for a new style of participatory, non-hierarchical democracy. Far from being single 
issue parties, as they are commonly portrayed, the Gr ens’ programme was 
comprehensive, advocating specific policy changes in every area: these changes 
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emphasised the importance of a strong, welfare state, he redistribution of wealth, 
solidarity with minorities and with all the world’s inhabitants, both in the present and 
in the future.   
 
Green parties began as ‘anti-parties’ or movement-parties (Bomberg 1998:3) that were 
started by groups of actors within the PESM (in the 1970s and 1980s) because of a 
perceived need to contest elections. Their goals (see Table 2.2) were twofold: electoral 
success provided the party with access to power and legitimacy for the political 
ecology movement. If they failed to obtain representation, they retained a testimonial 
presence that gave greater visibility to PE.  
 
However, from its inception the Green party attracted considerable criticism from 
certain quarters of the PESM, which saw party political power-seeking as ‘fatally 
compromised’, ‘grounded in vested interests’, and still committed to ‘pursuing 
economic growth and allowing market forces full rein’ (Hayward 1994: 191).  
 
Governments and parliaments were believed to lack the power to address the 
most urgent issues relevant for the survival of mankind … Why, then, try to get 
into government? While parliamentary representation might provide a suitable 
forum for making green ideas and demands known to a wider public, 
participation in government would at best change very little; at worst, it might 
merely serve to legitimise the continuation of the Old Politics of growth, 
militarism, exploitation of the third world and pollution’ (Poguntke 2002: 133) 
 
These sentiments were particularly pronounced in Spain (Fernández 1999) when the 
Spanish Greens were first created and they continue o carry considerable weight. 
 
The party/movement debate (a heated ‘Green’ topic in the 1980s) is generally 
thought to have lost the importance it once had. As Bomberg and Carter state: ‘Few 
activists now seriously debate the merits of seeking parliamentary representation as a 
means of achieving Green objectives’ (2006: 99). However, this does not hold true 
for Spain where the Greens are still viewed by many ctivists within the PESM with 
great hostility: in addition to the reasons outlined above, this could also be attributed 
to ‘cross-pressure’(Toka 2003), i.e. the notion that m ny activists have conflicting 
political interests (i.e. divided loyalties as socialists, nationalists, IU supporters). By 
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supporting an EMO rather than a Green party, they ar  able to maintain their dual 
identification and be part of a wider PESM.   
 
Green party and social movement literature is divided on the issue of whether Green 
parties are part of the broader social movement. Even the question of what 
constitutes a party is open to interpretation. Jordan and Maloney (1997: 68) argue 
that the difference between movements and parties is imperfectly distinct and that, 
‘contrary to culturalist interpretations, no categorical distinction can be drawn 
between social movements, pressure groups and parties. Social movements are best 
understood in terms of a continuum stretching from informal network-like 
association to formal party-like organisations’ (ibid: 61).   
 
Rootes (1999:2) indicates that ‘parties, particularly g een parties, are not in principle 
excluded’ from the wider PESM whereas della Porta and Diani view parties as being 
part of the system of parliamentary, organised democracy, which is what the 
movements are there to oppose (della Porta and Diani 1999:242). The latter 
argument does not take into account that a maverick representative within the 
parliament is effectively being ‘oppositional’ and that his input could therefore be 
welcome to PESMs (as was the case when two Spanish Green MPs were in the 
Congreso during the 2004-2008 government). Furthermore, the presence of Greens 
at any level of government gives green ideas a broader political platform: at the very 
least, this constitutes a piecemeal gain in that some f these ideas may go on to be 
co-opted by other parties.  
 
Since they first made an appearance, many academics have thought that Green 
parties would prove to be a ‘flash party’, doomed to disappear (Bramwell 1994). In 
their work on linkages, Lawson and Merkl stated that t e Greens’ prospects were 
poor as they address interests only held by a small inority (1988: 12). They argued 
that once the major parties realised that the issues in question had acquired a certain 
salience which could lose them substantial support, they would adopt the necessary 
green measures in order to restore linkage (Lawson and Merkl 1988: 36). Despite 
these predictions, Green parties appear to have increased their presence (albeit 
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modestly) in many European countries. However, they remain a minority party and 
still fail to attract a number of people who might be sympathetic to Green ideas but 
who are alienated by problematic issues or contradictions which characterise these  
parties.  
 
Green party literature has addressed a number of issues or problems relating to the 
structure, organisation and strategy of these parties. A few of these issues, where 
particularly  relevant to the Spanish Greens, are introduced here but will also be 
revisited later on in the course of this thesis.  
 
Green party formation 
Lucardie's (2000) theory on parties as 'prophets, purifiers, prolocutors or personal 
vehicles' (the Greens are ‘prophets’) pinpoints three factors which are necessary to 
the foundation and success of a new party: a political project which addresses 'social 
problems considered urgent by a significant number of voters' (2000:176); resources 
such as 'members, money, management and mass media exposure' (2000: 175); and 
finally, a favourable political opportunity structure (POS). The Spanish Greens do 
not meet most of these criteria and it is therefore unsurprising that they have failed to 
establish themselves as a national party of some substance: the problems they 
address are only considered urgent by a tiny minority (although this situation also 
prevails elsewhere); the Spanish Greens are also woefully low on financial and 
human resources. On the question of POS the situation is slightly less negative. 
Although the electoral system makes it almost impossible for the party to gain 
representation at statewide elections, the electoral system for the European elections 
is entirely proportional, and the regional and loca elections potentially offer an 
easier entry point to smaller parties.   
 
Nonetheless, and in spite of a few electoral successes, the Spanish Greens’ position 
resembles that described by Lucardie: 'many prophetic parties … never enter 
parliament but die at its doorstep' (2000: 178). They build a 'proto-party' but fail to 
evolve into a political party of any standing. As Lucardie states (ibid: 179), proto-
parties can instead become political pressure groups, political clubs, think-tanks 
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outside the party system, or even constitute a faction within an existing established 
party. Given the number of green parties that exist in Spain, and the different 
strategies they pursue, it could be said that they ave variously, and at different 
times, chosen all of these options. Since the party was founded in 1984, it has 
constantly re-formed and continues to ponder its identity or future development.  
 
Green party organisation  
As Doherty states, the Greens ‘have failed in practice to live up to all the ideals of 
grassroots democracy’ (2002: 115). The praxis of political life has led many Green 
parties to accept the need to act decisively and swiftly by having small, tight groups 
of well-informed, professional politicians. They have also accepted the need for 
professional marketing, networking with the ‘enemy’ and other similar activities. In 
spite of this capitulation, Frankland et al. demonstrate empirically that the Greens 
have managed to avoid becoming a professional-electoralist party (2008: 5). Instead 
they have evolved from an ‘amateur-activist’ to a ‘professional-activist’ party, in 
other words retaining the ‘democratic paradigm’ (2008: 260). In the case of the 
Spanish Greens, the activism remains an essential component but the amateurism has 
been replaced by a semi-professionalism born out of some access to power and the 
institutionalisation of Green party leaders who have become well acquainted with the 
electoral system.  
The Spanish Greens still suffer from a set of organisational problems that more 
successful Green parties have overcome. Two studies, in particular, have helped to 
situate the Spanish Green party’s organisation within a wider framework. Kitschelt 
and Hellemans’ (1990) study of the Belgian Green parties and Kitschelt’s 
comparison of German and Belgian parties (1989) afford numerous insights into the 
organisational structure  of green parties. For example, they refer to the prevalence of 
‘stratarchies’ or small factions within many green parties, each with their respective 
leaders, and consequently endless personality clashes and internal conflicts over 
strategies. Kitschelt (1989) also stresses that party leaders with no chance of being 
elected tend to be ideologues who accept the need to work through the main parties 
because no other avenues of influence are available (Kitschelt & Hellemans 1990: 
408). They adopt a ‘logic of constituency representation’ which leads them to pursue 
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strategies that maximise policy impact rather than seeking votes in the short term. 
Pragmatists, on the other hand, are more focussed on obtaining representation at any 
possible level of government and therefore adopt a ‘logic of party competition’ 
(Kitschelt and Hellemans 1990:  18).  
 
Further insights regarding party organisation from these two studies have been 
invaluable in helping to situate the Spanish Greens in a comparative framework.  
 
Green party strategies 
Spanish Greens differ in their objectives: they either seek office, election, policy 
change or to strengthen the party’s identity. Their strategies, or means of achieving 
these objectives, have therefore differed substantially over the years and have been a 
source of intraparty and interparty conflict. The decisions taken by individual green 
parties as to which direction to pursue can, initially, be tenuously arrived at but can 
go on to have a lasting influence on the development of that party. As Kitschelt 
states, ‘… a party’s past strategies and policies influence the recruitment of activists 
and the strength of intra-party groups (Kitschelt 1989b: 408). The Spanish Greens 
are a clear example of path dependency in that theyappear to be locked into 
‘processes that are … unable to shake free of their history’ (David 2000: 19).  
 
Gunther defines Spanish political parties as ‘modern electoralist’ parties and further 
divides these into different categories: catch-all, programmatic, and personalistic 
parties (2005: 259). According to this theory, a ‘programmatic’ party, such as the 
Spanish Greens aspire to be, needs to remain ‘committed to a specific ideology or set 
of program priorities over several elections’ if it is to ‘command much greater 
loyalty on the part of its voters than … the more ephemeral catch-all party’ (Gunther 
2005: 260). Unfortunately for the Spanish Greens, although their core ideology and 
priorities have been coherent over the years, their strategies to achieve electoral 
success (their constantly changing alliances with a variety of political parties with 
intermittent periods in which they have stood alone) have in fact obscured their 
ideology as they have slid in many cases into being a ‘personalistic’ party: is it 
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possible for a party to seemingly maintain the same ideology but share a political 
platform with IU, PSOE and nationalist22 parties?  
 
Differences as to which strategic approach to adopt have been particularly 
problematic. The party/movement dichotomy has already been addressed, and the 
next few pages briefly outline the green/red-green dichotomy and the ‘fundi’/‘realo’  
dichotomy.   
 
The Greens and the Left 
A number of influential studies by Kitschelt, Poguntke and Müller-Rommel clearly 
define the Greens as ‘new politics’ or ‘left libertarians’ and, by and large, most 
academics have now come round to the view that the Gre ns are decidedly a left-wing 
party (Doherty 2002).   
 
Kitschelt coins the use of the term left-libertarians to cover both ‘new left’ and 
ecology parties, sees the two as sharing many charateristics and therefore scarcely 
distinguishes between the two – although he implicitly acknowledges there is a 
difference: he suggests that Green parties appeal to ‘more ideologically moderate’ 
voters’ (1988: 219), a view shared by many commentators. Müller-Rommel (1999) 
classifies Green parties in Europe according to whether they are prepared to make an 
accommodation with a social democratic agenda or are firmly opposed to it: by and 
large, although there are exceptions, the Greens are more disposed to collaborate  
whereas he reserves the term ‘new left’ for the radical alternative left which is not 
prepared to compromise with capitalist parties. In Müller-Rommel’s view there is 
therefore a clear difference between these two strands of left-libertarianism but this 
assessment, and Kitschelt’s, are of course generalisations that do not take account of 
the specificity of different manifestations of left-libertarianism in a particular country.  
 
It is undeniable that Greens and the New Left – chiefly represented in Spain by IU and 
ICV – share ‘programmatic outlooks and electoral constituencies’ (see Kitschelt 1988: 
                                                
22 Chapter 3 offers an explanation for this use of the word ‘nationalist’ which is used to designate 
‘regional’ parties which consider themselves to be representing a distinct ‘nation’ and therefore reject 
being designated as ‘regional’.  
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195). Kitschelt makes no mention of the single clear difference between the two, 
namely the fact that the Greens’ ideology is explicitly based on ecologism. In Spain, 
the boundaries between IU and the Greens are unclear, with some Greens calling for a 
programme which is closer to IU’s, and a faction of IU advocating ecosocialism and 
degrowth (Latouche 2004).   
 
Another point which needs to be clarified with greater precision is the question as to 
what is defined as ‘left’. Kitschelt and Müller-Rommel’s definitions clearly refer to 
what March and Mudde refer to as a ‘democratic socialist party’, i.e. parties such as 
IU that are ‘to the left of social democracy’, that ‘ ccept parliamentary democracy but 
retain a radical commitment to systemic transformation, usually through a 
commitment to grassroots democracy and (especially) through a rejection of 
capitalism (March & Mudde 2005: 34) – although, as h  been shown, some Greens 
rejection of capitalism is not unequivocal.   
 
However, when other scholars mention the Greens’ accommodation with the ‘left’ 
(e.g. Environmental Politics, Volume 11, a series of articles on the Greens in 
government) they are referring to the social democrats. It is important to distinguish  
between these two different alliances with the ‘left’, in the Spanish case at least: a left-
libertarian alliance (between the Greens and a ‘democratic socialist’ party like IU) is 
ideologically coherent; by contrast, there is a far greater gap between the Greens and a 
large social democrat party (like PSOE).   
 
Despite predictions to the contrary, over the years the Greens have increased their 
share of the vote across Europe but there is a general consensus that they no longer 
‘play a significant role within the radical left ofEurope’ (March & Mudde 2005: 33). 
In Spain, the relationship between the Greens and IU has been a long and difficult 
one, but has (so far) led to the creation of Cataloni ’s ‘successful’ ecosocialist party 
ICV. Elsewhere, IU and the Greens maintain d hoc alliances in a number of regions, 
but both parties have seen their share of the vote decrease. Despite a pool of left 
libertarian voters, neither alternative left party is prospering. In Spain, IU – 
previously ‘successful’ – is struggling for survival. This suggests one of two possible 
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outcomes: IU and the Greens will either have to reslv  their many differences and 
form a party similar to IU’s sister party in Catalonia, ICV or alternatively, both 
parties are likely to remain as ‘proto-parties’.  
 
Realo or Fundi  
Another strategic dilemma for Green parties, and liked to the previous one, is 
whether to retain their independence  – thereby streng hening the party’s ideological 
identity – or whether to accept that politics is ‘the art of the possible’. The conflict 
which played itself out in die Grünen between the radicals (Fundi) and the 
pragmatists (Realos) has been well documented by numerous scholars (includi g 
Doherty 2002; Carter 2007; O’Neill 1997) and was eventually ‘won’ by the Realos. 
In a similar way, many of Spain’s green parties have opted for strategic alliances 
with a number of parties. As Poguntke explains in hs article on Greens in 
government, cooperation with a majority party is more effective than holding out 
ineffectively for a fundamental transformation of politics and policy, although a 
Green party can still make it clear that ‘Green policy objectives go far beyond the 
rather limited reforms that are possible under the constraints of coalition 
government’ (Poguntke 2002: 144).  
 
A small party 
A key problem facing green parties everywhere is the uncomfortable truth that they 
are ‘permanent minority parties’ (Duverger 1959) and, at best, ‘can only expect to 
play a relatively minor role in coalition government since their growth has had clear 
limits everywhere’ (Poguntke 2002:137). All of Spain’s Green parties (apart from 
ICV) are in an even less favourable position and could be designated a ‘flop party’ 
(Mustillo 2006), i.e. a  new party which never gains more than 1% of the vote and 
lasts no more than 4 election cycles (although according to this definition, Spain’s 
green parties have lasted 5 election cycles and therefor  no longer belong in this 
category).  
  
Given their survival, it would perhaps be more correct to characterise them as niche 
parties. Adams et al. argue that, as niche parties, n ither the Greens nor the left-
libertarians can afford to moderate their policies without losing some of their 
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supporters who have precisely chosen this small party because of its specific 
ideology. Thus, ‘ideological stability may actually be an optimal vote-seeking 
strategy for niche parties’ (Adams et al 2006: 515).   
 
One of the most problematic aspects for the Spanish Greens as niche parties is that 
they are considered single issue, environmental, parties. Given their limited 
resources when campaigning, they have to weigh up the impact of focusing on their 
perceived core distinctiveness or risk diluting this message by campaigning on issues 
that accentuate their  similarity to IU.  
 
In spite of the limitations of size – even successful Green parties think that their 
ceiling can never rise above 10% – it is important to remember the importance of 
pivotality (Bolleyer 2007) and the party’s coalition potential. This has afforded some 
of the Spanish Greens a certain measure of success until now.  
 
Yesterday's party  
Without a doubt, the Greens’ increasing institutionalisation and the passage of time 
has dulled the party’s message and image across Europe. They’ve lost their ‘glamour 
and innocence’ (Frankland et al. 2008: 3), and as Doherty states:  
 
The old utopianism and confrontational critique has gone from most Green 
parties, and with it much of the excitement’ (Doherty 2002:120) 
 
Green parties who get into government as part of a co lition are viewed as a 
pragmatic, ‘realist’ party which has abandoned any notion of pushing for a radical, 
paradigmatic policy change (Rüdig 2002: 79, speaking of die Grüne). In Catalonia, 
where ICV has been a minority player in a regional government coalition since 2003, 
its credentials as a ‘green’ and ‘new left’ party seem irredeemably tarnished to many 
from the PESM.  
 
A number of scholars have commented on the fact that the Greens’ problem with 
trying to attract more voters is further compounded by  a downturn in conventional 
politics (Richardson 1995: 121; Katz and Mair 1995; La Palombara 2007; Dalton and  
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McAllister 2007: 139). This phenomenon is apparent in Spain where new single 
issue ‘parties’ have sprung up to oppose the party system. 
 
The Spanish Greens are therefore in an apparently impossible position: their 
ideology is as a radical as ever but their accommodati n with the political 
establishment is likely to alienate many ecologists or the anti-globalisers who 
perceive the Greens as being power-hungry, no different from other politicians and 
far too ready to compromise. The Green party has failed to capitalise on any initial 
appeal it might have had, and potential new voters now have a range of alternative, 
protest-vote parties to choose from. Given these circumstances and the persistently 
weak identity of the parties, their future trajectory seems problematic. 
 
Chapter 2 has drawn on a number of scholars to examine a number of key concepts 
and themes that are central to understanding political ecology in Spain. The themes 
have included the following: an examination of the difference between ecologism and 
environmentalism; multiple definitions of ecologism; sustainable development and 
ecological modernisation as two concepts that highlight the ambiguity of 
environmental discourse; a typology of different PESM actors and key issues relating 
to green party literature. Before moving on to Chapter 3 the chapter will end with an 
apologia which will outline political opportunity structure (POS) and the reasons why 
this thesis decided not to use this analytical framework rigorously.  
 
 
2.4 CIRCUMVENTING THE ‘WINDING, SNARLING VINE ’  
 
Goodwin and Jasper’s reference to political opportunity structure (POS) as ‘a 
winding, snarling vine’ (1999: 28) is just one of the many criticisms made regarding 
a theory (model or concept) which is routinely alluded to in most studies on Green 
parties and movements. As mentioned in Section 1.6, this thesis does not make 
explicit use of political opportunity structure (POS), and the decision to circumvent 
POS undoubtedly springs from a desire not to become involved in the heated debates 
and semantic deliberations surrounding POS. However, th  rationale for this decision 
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needs to be justified given that POS is regarded as a standard tool for analysing 
social movements and parties.  
 
This section begins by looking at some of the literatu e on POS, and highlights the 
range of divergent interpretations as to what this concept includes. Subsequently, it 
defends the decision to analyse Spain’s Green parties and movements without 
making explicit use of POS, although it acknowledges its indebtedness to many 
discrete concepts and ideas which feature in the POS literature.  
 
2.4.1 Multiple interpretations of POS 
The introduction of the term POS is sometimes attribu ed to Eisinger (1973)23 – see 
Kriesi (2004: 69) – but had in fact ‘already found some currency in urban sociology and 
politics through Greer and Orleans’s (1962) article’, as Rootes points out (1999b:5). 
Subsequently, it was taken up by numerous scholars, in particular sociologists including 
Tilly (1975 and 1978), Gamson, Tarrow (1983, 1989 and 1994), and particularly 
McAdam (1982), who regarded themselves as ‘structuralists’. McAdam, in particular, 
is credited with being the pioneer of political process theory (PPT), a theory which 
‘recognises a central role for opportunity in the emergence of collective action’, the 
other two ‘essential ingredients’ being ‘organisational readiness and insurgent 
consciousness’(Buechler 2010: 62). 
 
The emergence of POS as an analytical tool in the late 1970s provided sociologists 
with a new framework to analyse SMs by taking into account the political context 
within which they operate. At that time, this new approach represented a real 
innovation in the study of social movements and colle tive action which, until then, 
had ignored the impact of exogenous factors. POS quickly became the dominant 
paradigm in SM theory, as evidenced by many seminal studies which explicitly used a 
                                                
23 Eisinger (1973 in McAdam1996: 23)said that POS is ‘the degree of openness of a political system 
to the social and political goals and tactics of social movements.’ According to Rootes (1999), 
Eisinger only mentions POS once.  
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POS model (e.g. McAdam 1982; Kriesi et al. 1995; Kitschelt 1986; McAdam et al. 
1996b; Brockett 1991).  
  
However, the POS framework was interpreted somewhat differently by the numerous 
researchers who each established their own POS approach. Rootes takes most of the 
POS theorists to task about their ‘stretching’ of the POS concept. Rather than 
analysing variables that can be viewed as ‘genuinely structural’ they also, as Rootes 
states, include others ‘which are contingent or simply conjunctural’ (1999: 7). Even 
scholars such as McAdam (but see also Kriesi et al. 1995; Diani and Van der Heijden24 
1994) include dimensions of POS that could be considered not to be ‘genuinely 
structural’.  McAdam identifies four dimensions of POS: (i) the relative openness or 
closure of the institutionalized political system; (ii) the stability of or instability of that 
broad set of elite alignments; (iii) the presence or absence of elite allies; (iv) the state’s 
capacity and propensity for repression (McAdam 1996.:26- 27)25.  Items iii and iv are 
not ‘structural’ in the strictest sense of the word. Instead, they represent what Tarrow 
has defined as ‘consistent – but not necessarily formal or permanent – dimensions of 
the political environment’ (1998: 76-77).   
 
A definition provided by McAdam, Tarrow & Tilly  once again indicates that their 
conception of the structural is less strict than Rootes’.   
 
'Political opportunity structures are … the formal organizations of 
government and public politics, authorities' facilitation and repression of 
claims-making by challenging groups, and the presence of potential allies, 
rivals, or enemies'.    (McAdam, Tarrow & Tilly 1996: 24) 
 
By the mid 1990s, although many scholars had taken gr at trouble to define their 
multiple understandings of POS, the term itself had become ubiquitous and was 
routinely inserted in numerous works which did not specify what they understood by 
this term, which began to be used somewhat indiscriminately, making no distinction 
                                                
24 Diani and Van der Heijden  restrict the term ‘political opportunity structure’ to ‘the legal-political 
framework that any movement has to confront when making its claims … variables that may be 
expected to remain relatively stable, at least in the mid term..: the openness of political and legal-
administrative institutions and the number of actors in a given polity’ (1994: 368).  
 
25 Kriesi et al. (1995) use a similar modified version of this concept 
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between POS, simple political opportunity and PPT, which was of course a far wider 
framework.  
 
The popularity but pervasiveness of the term was so widespread that Gamson and 
Meyer wrote:  
 
The concept of political opportunity structure is in trouble, in danger of becoming a 
sponge that soaks up virtually every aspect of the social movement environment – 
political institutions and culture, crises of various sorts, political alliances, and policy 
shifts.… It threatens to become an all-encompassing fud e factor for all the conditions 
and circumstances that form the context for collectiv  action. Used to explain so 
much, it may ultimately explain nothing at all.(Gamson and Meyer 1996: 275).   
 
However, this did not prevent them from pointing out that the media should be another 
component of POS, thereby  adding another ‘fudge factor’  (Gamson and Meyer 1996: 
287). A number of further dimensions have also been added by different scholars: 
Lucardie (2000: 175) includes socio-economic and cultural conditions, Koopmans 
states that ‘opportunity … generally refers to constraints, possibilities, and threats that 
originate outside the mobilizing group … Structural characteristics of political 
systems, the behaviour of allies, adversaries, and the public; societal "moods"; 
economic structures and developments; cultural myths and narratives— all of these 
can be sources of mobilization opportunities’ (Koopmans 1999: 96).  
 
McAdam, McCarthy and Zald’s key work on social movements is  only too aware of 
the multiple definitions surrounding POS, one of the central themes of this book.   
 
Scholars have defined or interpreted the term differently, applied it to a 
variety of empirical phenomena, and used it to address an equally wide range 
of questions in the study of social movements. This lack of consensus is 
clearly a problem (McAdam, McCarthy and Zald 1996: 25).  
 
Despite the book’s rigorous attempt to ‘bring more analytic clarity to the concept’ 
(McAdam, McCarthy and Zald 1996: 26), its implication that POS or ‘political 
opportunity’ (the distinction between the two is somewhat blurred by most scholars)26  
                                                
26 Rootes  refers to POS as a ‘concept in retreat’ (1999: 13),  and points out that although Tarrow used 
the term POS in the first edition of Power in Movement (1994), by the second edition (1998) most of 
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had  become a ‘hegemonic paradigm’ offended two academics who subsequently 
published a critical article on POS (Goodwin and Jasper 1999: 28). Goodwin and 
Jasper’s central objection to POS (or PPT, politica opportunity27 ) was that   POS’s 
structural bias played down and misinterpreted cultura  and social factors; 
furthermore, the concept was ‘muddled’, ‘tautological, trivial, inadequate, or just plain 
wrong’ (1999: 28).  
 
A number of scholars (Tarrow, Tilly, Koopmans, Meyer) wrote articles defending 
their positions and, in turn, dismantling Goodwin ad Jasper’s objections. These 
articles constituted the opening chapters in a work edited by Goodwin and Jasper 
(2003) which spans numerous viewpoints on POS, from the structuralist to the 
constructionist or socio-cultural approach.   This book was published at a time which 
seems to have been a turning point for POS. By 2004, the general consensus in The 
Blackwell Companion to Social Movements was closer to the following position, as 
outlined in a chapter from the latter book on feminism: 
Current social movement theorists define opportunity structures as comprising 
temporally stable elements, both formal institutional arrangements as well as 
cultural patterns and expectations, in addition to dynamic elements of shifting 
alignments and policy windows interpreted through issue cultures, public 
discourses, and media frames.  (Marx  Ferree & McClurg Mueller 2004: 588)    
 
As della Porta and Tarrow state, the structural approach has dominated the study of 
social movements for the last 30 years, has ‘reoriented the field to the study of 
organizations, networks, power and politics,’ and le  to useful empirical findings. By 
now, however, the POS/PPT approach might ‘be approaching the limits of its 
usefulness’ (della Porta and Tarrow 2005: 5).  
 
In short, POS is a slippery and contentious concept which is often used 
indiscriminately (Rootes 1999:1); in the right hands, it can be a useful tool which 
                                                                                                                                
the discussion on POS simply refers to ‘the concept of olitical opportunity (Tarrow 1998: 76-7 in 
Rootes 1999: 13).  
27 Although Goodwin and Jasper berate POS scholars for confusing these three terms, they 
occasionally fall into the same trap.  
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allows one to compare a few rigorously defined variables in order to try to determine 
how exogenous factors impact on social movements (and, by extension, a political 
party such as the Greens); in other instances, it means no more than a simple window 
of opportunity.  
The present study opted not  to use POS for a number of r asons which are outlined 
below. 
2.4.2 A justification of the ‘circumvention’  
Firstly, the ‘paradigm wars’ (Tarrow 1999), or controversies surrounding the  use or 
misuse of POS, disadvise the use of this concept unless it is rigorously defined. 
Certainly, it should not be used ‘loosely’ as many have tended to do when citing ‘a 
favourable POS’ or ‘openings in the POS’ without specifying what these entail (see 
O’Neill 1997; Krouwel & Lucardie 2008; 307). Müller-Rommel’s  use of the term 
could also lay him open to criticism from the ‘paradigm warriors’. In an article which 
discusses the electoral success of Green parties – an article which lists ‘a number of 
factors’ (1998: 148) without mentioning POS – he finishes with a table headed 
‘Opportunity Structures and the Greens’ Electoral Success’ (1998: 153). This lists 
five independent variables used to determine the likely success of Green parties in the 
countries analysed: Federalism, Moderate Party System, Cartelised Party System, 
Unemployment Rate, Growth (sic) National Product. His choice of the term POS 
seems inappropriate given that his variables include factors which are not structural; 
on the other hand, he omits the electoral system, which is generally held to be a 
structural element of the political system (but which he thinks is less influential in the 
formation of new parties).  Müller-Rommel’s use of the term POS in this instance is 
surely another example of the term having been adopte  indiscriminately as a more 
academic synonym for the term ‘situation’. Its ubiquitous use makes it a useful term 
which carries little explanatory power.    
  
Secondly, it was decided not to make explicit use of POS in this thesis because the 
latter is ideally suited to a comparative study in which a number of variables are 
cross-matched (Koopmans 1999: 101). If  this thesis had set out to compare either 
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Spanish green movements or parties with a number of similar parties or movements 
elsewhere, then a POS approach might have been appropriate.  
 
However, the thesis provides a comparative case study of the PESM in Catalonia and 
Andalucia. As such, one of the central objectives is to deepen  understanding of the 
differences and similarities of the PESM in these  two regions in order to highlight 
the impact of the regional dimension on the Spanish PESM.  The  emphasis lies, 
therefore, on studying these two cases in depth, including not only the parties but also 
the movements involved in the PESM. If the study had opted to determine whether 
regionalism was an important factor, using  a POS analysis, it would have ideally 
examined all 17 regions. This might have appeared to be a more ‘scientific’ approach 
but the findings may not have been reliable or useful without first having a deeper 
understanding of the  conjunctural and structural factors pertaining to Spain. 
Furthermore, it would have been difficult to use data from both the parties and the 
movements: given the numerous small movements, the study would have had to 
exclude them from the data, thus falsifying the results.  
 
It could also be argued that an analysis which includes a structuralist POS element is 
more suitable in the case of a country that has already been studied in great depth. In 
his 1986 seminal study on the anti-nuclear movement, which used POS to make a 
comparative analysis between the movements of four different countries, Kitschelt 
argued in favour of arriving at a ‘generalized understanding of the factors that 
determine the dynamics of social movements’ because, as he said, many case studies 
had already been done and had already ‘generated much description’ (Kitschelt 1986: 
57). This is, however, not the case in Spain.   
 
Furthermore, if one looks at Kitschelt’s influential study on anti-nuclear movements 
(1986), the dangers of using such a simplified and spare model become apparent. 
Kitschelt’s study, whilst making a few generalisations that have stood the test of 
time, has been criticised on a number of fronts (Rootes 1999; 2-4; Meyer 2004: 131; 
Rucht 1990; Flam 1994), both for his methodology and the accuracy of his conclusions.  
When Rucht and, later, Flam, subsequently studied th  same anti-nuclear movements as 
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Kitschelt they came to a number of different conclusions because they attached different 
values to the variables employed by Kitschelt. For example, Kitschelt’s categorisation of 
Germany as having a   ‘closed’ as opposed to ‘open’ government has surprised many 
critics, given the federal nature of this country and, consequently, the increased 
points of access for social movements. Kitschelt doubtless had good reason for 
designating Germany thus, but other scholars have been equally justified in assigning 
opposite values to the government system. This demonstrates the problems associated 
with using a ‘scientific’ approach such as POS. Someti es, the desire to generate 
theory can lead to an over-simplified or even distorted version of the situation.   
 
An example of this is illustrated below. Table 2.4 sets out Kitschelt’s simple matrix, 
showing how the combination of weak and strong input and output structures 
influences the dynamics of social movements  in a given country. Spain was not in 
Kitschelt’s original table, and the characteristics he attributed to the dynamics of his 
four countries (France, Sweden, the United States and West Germany) broadly 
speaking corresponded to perceived perceptions of those countries’ social movement 
dynamics. However, it we use the same dimensions to examine Spain’s social 
movements, it is immediately clear that there is a problem. Few would question that 
Spain’s output structure is strong, thus placing Spain in one of the two upper squares. 
 
The problem arises when trying to determine whether it should be classified as 
having an ‘open’ or a ‘closed’ political input struct re. Like Germany, it is a federal 
state and therefore should, perhaps, be considered as having an ‘open’ structure 
(although Kitschelt clearly did not think this was the case for Germany) in that the 
regional governments have had many powers transferred to them. However, in the 
case of the nuclear question (which is what this particular table is concerned with) 
this is not the case. It could be argued that the table would gain in clarity if it 







Table 2.4  Hypotheses about the relationship betwee n POS and the 
dynamics of social movements   
              POLITICAL INPUT STRUCTURES   
Open  Closed  
Strong  1) Assimilative movement 
strategies dominant 
2) Significant procedural 
gains 
3) High substantive policy 
innovation 








2) Few procedural 
impacts 
3) Limited substantive 
elite reform; low-
medium innovation 
4) Strong structural 
pressures 
 













Weak 1)   Assimilative movement 
strategies dominant 
2) Significant procedural 
gains 
3)   Substantive impacts: 
tendency towards policy 
stalemate; medium-low 
innovation 




            (United States) 
1) Confrontational 
movement strategies 
2) Few procedural 
impacts 
3) Few substantive 
impacts: tendency 
towards policy 
stalemate; very low 
innovation 
4) Strong structural 
pressures 
 
      (West Germany) 
   Source: adapted from Kitschelt’s Table 2 (1986: 68) 
 
 
Moreover, it is hard to define Spain as either ‘open’ or ‘closed’ as regards input 
structures in that this depends on a number of different factors: for example, the 
saliency of the issue in question, the level of government, media interest and the 
political persuasion of the party in government. Consequently, it is really impossible 
to place Spain in either one or other of these two boxes.  A further difficulty would 
have to include the fact that, in Spain,  nuclear power has always been strongly 
opposed by the majority of the population. Consequently, this factor alone would 
carry far more weight  than the degree of openness of input structures.   
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A final reason which militated against using POS in the present study is the fact that, 
whilst POS has been used  in a number of comparative s udies to explain the success 
of some Green parties (see Kitschelt 1988a;  Müller-Rommel 1993; Bomberg 1998; 
Frankland 1995), it is primarily ‘ useful for the study of collective action’ (Kriesi et 
al. 1995: xiii), a framework that can help to explain the emergence, development and 
impact of protest movements. The present study is more focussed on the identity of 
each of the parties and movements and the interaction between these disparate 
groups.  
 
2.4.3 POS factors  
Despite its rejection of POS as an overarching theory, the present thesis is informed 
by numerous scholarly works in this area. These have offered many insights into the 
range of opportunities and constraints that can help or hinder parties and movements 
from achieving their objectives and have also pinpoi ted issues that serve as points of 
comparison with the Spanish PESM. A number of these are discussed at length in the 
course of the thesis, but are listed (not exhaustively) in Boxes 2.1-2.3.  As Meyer has 
stated, opportunity variables are multiple. They are 'often not disproved, refined, or 
replaced, but simply added' ( Meyer 2004: 135). This t esis has made use of many of 
them, but with no attempt to bring them together to create a new theory or prove a 
hypothesis.   
 
Box 2.1  Opportunities/constraints related to the t erritorial dimension  
• A ‘decentralised institutional design’ is a factor that ‘facilitates popular 
activism’ (Kriesi and Koopmans 1995: 38-40) and opens more access 
points.  
 
• Regional governments provide opportunities to environmental movements 
and Green parties because it is this tier of governm nt that is responsible for 
legislation pertaining to, for example, many environmental matters, 
transport, social issues, etc. 
 
• Sub-national governments and regional p rty systems offer small parties 
increased opportunities.  The quasi-federal system allows less established 
green parties to secure a regional base and to implement some policies if 
they gain some access to power, thereby establishing t e legitimacy of 
party. (Kitschelt disregards the impact of federal systems but both Müller-
Rommel and Rootes feel it is an extremely helpful factor). 
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Box 2.2 Opportunities/constraints related to politi cal factors 
 
Box 2.3  Sociocultural Opportunities/constraints 
• Historical precedents are also a POS factor (Meyer 2004) 
• Societal cleavages can open up opportunities or indeed constrain a party’s 
possibilities (Meyer 2004) 
• The Spanish institutions’ failure to implement European Union directives 
(until recently)  has provided the PESM (including the Green parties) with 
a golden opportunity to highlight environmental and social irregularities  
• Party membership is  not part of Spain’s political ulture. The greens are 
no exception. Without members and little institutional support, the party’s 
resources are very limited and this impacts on efforts t  increase its 
profile.   
• A feature of Spanish political culture is a continuing loyalty to the 
progressive or traditional camp in Spain, mainly represented by the 2 main 
political parties;  in some regions there is a furthe  ‘nationalist’ dimension 
which has a loyal electorate.   
• If there are two ‘alternative left parties’ vying for power one is very likely 
to have no success (Kitschelt 1988) 
• Proportional representation is generally held to open up opportunities  
to new or small parties. Both Kitschelt and Müller-Rommel disregard   
the impact of electoral systems as a factor of success.   
• A change of government can suddenly open up new possibilities to a party 
but also to social movements (or indeed close any possible possibilites) 
• The alternative left has increased chances of gaining ground when the 
moderate left is in government 
• The strategies of social movements can have an impact on parties (Meyer 
2004)  
• There is a link between open/closed governments and the nature of 
collective action. The more closed the government is, he more likely it is 
that there is a low volume of participation but that action is confrontational 
and even violent, though this declines when the left is in power. This is the 
case in France (Kriesi et al. 1995)  
• Actors are more likely to form parties when NSM demands are not met by 
established organisations and institutions. Kitschelt and Rootes also think 
that conflictive post-materialist issues are likely to encourage the 
formation of green parties.  
• Kitschelt contends that a Green party will not proser where there is a very 
strong social movement. This must be set alongside Rootes’ assertion that 
institutionalisation of the environmental movement has led to the creation of 
Green parties (Rootes 2010: 623).  
• The openness and ideological positions of other political parties can 
constrain the success of the Greens (Kriesi et al. 1995, Rucht 1996) 
• Societal cleavages can open up or c nstrain a party’s possibility of gaining 




In conclusion: ‘factors’, ‘dimensions,’ ‘opportunities’ and ‘constraints’  are a 
constant feature of this thesis but appear as part of a narrative. This ‘misuse’ of POS 
theory has allowed for a greater flexibility to provide a more in-depth analysis of the 
Spanish PESM.  
 
Chapter 3 moves beyond ecologism to examine a number of factors which, it will be 
argued, are generally overlooked or misinterpreted by scholars when they examine the 
PESM in Spain. The resulting studies have always therefore portrayed the PESM in a 
more negative light than it warrants. 
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CHAPTER 3:  CULTURE AND TERRITORY  
 
According to Closa and Heywood (2004: 240-241), in the last 30 years Spain has 
undergone ‘a gradual process of normalisation [and] the country is a fully integrated, 
mainstream member of the EU on a par with other establi hed states’. Whilst 
acknowledging that Spain is ‘idiosyncratic’ in some respects and that this has some 
explanatory value, their main contention is that it is time to stop pigeon-holing 
southern European countries as outsiders’ perception of the country.   
 
Nonetheless, whilst acknowledging Spain’s ‘normality’ (Wiarda 2000), this chapter 
contends that specificities exist and certainly contribute to Spain having a distinctive 
political culture and system, albeit one that continues to be misinterpreted because 
outsiders’ perception is inaccurate (Chislett 2008: 207). The present chapter will 
examine three areas that reflect Spain’s distinctiveness and which certainly have 
explanatory value as far as Spain’s PESM is concerned: Spain’s political culture; its 
putative position as an environmental laggard, and its quasi-federal territorial 
arrangements. In all three cases, by understanding the context within which this 
movement operates it will be possible to correct or question  some  generalised 
beliefs about the Spanish PESM. The chapter firstly provides a corrective to the 
perception that Spain has a weak environmental moveent, an assumption that is 
based on the low membership of environmental organisations. This, in turn, is linked 
to Spain having a supposedly deficient civil society and political culture. As we will 
see, this causal link is invalid. Secondly, the definition of Spain as an ‘environmental 
laggard’ will also be questioned. It will be argued that Spanish society is – on 
average – no more or less ‘environmental’ than elsewhere in Europe (bearing in 
mind that the measurement of what constitutes a more ‘environmental’ society will 
partly depend on the variables used). Section 3 examines Spain’s territorial 
arrangements because, although scholars of territorial politics have focused 
extensively on the Spanish case (Keating & Wilson 2009; Swenden 2006; Swenden 
& Maddens 2009), this dimension has often been overl oked by scholars of party 
politics or social movements. However, regionalism (or nationalism)28 permeates 
                                                
28 The words ‘nationalist’ and ‘nationalism’ will be used, from henceforth, as synonymous with the 
more commonly-used English-language word ‘regional’, in order to observe Spanish language and 
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every area of political life in Spain. It is arguably Spain’s most contentious issue, 
‘one of the deepest and most delicate problems which as prevented the emergence 
of an integrating national identity’ (León Solís 2003: 2). The final section, 3.4, will 
examine how the territorial dimension has influenced, and continues to influence, the 
trajectory of the PESM.   
 
 
 3.1  POLITICAL CULTURE , CIVIL SOCIETY AND THE PESM IN SPAIN   
 
This section questions the assumption that Spain has a weak civil society by 
examining a number of different, but related, issue.  
 
3.1.1 Political culture 
Spanish writers (among them Subirats 1999; Perez Día  1998; Aja 2001; Torcal, 
Gunther & Montero 2002) attest to Spain’s almost  complete transformation over the 
last 30 years but retain a few reservations as to Spain’s continuing democratic deficit 
in a couple of areas. Pérez Díaz, for example, expresses concern about  the ‘tensions 
between the process of western Europeanization and the persistence or re-creation of 
traditions moving in quite the opposite direction’ (Pérez Díaz 1998: 8 ). In other 
words,  cultural traits from a previous era continue to exercise undue influence.   
 
Examples of these traits, highlighted by Subirat (1999) and Wiarda (2000), include 
the persistence of corporatism, clientelism, elitism and authoritarianism. Subirat  
imputes the persistence of this culture to the fact tha  Spain is still ‘different’ in one 
important area: ‘The country generally has no concept of the public sphere as an area 
of collective responsibility and also lacks a strong, structured and responsible 
                                                                                                                                
cultural conventions.  This is because the ‘national st’ label is used in Spain, with less semantic 
precision, to qualify people or concepts that advocate  greater self-determination on the part of a 
nation or region28. This option may seem to fly in the face of accepted English-language convention 
(which makes a distinction between ‘regionalist’ and ‘ ationalist’ parties) but has been chosen to 
maintain the more open-ended nature of the terms as well as the emphasis on the emotional force of 
the terms (for example, the Scottish ‘Nationalist’ Party is a ‘nationalist’ party, even though some 
activists – in the past – did not necessarily aspire to independence). In order to avoid possible 
confusion, the term ‘Spanish Nationalism’ (with a capital N) is used to refer to statewide nationalism 
which holds that Spain is a single nation.  
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presence of what is known as civil society’ (*1999: 1 -20). Other scholars emphasise 
the country’s ‘political alienation, apathy and non-participation’ (Montero 1993:158), 
and largely blame this on Spain’s difficult political development which has resulted 
in an apathetic society ‘bred from cynicism and the fear of involvement after a long 
period of repression’ (Pujas & Rhodes 1998:1).  
 
3.1.2 Spanish civil society 
This section will demonstrate that the assumption that Spain is more apathetic or 
lacking in civil society than other European countries is a value judgement based on 
a particular interpretation of what a flourishing civil society entails. Spaniards, 
including scholars (Valencia Sáiz et al. 2010), have inclined towards viewing their 
own political and social system somewhat negatively (victims of the cynicism 
referred to by Pujas and Rhodes perhaps). A recent Spanish study on citizenship and 
environmental awareness (one which analyses CIS data taken from surveys between 
1995-2009) comes to the conclusion that ‘ecological citizenship’ is weak in Spain 
(*Valencia Sáiz et al. 2010: 25). The authors hold that although there are clear signs 
of an increasing environmental awareness there is insuff cient commitment from 
citizens as far as adopting more sustainable lifestyl , or joining associations linked 
to PE (Valencia Sáiz et al. 2010: 25).   
 
Interestingly, another study carried out just befor this one, and based on some of the 
same data (a CIS 2007 survey on attitudes to the environment, a summary of which is 
provided in Appendix M), makes similar observations but reaches a more positive 
conclusion:  
 
Our society is predominently ‘environmentalist’ and people are markedly 
environmental in their values as well as their behaviour … although we still 
have a long way to go before we catch up with countries like Germany or 
Sweden, particularly when it comes to our behaviour (*Echavarren 2009: 27).  
 
Echavarren’s interpretation is unusual within the Spanish context but demonstrates 
that the evidence is not irrefutably negative. Nevertheless, even he concurs with 
Valencia Sáiz et al.’s (2010) conclusion which stresses the country’s weak civil 
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society and the low levels of associationalism (Valencia Sáiz et al. 2010: 112). As the 
latter study states,  
 
Spaniards tend to give their moral support to environmentalism and to a 
certain extent cooperate on a voluntary basis on a personal and domestic 
front. However, their active participation in environmental causes is very 
slight (*Valencia Sáiz et al. 2010: 133).  
 
Analyses such as these are commonplace and are used (O’Brien 2006; Keating 1999) 
to account for the weakness of the country’s environmental movement. However, this 
thesis argues that this causal link is somewhat misleading and is, furthermore, based 
on a very particular definition of what constitutes ‘active participation’.   
 
Admittedly, Spain has low levels of associationalism. The 2005 World Values 
Survey’s comparison of  different countries’ levels of  associationalism  (WVS 2010) 
demonstrates that the  Spanish are markedly disinclined to belong to voluntary 
organisations (see Table 3.1): in fact, the Spanish – despite an earlier democratic 
transition and stronger economic position – lag far behind the Slovenes, who score 
the same as the French: on average, each Spaniard is n active member of .38 of a 
society in comparison with every Slovene or French person  who is an active member 
of  0.68 of a society.  These figures are far lower than the UK’s, where each person 
actively belongs to 1.25 societies. These indicators unequivocally demonstrate that 
the Spanish are traditionally not great ‘joiners’. It is inferred from this that Spain 
therefore has a weak civil society and hence a weak  nvironmental movement and 
Green party. However, this reasoning is flawed as the empirical evidence 
demonstrates. For example, the French Green party has intermittently had 
considerable success (certainly, much more than the English Greens) in spite of 
French society having a fairly low level of associationalism.29 
                                                
29 This argument demonstrates the flawed reasoning in equating a low level of associationalism with a 
weak environmental movement. However, the figures in Table 3.1 which relate solely to belonging to 
an environmental movement tell a different story. Despite the French recording an overall relatively 
low level of associationalism, their environmental score is one of the highest.  
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 Table 3.1   Inactive (I) and Active (A) participation in 7 cate gories of voluntary associations – showing the perc entage 
of members within a country’s population    
 
 Religion Politics 
Labour 










































































































































10 32 7 11 0.75 0.75 
 
UK 17 19 8 3 9 10 9 15 10 6 10 21 11 30 9 22 0.82 1.25 
   Source: adapted from the  WVS Five Wave Aggregated File 1981-2005 (WVS 2010) 
 
Values for ‘All’ show the  inactive and active per capita levels of participation in each country,  i.e. the average number of associations which each person belongs to.  
Furthermore, the failure to adhere to the dominant co ception of how civil society is 
defined – historically, as defined largely by ‘Anglo-Saxon scholarship’ – by no 
means implies that Spain’s civil society is ‘weak’ in absolute terms; it just means that 
it is weak if a particular definition of associationalism is used as the yardstick.  In a 
book comparing Spain (which has a successful democracy but weak civil society) and   
Brazil (with a strong civil society but a weak democracy),  Encarnación  even 
questions the ‘myth’  that a strong civil society necessarily guarantees a successful 
democratic system (2003:4).   
 
In short, the concept of what constitutes a ‘civil society’, is not vigorously analysed,  
as Karamichas states, and may therefore be an ‘irrelevance’ (2007: 280). It is 
certainly open to different interpretations.  Castell  (1997) argues that loose networks, 
specific mobilisations and internet networks have replaced traditional organisational 
associations: his theory holds true for Spain, where civil society is characterised by 
vast displays of solidarity and mobilisation over  discrete issues, as and when they 
arise (Tremlett 2006). Commentators of the 2004 Spanish general election (which 
took place three days after the Madrid bombings) attributed PSOE’s unexpected win 
to the power of civil society – about eleven million people demonstrated in support of 
PSOE (Tremlett 2006: 263) and  young voters launched a text campaign urging 
friends to vote in order to avoid returning the PP to government (Oppenheimer 2004; 
Prieto del Campo 2005: 43). Chapters 4-6 will provide further evidence of the high 
level of participatory, non-institutionalised activi ies.   
 
Events such as the above contradict the notion that Sp in has a weak civil society and 
suggest that the concept may need to be redefined. Furthermore, the country’s ‘weak 
associationalism’ could also be questioned on other grounds.  Spanish society has 
many examples of associations, but these do not feature in the WVS questionnaires. 
For example, the preparations for the numerous fiestas which take place throughout 
Spain involve huge numbers of inhabitants in events that arguably do more to 
promote a sense of belonging and solidarity than the UK ‘club’. In the cities, in 
addition to organising neighbourhood fiestas, there ar  also many effective 





everyone in a particular block of flats: the association is extremely active in ensuring 
that the building and services provided are up to standard and residents are expected 
to attend the regular meetings. It seems, therefore, that the reluctance to ‘join’ (as 
illustrated by the previously cited WVS survey) applies predominantly to 
organisations which are impersonal and not based on contiguity.   
  
3.1.3 Spaniards’ political engagement 
A recent study by Fernández and García (2008) further questions the correlation that 
is held to exist between associationalism and politica  activity.  Whilst not denying 
the importance of associationalism (clearly, it would be in the interest of Spanish 
EMOs if more people signed up as members), they add that there is a complementary 
and equally important non-institutionalised activity which has previously been 
disregarded when it comes to measuring Spaniards’ involvement in politics. Their 
argument (supported by the analysis of a comprehensive attitudinal survey) maintains 
that traditional associationalism is in fact linked to individuals with a low degree of 
social trust and closely related to a political party whereas those who believe in non-
institutionalised participatory activities (protests, signing petitions, strikes) are 
generally more trusting, sociable individuals with a greater interest in politics and a 
propensity to dialogue, argue and participate with o ers in a more spontaneous 
fashion. It is these non-institutionalised individuals who are at the heart of a new civil 
society (as propounded by Castells): ‘non-institutional mechanisms  have become a 
source of democratic values, control of government, a d generation of social trust’  
(Fernández & García 2008: 489).  
 
In other words, Spaniards’ failure to ‘join’ societies (i.e. environmental movements 
or Green parties) does not need to be viewed as the result of apathy and lack of 
interest but stems from a different conception of the political. Fernández and 
García’s ‘spontaneous’ and ‘politically active’ indvi uals are likely to engage in 
social movements but without becoming members of an organisation.  
 
Morales (2005) also questions the truism that Spaniards are apathetic and 





during the transition (1975-1982),  Spain is register ng some of the lowest levels of 
interest in politics and associationalism in Europe (Morales 2005: 54), thus leading 
many Spanish analysts to declare that fewer people are involved in politics in Spain. 
However, she believes it is important to define what is meant by ‘political 
involvement’. Her findings confirm that young people are less likely to vote than 
older people but  are more likely to engage in non-institutional activity. Her findings 
demonstrate that Spaniards’ attitudes since the transi ion have not changed very 
much as far as their engagement goes. ‘In fact, there s em to be few reasons to be 
excessively optimistic or pessimistic about it all’(*Morales 2005: 84). 
 
Consequently, surveys in which a large majority of Spaniards routinely voice their 
lack of interest in politics should perhaps not be regarded as anything more than an 
expression of cynicism about politics. Vassallo’s study (2006) shows that, when 
asked three key questions (whether they are interested in politics, discuss politics or 
feel close to any party), Spaniards are twice as likely as British people to say they 
have no interest in politics. However, they are only slighly less likely to ‘feel close to 
any party’ and are slightly more likely to discuss politics. Her findings even show 
that there is a little more interest in 2005 than 20 years ago,  with 20-30% expressing 
an interest in politics: more people discuss politics han two decades ago, and more 
people read the newspaper, go to political meetings a d collaborate with parties.   
 
Torcal, Gunther & Moreno (2002) also highlight the fact that Spain’s deep-seated 
anti-party culture and a mistrust of politicians does not prevent a  healthy turnout at 
election times.  The turnout in the Spanish general lections is generally higher than 
the UK’s as the last results in both countries show: the turnout in Spain was 73.85% 
in 2008 (down from 75.66% at the previous election) (MIR 2010) compared with the 
UK’s 65.1% in 2010 (61.4% at previous election) (UK Political Info 2010).  
 
3.1.4 Elections and attitudinal surveys 
Another characteristic of the Spanish political system which derives from the 
country’s past history and which has also contributed owards fostering a certain 
cynicism  about politics is the fact that the electoral system was expressly designed 





that the more conservative (rural) votes counted for m re. Voters therefore adopt a 
very pragmatic position at election time, particularly in the general elections. This 
pattern (common enough elsewhere but pronounced in Spain where the majority 
parties are particularly dominant30) is blamed on the Spanish electoral system which, 
whilst theoretically proportional, in fact favours only the parties receiving the most 
votes in any province (see Pallarés & Keating 2003: 244), frequently leading to a two 
party race31: in the general elections, districts only have 6 seat  on average32,  which 
means that a party needs to win more than 16% of the votes in order to win a seat. 
Only very populated provinces, which therefore return many MPs (35 for Madrid and 
31 for Barcelona), have an electoral system which is nearer to being genuinely 
proportional – although even here, there is a bias in favour of the most voted parties. 
 
The electoral system is particularly unfavourable to small, statewide parties who fail 
to concentrate a sufficient number of votes in any o e constituency; this is in sharp 
contrast to the nationalist parties who may win fewer total votes than the small, 
statewide parties but nevertheless are more successful at winning seats in the few 
districts they contest.  
 
The Spanish public is well aware of the constraints of the electoral system and this 
factor, as well as an inclination to support one or other of the dominant political 
cleavages (left or right; centralist or nationalist) has contributed to the Green party’s 
difficulty in attracting voters. However, despite the Greens’ poor election results, a 
number of surveys published by CIS (Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas, the 
Spanish Centre for Sociological Research) suggest that there is far more support for 
Green political ideas than the election results demonstrate. Table 3.2 shows that a 
significant minority of respondents defined themselves politically as being 
ecologists.  The high score entered for ecologism (fourth highest if one aggregates 
respondents’ first and second choices) suggests tha there is far more support for 
Green ideas than evinced by the election results.  
                                                
30  As pointed out on p. 80,  in the 2008 general election PSOE and PP obtained 92% of the seats 
between them 
31 The exception to this is in the regions with  strong nationalist parties which are frequently 
successfully in obtaining a substantial percentage of the vote.   





Table 3.2  ‘How would you define yourself political ly?’  
Ideology 1st choice 
 (%) 





Conservative 13.8 3.4              17.2 3             
Christian Democrat 6.9 4.9              11.8 6             
Liberal 12.4 7.5              19.9 2             
Social Democrat 7.8 4.2              12 5             
Socialist 19.1 4.9              24 1             
Communist 1.4 0.9              2.3 11            
Nationalist 3.5 2.6               6.1 8              
Feminist 1.3 3.1              4.4 10           
Ecologist 5.8 9.5              15.3 4              
Apolitical 5.0 0.2              5.2 9            
 Source: *adapted from CIS Barometer January 2010, Questions 11 & 12 
 
Another CIS survey, as listed in Table 3.3, also demonstrates a considerable degree 
of sympathy for ecologism, which elicits the third highest score in the ranking. 
Although these results must be interpreted cautiously (because, as will be shown in 
Section 3.2, differently-framed surveys apparently arrive at very different results), at 
the very least the answers given by these respondents co tradict the notion that there 
is a lack of interest in environmental matters in Spain. 
  
Table 3.3 ‘On a scale of 0-10, list your sympathy w ith the following 
movements’ 
 
 0-1   
No 
sympathy  
2-3 4-6 7-8 9-10   
A lot of 
sympathy 
Ecologists 5.9  5.5 35.8 28.7 17.1 
Animal Welfare 3.0 3.5 30.4 31.0 27.7 
Political parties 32.7 23.0 34.1 5.0 0.9 
Pacifists 9.2 7.8 37.5 22.2 13.3 
Feminists 12.3 11.0 40.0 18.2 9.0 
Pro Human Rights 2.2 1.8 23.2 33.7 33.0 
Trade Unions 21.4 14.2 38.9 12.8 5.2 
Gays and Lesbians 18.6 9.9 35.6 16.4 8.9 
Anti-globalisation 12.9 9.9 32.2 12.1 4.9 
Religious 
organisations 
24.7 13.7 36.6 13.2 6.2 
Immigrant support 11.7 8.5 42.4 20.6 8.8 






This section has  demonstrated that it is simplistic and inaccurate to link problems 
relating to Spain’s PESM to the country’s weak civil society: viewed differently, 
Spanish civil society is not weak, the link between weak civil societies and poor 
democracies is flawed, and none of these factors are responsible for the deficiencies 
of the Spanish Greens. The Spanish Greens’ failure to capture a larger percentage of 
the vote is not related to the country’s weak associati nal culture (as stated by 
Holliday 1997: 171) but to a series of other inter-r lated factors that will be 
examined subsequently.  
 
 
3.1   SPAIN AS AN ENVIRONMENTAL LAGGARD  
 
As well as being characterised as having a weak civil society and a deficient political 
culture, Spain is routinely considered to be an enviro mental laggard, an attribute that 
is linked to the country’s predominantly materialistic stance which in turn is linked to 
its undeniably late economic development (in comparison with other Western 
European countries) as the following statement illustrates:  
 
A post-materialist movement marooned in a society obsessed with economic 
growth and the politics of materialism is hardly likely to impact on events, 
however sensibly it behaves’ (O’Neill 1997: 262) 
 
The following section seeks to correct this assumption which has been contested by a 
number of scholars (see Richardson & Rootes 1995:14) but which is nevertheless 
frequently invoked to explain the insufficient support which PE is accorded in Spain.  
 
Firstly, as Martínez Alier has pointed out (1995, 2003), academics such as Inglehart, 
who have linked ecologism to postmaterialism, base their theories on the world’s 
most developed economies and on the commonly held assumption that ecologism 
primarily concerns those who have satisfied their material needs. However, it 
overlooks what Martinez Alier (1995) calls the ecologism of the poor, namely the 
powerful environmental campaigns that often develop in Third World countries 





their natural resources have been commandeered by a company or individual as a 
money-making commodity. Given Spain’s economic circumstances in the early days 
of ecologism, it is therefore incorrect to assume that Spain is less likely to have a 
strong ecologist movement on the grounds that it isnsufficiently post-materialist.  
There is, however,  a case for arguing that Spain’s PESM straddles two different 
approaches to materialism: on the one hand, many within the PESM are middle-class 
urban ‘post-materialists’ who share a similar worldview to ecologists elsewhere in 
Europe; on the other hand, the movement counted on (and still does, though less than 
before)  the support of local activists who often joined the movement because of 
specific issues, many of which were rooted in social conflicts deriving from a sense 
of injustice at the exploitation of land and resources which were considered part of 
the commons.  
 
Furthermore, despite scholars’ insistence on postmaterialism being far less 
widespread in Spain than in other European countries (Gibbons 1999; Cantijoch 
2009), the Eurobarometer’s analysis of public opinion (Eurobarometer 2010), shown 
below in Table 3.4, shows that Spain’s ‘post-materilist’ position (as shown in its 
attitude to immigration, crime and the environment, for example) is relatively similar 
to that of other EU countries.  Admittedly,  Spain is far more concerned about the 
economy than the other selected countries, but this probably reflects the scale of the 
problem facing Spain in 2009 rather than Spaniards’ attitudes concerning 
materialism. In 2007, only 5.7% of Spaniards thought the economic situation was  











                                                
33 The issue is not even mentioned in the Eurobarometer Factsheets corresponding to that year,  as it is 





Table 3.4  Public opinion as to the two most import ant issues facing 
respondents’ countries at the moment? (Answers expr essed as 
percentages) 
 
 EU average UK Spain France Germany 
Unemployment 51 38 66 59 58 
Economic situation 40 28 55 31 16 
Crime 19 36 11 16 13 
Rising prices and 
inflation 
19 8 10 22 16 
Healthcare 14 10 2 11 21 
Pensions 9 6 2 14 7 
Immigration 9 29 6 6 4 
Taxation 8 5 6 6 7 
Education 7 6 3 8 11 
Housing 5 8 7 10 0 
Terrorism 4 6 12 2 3 
Environment 4 2 2 10 4 
Energy 3 6 0 1 2 
 Source: adapted from Eurobarometer Factsheets 2010  
 
The low priority that Spaniards accord to environmetal questions according to Table 
3.4 tallies with other CIS surveys (see Table 3.5 below) and appears to contradict 
previous surveys (see Tables 3.2 & 3.3). This apparent contradiction could lead one 
to hypothesise that Spaniards respect the social aspect of environmentalism (they 
value the organisations and identify with the ideology as represented in Tables 3.2 & 
3.3) but are far less persuaded that the environment is the single most salient 
problem.  
 
Table 3.5  ‘What is the worst problem facing Spain right now?’ 
 April 







Unemployment 79.6 75.7 52.0 37.4 
Economic problems 46.8 54.1 48.2 18 
Parties and Politicians 19.4 8.8 7.2 11.9 
Immigration 13.3 14.4 26.1 31.9 
Terrorism (ETA)  12.3 16 31.4 36.5 
A further 14 problems ranked above the environment & 6 had a lower ranking.  
Environment 0.5 0.4 2.8 2.4 






By contrast, a Eurobarometer survey examining attitudes towards climate change 
showed that Spanish respondents’ views are similar to those of other Europeans, as  
illustrated in 3.6: 
 
 
Table 3.6  Europeans’ Attitudes Towards Climate Cha nge 2008   
Responses to two different questions 
   Source: adapted from Special  Eurobarometer 300, 2008  
 
Similarly, it is necessary to provide a corrective regarding Spain’s status as an 
environmental ‘laggard’. The designation of countries as environmental ‘laggards’ or 
‘pioneers’ describes  the reactive or proactive enviro mental approach of different 
countries in a comparative context, applying very ci cumscribed and limited criteria. 
These terms should not, however, be applied loosely to make value judgements about 
a country’s environmental status.  
 
In her comparative studies on the implementation of EU environmental policy, 
Börzel (2001; 2003) questions the methods used to categorise countries’ 
environmental performance and states that it depends o  how the analysis is carried 
out. The present thesis also contends that it is important to establish what is analysed 
(problems vary from one country to another) as well as the timeframe for these 
studies. Each country is in a unique position, is constrained by different political and 
socioeconomic needs, and should therefore be viewed as a sui generis case.  
 
Börzel (2003) considers that a number of ‘Southern Problem’ questions are ‘wildly 
exaggerated’ (2003: 7) and takes issue with the so-called ‘Mediterranean Syndrome’ 
thesis and its ‘fatalistic and reductionist impetus’ (2003: 30). For example, one of the 
key indicators used to single out the laggards and the pioneers is the question of 
compliance, but as she demonstrates, the question of determining which countries are 
 EU 27 
Average 
Spain France UK 
Global warming / climate change is a very 
serious problem 
75% 83% 84% 59% 
Totally disagree that the seriousness of 
climate change has been exaggerated 





more compliant than others is largely a ‘statistical artefact’ (2003:7). Her study shows 
that Spain had a very poor compliance record and was therefore classified as a 
laggard. However, this was because Spanish EMOs reported many infringements to 
EU institutions in the 1990s (when her data is was collected) because this was the 
most effective way of drawing attention to environmental problems, given that the 
mechanisms for doing so within Spain were deficient (2001: 810).  Borzel’s 
compelling evidence to discredit the ‘laggard’ label also includes her finding that the 
four worst EU-15 laggards – in terms of non-compliance – are, in fact, Italy, France, 
Belgium and Greece.   
 
Börzel’s studies argue that Spain’s poor reputation is ot entirely merited. Further 
considerations can be brought to bear to strengthen t is judgement. For example, if 
one uses different instruments to measure Spain’s ecological standing, it occupies a 
‘better’ position than most of the EU-15 countries. Table 3.7 lists a few EU countries 
in terms of their per capita ecological footprint ad per capita carbon footprint (the 
first is an indicator of environmental sustainability and calculates the number of 
hectares needed per person to produce the resources they consume and to absorb their 
waste (GFN 2005); the second measures the tonnes of carbon dioxide equivalents per 
person). According to these figures, Spain is by no means an environmental laggard.  
 
Table  3.7  The Ecological Footprint of Spain and other Eu ropean 
countries   
Ecological Footprint 
Hectares per person 
2005 
Carbon footprint per 
capita (CO2 tonnes) 
2010 
Sweden 6.1 10.5 
France 5.6 13.1 
United Kingdom 5.6 15.4 
Spain 5.4 10.9 
Ireland 5.0 16.0 
Germany 4.5 15.1 
  Source: Global Footprint Network 2005 and  Carbon Footprint of Nations 2010   
 
Furthermore, it could be argued that indicators about a country’s environmental 
sustainability or otherwise should not be based on current data but should be based on 





accounted for about 1% of the world’s CO2 man-made emissions, as compared to 
France’s 3%, Germany’s 7% and the UK’s 6% (Pewclimate 2010).  
 
Finally, OECD data on countries’ per capita total primary energy supply and CO2 
emissions from fuel combustion demonstrate that Spain h s an environmentally 
sounder record than countries such as Germany, France or the United Kingdom  
(OECD Fact book 2010). In fact, the country’s commitment to wind power and its 
position as the world’s leading solar power generator (The Guardian 13/07/2010) 
means that in some respects it could be defined as an environmental ‘pioneer’.   
 
The preceding argument does not set out to claim that Spain has a ‘better’ record than 
other countries but simply seeks to emphasise that culturally-determined judgments 
about Spain’s reputation as a laggard are unjustified, because the criteria used to 
apportion blame or praise on different countries’ environmental probity are 
untenable. Furthermore, as has been noted, the link between postmaterialism and  the 
environmentally-aware position of some developed countries does not constitute a 
sounder ‘ecological’ position and could be viewed as nothing more than a 
sophisticated consumerism which has moved beyond satisfying tangible material 
needs to securing intangibles such as clean air and unspoilt countryside.  
 
In short, O’Neill’s criticism of Spanish society as being ‘obsessed with economic 
growth and the politics of materialism’ (O’Neill 1997: 262) overlooks a number of 
points: firstly, the pursuit of a more ecological way of life is not necessarily 
incompatible with ‘materialism’. At the core of green politics there is a ‘materialistic’ 
thesis that our natural resources are limited. Secondly, the pursuit of  economic 
growth remains the principal goal of all capitalist societies and, in that respect, Spain 
is no different to other societies.  
 
The study now moves on to address another facet of Spain’s political culture which 
has impacted on the environmental movement, namely the country’s distinctive 





arrangements and the underlying tensions which surround this issue. Section 3.4 will 
then go on to show how the territorial dimension has impacted on the PESM.  
 
 
3.2 THE TERRITORIAL DIMENSION  
 
As Conversi states, ‘Two visions of Spain have competed since the beginning of the 
19th century’ (1998: 1), one centralist and the other regionalist. An awareness of 
these competing visions and of the importance which Spaniards attach to their 
locality is essential to understanding Spanish politica  culture.  
 
Although the centralist nation-state – as epitomised by  Franco’s regime – has lost its 
hegemony as power has shifted to regional and supranational level (Castells 1997; 
Pérez Diaz 1998 and Keating 1996), the centralist-natio alist cleavage still divides 
Spain and impacts on many areas of political life, including political ecology. Sub-
section 3.3.1 outlines Spain’s existing institutional arrangements and shows how, 
over the course of the last 30 years, sub-national government and politics has 
increased in importance as Spain has evolved into a quasi-federal state. Sub-sections 
3.3.2 and 3.3.3 examine competing visions regarding Spanish identity and 
nationhood. This analysis provides a necessary background to understanding the 
different political context within which Spanish PE operates.  
 
3.3.1 El Estado de las Autonomías (The State of the  Autonomies)  
After Franco’s death in 1975, Spain embarked on its transition to democracy, ‘a 
delicate operation’ (Ross 2000: 123) in which the old regime was gradually 
dismantled. The road-map for the new democracy was the 1978 Constitution, 
considered to be ‘a marvel of compromise and consensus’ (Mar-Molinero 1996: 82). 
Devolution was considered a priority (Pallarès & Keating 2003) because it was clear 
that the sine qua non of the new democratic system was to give Spain’s ‘nationalities’ 
(as the Constitution refers to the regions which consider themselves nations) the 
autonomous status that they had been demanding for alm st a century.   
   































      Source: Luventicus 2: 2010  
 
 
As a result, Spain has changed from being a highly centralised state (during Franco’s 
dictatorship in 1936-1975) to a country officially designated as El Estado de las 
Autonomías (‘The State of the Autonomous Regions’), in recognitio  of its status as 
one of Europe’s most decentralised countries (Moreno 2001). As commentators 
emphasise (see Swenden 2006; Pallarès & Keating 2003; Moreno 2002 and Requejo 
2005), the 1978 Constitution did not stipulate details of Spain’s territorial division. It 
merely specified how regions could opt for self-government and outlined some of 






















In fact, the Constitution’s provisions for autonomy were taken up by all the  regions, 
and what started as an expedient solution to placate the nationalities took on a 
momentum of its own. As Swenden states, the decentralisation process went further 
than the original architects envisaged (2006: 21) and by 1983 Spain was officially 
divided into 17 autonomous regions (see Figure 3.1).  
 
However, the precise relationship between central and regional governments remains 
undefined and the Constitution has never been revised to reflect these changes which 
remain provisional in nature. Although the territorial arrangement which evolved has 
been hailed by many as a ‘quasi-federal’ or ‘asymmetric federation’ (Swenden 2006; 
Aja 1999) and a ‘deeply decentralised’ state (Moren 2002), the shortcomings of the 
present system are undeniable. Vallespín describes it as an ‘incomplete federal stte’ 
(*2009), given that, although the Spanish regions have greater financial control over 
their budget than most federal countries, the federal model is still ‘in construction’ 
and lacks certain elements. For example, the Senate has never become a chamber for 
the territorial representation of the different regions, as has often been proposed; the 
regions have bilateral relations with a ‘strong core executive’ that dominates policy-
making (Chari & Heywood 2009: 45). Consequently, ‘the institutional involvement 
of the Spanish nationalities and regions in statewid  decision making is somewhat 
provisional in character’ (Moreno 2002: 404). According to a Catalan academic, the 
regions’ status is so ambiguous that they are not even ‘constituent entities’ (they are 
not mentioned in the Constitution) and the central government still retains the upper 
hand when it comes to tax-raising, law-making and accessing international 
institutions such as the European Union (Requejo 2005: 82-83). However, the central 
problem (according to Requejo) is that of ‘accommodating the distinct national 
identities that coexist’ within the state (2005: 90). Until this happens, the minority 
nations will continue to resent the fact that their demands are not being met.  
 
Although many leading Spanish constitutional experts agree that there is 
considerable ambiguity as to the status of the regions (El País 6/12/2008a), the 
devolution process has nevertheless resulted in 17 sub-state governments, each with 





more than 30% of public spending, [and] employ more than one million civil 
servants; they [also] implement and monitor more than three thousand laws and 
norms, many of which come from Brussels’ (Noferini et al. 2010: 10). The regions’ 
devolved areas include agriculture, transport, urban planning, social services and 
tourism, and regional governments are also responsible for the implementation of 
many other areas of legislation. Environmental laws and regulations are frequently 
enacted at regional level, though some emanate from central government. 
 
The regions are so securely anchored in their own specific identity that each now has 
a very distinct culture. Conversi, for example, highli hts the fact that each region has 
its own regional multi-tome encyclopaedia, thus contributing to a ‘vast 
systematization of local knowledge’ which contributes towards creating a sense of 
belonging (1998 :14). The strength of nationalist sentiment which has taken root 
throughout Spain since the regions were established is a feature of modern Spanish 
society: more than 25 years since their creation, yung adults have ‘the least sense of 
belonging to Spain and the highest level of identification with the region’ (Balfour 
and Quiroga 2007:197).  
 
For some regions, the present level of devolution is satisfactory, but there are others 
(such as Catalonia) who would like to see further powers and, above all, would like 
to be recognised as a nation. The unresolvable nature of this issue springs from the 
impossibility of finding an accommodation between two very different ways of 
viewing the territorial organisation of the country. For some, Spain is essentially – 
despite extensive devolution – a unitary state, whereas for others it is, or should be, a 
pluri-national state. The often quoted Article 2 of the 1978 Constitution outlines the 
state’s legal position as regards the regions, but also demonstrates the inherent 
ambiguity of the present situation.  
 
The Constitution is based on the indissoluble unity of the Spanish Nation, the 
common and indivisible homeland of all Spaniards; it recognises and 
guarantees the right to self-government of the natio l ties and regions of 
which it is composed and the solidarity among them all (Spanish Constitution 






Article 2 acknowledges a region’s right to self-government but explicitly refers to the 
unity of the Spanish nation-state (rather than acknowledging the concept of Spain as 
a pluri-national state). The allusion to inter-regional solidarity emphasises that 
everyone within Spain is required to pull together as one nation, both politically and 
economically. The principle of inter-regional solidarity is often quoted to oppose 
nationalists who maintain that a particular resource – water is an important example 
of this – should ‘belong’ to a region and serve the ne ds of the region rather than 
being commandeered for other parts of Spain.  
 
The Constitution also denies minority nations the status of ‘nation’, choosing to 
describe them as ‘nationalities’. From an outsider’s perspective (bearing in mind that 
Scotland, for example, has always referred to itself as a nation) it is easy to be 
unaware of the semiotic difference between the terms ‘nation’ and ‘nationality’ but 
the state’s refusal to allow regions to define thems lves as ‘nations’ rankles deeply in 
some quarters. 
 
Many Spaniards feel that the devolution process has gone far enough, but (see  Table 
3.8)  a sizeable minority (16.6%) would like to see gr ater powers of self-government 
or even the option (6.5%) to become an independent country. Although the 
devolution process has resulted in what many consider to be a plurinational state, a 
sizeable minority of Spaniards are opposed to the decentralisation of the State 
(25.3%): they are worried about the break-up of Spain and hostile to the demands of 
ETA, who have fuelled a backlash against minority nationalisms.   
 
Table 3.8:  Question 12 of a CIS survey asking Span iards how the 
Spanish state should be structured 
 
We should have a central government and no regional governments 14.1% 
Regional governments should have fewer powers than at present 11.2% 
We should continue with the present arrangement 42.3% 
The regional governments should have greater devolvd powers  16.6% 
The state should allow the regions self-determinatio  6.5% 





In brief, questions as to ‘where the Spanish state should be heading – ‘a federal, 
regionalised or unitary decentralized state’ (Swenden 2006: 55) – remain contentious 
and are therefore sidelined. The complications and mbiguities of Spain’s quasi-
federal model constitute an apparently indissoluble problem which rests on a number 
of competing notions of nationalism. As Balfour and Quiroga state, although 
plurality – ‘the source of innovation, cultural vitali y, internal competition’ – could 
be seen as an advantage, ‘it is a political problem in that this plurality has not been 
resolved at an institutional level. It has no simple solution in that it is a complex, 
multilayered problem, embracing state structures, competencies, identities, and 
cultures. There are no quick fixes or perhaps no fixes at all’ (Balfour & Quiroga 
2007: 199). Notwithstanding the imperfections of the arrangement, the new 
configuration of Spain is so deeply embedded, as Aja states, that the process is 
irreversible (2001: 234).   
 
The following sub-sections continue the analysis of Spanish nationalism or 
regionalism but from a different perspective. The clash between the centralists and 
the regionalists is deeply embedded in Spanish society and politics and therefore 
needs to be fully appreciated in order to understand how this underlying tension 
influences policy makers as well as the strategies and actions of individual parties.  
 
3.3.2 A nation of nations? 
As previously mentioned, Spain is made up of 17 regions. In ten of these34, a sizeable 
minority (and in the case of Catalonia, a majority) considers their region a ‘nation’.    
 
Minority-nation nationalists in Spain have a range of different aspirations: some 
regard their region as a distinct nation and demand the right to greater self-
determination over its future; others envisage an independent nation-state, a federal 
state within a confederal state or simply a greater degree of home rule. Regardless of 
                                                
34 The following regions include a sizeable minority of inhabitants with nationalist aspirations: 
Andalucia, Aragón, Asturias, the Balearic Islands, the Basque Country, the Canary Islands, Galicia,  
Navarre and  Valencia.  A Survey from CIS, the Spanish leading  Sociological Research Centre (CIS 
2667: 2007), puts only eight regions in the ‘nationalist’ group but this decision is questionable. It could 
be argued that Aragón and Asturias, included in CIS’s list of regionalist regions  (but both with  their 
own language and the former with two regional parties), should be more correctly assigned to the 





these differences, most of those who define themselve  as nationalists want their 
region to be legally defined as a ‘nation’.  
 
Spaniards who insist on regarding Spain as the only ‘Nation’ within the Spanish state 
hold a less clear-cut position. Spanish Nationalism has undergone a radical 
transformation since Franco’s dictatorship. The two main parties, PSOE and PP 
(Partido Popular, People’s Party), have officially accepted the need to reach an 
accommodation with the ‘historic nationalities’ as well as with the nationalist 
sentiment that has developed in a number of other regions. They have therefore 
accepted, or in some cases welcomed, the need for dev lution. However, there is also 
a majority consensus to maintain the unity of the natio -state by appealing to the 
need for solidarity between the regions, a key featur  of civic Nationalism. This state-
led Nationalism was reformulated as ‘patriotic constitutionalism’ by PSOE in 1991, 
after Habermas gave a seminal lecture on the subject when he visited Madrid in that 
year (Magone 2004: 42 and Pastor Verdú 2007a). Habermas’s theory maintains that 
one can retain loyalty to a region and identify with it as a nation whilst 
constitutionally opting to retain the status quo, or existing nation-state, in the interests 
of solidarity, cooperation and universal democracy. Both main parties have used 
decentralisation – a cornerstone of EU policy – as a way of promoting state 
modernisation, reinforcing democracy and emphasising Spain’s break with the 
previous Francoist centralist regime (Muro & Quiroga 2005). However, both have 
shown their commitment to the unity of the Spanish nation by refusing to 
countenance the official use of the word ‘nation’ to describe a number of different 
regions.  
 
During the first two years of Zapatero’s first mandte (2004-2008), the Socialists 
appeared to be moving towards a greater recognition of Spain’s status as a ‘nation of 
nations’ – the party’s electoral programme had annou ced that it envisaged making 
changes to the Constitution in order to turn the Senate into a chamber of territorial 
representation (PSOE Election Programme 2004: 60). PSOE sanctioned the reform 
of several statutes of autonomy (regional constitutions) in the period between 2004-7 





‘plurinational state’. The term even crept into a PSOE law which was passed in the 
Congreso in 2006, stating that Spain was ‘a plurinational, p uricultural and 
plurilingual state’ (*El Confidencial  28/09/2006). However, this ‘aberration’ was 
quickly amended when the same law went through the Senate. Moves towards a 
formal recognition of Spain’s plurinational status were swiftly stifled by the PSOE 
which, from 2006 onwards, has reverted to  a similar line as the PP (Pastor Verdú 
2007b). According to Zapatero (speaking at a formal celebration of 30 years of the 
Constitution), the Constitution will stay as it is – with all its ambiguities – because 
there is no consensus as to how to move forward on this issue (El País 06/12/08b). 
 
In sum, the nationalists feel discriminated against and are likely to continue to do so 
until the Spanish state stops advocating a Nationalism that, according to Muro and 
Quiroga, contains ‘an underlying element of ethnic Nationalism’ (2005: 23). On the 
other hand, a majority of Spaniards consider themselve  Spaniards first and foremost.  
 
Data from the Spanish Centre for Sociological Research’s study on identity (CIS 
Survey 2667: 2007) helps to put the ‘nation’ issue into some perspective. When 
asked whether Spain is a state rather than a nation (see Table 3.9), 34% of Spaniards 
(22.8% +11.2%) think of Spain as a Nation; even in the Basque Country and 
Catalonia, a respective 26.8% and 22.7% hold this po ition. On the other hand, 
50.4% of Catalans reject the idea of Spain as a nation, as against 34.3% at statewide 
level and 38.5% in the Basque Country.  
 
Table 3.9:  ‘Do you agree that Spain is a state and  not a nation?’ 
  














All Spaniards 8.8 25.5 12 22.8 11.2 17.7 
 Basques 13 25.5 10 16.8 10 24.7 
Catalans 15.5 34.9 8.2 16.2 6.5 18.7 
Madrid 8.8 21.9 8.6 27.2 15.5 18 






The survey demonstrates that regional differences on the question of national identity 
are less marked than might be anticipated. Table 3.10 below provides further 
indications as to how respondents feel on the question of Spanish identity.   
 
Table 3.10:  Comparative views on nationalist-relat ed issues  





1. Regions should become 
independent if this is what their 
citizens want 
22.5 26.3 5.1 7.7 
2. I identify solely with my region 14 20.8 1.7 5.3 
3. I do not consider myself 
Spanish (despite holding a 
Spanish passport) 
21.3 31.2 5.3 8.5 
4. Catalonia, the Basque Country 
and Galicia should have their own 
‘national’ teams for sports if that 
is what the citizens of these 
regions want.  
67 65.5 24.2 32.6 
 Source: Based on data in *CIS Survey 2667: 2007 
 
Statement 4 addresses the importance of recognising the legitimacy of minority 
nations and has strong support, not only in the regions directly affected but also (to a 
lesser but significant extent) in other regions. Statements 3 and 1 show that between 
20%-30% of Catalans and Basques believe in the self-determination of their region 
and certainly favour a fairly radical pro-independec  position, a stance which enjoys 
less support elsewhere in Spain. The far lower percentage of those who support 
Statement 2 demonstrates that, amongst Catalans in particular, only a sizeable 
minority identify solely with Catalonia.35 
 
However, when asked to declare their stance on spañolismo (Spanish Nationalism), 
respondents showed a surprising level of attachment to the concept of Spanish 
Nationalism (see Table 3.11). The CIS survey confirms the prevalence of nationalist 
sentiment but also demonstrates the persistence of Spanish Nationalism: even the 
Basque Country includes 14% who identify with Spanish Nationalism (Table 3.11) 
                                                
35 These figures obviously only provide an approximaton and do not take into account a number of 





whilst only 20.8% of Basques and 14% of Catalans identify solely with their 
respective regions (Table 3.10). 
 




Catalonia All of Spain 
Minimal 
identification  
40% 31% 12.9% 
Maximal 
identification 
14% 31% 54.7% 
 Source: Based on data in *CIS Survey 2667: 2007  
 
In an article on non-statewide parties (NSWP), Pallarès and Keating argue that the 
regionalisms in Spain vary in strength and that ‘large parts of the country are without 
significant regionalist sentiment’ (2003: 240). However, this analysis is contradicted 
by other academics who recognise that all the regions are involved in a ‘nation-
building process’ and that ‘regionalism is growing ever stronger’ (Lindley, Upward 
& Wright 2002: 20). In fact, the aforementioned authors’ findings show that trans-
regional migration is becoming less and less likely as people increasingly identify 
with their own region.  
 
 Spanish workers with higher education qualifications (the most likely to 
migrate from one region to another) have a migration probability of only 
0.39% (Lindley, Upward & Wright 2002: 20). 
 
Few would doubt that, by and large, a ‘secular, modern and decentralised conception 
of the Spanish nation’ (Muñoz 2009: 620) has been achieved, and that nationalism 
bolsters the legitimacy of the central government in that it allows citizens to have a 
greater voice in the matters that concern them, thus fostering a greater social 
solidarity. However, this trend also promotes citizens’ closer identification with their 
region, and hence exacerbates underlying tensions between regions and between the 
regions and the state. To date, it has proved impossible to reconcile these two 
competing notions of Spain as a unitary state or as a ‘nation of nations’. This 





are referred to in Spain as ‘The Two Spains’. It is important to consider this concept 
briefly, given its complexity and its influence on all areas of political life.   
 
3.3.3 The Two Spains   
The concept of the two Spains – i.e. the division of Spain into two polarised and very 
antagonistic ideological camps – is a metaphor that became common currency in 19th 
and 20th century Spain (Benlloch 2006), culminated in the confrontation of these two 
sides during the Civil War (1936-1939) and lives on in the collective memory to this 
day. The first ‘Spain’ was Catholic, monarchist, traditionalist, middle-class, 
conservative, land-owning, centralist and isolationist; the second ‘Spain’ was 
Republican, anti-traditionalist, left-wing or anarchist, less prosperous, in favour of a 
decentralised Spain and anxious to become ‘European’.  
 
Nowadays, the dividing lines between the two camps are less clear cut. Nearly all 
Spaniards are pro-European (and, in fact, the anti-Europeans are more likely to be 
drawn from those on the left) and the religious question is less important than it was.  
Nevertheless, most Spaniards align themselves on one side or other of the divide, and 
an awareness of this ideological undercurrent is essential to understanding Spanish 
politics.  
 
Domestic political and social policies continue to play out the tussle between the two 
Spains, depending on which of the two majoritarian36 parties, the socialists (PSOE) or 
the People’s Party (PP), is in government. Since 2004, when it won the elections37, 
the PSOE government has further decentralised Spain by devolving more powers to 
the regions, has introduced a number of progressive ocial policies (for example, 
there has been gender parity in the Cabinet since 2004), and has introduced the 2007 
Historical Memory Act, a law finally recognising the need to honour the Republican 
soldiers killed during the Spanish Civil War. Such measures have been opposed by 
                                                
36 Despite an electoral system based on proportional representation, the Spanish two-party system is 
more firmly embedded than the UK’s. In the 2008 general election, PSOE and PP obtained, between 
them, over 84% of the votes and 92% of the seats, slightly up from the previous election, which in 
turn shows an increasing bipolarisation on earlier el ctions. In contrast,  UK figures for the 2005 
general election show the Conservatives and Labour obtaining 70% of the votes and 87.5% of the 
seats (whilst in 2010 they obtained 65% of the votes and 87.7% of the seats).   





the PP as unnecessarily stirring up antagonisms from the past. Although similar 
ideological cleavages are present in all democracies, in Spain the concept of the two 
Spains is particularly contentious because the subject was avoided until recently by 
tacit consensus and was held to have diminished greatly in importance (Torcal, 
Gunther & Montero 2002:82). However, it is implicitly or explicitly present in many 
debates, and has been the subject of many historical analyses (for example, Juliá Díaz 
2004). Since PSOE came to power in 2004 and passed a number of controversial 
laws, the notion of the two Spains has risen to the for  once again.  
 
Although a number of cleavages divide Spanish society – attitudes to religion, the 
monarchy, left-right and nationalism – and it is possible to adopt a different position 
on each issue, in practice Spaniards generally align themselves either with 
‘reactionary’ or ‘progressive’ Spain, thus perpetuating the polarisation of Spanish 
politics. The exception to this rule are some nationalist parties, which combine an 
economically conservative, Catholic position with a commitment to nationalism. 
However, these parties38 focus exclusively on their own nation’s political culture and 
are therefore less interested in considering their positions with respect to the Two 
Spains.  
 
3.4 THE TERRITORIAL DIMENSION AS A KEY FACTOR WITHIN THE SPANISH PESM 
 
This thesis argues that the territorial dimension is key to understanding the Spanish 
Greens’ trajectory. The polarisation of Spanish society into centralists and 
nationalists is replicated within the Greens, but complicated by the fact that, 
ideologically, the Greens inequivocably place themslves in the ‘progressive’ camp 
with regard to the Two Spains. However, their positi n as regards nationalism 
straddles both sides of the divide. Whilst supporting decentralisation and government 
that is closer to the people, many Green leaders – backed by the European Green 
Party (EGP) and its precursors – believe that Spain needs to have an effective 
statewide Green party. Any attempts to bring this about have resulted in a centrally 
organised party which, ipso facto, has alienated many of the regional parties and has 
                                                
38 The two main parties that represent this position are CiU, the Catalan Convergence and Union 
party, which has governed Catalonia more than any other party and PNV, the Basque Nationalist 





led to accusations that the party is authoritarian and reactionary in its modus 
operandi.  
 
Until now, the Greens’ ‘solution’ to the regional quandary has evolved organically as 
the original Green party gradually gave way to a serie  of regional parties; however, 
rather than working from the premise that these regional parties could form the basis 
for a loose confederation of Greens, many of the Grens’ activists and leaders 
continue to aspire to the ideal of a single, statewid  Green party.  
 
The next section will examine in more detail the double-edged  impact of the 
territorial dimension on the Spanish Greens.  
 
3.4.1 Territorial politics as a constraining factor  for the Spanish Greens 
This section examines a number of issues related to nati nalism which have had, or 
continue to have, a negative impact on the Spanish Greens. The besetting problem for 
the Spanish Greens is undeniably the hostile factionalism that exists within this group 
of parties, and there is no doubt that the nationalst issue led to the initial 
fragmentation of LV. Less than a year after the party was formed, the main C talan 
faction seceded from the party: the key disagreement was a difference of opinion as 
to whether to set up a confederation or federation of Green parties. The undercurrent 
of this semantic argument originated in the sense of grievance harboured by Catalan 
Greens (many of whom were nationalists) who perceived the Spanish Greens as 
wanting to assume control over the Catalan party. Their view was that the Catalan 
Greens should be autonomous as they were representing a nation rather than a 
Spanish region. The Spanish Greens, wittingly or unwittingly, reflected the views of 
most Spaniards on Catalonia: they viewed the Catalans s being haughty and 
absurdly hostile to Spain. In this atmosphere, it was easy for emotions to run high. 
This in turn led to recriminations, and an antagonism which led the Catalans to 
withdraw from LV (Interviews with a number of party leaders: 1996, 2005, 2007).  
 
With hindsight, it is clear that greater sympathy with the Catalan’s viewpoint in the 
early days, followed by proper deliberation and cooperation, might have led to the 





Spain’s minority nations were less understood, and certainly did not have the 
legitimacy which they have by now acquired amongst Spanish ‘progressives’. The 
majority of the Green party favoured the creation of a centrally controlled party, 
largely because they lacked the resources to establish grassroots operations 
throughout Spain (Interview with Garrido 2005). At that time the statewide Green 
party model also seemed the obvious choice, given that LV aimed to establish 
themselves as the Spanish counterparts of Green parties in other countries. In this 
respect, they were following the advice of the European Green Coordination (EGC), 
an early precursor of the EGP. One of the biggest grudges which the Catalan greens 
bore towards the ‘Spanish’ greens was the fact that, during those early years, the 
EGC would not recognise the Catalan Green party because it only ‘allowed’ one 
green party per ‘nation’ to join the alliance of Green parties39. This was very galling 
to Catalan sensibilities, as was the ‘gloating attitude’ of the Spanish Greens 
(Interview with Catalan Green leader 03/12/07).  
 
However, the fragmentation was not limited to a sece sionist Catalan group. 
Libertarian Spanish Greens from many different regions were disinclined to accept 
control from a centrally controlled party. Tensions began to arise between the party 
elite at the centre and the various regional parties which increasingly clustered around 
a key regional leader or leaders, thus giving rise to the creation of separate fiefdoms 
which persist to this day.  
 
By 1993, LV acknowledged the reality of its position – the fact that the party was 
made up of disparate regional factions – and constituted itself into a confederation of 
regional Green parties, La Confederación de los Verdes (CLV). However, this 
decision led to the emergence of another Green party, LVGP  (Los Verdes-Grupo 
Verde, The Greens-Green Group) which was created to oppose the fragmentation of 
Spain’s Greens. It strongly defended the idea of a statewide party, thus illustrating the 
centralist-nationalist cleavage at the heart of Spanish politics. The following extract, 
                                                
39 In the early days of the Green parties, the different European Green parties formed various unifying 
associations or federations. Between 1984-1993 they had a loose alliance, the EGC. In 1993 they 
became the European Federation of Green Parties (EFGP) and, in 2004,  they reconstituted themselves 





written by the leader of LVGV, gives an insight into the centralist-nationalist division 
within the Greens on this issue. 
 
[LVGV] is a party of national scope in Spain, but there are other regional 
Green parties that do not agree with the existence of a national party. They 
say … that its regions are the true nations and that the Spanish State is a 
supranational structure. We do not participate in discussions as to whether or 
not the regions are states because the nationalist argument is often hollow. It 
is purely rhetorical [...] We feel that people should be free to decide their own 
destiny … But as long as Spain is a State, our structu e ought to have the 
scope of the State so that we can offer alternative solutions to its problems 
(Cabal 1997).   
 
Despite the increasing regionalisation of politics (Swenden & Maddens 2009: 5), and 
the fact that there are now other models of successful Green ‘regional’ parties (such 
as, for example, the Scottish Greens or the Swiss Greens, who are a confederation of 
independent parties), path dependency40 appears to have prevented the Spanish 
Greens from finding a solution that combines regional diversity and a single political 
brand at state level. Enmities and  mistrust generated in a previous period have left 
the Spanish Greens trapped in their past history and u able to reach an 
accommodation. However, if one looks beyond parties to other Spanish green actors 
there are examples of formerly factionalised groups which are now working 
effectively within a confederation. The best example of this is Spain’s largest EMO, 
Ecologistas en Acción (EA). EA is an excellent working model of a confederation 
that has proved effective in preserving the autonomy of regional groups whilst 
creating a statewide identity.  
 
There is lack of consensus within the Spanish Greens as to which strategy to pursue 
with regards to party organisation. Whilst some are decidedly in favour of creating a 
single party (regardless of whether it is confederal or federal), a number of the 
regional parties are unwilling to choose a path which prevents them from having 
complete autonomy as regards electoral alliances they want to make at regional level. 
This issue will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter 4.  
 
                                                
40  As stated in Chapter 2, ‘path dependency’ refers to the theory that parties or organisations are 





A second constraining factor for the Greens, and one that is also linked to the 
nationalist issue, is party competition. As previously mentioned, nationalism is no 
longer the preserve of the historic nationalities but has spread significantly to about 
10 regions, which now have – to a greater or lesser extent – at least one (sometimes 
more) nationalist party, many of which are left-of-centre. As such, these parties allow 
‘ecologists’ or sympathisers of  political ecology who are disaffected with the main 
statewide parties to choose a party that promotes values which appear to be fairly 
similar to the Greens’. As Holliday states, ‘these parties, which naturally and 
uniformly base their campaigns on all forms of regional promotion and protection, 
are often explicitly defensive of the regional environment’ (Holliday 1997: 170). In 
some regions, therefore, the Greens have to compete with a more established, 
broader-based nationalist (and more electable) party. Galicia and Aragón, to cite a 
couple of examples, each have a left-wing nationalist party (the BNG41 and CHA42 
respectively). Consequently, despite the high profile accorded to environmental 
concerns in both regions43, both regions have an unexpectedly weak Green party.  
 
This section has demonstrated that the territorial aspect of Spanish politics has been a 
key factor contributing to the weakness of the Spanish Greens. In addition to 
hindering the coordination that would be necessary to sustain an effective Green 
Confederation, and contributing to the proliferation of Green parties, the presence of 
nationalist parties has further undermined the Greens’ possibility of securing the 
votes of environmentally-conscious voters.  
 
Having dwelt on the more problematic aspects concerning regionalism and its impact 
on the Spanish Greens, the following section looks at the opportunity afforded by 
sub-state government and suggests that this is the locusof green politics. 
 
 
                                                
41 The Bloque Nacionalista Galego (Galician Nationalist Bloc) 
42 The Chunta Aragonesista (The Aragonese Union) 
43 Galicia is routinely affected by the large number of forest fires which rage through the region each 
summer and in 2002 the coasts of Galicia suffered a terrible environmental disaster as a result of a 
vast oil spill from an oil tanker, the Prestige, which sank off the coast of Galicia.  





3.4.2 The regional dimension: key to understanding ‘Los Verdes’  
As has been made clear, there is no longer a party c lled Los Verdes, although a 
statewide party going by this name existed between 1984 and 1993. At present, there 
are three Green parties with a statewide remit. Most of the regional Green parties 
(sometimes there are two or three Green parties in ach region) belong, or are allied, to 
one of these three groups but the interregional differences between parties within the 
same federation are considerable. Some of the parties always stand on an  
‘independent’44 ticket whereas others form an electoral alliance with IU or a 
nationalist party.  
 
In sum, whilst there is no doubt that Spain lacks a Green party in any way comparable 
to Europe’s emblematic Green parties – i.e. there is no single, symbolic ‘party’ that 
unites ‘Greens’ throughout the country – this does not mean that political ecology 
should be discounted as being irrelevant to party politics. If we interpret the Greens’ 
collective trajectory from a regional perspective th n the achievements of the smaller 
parties which make up the Spanish Greens deserve greater recognition. Firstly, these 
parties have been in operation for over 25 years and during that time, whilst routinely 
failing to win any elections unless they are part of a coalition, they have usually been 
the fourth or fifth most voted party in their respective district, and well ahead of other 
single issue or protest parties. Their survival andsupport (even if slight) demonstrates 
that they are not just a conjunctural phenomenon but represent a deep-seated if 
minority desire for structural and institutional change.  
 
But above all, regional and local Green parties have t times enjoyed a higher profile 
than that outlined above. As a result of the different opportunities available at 
regional level, in a small number of cases the Greens have featured in coalition 
governments where they have been able to introduce policy changes and gain access 
to government (examples of Green coalitions will be given in Chapters 4-6).  
 
However, despite the importance of sub-national politics in a quasi-federal country 
such as Spain, academic literature on the Greens neglects the importance of the 
                                                
44 ‘Independent Green votes/parties are those which are not allied to any other party, so that each 





regional and local arena and largely restricts itself to measuring the performance of 
Green parties at statewide level. For example, in a comparative study of European 
Greens, Müller-Rommel defines a Green party ‘as successful if its degree of 
concentration in national government is above three percent’ (1994a: 13).   
 
In a later work, Müller-Rommel and Poguntke systematically compare Green parties 
according to how many ‘thresholds’ they have crossed. They equate  ‘successful’ 
Green parties as those which have passed the ‘representation’ and ‘relevance’ 
thresholds at national level (2002:3). Spain is cited in this study45 as one of five 
countries that fails to pass either of these threshold . Although Müller-Rommel 
recognises that federal structures can help Green parties achieve electoral success 
(1994b: 149), ultimate ‘success’ continues to be measured by achieving 
representation in the national parliament.  
 
Müller-Rommel and Poguntke’s conclusions can be criticised on two counts. Firstly, 
their study is factually incorrect in its findings that there was no Green party in the 
Spanish national parliament in 2002 because ICV – which has defined itself as an 
ecosocialist party since 1999 – held a seat in the Congreso at that time. The failure to 
include them is based on an imperfect knowledge of the Spanish Greens thus 
demonstrating that, because they were unaware of a regional Green party, they failed 
to spot its presence in the national parliament.  
 
Secondly, the shortcomings of Müller-Rommel and Poguntke’s position are evident: 
Europe’s regions and minority nations have gained immeasurably in importance as 
has the importance of regional government and the growing interest of scholars in 
this area of politics (Swenden & Maddens 2009; Hopkin 2009). Whilst this trend is 
worldwide and is part of the ‘glocalisation’ phenomenon (Swenden 2006:1), it is 
particularly pronounced in the case of Spain, and the State of the Autonomies’ 
arrangement has led to the country’s inclusion in many studies relating to sub-
nationalism. These studies have emphasised the existence of multilevel government 
and co-existing party systems (Pallarés & Keating 2003) within Spain and have also 
                                                





emphasised the influence that territorial politics can have on statewide politics. It is 
therefore surprising to see scholars writing about Green politics – given Green 
politics’ belief in decentralisation – whilst adhering to a stance which is closer to the 
statewide perspective traditionally adopted by classic literature on political parties.  
 
As well as contesting the premise that a party’s importance can only be measured at 
statewide level, there are undoubtedly a number of empirical reasons which support 
the idea that the regional arena is the ideal locus of green party politics in Spain.  
Firstly, the meso-government level has ‘produced multiple arenas for political 
competition, strategic opportunities for political actors, and possibilities for electors 
to use their votes tactically’ (Pallarès & Keating 2003: 239). In other words, the small 
regional Green parties are best placed to find themselves a political space within a 
regional party system, and one that increases their possibilities of election (via 
seeking electoral alliances), if that is the line that the regional party activists want to 
pursue. In addition to these strategic reasons, there are further crucial reasons for 
stressing the importance of regional politics. The regional tier of government is 
responsible for the implementation, and indeed enactment, of many policies that 
impact on the lives of that region’s inhabitants: the environment, transport, housing 
and agriculture, to name but a few. As chapters 4-6 will demonstrate, the Greens and 
the wider PESM have been able to seize opportunities afforded to them by a smaller 
political arena to implement policy changes in some of these areas.  
 
The regional tier of government also provides greater electoral opportunities to a 
smaller party such as the Greens because the threshold of representation is lower. 
Regional elections use the same voting districts as the general elections but return 
three or four times more deputies per province, which allows for greater 
proportionality. However, many regions set a 5% thres old for the regional elections 
(some set only 3%) and, given the Greens’ low level of support, it has so far proved 
impossible for an independent Green candidate to win a seat in the regional elections. 
Nevertheless, the possibility of winning a seat in a regional parliament is a more 





the province of Seville46 if they got just over 5.5% of the vote. In order to win a seat 
for Seville in a general election, the Greens would have to obtain about 7.6% of the 
vote.  
 
Regional parliaments also offer greater opportunities o a smaller party due to the fact 
that the regional elections are less dominated by the two main parties than in the 
statewide elections, where PSOE and PP concentrate mor  than 75% of the votes and 
80% of the seats. Admittedly, even at regional level, the two leading parties have 
tended to govern in most of the autonomous regions. Figures for 2007 showed PSOE 
and PP each governing in eight regions whilst only e region,  the Basque Country,  
was governed by neither of these parties (El Pais 2007 Election Special); however, 
PSOE only had an absolute majority in three regions whilst PP had an absolute 
majority in five regions. In eight regions, therefore, the government consisted of a 
coalition, sometimes of just two parties, but in some cases including three or more 
parties, including the Greens.   
 
3.5 Conclusion 
The present chapter has outlined a number of Spain-specific factors which have 
influenced the trajectory of the country’s PESM and its Green parties. It has shown 
that Spaniards are not less postmaterialistic than other West European countries, are 
similarly concerned about the environment, and that t e presumption that the country 
is an environmental laggard is based on a value judgement that is questionable. The 
chapter has provided explanations which allow for a more accurate interpretation of 
the state of political ecology in Spain. The chapter argued further that Spanish PE 
needs to be judged on its own merits rather than making (usually) unfavourable 
comparisons with other countries. Finally, the chapter demonstrated that a study of 
Los Verdes must start from the realisation that the territorial dimension has been 
instrumental in the fragmentation of  this group of parties, a fragmentation which 
could, theoretically, be turned to the advantage of LV. The following chapter 
provides an in-depth analysis of Spanish PE, and demonstrates that, contrary to 
popular perception, ecologism is a well-established movement in Spain.  
                                                





CHAPTER 4 POLITICAL ECOLOGY IN SPAIN  
 
The present chapter provides an understanding of what Monica Frassoni, co-
president of the European Green Party (EGP), has called ‘a very various and 
complicated Green world’ (Greens/EFA Media 2010). The first section looks at the 
origins and early years of  ecologism in Spain while Sections 4.2 and 4.3 respectively 
provide an overview of the Spanish Greens and the PESM after 1983. The 
complexity of Spanish ecologism deserves to be examined in some detail in order to 
build up a more accurate picture of this largely neglected phenomenon. The present 
account seeks to correct the commonly-held view regarding Spain’s lack of interest 




4.1  THE ORIGINS OF POLITICAL ECOLOGY IN SPAIN: 1970-1986 
 
Ecologism started in Spain towards the end of the 1960s47, in the latter days of 
Franco’s dictatorship, when opposition to the regime was growing exponentially. 
The movement was made up of small environmental groups, some arising out of 
neighbourhood associations, but most set up to mobilise opposition to the regime 
over a range of local problems. There was very limited statewide coordination in the 
                                                
47 However, as Fernández demonstrates, the notion of res urce depletion, or the confrontation between 
Economics and Ecology, is centuries old. He cites a 1679 document  outlining the complaints of  some 
Catalan fishermen against the owners of  ‘modern’ drift-net fishing-boats. These  used fine mesh and 
caught a large number of very young fishes, thus dangerously reducing fish stocks (1999: pp. 13-43). 
 
More recently, the last 20 years of the 19th century witnessed a number of movements that were the 
precursors of modern ecologism: the 50 years preceding the Spanish civil war (1936-1939) saw a 
growing interest in conservationism and a raft of measures introduced to protect Spain’s natural 
environment (Ramos Gorostiza 2006). Concurrently, there was a liberal impulse, largely driven by the 
ideas outlined by a progressive educational movement called the Institución Libre de Enseñanza (The 
Free Institute of Education), which emphasised the positive aspects of the countryside to urban 
dwellers and also encouraged the rural population to value their surroundings; finally, the anarchist 
movement was particularly vigorous in Spain during this period  and advocated what  Masjuan 
Bracons (2000) calls ‘human ecology’. By this, he is referring to a set of beliefs which included 
concern for overpopulation, a belief in naturism and vegetarianism and a belief in counteracting the 
negative effects of industrialisation by creating communities linked to the land: garden cities in urban 







early days, a pattern that has marked Spain’s PESM and affected its subsequent 
development.  
 
The dictatorship which lasted until the end of 1975 and the country’s ensuing 
transition to democracy also influenced the early days of the PESM. Franco’s 
dictatorship is seen as a 35 year period which ‘anaesthetised’ civil society (Ramos 
Gorostiza 2006) and severed pre-existing links with the past, including a number of 
movements that appear to have clear connections with ecologism. Spanish ecologists 
stress their isolation from the ‘outside world’ during that period and even, for 
example, their disconnection from the uprisings in Prague or Paris (Varillas and da 
Cruz 1981: 8)  
 
However, when the Club of Rome’s report, The Limits to Growth, was published in 
1972, a translated version was available that same year in Spain and attracted 
considerable interest. Clearly, the interest in enviro mental questions elsewhere had 
also begun to resonate in Spain. In the late 1960s the Franco regime began to accord 
environmental questions a limited attention (Ramos G rostiza 2006: 123-125) and 
introduced a few laws relating to the protection of natural resources. The first 
environmental government organisations (ICONA and CIAMA 48) were created in 
1971 largely, according to Ramos Gorostiza (2006), in order to demonstrate Spain’s 
legitimacy at the UN’s 1972 Conference on the Human Environment in Stockholm. 
In fact, the regime prioritised a developmentalist approach that capitalised  on low 
wages and ignored health and safety concerns in a drive to attract inward investment 
(Recio 1992 :163).    
 
Attempts to set up a state-wide environmental movement organisation (EMO) 
occurred at around the same time. AEORMA (1970-1975)49 was the first statewide, 
contestatory EMO (largely based in Madrid). As well as mounting a big campaign in 
defence of the threatened capercaillie, it also took a clear anti-nuclear power and 
                                                
48 ICONA was the  Instituto Nacional para la Conservación de la Naturaleza (National Institute for 
Nature Conservation) and CIAMA stands for  the Comisión Interministerial para la Adecuación del 
Medio Ambiente (Inter-Ministerial Committee to Ensure Environmental Standards) 
49 Asociación Española para la Ordenación del Territorio y el Medio Ambiente  (The Spanish 





anti-motorways stance (Fernández 1999: 52). Its exit nce encouraged the creation of 
a large number of local and regional movements and in 1974 the first gathering of 
these movements took place in Navarre50.  
 
A few international NGOs such as ADENA/WWF51, Friends of the Earth (FOE) and 
Greenpeace were established in Spain during these early years (in 1968, 1979 and 
1984 respectively). However, these ‘professional’ ENGOs focused exclusively on 
environmental matters and were not part of the PESM, with its wider social and 
political remit.   
  
Early attempts to create a strong, statewide movement foundered: statewide 
movements were short-lived and lacked grassroot support. This failure was hardly 
surprising. The importance of the regional dimensio made it more likely that 
ecologists would continue to identify with regional movements. Furthermore, the 
movement rejected the compromise which a strong central organisation would 
require, was viscerally libertarian, predominantly left-wing, closely connected to 
pacifist and feminist movements, in favour of a pluri-national and federal Spain and, 
above all, linked to the struggle for democracy (Ramos Gorostiza 2006: 114; Varillas 
1992; Jiménez 2005).  
 
After Franco’s death in 1975, local and regional groups proliferated but failed to 
come together. AEORMA ceased to exist in 1975, was replaced by another  
organisation which only lasted a few months, and then by AEDENAT (Asociación 
Ecologista para la Defensa de la Naturaleza, The Environmental Association for the 
Defence of Nature), which was created in 1976. However, these state-wide EMOs 
                                                
50 The conference was sanctioned by the dictatorship wch even published the conference’s details in 
the National Movement’s official magazine (the National Movement was Franco’s  official ‘party’ or 
ideological club).  
  
This small detail highlights the ambiguous position l g occupied by political ecology: despite its 
‘radical’ ideology, in practice PE often allies with environmentalists of a more conservationist hue. As 
the above example shows, this compromise can lead to the activities of a progressive organisation 
being given coverage in a magazine which promotes a r pressive status quo; this, in turn, leads to 
political ecologists  being regarded with a certain degree of mistrust, a situation which has persisted to 
this day (and which also pertains in other countries).   
51 Adena was ‘mainly known as trying to protect nature without daring to confront and attack those 





were organised from the centre and were therefore ignored by the many local groups 
and associations. It is estimated that there were around 500 different groups in the 
early 1980s (Varillas 1980) but, given that the country had only just emerged from a 
40 year repressive regime, it is unsurprising that e movements were loath to give 
up their autonomy. Furthermore, the suppression of civil society and the social 
mobilisation which exploded in the final years of the regime went hand in hand with 
abundant idealism but no experience as to how to create an effective organisation 
(Recio 1992: 168).  An activist from the early days de cribes the movement:   
 
About 30 groups and organisations were there, and there was everything: 
ornithologists, anarchists, communists, anti-nuclear activists, farm-workers 
and country folk, intellectuals, machos, feminists, those who were in favour 
of violence and those who opposed it, pacifists … Sheer physical exhaustion 
finally led to the statutes being passed. (Varillas 1985, quoted in *Fernández 
1999: 61) 
 
Nonetheless, despite its apparently fissiparous nature, the PESM achieved a few 
notable successes. Firstly, mobilisation against Spain’s nuclear power programme 
successfully halted the planned expansion of this programme. The first three nuclear 
power stations had opened in 1968, 1971 and 1972. By 1978, when the National 
Energy Plan was introduced, seven more were already un er construction, and the 
new plan proposed to build many more (37 altogether). The level of opposition to 
nuclear power – the campaign was the centrepiece of the ecologist movement from 
1973-1983 – led the new PSOE government in 1982 to announce a moratorium on 
building any more nuclear power stations.52 The PESM also influenced policy on 
numerous conservation issues by mobilising public support – some of these will be 
looked at in subsequent chapters on Andalucía and Ctalonia. 
 
However, attempts to unify the ecologist movement ld only to periodic meetings 
and the drafting of successive manifestos. The 1978 Daimiel Manifesto, drawn up at 
such a gathering (see Appendix B), demonstrates that the core tenets of PE were 
clearly in place. The document  lists 12 points which coincide substantially with the 
‘four pillars or principles of Green politics’, as set out later in the German Greens’ 
                                                





1983 programme: ecological responsibility, grassroots democracy, social justice and 
non-violence (Carter 2001: 49). The only ‘problem’ was that the movement could not 
decide on how to operationalise their ideas.  
 
As 1982 drew nearer, ecologists began to mark time in anticipation of PSOE’s 
electoral victory, which augured well for the future of environmentalism in Spain. 
PSOE had promised to introduce substantial changes if they won the 1982 election: 
one of their pledges was to pull Spain out of NATO53.   
 
Once in power, PSOE largely showed its disregard fo environmental concerns that 
clashed with the need to promote economic prosperity and create jobs54. The 
Socialist’s dismissive attitude towards environmental matters is well documented (La 
Calle Domínguez 2001; Bigas 1992) and most of the reforms anticipated by ecologists 
were not to take place, although the prospect of such reforms had persuaded  many 
ecologists to join the new socialist administration (Jiménez 2005: 71).  
 
Once it became evident that PSOE would not advance the ecologists’ cause, a 
subgroup within the movement was persuaded of the need to establish a Spanish 
Green party, spurred on by the electoral success of die Grünen, who in March 1983 
won 27 seats in the German Bundestag. In May of the same year, at an 
environmental  film festival in Tenerife, die Grünen’s leader, Petra Kelly, persuaded 
a group of Spanish ecologists to sign a manifesto stating their intention to found a 
Green party. Her reasons were that Spain needed a  Green party so that it could 
pursue a common strategy with other European Green parties, namely to fight against 
salient problems such as radioactive waste, nuclear ene gy and the NATO alliance 
(Cabal 1996: 22). 
 
Ecologists interested in setting up a party, like th ir counterparts elsewhere, felt that 
the time had come to fight the political system from the inside. However, the project 
                                                
53 Spain joined NATO  in 1981 when, despite  much popular opposition, the Spanish parliament voted 
in favour of the decision. On this occasion, PSOE – along with the communist party -  voted against 
the motion.  
 





was greeted with hostility by most ecologists, eithr because they espoused anarchist 
anti-party values, distrusted the motivation of aspiring Green politicians or because 
they were already affiliated or loyal to another paty. It must be borne in mind that, 
just as some progressives in other countries were growing disillusioned with their 
countries’ main parties and were turning to the Greens as something new and fresh, 
Spain was coming out of the transition and progressiv  voters continued to place 
some hope in PSOE (Valencia Sáiz 2009).  
 
Nevertheless, despite the disapproval of most ecologists, a preliminary meeting was 
held at the end of 1983 in Seville to set up the Spanish Green party, Los Verdes 
(LV) 55.  
  
Before moving on to examine the Spanish Greens, thi section will briefly56 provide 
some background to the NATO issue, given that the opposition movement it 
spawned provided a starting point for both LV and IU, both founded around this time 
and issue.   
 
When PSOE first came to power in 1982 it declared its intention to hold a 
referendum to decide on Spain’s continuing membership of NATO. Once in power, 
PSOE gradually shifted its position and mounted a strong campaign calling for a 
‘yes’ vote. Opposition was fierce, and was led by a broad social movement that 
included the PCE (Partido Comunista de España, Spanish Communist Party), some 
left-wing nationalist parties, ecologists and pacifists. In spite of this, the decision to 
remain within NATO carried the day, with 52.5% voting in favour (Vallés et al. 
1986: 308).  
 
The NATO question, which irrefutably showed that PSOE was not the harbinger of 
progressive politics, was instrumental in leading the PCE to found IU (United Left), 
a coalition party that included members of the anti-NATO movement, left-wing 
nationalists and smaller alternative left parties. Although LV had been part of the 
                                                
55 By 1983, the UK’s Ecology Party - the first Green party in Europe – had been in existence for ten 
years, whereas the French Greens, Les Verts, were only founded in 1982 





social movement surrounding the anti-NATO campaign, they declined to join IU, 
fearing that this far more established party would absorb the Greens. Consequently, 
LV ’s electoral début in the 1987 municipal elections took place at the same time as 
IU’s: LV therefore found itself competing for votes with another alternative left 
party, one that symbolised the anti-Nato struggle and, furthermore, could count on 
the organisational structure and resources of the PCE.  
 
 
4.2  THE SPANISH GREENS 1983-2010 
 
The following section follows the trajectory of the Spanish Greens. The first two 
sub-sections provide a diachronic account which show  how and why LV fragmented 
into increasingly numerous parties, analyses their electoral performance and 
highlights the various strategies adopted by this group of parties over the years.   
 
The third subsection focuses on a number of key dimensions that have constrained 
the Greens’ attempts to establish a ‘successful’ party.  
 
4.2.1 The Early Years (1984-1993):  
LV was largely modelled on die Grünen and shared all of the principles and many 
characteristics common to Green parties elsewhere. Th re was, for example, a belief 
in  participatory democracy, a non-hierarchical leadership structure and the insistence 
on being a non-party party (Espinoza 1995: 120). However, one of the central 
barriers facing LV from the outset, namely the presence of ‘rogue’ Green parties, 
was instrumental in preventing the Greens from consolidating their presence in the 
early years. These ‘rogue parties’ were clearly not par  of the PE movement and their 
principles and organisation did not conform to Green party norms. Table 4.1 lists the 
first Spanish Green parties and indicates the rogue parties with an ‘R’.   
 








Table 4.1:  First Green Parties in Spain 
Year 
founded 
Name Acronym English equivalent 
1977 Partido Ecológico 
Español 
PEE   (R) Spanish Ecology Party 






Spanish Vertex for the Demand 
for Environmental Development 





Green Alternative – Catalan 
Ecology Movement 
1984 Los Verdes LV The Greens 
1987 Los Verdes 
Ecologistas 
LVE  (R) The Green Ecologists 
    Sources: MIR 2010 and Lozano 2010 
 
PEE was a very short-lived (it lasted one year), right-wing, ‘two-man Green party’ 
(Fernández 1999: 56); it is only worth mentioning because its right-wing 
characteristics contributed to a confusion of the Greens’ ideological positioning; 
Spain’s second Green party, VERDE, ostensibly espoused some Green issues, but 
was generally held to be idiosyncratic, conservationist and conservative (El Pais 
15/06/1989), with a raison d’être based around an i terest in naturopathy57 (Baras 
1992: Cabal 1996). Others have described it as a reactionary party whose leaders 
were in favour of nuclear power and bull-fighting (Recio 1992).   
 
The third Green party to register itself officially was Alternativa Verda (AV), a 
Catalan party that was the Catalan counterpart of the soon to be founded Spanish LV. 
Although AV was initially a signatory to the creation of LV, its nationalist stance led 
to its secession from LV almost immediately.  
 
In addition to VERDE, another ‘rogue’ party, LVE, was created in 1987. This party 
was part of a sect called Silo (Cabal 1996) althoug other reliable sources claim that 
it was funded by PSOE to split the Green vote (Recio 1992).  
                                                
57 The activity of VERDE is harder to fathom, and it is impossible to obtain a satisfactory account of 
this party, led by the prosperous editor of successiv  newspapers who enlisted friends and family into
his political project. The party clearly had the funding to present itself exactly where other green 





Over and above the usual problems faced by Green parties (see Kitschelt 1989 on the 
Belgian Greens), LV faced two additional problems during the early years: the first 
was the fact that the Green message, accompanied by a verde or ecologista label, was 
tarnished from the outset. Surveys at the time showed that voters could not 
distinguish between the different Green parties (El Pais 09/06/1989) and this 
undoubtedly prevented the Greens from establishing a distinctive political space. 
Voter confusion was further exacerbated by the ‘real’ Greens’ propensity to change 
their names slightly from one election to the next, to reflect  changes of strategy or 
realignments58. The second major problem facing LV was the fact tha heir centralist 
edifice lasted only a few months before factionalism led to a few groups breaking 
away. 
  
Whilst the problems outlined above prevented the consolidation of a single Green 
party, a further significant factor constrained LV’s chances of creating a successful 
party, namely IU. As party literature has shown – in particular Kitschelt’s left 
libertarian thesis (1988) but also Richardson and Rootes (1995) – the rules of party 
competition militate against the existence of two ‘alternative left’ parties such as LV 
and IU. Furthermore, the Greens were also competing for votes with a number of 
nationalist, left-wing parties whose programme also demonstrated a similar 
commitment to social and environmental issues59.  
 
A further problem that arose during this first period relates to internal conflicts 
caused by personal rivalries, a common problem in small, unsuccessful parties, as 
Kitschelt states, particularly parties that have too many ideologues (1989: 402). 
Greens from this early period refer to the numerous, heated arguments which 
dominated local and regional meetings, leading many frustrated activists to pull out.   
 
                                                
58 This study has, in many instances, ignored or simplified all the slight variations in nomenclature as 
they are very confusing and of little interest except insofar as they reflect a lack of awareness of the 
electorate’s need to identify with a particular party 
59 Examples of these parties are Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya (ERC, the Catalan Republican 
Left), Bloque Nacionalista Galego (BNG, the Galician Nationalist Bloc), Euskadiko Ezquerra (EE, 





Commentators during these early years (and since) routinely stated that the leaders of 
the party were not up to the task (Barcelò 1994; Rodríguez Barreda 2009). Pastor and 
López de Uralde, spokespersons for Greenpeace Spainat the time, referred to LV as 
‘a host of divided Green parties, led sometimes by opportunists or groups with 
dubious Green credentials’ which ‘caused confusion amongst voters’ (*Pastor and 
López de Uralde 1993). Green leaders, on the other hand, complained about the 
shortage of activists (Garrido interview: 2006).  
 
The problems outlined above resulted in poor election results at every level of 
government during these first years. These results are analysed below.   
 
European Parliament and General Elections:  
The results for the European and general elections (1987 and 1989), listed in 
Appendix C, illustrate the fragmentation of the Greens in these early years. LV and 
AV’s inability to present a joint list, coupled with the existence of the two rogue 
parties, led to four different green parties standing in the 1989 European Parliament 
(EP) elections. The aggregated ‘Green’ vote totalled 2.73% which, under Spanish 
electoral rules for the EP, would have secured the Greens a seat (they only needed  
about 1.5% of the vote to win a seat). EP elections n Spain are very favourable to 
small, state-wide parties because there is only one district - the whole country - and 
no minimum threshold. This fact is frequently ignored by Greens when they 
complain that the system of proportional representation in Spain is highly 
unfavourable to small, state-wide parties.60   
 
In the 1989 general election, later that year, LV’s re ults again failed to meet 
expectations. Two leading figures in the ecology movement, Humberto da Cruz 
(founder of the Spanish Friends of the Earth) and the well-known economist, 
Martinez Alier, headed the lists for LV’s two most winnable districts, Madrid and 
Barcelona. Despite surveys predicting that both of these candidates would win a seat, 
                                                
60 In the 1989 EP elections, a small Basque nationalist left-wing party, Euskadiko Ezquerra (EE), 
obtained 1.83% of the vote and consequently got one seat in the European Parliament where it joined 
the Rainbow Group (including Greens and left-wing re ionalist parties). During the election 






da Cruz only managed to get 1.14% of the vote, nowhere near the 3% threshold he 
needed to win a seat, and even the aggregated Green vot  in his district failed to 
reach 3% (see Appendix C for a table showing the disaggregated Green vote for 
Madrid).   
   
Although these results were disappointing, the 1989 results represent the best general 
election results the Greens have ever had when standing independently. Undoubtedly 
the Chernobyl disaster in 1986, the novelty of the Gr en message and die Grünen’s 
electoral success in 1987 (when it captured 8.3% of the votes, and 42 out of 497 seats 
in the Bundestag) contributed towards stimulating interest in Green party politics in 
Spain (Barcelò 1994). 
 
Before the 1993 general election, optimism was once again running high and the 
Greens had finally attracted considerable interest. El País, Spain’s most influential 
(socialist) newspaper, even published a special supplement on Green politics (El País 
01/04/1993). There was great optimism that the Greens would finally arrive on the 
Spanish political scene. One of the rogue parties, VERDE, had ceased to exist, and 
LVE only mounted a half-hearted campaign. The Catalan AV had brokered a unity 
with LV. Nonetheless, the Greens  polled fewer votes than in the 1989 election61.  
 
After this electoral defeat, LV effectively ceased to be a state-wide party as the 
different regional federations distanced themselves from the party command and 
began to chart their own way forward. Behind the scnes, there had long been talks 
with IU (and even PSOE) about possible alliances, and although these were officially 
denied prior to the election (Cabal 1996), LV’s electoral rout precipitated a further 
centrifugal impetus. In January 1994, the party executive decided to change LV into 
a confederation (LV de Asturias 2010) of regional and wholly autonomous parties.  
 
 
                                                
61 LV won 0.79% of the votes as against 0.77% in 1989. However, in 1993 the party also included the 
Catalan AV,  so that this apparently higher figure actually represents a decline in the number of votes 







Regional and local elections 
In the party’s early days, LV primarily prioritised the general and European 
elections, where they received some financial and moral support (Garrido interview: 
2006) from the EGC. They only began to contest regional elections in the early 
1990s. Once again, media predictions that los Verdes would win about 5 different 
regional seats in these early elections (Cabal 1996: 85) came to nothing. However, 
support for the Green option was promising in a fewr gions (standing at about 2.5% 
of the aggregated vote).  Given a more proportional electoral system, LV would even 
have secured seats. For example, LV secured 1.59% of the vote in Madrid in 1991 
but failed to win a seat whereas IUobtained 12.22% of the vote (7.6 times more than 
LV) and won 13 seats. Clearly, the 5% threshold prevented LV from obtaining a 
representation commensurate with their share of the vot .  
 
In short, despite the fact that gaining representation at regional level had a lower 
entry barrier (as was the case for die Grünen, who achieved their first success at 
meso-government level), the Spanish Green regional parties were still disadvantaged 
by the electoral system. Moreover, at regional level th y had to face additional 
competition from nationalist parties, a number of which combined a nationalist and 
new left discourse emphasising the importance of the region’s natural and cultural 
resources as well as calling for solidarity and social justice (see Appendix D for an 
example of the overlap between the Aragonese nationalist party’s discourse with 
LV’s).   
 
In local elections, LV’s failure hinged on a number of further factors: the party was 
under-resourced and prioritised the higher-visibility elections; Green candidates were 
generally viewed with suspicion, were held to be idealistic, impractical and unable to 
provide the services which Spaniards require from their local council, where 
knowing the right person in the town hall can ease bureaucratic hurdles; there were 
competing local parties, including not only the regional parties but usually ad hoc 
independent parties, representing the interests of a particular faction within a town or 
village. Success in the municipal elections would have needed  a network of well-





return 66,099 councillors across the country, only a handful of seats (2 and 5 
respectively) were won by LV in 1987 and 1991. 
 
The death of Los Verdes  
At the end of this first period, LV ceased to exist a  the party was transformed into 
the Confederación de los Verdes (CLV) in January 1994. After ten years, the Greens 
had finally adopted the organisational model first proposed by the Catalan Greens in 
1985. Unfortunately, the decision came too late to save LV. The Catalan Greens 
withdrew from the confederation almost immediately, and CLV remained a loose 
association of predominantly warring Green parties. If the Greens had adopted a  
confederal solution at an earlier stage, they would have avoided the endless inter-
regional party problems ‘which took up almost the entir  energy’ of the early 
Greens’ (*Campomanes 1994: 33). 
 
Nonetheless, during its first ten years the party (and its Catalan counterpart) 
contested an increasing number of seats, and by 1993 the Greens had become an 
established, if still  electorally insignificant, part of the political landscape. 
 
4.2.2 A Confederation of Green Parties is born too late: 1994-2010  
The years 1993 and 1994 marked an important turning point for the Spanish Greens. 
The Green option continued to arouse increasing interes , and despite their 
disappointing general election results in 1993 an El País survey (10/04/1994) 
forecast that the Greens would obtain 3.7% of the vot s in the EP election, thereby 
securing two MEPs – as long as they presented a single list. However, in early 1994 
the party, now a confederation, was at a crossroads: over the last ten years the Greens 
had failed to ‘anchor’ (Gunther 2005) more than a negligible percentage of the 
voters, and the party had to find an alternative way forward.  
 
Two influential documents from this period illustrate ecologists’ awareness of the 





(Pastor & López de Uralde 1993)62. The article analysed the constraints limiting the 
Greens’ potential despite an ‘extraordinarily active and diversified’ PESM (see 
Appendix F,1 for an extract from this article; Box 4.1 provides a brief summary of 
the article). It also expressed optimism about the future of a newly reconstituted LV.  
 
Box 4.1  Factors constraining the Greens  
 Source: Pastor and López de Uralde 1993 
 
The optimism expressed by Pastor and López de Uralde (1993) about the future of 
the Spanish Greens proved to be misplaced. The previous nine years of factionalism, 
divisions and political disappointment had set up a path dependence which prevented 
LV from resolving its internal problems. 
 
The second document, published a few months later by a number of leading 
ecologists in Ecología Política, an environmental journal, was a manifesto outlining 
the challenges facing the Spanish Greens (VV AA 1994). A summary of the 
manifesto’s key points is provided in Box 4.2.  
 
Both documents represent LV’s ‘swan song’. By the time the second one was 
published, LV had become a confederation of regional parties, some of which had 
already distanced themselves from CLV by forming alliances with IU. CLV was 
therefore a weak and incomplete confederation from the outset and, furthermore, had 
to compete with the newly created LVGV, a new statewid  party created by a Green  
 
                                                
62 Pastor founded Greenpeace Spain in 1984 and was its director until 1999. López de Uralde became 
director of Greenpeace in 1999. He stood down  in September 2010 to set up a foundation that is 
hoping to become Spain’s new ‘ecology’ party 
• Ecologists prefer to dedicate their energies to the social movements rather  
      than to a power-seeking Green party        
• Ecologists are reluctant to increase the division of the left  
• The rogue parties led to party fragmentation and hence voter confusion  
• The regional dimension has led to difficulties in creating a single Green party 
• There is intense party competition from similar new l ft parties such as IU  





Box 4.2  The Greens’ Coming of Age Manifesto  
Source: VV AA 1994: 44-46 
 
faction opposed to the setting up of CLV. From this point on, the party began to 
fragment increasingly.   
 
Table 4.2 (below), listing the Green groups that stood in the 2008 general election, 
provides a snapshot indicating the degree of factional sm which has prevailed within 
the Spanish Greens during this second stage. If each ‘Green’ party in this snapshot 
were the sole Green representative for an electoral district the fragmentation would 
not hinder this party’s electoral chances in this district. However, in the 2008 general 
election there were two Green lists in over half the constituencies and even three in 
some (see Appendix E,4). The inability to negotiate single lists amongst themselves 
may be of secondary importance to Green party leaders who are ideologues and 
following the logic of constituency representation rather than of seeking votes 
(Kitschelt 1989) but the party’s fragmentation confuses and demotivates potential 
fellow travellers. As a signatory of  LV’s 1984 statutes wrote: ‘Quite honestly, by 
now Los Verdes have created such a tangled mess that it’s even difficult for me to 
distinguish who they all are’ (*Rodríguez Barreda 2009). 
 
 
• Political ecology needs to be represented by a political party 
• The Greens are strategically and organisationally ver weak 
• Personalism and factionalism are rife within the party which is  
      therefore unable to operate effectively 
• The party lacks realism, & has too many inadequate or self-serving  
      leaders 
• The party has not built up a good connection with the PESM, a necessary 
condition to mobilise more activists and strengthen the party’s identity 
• The party should reject the ‘‘neither right nor left’ slogan: ‘the obvious  
option for any alternative Green political force … that advocates equity           
and solidarity is to be part of the left camp’ 
• Cooperation, wherever possible, should be sought wit  IU, whilst working  
      towards the consolidation of a strong, independent Green party 
• The party should adopt an electorally pragmatic position, given the  
difficulties of competing within the electoral system. IU and LV  





Table 4.2  Spanish Green Party Groupings & Results in  March 2008 




This formation (it is not a party) is a Confederation 
of regional parties which, until recently, was largely 
‘controlled’ by the Andalusian Greens,  
who dominate the party executive. 
 






This group is based in Madrid where its undisputed 
leader, Esteban Cabal,  has  led this party since 1994
(he was previously in IU, LV and has several times 
been a Green councillor).  
 





This is a breakaway group from LV, generally 
thought to have seceded from LV for personal 
reasons.  Its leader was the 2004-2009 MEP (elected 
on the PSOE list). He and his followers fielded lists 
in several regions: Madrid and three other regions.  
A short-lived and now defunct ‘party’.  
 








and alliances  
A number of regional Green parties allied with IU 
and, when they did so, carried this particular logo. 
 
The number of votes they received in the regions 
where they stood reflects a choice for an ecosocialist 
OR left-wing vote. 
 
In Catalonia, for example, the ecosocialist ICV 
obtained 4.92% of the total votes (183,338) and 
secured one seat in the Congreso . That seat went to 
an ICV deputy, Joan Herrera, who is known for his 
‘Green’ stance 
 
In Asturias, the IU/LV/Nationalist coalition got 
7.18% of the votes – insufficient to obtain an MP 






No logo as this group represents all the Green parties 
which do not fall into any of the groupings above: 
sometimes 
they are part of a regional national/left-wing alliance 
(as in the case of the Balearic Greens) or sometimes 
they are just standing alone.   






The Greens’ apparent failure to improve their electoral performance between 1994-
2010 seems to  justify commentators’ views that the Spanish Greens enjoy only 
‘trivial support’ (Mair 2001: 103). However, on examining the parties’ trajectory in 
greater detail it is clear that – despite numerous difficulties – Green politics has made 
greater inroads than is generally allowed. The sections below show how, despite their 
failure to create a single Green party, from 1994 onwards disparate groups or 
regional parties have achieved some electoral succes, predominantly through a 
strategy of alliances. 
 
General elections 
The Greens’ 1994-2008 general election results (see Appendix E,1) show a 
considerable downturn since 1989 and 1993, when the aggregated Greens polled 
1.59% and 1.15% respectively. However, this by no means necessarily  signifies a 
diminishing interest in PE as many ‘Green’ voters may now be voting for red-green 
alliances. 
 
For instance, the poor results look particularly misleading in that CLV, for example, 
did not contest all of the elections due to a pre-electoral alliance with PSOE, which 
needed the estimated 200,000 Green votes (El Mundo 12/01/04), and also felt that 
this alliance would strengthen its Green credentials.  The alliance gave CLV its first 
seat in the Congreso in 2004 (in 2006 a second Green, next in line on the PSOE list, 
secured a parliamentary seat when a PSOE MP stepped down) . Whilst the alliance 
gave CLV an opening in national politics and provided much-needed funding for the 
party, the confederal committee’s decision to opt fr a PSOE alliance was rejected by 
half of CLV’s regional parties and led to further fragmentation. A newspaper article 
written by the Catalan green, Josep Lluis Freijo, attests to the dismay (see Appendix 
A) generated by the committee’s decision.  
  
Only the Andalusian Greens were wholeheartedly behind the PSOE-CLV pact 
although in a few other regions (the Basque Country, Castille and León and 
Cantabria) the ‘main’ Green party supported the confederation’s decision whilst 





Barcelona and Valencia only breakaway groups of Greens remained within the 
Confederation (El Mundo 12/01/04). The consequences of the confederal 
committee’s tactic became evident in the 2008 election: CLV, once again standing on 
an independent ticket, saw its share of the Green vote decline substantially  
 
Ecologists have also been represented in the Congreso since 2004 by the ecosocialist 
party, ICV (Iniciativa per Catalunya Verds, Initiative for Catalonia Greens). In the 
last two parliaments ICV has been represented by Joan Herrera, a young politician 
whose words and actions predominantly show his commit ent to ecologism63. 
Consequently, despite the Greens’ share of the vote ostensibly declining over the last 
15 years in the general elections, between 2006-2008 there were in fact three ‘Green’ 
MPs in parliament – not a negligible result for a political force which is generally 
held to be of no standing.  
 
European Parliament elections 
As mentioned previously, despite the opportunities afforded by the Spanish single 
district elections for the EP, the Greens have repeatedly squandered this opportunity 
through their inability to present a single list, as indicated in Table 4.3 (Appendix E,3 
provides greater detail of the results).  
 
The nearest the Greens came to presenting a single list was in 1999, when a coalition 
led by CLV and ICV (called Los Verdes–Izquierdas de los Pueblos, The Greens – 
The Nationalist Left) fell short of winning a seat by 0.03% of the total vote. Only 
LVGV (who obtained 0.66% of the vote) did not join the coalition. If it had done so,  
the Greens’ victory would have been assured.  
 
The 2009 EP election further exemplifies the Greens’ disarray. Responding to the 
ever-increasing fragmentation of the Greens, there was another concerted effort to 
unify the Greens in time for the European elections, thi  time emanating from a new 
                                                
63 In the 2010 Catalan regional elections, Herrera stood as the head of  ICV’s list and won a seat, 
therefore becoming a regional MP and abandoning his seat in the Cortes. His replacement in the 
Cortes, Nuria Buenaventura, appears to be less committed to cologism than her predecessor though 





Table 4.3  The Greens’ Various Strategies in Successive EP Ele ctions 
Year Strategy Results  Seats 
1994 The Andalusian, Catalan and 
Canaries Greens stood on the 
Els Verds list (these three 
parties were in talks with IU).  
The remaining CLV parties 
failed to organise a list. 
The only statewide Green party 
to stand was LVGV 
Els Verds  0.23% 
Los Verdes-Grupo Verde  
0.59% 
0 
1999 CLV allies with ICV to present 
a single list: Los Verdes–
Izquierdas de los Pueblos (LV-
IP, Greens and the Nationalist 
Left) 
LVGV present a separate list 
LV-IP just miss getting a seat 
with 1.42%.  
LVGV obtained 0.66% of the 
votes 
Euskal Herritarok (previously 
Herri Batasuna, the political 
wing of ETA) win a seat with 
1.45% of the vote 
0 
2004 CLV forms a pre-electoral 
alliance with PSOE but many 
CLV parties do not support the 
alliance 
 
They ally with other parties or 
stand alone 
 
LVGV stands alone 
ICV stands with IU 
David Hammerstein (the 
‘Green’ on the PSOE list) wins 
a seat in the EP. He joins the 
EP Green Group.  
 
ICV’s first ecosocialist MEP, 
Raül Romeva, joins the EP 





2009 Europa de los Pueblos – Verdes 
(EP-V, Europe of the People – 
Greens). CLV stands with a 
coalition of left-wing nationalist 
parties headed by the Catalan 
ERC64.   
ICV stands with IU 
LVGV stands alone 
EP-V wins one seat 
 





Source: MIR website; El País; party websites 
 
generation of Greens. In July 2008 a group of northern Green parties and movements 
met at Hondarribia (in the Basque Country) and drew up a manifesto calling for unity 
of the Greens and a single Green list.  
                                                
64  This group is led by ERC, the Catalan pro-independence party; BNG, a Galician left-wing 
nationalist party; two small Basque nationalist parties, Aralar and Eusko Alkartasuna; the Aragonese 





Those who have signed this declaration would like all of Spain’s Greens to 
reflect on the fact that there are no ideological differences between us to 
justify our existing divisions.  (*Hondarribia 2008) 
 
The goal was to unite all Spanish Greens including ICV, which stated that it would 
only join if all Spanish Green parties signed up to the initiative. But  negotiations to 
present a single list for the EP election fell apart, largely because ICV and the 
Confederation could not agree on issues such as who would head the single list. 
CLV’s ruling council voted  to present itself for the European elections as  part of 
EP-V, a coalition of left-wing nationalist parties65.  A number of small Green parties 
rejected the EP-V coalition and instead opted for LVGV, the only independent Green 
option (LV-GVE 2009). 
 
Since 1995, CLV has varied its electoral strategies for each European election with 
limited success. Its alliance with PSOE in 2004 secur d CLV an MEP, and in the 
2009 EP elections the EP-V won one seat which, according to the pre-electoral 
agreement, will be rotated by the first four on thelist, which includes CLV. The 
Spanish Greens were also represented by another Gren MEP, elected in 2004 and 
2009. He represents the ecosocialists and is from the Catalan party, ICV.  
 
Regional Elections  
Meso-government in Spain potentially provides small parties with a better 
opportunity to access power66, although they still face considerable obstacles to gain 
representation. For example, a minimum threshold is required to win a seat and each 
                                                
65 EP-V is part of the European Free Alliance (EFA) which, together with the European Green group, 
forms the Greens/EFA group in the EP. 
 
CLV was welcomed into this coalition to help EP-V secure a second seat.  However, they won only 
one seat which, according to a pre-electoral agreement, is to be shared by the different parties making 
up the coalition – with CLV being allocated the last six months of the parliamentary term.  
 
66 The following example demonstrates how regional elections provide better opportunities to small 
parties in Spain: the region of Aragón has three electoral districts (three provinces). In general 
elections the region returns 13 MPs to the 350-seat Congreso (the different provinces return 7, 3 and 3 
deputies respectively in recognition of their population levels).  
 
In contrast, in the 2007 elections to the Aragonese parliament, which has a total of 67 elected 






 regional parliament can set its own barrier: most have opted for a 5% minimum in a 
given constituency though some have set a 3% threshold. In the regional elections 
since 1993, Green parties have either stood independently or in an alliance and have 
won 1567 seats altogether (see Table 4.4). Only one seat (Ibiza) has been won by an  
 
Table 4.4  Regions which have had a ‘Green’ Regiona l MP 
Source: adapted from the Valencian Government’s electoral archive and El País               
 
 *A star indicates that the coalition in question was in government.  
independent Green MP. The remaining elected Greens wo  as part of a coalition, and 
were high enough on the coalition list to be elected.  
                                                
67  This figure is approximate due to  the inclusion of some of ICV’s regional MPs as ‘Green’.  As a 
result of the 2010 elections in Catalonia, the new leader of ICV is Joan Herrera, previously an MP in 
the Congreso. Herrera’s credentials as a Green politician are not questioned by anyone, not even rival 
Green  parties. Although critics are distrustful of ICV as a Green party, they always make an 
exception for a few politicians in its ranks. In recent years, the party has become decidedly more eco-
socialist. Whereas previously there were no ‘Greens’ in regional government, the 2010 regional 
election in Catalonia resulted in the election of 10 ICV MPs. 4 of these, including Herrera, have 
profiles that link them to ecosocialism. 
68 EBB-Berdeak is the Basque name used in the Basque Co ntry  for IU-Los Verdes Ezker Batua-
Berdeak 
69 The elected Green, Carles Arnal, resigned from Los Verdes in 2004 as a result of Los Verdes’ 
decision to ally with PSOE.  
70 This is a broad coalition of the Mallorcan left, including all the left –wing and nationalist parties. It 
has 4 seats in the Balearic Parliament, is itself in all ance with PSOE and is therefore able to govern 
instead of PP. One of the Bloc MPs is a  ‘green’.  





1994-1996 Andalucía 2 Izquierda Unida 
1995-1999 Balearic  
Islands 
1 (Ibiza) Els  Verds of Ibiza were 
independent  
1995-1999 Catalonia 1 ICV (the Catalan IU)  
1999-2003 Balearic 
Islands 
1* Izquierda Unida* 
2000-2004 Andalucía 1* PSOE* 
2003-2007 Balearic 
Islands 
1 Izquierda Unida 
2003-200469 Valencia 1 Izquierda Unida 
2007- Balearic 
Islands 
1* Bloc per Mallorca*70 
2007-  Asturias 1* IU and Asturian Bloc* 





In addition to these 15 ‘Green-Green’ deputies, ICV has won between 7-12 seats at 
each regional election in Catalonia; however, until 2010 only one of these could have 
been categorised as as ‘Green’. This situation has c nged. In the 2010 Catalan 
regional election ICV won ten seats, and for the first time ever a cluster of these MPs 
(four or five) have credentials and interests which define them as ecologists.  
 
In the remaining regions which have seen the election of a Green, this has usually 
happened as a result of the Greens either joining IU or a broad coalition of the left in 
order to defeat PP. An arrangement of this kind has become the norm in the Balearic 
Islands. In 1999, the Majorcan Greens and IU forged an alliance, Esquerra Unida-
Els Verds (EU-EV)71, and won three seats in the regional elections that ye r – one of 
these went to a Green, Margalida Rosselló. As a result of a pact signed by all the 
Balearic parties of the left, who together had a sufficient majority to form a 
government, Rosselló was made regional minister for the environment, thus 
becoming the first Spanish Green to achieve high office. During her four year 
mandate, she was instrumental in introducing the controversial ‘ecotax’, a €1 per day 
tax on tourists staying in holiday accommodation on the island. Rosselló was re-
elected in 2003, but the ‘Pact’ lost the election.  
 
The Balearic example demonstrates how the Greens can use regional politics to gain 
some influence at regional level despite being handic pped by the electoral system. 
The regional  arena is also more favourable for the Greens because the parties appear 
to be better at finding a workable strategy when it comes to regional elections. 
Geographical proximity and a shared regional culture means that Green activists 
identify more closely with each other and with other potential partners, thus 
facilitating the decision making process and arriving at a decision which is viable for 
a very particular set of local circumstances.   
 
In Spain as a whole (with the exception of Catalonia) Green politics continues to 
push for the creation of a statewide party, and continues to prioritise high-profile 
candidates as well as general and European elections. This course of action is 
                                                





encouraged by the EGP and by some leaders of Spanish Green parties. However, 
given that Spain’s Green parties are mostly regional, and only cooperate  with each 
other intermittently, it is difficult to understand the persistent attempts to force a 
state-wide model on a party-movement which is more suited to territorial politics.  
 
Local elections 
Although the Spanish Greens’ electoral performance at municipal level has improved 
in the last 18 years, their achievement to date remains statistically low: in the 2007  
municipal elections they secured 70 seats on different councils in ten different 
regions (EGP Website 2010).72 These results compare favourably73 with 1999 (35 
seats) and 2003 (28 seats), and very well with the 2 and 5 seats of the early years, but 
never match the favourable predictions made by surveys during the campaigns. 
Constraints at municipal level are varied and have lr ady been outlined: in all but 
the very small municipalities, parties need to reach the 5% vote threshold in order to 
win a seat; competition comes from all the major parties and also by highly local 
parties; engrained clientelism remains an important feature of local politics. 
 
Furthermore, voters do not appear to regard ecologistas as suitable local 
representatives. As a Green activist stated, ‘People want Green parties who will stick 
up for the rights of the citizens; but when they need representatives, they want 
someone who’s wearing a tie’ (El País  1/05/07).  
 
 In the 2007 local elections, CLV made a concerted effort to win more seats – and 
virtually bankrupted themselves in the attempt. But despite surveys predicting an 
upsurge in their number of supporters, these forecasts did not translate into votes. 
CLV’s 2007 electoral campaign prioritised one issue, property speculation, an issue 
which ecologists had been fighting single-handedly for years; by 2007, ecologists’ 
                                                
72 Early results for the 2011 municipal elections, two eeks after the event (06/06/2011), suggest that 
the Greens did slightly better in these elections but the results are difficult to determine. One Green 
party states that the Greens have won 79 seats(Coordinadora Verde  2011) and control three 
councils; another Green party says that the Greens have won more than 100 seats (LVGV 2011). 
Because neither of these parties acknowledge some of th legitimate results obtained by the other 






viewpoint on the causes and solutions to rampant property speculation had gained 
many adherents, with many Spaniards convinced that the fundamental reason behind 
the property boom was that councils and property developers were collaborating 
extensively to maximise profits, with no regard forthe longer-term environmental or 
social consequences. Despite the general public’s awareness of the corruption of 
many councils which were in the hands of the big parties, the majority of these 
councils were voted back into power. Spaniards, it eems, agree with the Greens’ 
analysis of the problems but don’t trust them to deliver the solutions.   
 
In the small towns and villages, Greens only present ca didates if there is a local 
party; however, council elections in the big towns a d cities have a high profile and 
the Greens always field candidates in these. The 2003 Madrid municipal election will 
be examined here because of it is one of the Greens’ mo t famous campaigns and 
helps to illustrate the external and internal difficulties faced by the Greens.  
 
In 2003, nearly all the Madrid Green parties had agreed to stand together as Los 
Verdes – Izquierda de Madrid (The Greens – the Madrid Left)74. The coalition, 
financially backed by ICV and supported by the EFGP, even included LVGV 
(normally antagonistic towards CLV) as well as a number of small IU splinter 
groups. The coalition secured a charismatic, well established figure, José María 
Mendiluce (a PSOE MEP), to head the Green list for Madrid. As Gunther says of 
Spanish political culture, the personal attractiveness of a party's candidates is 
considered very important and takes precedence over aspects such as how long the 
individual has been in the party (2005: 259). Mendiluce was in the PSOE ranks until 
shortly before his nomination as candidate to be Gren mayor of Madrid75.  Although 
his credentials as an ecologist were sound – for  example, he was elected president of 
Greenpeace Spain in 2000, a position that was, however, rescinded when he 
                                                
74 This coalition was built upon the earlier project  (in 2001) to bring together most of Spain’s Greens 
under a new banner – Los Verdes-Izquierda Verde (The Greens – The Green Left). However, this 
‘new’ party was not even registered as such.  
75 Mendiluce was an independent MEP on the PSOE lists from 1994-2004 and, before that, from 1980 
onwards worked in Africa and Central America for the United Nations High Commission for 





announced that he wouldn’t be stepping down as an MEP – he was not a long-
standing Green party activist. 
 
Mendiluce’s campaign drew much media attention and certainly put the spotlight on 
the Greens. It was stylishly produced, with an imagin tive video, numerous posters 
and plenty of media coverage, and the EFGP sent repres ntatives to Madrid to 
support Mendiluce’s bid. The Greens were predicted to win 4% of the votes (ABC 
18/11/2002) and were aiming for 5%, in order to reach the electoral threshold for 
municipal elections in Madrid. This seemed an achievable goal and would have 
given them two councillors.  
 
However, PSOE and IU counterattacked: PSOE expressed indignation that a 
socialist-sponsored MEP was heading the Greens whilst IU (and PSOE) called on the 
Greens to abandon their campaign, in order to prevent the fragmentation of the left 
(no-one called on IU to do the same). The media fuelled the fire of a vitriolic 
campaign against the Greens, who were portrayed as traitors to the left. In the event, 
they only secured 1.55% of the votes (the other Green party in Madrid obtained 
0.58%). Whilst their failure can certainly be attributed in part to the successful 
campaign accusing them of ‘lack of solidarity with the left’, it is also clear that 
Mendiluce’s behaviour during the campaign helped to alienate some Greens. Some 
supporters disliked Mendiluce’s authoritarian, ‘Bonapartist’ style (El Mundo 
02/02/2003) and Angel Requena, the candidate heading the Green list for the 2003 
regional elections, also had grave misgivings about Mendiluce (El Mundo 
31/01/2003).   
  
In retrospect, this episode reveals some flaws in the initial campaign. Despite the 
Greens’ attempts to present a single list, they were unable to persuade one faction to 
join them (the stumbling block was the choice of Mendiluce as candidate); 
furthermore, the strategy of adopting a candidate who as not a Green party militant 
may have backfired. Certainly, it led to accusations that the Greens’ co-optation of 





defeat, there is nothing but criticism and this is a situation which the Greens have had 
to face routinely.  
 
Having provided a chronological account of the Greens’ electoral fortunes  the next 
sub-section will analyse these outcomes by revisiting some of the particular 
constraints which mark the Spanish Greens out from Greens elsewhere.  
 
4.2.3 Reviewing some key themes 
The previous two sections have highlighted the fragmentation of the Green vote, 
demonstrating that it is a misnomer to talk about Los Verdes as if this was a single 
Green party. However, it is easy to see why the confusion persists: many Greens 
loosely refer to themselves as ‘Verdes’ without specifying which Green party they 
support76. More confusingly, for some, allegiance to the ‘Greens’ means supporting a 
Green-Green party while others would widen the definition of a Green to include the 
ecosocialists.  
 
This ambiguity impacts substantially on any analysis of the Spanish Greens. The 
latter’s electoral performance is particularly poor if one only looks at data for CLV, 
supposedly Spain’s ‘official’ Green party; it improves a little if one considers the 
aggregated Green-Green vote.  
 
However, PE’s electoral performance can be interpreted in a far more favourable 
light by redefining what a ‘Green’ party is. For instance, according to Mendiluce’s 
criteria, in 2003 the Greens had 500 local councillors, 20 mayors, 17 regional MPs, 
an MEP and an MP in the Congreso (ABC 09/02/2003). But a reading of the Green-
Green parties’ position in 2003, excluding the ecoso ialists, would throw up far more 
modest results: about 38 councillors and 3 regional MPs77.  
 
                                                
76 On 14/02/2011, the newspapers reported the murder in Valencia of a lawyer who, according to the 
papers, was the head of Los Verdes’ list for Madrid. In fact, the person in question was to have headed 
the List of Los Verdes Ecopacifistas, a small dissenting party which decided not to join the Green 
coalition for the May 2011 local elections.  
77 For the sake of comparison it is worth mentioning the Greens’ position in France –a country where, 
in its early years, the Greens had problems in establi hing a viable party. In 2009 the Greens  had 41 





These two contrasting views of the state of Green politics in Spain demonstrate the 
difficulty of providing an account of the Spanish Greens. This thesis differentiates 
the Green-Greens from the ecosocialists and maintains that there is an important 
difference between these two positions (see Chapter 2). However, it must also be 
acknowledged that the ideological boundaries separating ecosocialism and ecologism 
are, in practice, becoming increasingly blurred.   
 
Clearly, there is an ideological space for a Green party or parties but it appears to be 
almost impossible for this formation to establish a functional, structural space. The 
following sub-sections will review further structural and strategic barriers that 
contribute to preventing the  Spanish Greens from cnsolidating their presence. 
 
Party fragmentation  
Scholars are all agreed that the main problem besetting he Spanish Greens is 
factionalism (e.g. Doherty 2002). As Larios states (2006), this is as a result of 
irreconcilable differences with respect to strategy, st les of leadership and a long 
history of frustrated battles, but it is a trait that has undoubtedly been aggravated by 
the ‘permissiveness’ of the Spanish electoral system (Lago Penas 2004). This refers 
to the fact that it is very easy to stand for public office in Spain: no deposit needs to 
be paid in order to present a list, and parties are entitled to some free publicity if they 
register to stand for an election (this is proportional to the number of votes won in 
the previous election). It is therefore all too easy for internal dissent to lead to the 
formation of a new party. 
 
As we have seen, between 1995-2010 there was one ‘official’ state-wide party, CLV, 
and at least one further state-wide Green party of comparable stature, LVGV. 
Periodically, there was also at least one other Green party with state-wide pretensions 
(such as Los Verdes de Europa nd Los Verdes Ecopacifistas) and, of course, ICV. 
At first, only CLV was a member of the EFGP but since 2004 ICV has also been 
admitted to the EGP. This has conferred a legitimacy on the two Spanish parties. 
According according to Karamichas, a useful way of determining whether a party is 





2002). However, this approach is questionable, particularly given ICV’s strong links 
with IU.  
 
A more accurate reason to explain ICV’s admission into the EGP was the fact that 
Raül Romeva (number 2 on the IU/ICV list for the 2004 EP elections) won a seat and 
asked to join the Green group in the EP rather thansitti g with his IU colleague in 
the GUE (European United Left) group. ICV’s inclusion in the EGP was galling to 
Spanish and Catalan ‘pure’ Greens because, previously, the EFGP had refused to 
accept Els Verds on the grounds that it was a ‘Catalan’ party; furthermore, LVGV 
has always been refused membership, an illogical position  given that even their 
many detractors within the PESM acknowledge them to be ‘Greens’. In short, 
although the EGP wants to resolve the Green’s factional sm, it has also fuelled 
discontent within this political group.  
 
The Spanish Greens have always been aware of the need to unify the party in order 
to build a strong party political presence, and have ttempted this time and time again 
with great illusion but no success. One particularly significant attempt concerned the 
setting up in 2001 of Los Verdes – Izquierda Verde, a project which would have 
brought ICV and the Confederation into a single Spanish confederation, thus creating 
a statewide umbrella group with real credibility. The setting up of this new 
confederation generated another surge of optimism for the Greens, as an article 
written by David Hammerstein (Spanish Green MEP 2004-2 08) indicates (see 
Appendix F,3); however, this embryonic party fizzled out after Mendiluce’s failed 
attempt to win a seat on the Madrid City Council  
 
Since 2008, another effort to bring together all of Spain’s Greens has been under 
way. The Hondarribia project, introduced in Chapter 4.2.2, now known as 
Coordinadora Verde, is led by two spokespersons, Florent Marcellesi and Sonia 
Ortiga, both of whom previously worked in the EGP headquarters. The project is 
backed by the EGP as well as by ICV (who have provided moral and financial 
backing but remain on the outside). It is further supported by some but not all of the 





Spain (2001-2010). Since late 2010, and with the support of Coordinadora Verde, 
López de Uralde has set up a foundation or think ta called Equo which aims to 
create a united Green political party to fight the 2012 general election. The new party 
will aim to include all Greens but will also embrace the alternative left, left-wing 
nationalism and, above all, try to persuade the social movements to come on board. 
Since Equo was set up, the Green battle lines have been re-drawn and new alliances 
are being forged between the different Green players and their allies, but with no loss 
of fragmentation. The concluding chapter of this thesis will examine these latest 
events which go beyond the period established for this study (1970-2010).  
 
In sum, for too many years the Spanish Greens have been unable to to pull together 
and the theory of path dependency highlights the Spanish Greens’s difficulty in 
moving beyond the present impasse they find themselve  in. However, the example 
of Spain’s leading EMO, Ecologistas en Acción, shows that a sea change is, indeed, 
possible. This possibility is supported by Boucek’s thesis (2009) that factionalism is 
not an incurable disease. Instead of viewing factionalism as a problem, she asserts 
that it can be cooperative, competitive or degenerative. In her view, factionalism is a 
very common group dynamic that can help like-minded groups of people to generate 
and sharpen their ideas. If they can cooperate withother factions within their own 
party (company or institution) then the factionalism is a positive trait. The same can 
be said for competitive factionalism which only becomes destructive when the 
factions do nothing but routinely oppose each other. Boucek’s view is that good 
leadership and a good set of incentives can help to channel the factionalism in a 
positive direction. According to this theory, the Spanish Greens have never had a 
better opportunity to break their mould.  
 
 
The nationalist question   
 LV was originally conceived as a state-wide federal p rty but fundamental 
disagreements regarding the configuration of the party undermined the party from the 
outset. These disagreements stemmed from factions who were opposed to the party’s 





Greens believed that their party, which represented th  Catalan nation, should have 
total autonomy and should not be subjugated to a Spanish executive. Other Greens 
prioritised a participatory and grass-roots party structure and therefore preferred 
giving their loyalty to regional or even local Green parties.  
 
However, the attempt to resolve this contentious issue by creating a confederation 
failed for a number of reasons. Firstly, the confederation came too late for the 
Catalans, who had spent ten years campaigning for a c nfederation and by 1994 had 
severed their connections with the Spanish Greens. Secondly, the new structure 
failed to give the regional parties either the full autonomy they craved or a 
consensual confederation of equals; despite CLV’s declared commitment to a 
confederal structure, party leaders continued to rule the party from the centre. 
Thirdly, a number of Greens were still convinced of the need for a state-wide party: 
consequently, the demise of LV led to the creation of LVGV, thereby increasing 
party fragmentation.  
 
The failure to reach a satisfactory confederal solution such as the one found by 
Ecologistas en Acción (EA) must also be attributed to the fact that Spanish Green 
party leaders are conditioned by the rules and customs of the Spanish party system 
and are therefore loath to abandon imperatives suchas t e need to found a state-wide 
party in order to be able to contest a general election.  
  
However, there are examples elsewhere in Europe to rove that the state-wide Green 
party is not the only option. Literature on the Spanish Greens makes no mention of  
the GPS78 and yet the GPS’s confederal party system could serve as a model for the 
Spanish Greens. The Swiss model (as discussed by Ladner and Brändle 2008) 
emphasises the autonomy of each of the many Green parties that stand in the local 
and cantonal elections as well as their success in creating a single Federation79.   
 
                                                
78 The GPS has had a moderate but increasing rate of success and in the last eight years has polled on 
average about 8% of the votes in different levels of elections (Ladner and Brändle 2008).  





It could furthermore be argued that the existence of a European Green party obviates 
the need for state-wide parties and that the Greens should, wherever possible, remain 
closer to their grassroots.    
 
A strategic divide: Green-Green versus Red-Green 
The most visible fragmentation as regards Green politics in Spain is an apparent 
ideological divergence, illustrated by the fact that Spain is represented in the EGP by 
two Green parties, ICV and CLV (EGP Website 2010): the first, broadly speaking, is 
a Green-Green party whilst the second is a Red-Green party (see Bomberg 1998: 24-
25 on this traditional distinction between two main Green families)80. The ecologist 
(CLV) and ecosocialist (ICV) variants of Green politics are further replicated in 
many Spanish regions that have a Green-Green party and/or a coalition Green-IU 
party81. In some regions, these coalitions represent a real attempt to merge the red 
and the green; in other regions, the Greens are co-opted for electoral purposes only 
and subsequently sidelined. 
 
Outside Spain, ICV is recognised as a ‘Green’ party but within Spain the party’s 
Green credentials are largely mistrusted and the party is still considered to be – as it 
once was – the Catalan variant of IU and hence a Eurocommunist party. Until 
recently, its party leaders still adhered to a productivist style of thinking and the party 
retains a number of links with IU (these will be discussed in Chapter 5). However, 
the election in 2010 of a committed ecologist, Joan Herrera, as the party’s new 
general secretary and leader of ICV in the regional par iament indicates how much 
the party has shifted towards ecosocialism in the last few years.    
 
The ideological shift within ICV reflects changes that are also taking place in some 
of IU’s different federations. The latter are riven with internal problems (leading to 
                                                
80 As previously mentioned, their differences also stem from the fact that  LCV retains a belief in the 
need for a Green party (albeit a confederation) representing the whole of Spain, whereas ICV believes 
that by representing Catalonia it is representing the Catalan nation which is its primary function.  
81 In November 2010 a new coalition party was created in the Balearics, bringing together most of the 
Greens and the region’s IU. The new party is called Iniciativa-Verdes and is modelled on (and was 
financed and advised by) ICV. ICV is also trying to encourage a similar red-green coalition in 
Valencia (Greens who are opposed to the forces of nationalism are appalled by what looks like ICV’s 
attempt to annex the Green parties of regions where Catalan is spoken – a pan-catalanist thesis is that 





divisions and defections from the party) (Público 07/12/2009): some factions are 
ideologically in favour of adopting an ecosocialist position and moving towards 
libertarian and participatory politics instead of the PCE legacy which has resulted in 
a closed and monolithic organisational structure. At present, however, these factions 
are in the minority at state-wide level, and the PCE executive is trying to prevent the 
federation from moving in that direction (Público 22/12/2010). 
 
If Spain’s Red-Greens are still perhaps more Red than Green at present, most Green-
Green parties are decidedly on the Red side of Green. D spite CLV’s statute, which 
avoids all mention of the left-right cleavage, stating only that the party is working to 
bring about a society based on ‘ecologism, pacifism, non-violence, feminism, 
egalitarianism, republicanism, radical pragmatism, libertarianism and universalism’ 
(CLV Statutes 2010), most Spanish Greens define themselves as unequivocally of 
the ‘left’.82  
 
We never liked the idea that ‘we’re not right nor left’, in a country where that 
kind of discourse was used in the thirties by Primo de Rivera’s son and the 
fascists. The empty rhetoric of being beyond right or left are not appropriate 
in a country that has been through a civil war and Franco’s dictatorship. But 
the worst of it is when this rhetoric is not devoid f meaning and, consciously 
or inadvertently, contributes to the triumph of thePP. The Greens are part of 
the Left, and enrich and transform the latter.  (*Santamarta et al. 2003) 
 
In fact, the Greens’ early history and subsequent cooperation between IU and the 
Greens demonstrate that, despite frequent hostility ar sing from these two formations, 
the Greens and IU share a similar ideological positioning on many issues 
(Karamichas 2004). Over the years, different regional IU and Green parties have 
engaged in numerous negotiations and most of these parties have, at some point or 
other, formed an  alliance. In some cases (i.e. Catalonia) the alliance prospered and 
evolved into a new, important (albeit minor) Catalan party; in other cases (most 
                                                
82 However, they are clearly less ‘left-wing’ than ICV who describe their ideological provenance as 
the following: ‘ICV is a democratic, catalanist, republican, left-wing, ecological, feminist, localist 
political party, composed of men and women who are inh ritors of the [party’s past communist 
history] and of the workers’ movement, a party of peo le who want to transform the world and 
overthrow capitalism; they also believe in social justice, peace, equality, radical democracy, freedom, 
a secular society … and want to build a society based on democracy and socialism (ICV Definició 





notably in the case of the Andalusians) the coalitin fell apart after only three years, 
leaving a legacy of bitterness and hostility which makes any medium-term 
association between the two parties unlikely in Andalucía.  
 
IU is presently a very beleaguered coalition that  has lost much of its former 
prominence: from its highest point, when it won 21 seats in parliament in the 1996 
general election, it dropped to 8 seats in 2000 and in 2008 only held two seats in the 
Congreso, one of which went to ICV, which stands within the IU group for the 
general elections (see Appendix E,7 for IU’s election results). The decision reached 
by Madrid’s IU federation to stand with the Greens for the 2011 municipal and 
regional elections signals the growing importance of a faction within IU who are 
increasingly in sympathy with many of the tenets of ecosocialism. However, another 
faction within IU is strongly opposed to this tendecy. Given the territorial variation 
and distinctiveness of IU’s federations regional coalitions between IU and the Greens 
will continue to be provisional.  
 
Accusations regarding incompatibility on ideological grounds (Green versus Red-
Green) are frequently cited as the reasons behind one Green party’s refusal to ally 
with another party. However, the history of the Spanish Greens shows that this is far 
from being the case. Parties which once stated theycould never countenance 
ecosocialism have been known to ally with IU (less Green that ICV) if the party 
leaders are persuaded that this strategy will work t  their advantage. All too often, 
the Greens have wavered between the path of indepennce and that of allying with 
the alternative left in order to gain access to power. In most cases the venture has 
proved unsuccessful in the long term. Recently however, a number of new alternative 
left coalitions have formed (for example in the Balearic Islands and Valencia). They 
include a Green faction, a faction of dissafected IU activists and some left-wing 
nationalists.  
 
The  party or movement dichotomy 
As in most countries, LV started out as a non-party party, a party that had emerged 





movements in the early days, in Spain this sentiment has not abated. The 
movement’s initial opposition to the founding of a Green party was based on a 
number of interconnected factors (anti-party sentiments; loyalty to the left; a 
preference for double militancy within the PESM and with a more mainstream party; 
distrust of personality cult prevalent in the Green parties – see Box 4.1 in which 
leading ecologists in 1993 express their mistrust of he Greens) and this initial 
rejection undoubtedly constrained the Greens’ progress in the early years. The 
Greens, in turn, felt some resentment against the move ents: whilst recognising their 
considerable contributions to PE, the Greens feel that hese movements are too 
closely connected to other political parties (by which they mean IU, but also some 
left-wing nationalist parties) or, alternatively, are often too ready to collaborate with 
the authorities (an accusation which the movements also use against the Greens).  
 
However, the initial mutual suspicion has undergone substantial changes. Although 
there is a residual antagonism, parties and SMs generally cooperate very well on 
major issues, and are mutually supportive of each other, recognising that they are all 
‘ecologists’ and working towards the same goals. Nevertheless, the sticking point 
remains: there is a perception, supported by countless examples, that a leading EMO 
such as EA is far closer to IU than it is to the Greens. In fact, large parts of the PESM 
remain opposed to the Spanish Greens, largely becaus  of the latter’s’ problematic 
history.  
 
However, without the PESM’s support the Greens willnever increase their meagre 
share of the vote. There are many groups of ecologists working to promote PE in a 
number of organisations such as the trade unions, IU, different regional parties and 
even PSOE. At present, most of these ecologists do not vote for Green parties, for 
one simple reason: although they are ideologically in agreement with the Greens, and 
can see that Green parties seem to represent their interests elsewhere in Europe, they 
are extremely sceptical of the numerous home-grown varieties and their internal 
bickering; some of these ecologists are erstwhile supporters of the Greens who have 
ultimately  distanced themselves because of the factionalism (Santamarta 2003). 





representing their views and opt for a tactical vote; he more anarchic (or 
disenchanted with mainstream politics) can cast a protest vote for small new parties 
such as the anti-bullfighting PACMA or PUM+J (For a F irer World).   
 
The distance separating Green parties and movements is a barrier to the Spanish 
Green parties’ possibility of improving their electoral performance; however, the 
existence of both increases the impact of PE. The parties, even if unsuccessful, 
provide voters with a periodic reminder of the main te ets of PE and also remind the 
other parties of the need to incorporate some of their policies in their own party 
programmes; meanwhile, the movements enable sympathisers to engage actively in a 




Green politicians recognise that one of the key problems with the Spanish Greens is 
the personalism (Larios 2008; Garrido 2006; Puig 2007; García 2007; Rubio 2010) 
which has arisen around certain individuals who have dominated the parties unduly.  
 
Personalism is a feature which is common to many Green parties and is said to be 
more pronounced when the parties are small and unsucce sful, and lack a well 
articulated organisational structure (Kitschelt 1989). This is certainly true of the 
Spanish Greens. Furthermore, personalism is a marked feature of Spanish political 
life and particularly dominates small, left-wing parties in Spain which were where 
many of the Spanish Greens first honed their political skills. Unsurprisingly, 
therefore, personalism is a feature which has dominated the Spanish Greens since 
their inception and continues to characterise this group of parties.  
 
The small parties lack resources and, all too often, the day to day running of the party 
is left to the leader who therefore reacts to events a d makes sudden policy changes 
without broader consultation and with the support of only a few close allies. Those 
who are excluded from the inner circle feel they have been unfairly treated while the 





that the parties lack financial and human resources, the leaders are overworked and 
unrewarded. Ironically, these problems are aggravated by the very nature of Green 
political parties which lend themselves to frequent conflicts ‘as members tend to be 
highly involved, ideologically motivated and well-trained in confrontation techniques 
rather than in submission to authorities’ (Frankland et al. 2008: 7).  
 
This situation has contributed to the hostility and tension which is commonplace 
between different Green party leaders or factions, or within individual parties. 
Cabal’s book on the history of the Spanish Greens (1996) catalogues the constant 
intrigue and tales of shady deals carried out in the name of PE. Since then, there has 
been no let up in the gravity of accusations and counter accusations. For example, the 
2004-2008 MEP, David Hammerstein, was expelled from the Confederation in 2006 
for fraud and was subsequently found guilty of this offence by OLAF, the European 
Anti-Fraud Office (Kaos en la red 2007), though he was never brought to court on 
this count by the Spanish government.. Further accusations include the attack of a 
Madrid party leader by other leading activists of the same party, an incident which 
particularly incensed observers who accused the party of hypocrisy in failing to live 
up to the party’s commitment to pacifism (Interview with Green activist 2009).   
 
The Green leader who personifies the concept of personalism more than any other is 
Francisco Garrido, an Andalusian academic who began to lead CLV in 1993. Garrido 
has taken the confederation in and out of numerous alliances as a strategy to further 
his opportunity to be elected as a regional and then state-wide deputy. Garrido has 
stepped down from leading the Greens but is deeply involved in the new Equo 
project and continues to wield considerable influence. His name is frequently 
invoked by other Greens as epitomising all that is devious and backstabbing about 
Green politics (Interview with Green party activist 2008). These accusations may be 
unnecessarily harsh but reflect the personal rivalries that exist between fellow Greens 
from the same party.   
 
Another prime example of the personal hostility which predominates within the 





his party in 1994, Cabal was previously a member of LV (and previously, of IU) and, 
over the years, has worked tirelessly for Green politics. However, his party and his 
motives have always been viewed with suspicion and criticised harshly by other 
Greens; he himself is not slow to reciprocate in this respect. Curiously, in spite of 
endless, ongoing hostilies, Cabal and other Green laders frequently meet up and 
attempt, time and time again, to negotiate alliances. The Green political world 
resembles a close, but eternally warring family.  
 
A key figure to emerge in the last few years is Florent Marcellesi, who worked for 
EGP in Brussels for a number of years. Marcellesi is one of the key people steering 
the Greens in their new different direction, namely towards the Equo solution. His 
view on the personalism, the ‘division, fragmentation and the excessive prominence 
of some individuals’ is that it is caused by the different Green ‘families’ that co-exist 
in Spain (Planeta Verde 2009). As he states, it is nteresting that these different 
factions are always referred to as ‘families’ rather than tendencies or factions, thus 
emphasising the personal nature of the divisions. Tellingly, however, Marcellesi’s 
arrival on the scene has merely led to the creation of another powerful family, one 
that is being financed and supported by the EGP, and his swift rise within the ranks 
of the PESM in Spain seems suspiciously like personalism, particularly given his 
close connections to the EGP.    
 
The personalism within the Spanish Greens is yet ano her barrier preventing the 
Greens from establishing themselves as a party that is worth voting for. Meanwhile, 
ecologists can pursue their commitment to PE through their involvement with the 
broader PESM, an area that will now be addressed.  
 
 
4.3 POLITICAL ECOLOGY BEYOND THE PARTIES : 1986-2010   
 
As has been demonstrated, Spanish voters have been reluctant to vote for Green 
parties, despite the fact that there is a sizeable minority of people who support many 





environmental associations83. Additionally, groups of ecologists work within other 
political parties, trade unions, student bodies and groups of scholars or professional 
environmentalists. All of these ecologists are part of the PESM. The following 
section will start by examining the PESM, outlining its defining characteristics as 
well as the collective action it undertakes. The scope of the PESM’s action 
contradicts negative assumptions about Spain’s status s a country with a scant 
regard for environmental matters, (Gray 2005: 699; Saurí and del Moral 2001: 361). 
Furthermore, this section highlights the thesis that PE – or green politics – is better 
represented in Spain by the movements than by the parties, largely because the 
movements have been able to avoid some of the difficulties faced by the parties.   
 
The phenomenon of the PESM will subsequently be illustrated by looking briefly at 
the so-called ‘water wars’, an issue which is discus ed for two reasons: firstly, it 
underlines the fact that Spain’s key environmental issues are different from those of 
Northern European countries . Secondly, it also show  how the PESM’s actions 
managed to bring about a policy shift. The third sub- ection will briefly introduce a 
few of the best-known key players within the PESM and the final sub-section will 
focus on Ecologistas en Acción (EA), a Spanish EMO which presents a useful 
juxtaposition to the country’s Green parties and demonstrates that a concerted effort 
can lead to an efficient and (mainly) cohesive Confederation.  
 
4.3.1 The Spanish PESM  
Until the mid 1990s, Spain’s movement was ‘localised, defensive and volatile’ 
(*Jiménez 2005) and protest actions largely remained isolated and unable to bring 
about policy changes at central (or even regional) government level (an exception, as 
has been seen, was the anti-nuclear campaign). These features still apply to the 
PESM today, albeit to a lesser extent – according to Jiménez (2004) 87% of protests 
are local – and insufficient organisation and a failure to liaise with other groups are 
still routinely invoked as features of ecologism in Spain.   
                                                
83 It is generally agreed that this figure is very approximate. Fernández (1999: 56) says there were 
between 700 and 1000 environmental organisations in the 1990s. However, Jiménez (2005) says there 






Throughout the 1980s and until the mid-1990s the Spanish authorities ignored and 
were hostile to the PESM’s demands. The movement’s lack of access to policy 
makers therefore fostered  a level of contestatory collective action which, at 
European level, was only surpassed by Greece (Jiménez 2005). The high number of 
protests contradicted, and continue to contradict, the notion that environmental 
conflict is linked to a high level of socio-economic development and that Spain has a 
weak civic society and is therefore unlikely to have a strong social movement (as 
discussed in Chapter 3).  
 
The PESM’s propensity for collective action was strongly related to the fact that the 
PESM had no institutional access to the movements. PESM representatives therefore 
resorted to other means: in addition to resorting to unconventional actions (van der 
Heijden 1997: 35), they also engaged in ‘conventional actions’:  they brought legal 
action against an offending body, registered complaints in the courts, and alerted the 
press to environmental injustices or wrongdoing. Most mobilisations were local. In 
small towns and villages a demonstration was the easiest way of making others 
aware of the situation and of attracting press coverag .  
 
A further characteristic of the Spanish PESM is that e protest repertoire focuses on 
‘playfulness’ rather than anger or violence. The movement is deeply rooted in its 
pacifist origins (there was a strong conscientious bjectors’ movement until 2001 
when military service was abolished) and one of the key virtues propounded by 
Spanish society is the notion of tolerance and a stigmatisation of violence (Jiménez 
2005: 167). The Spanish love of pageant ensures that each major mobilisation 
becomes a celebration of solidarity.  
 
By 1990, many of the fragmented movements increasingly cooperated with each 
other and quite a number grouped under two important EMOs, AEDENAT and 
CODA, that emerged as state-wide, umbrella organisations. Both were participatory 
organisations (see Table 2.3 for della Porta and Diani’s typology of different kinds of 
pressure groups or EMOs), but AEDENAT  was more inclined to non-conventional 





environmental problems derived from industrial and urban matters, whereas CODA 
was more conservationist in nature.  
 
The gradual consolidation of a more coordinated PESM – increasingly better 
represented by major players such as AEDENAT and CODA, as well as by 
Greenpeace and a number of other larger NGOs or EMOs – coincided with a change 
in the POS. In the mid-1990s, the PESM’s previous marginalisation came to an end as 
it became recognised as a legitimate interlocutor on behalf of environmental matters 
(Jiménez 2005: 189). Since this time, the leading EMOs and NGOs have participated 
in the policy process although this process of institutionalisation is ‘fluctuating and 
uneven’ (*Jiménez 2005: 221). One reason for its uneve  role is the governing elite’s 
attitude towards the PESM.   
 
For example, during PSOE’s 2004-2008 mandate, the government appeared to 
embrace a pro-environmental agenda and the Minister for the Environment, Cristina 
Narbona, was appreciated by all ecologists for her evident commitment to this area. 
After the 2008 elections, the Ministry was restructured to include new areas,  the 
newly designated head of environmental minister was someone with no environmental 
interest and the government largely turned its back on environmental demands. 
 
Sometimes, and in keeping with ideas put forward by POS theory, opportunities have 
arisen precisely because the government is closed to the ecologists’ demands. This 
situation arose in 1996 when the PP came to power (after 14 years of PSOE 
government). PSOE’s fall from government led to a generational renewal in the 
PSOE shadow cabinet which included younger politicians, some of whom took an 
interest in ‘new’ environmental ideas which has been advocated for a long time by 
ecologists but were now being discussed within the EU. The more progressive PSOE 
politicians used the ecologists’ demands to voice th ir opposition to the PP’s 
policies, which disregarded environmental considerations.  
 
Amidst this slight change in the political climate, AEDENAT and CODA merged in 





working with or alongside other organisations – hassu tained numerous campaigns 
promoting better practices but also acting as a watchdog to report failures in 
complying with the law. As EA’s spokesperson has stated, one of the prime reasons 
for finally creating a state-wide organisation was the need for small environmental 
groups to access legal expertise, to learn from others’ campaigns, and to receive 
support from the wider confederation (Interview with Oberhufer 2005).  
 
By the time EA was created, the PESM had changed substantially and  the largely 
anti-nuclear, pacifist and conservationist movement had become more overtly 
political, arguing for a different model of society. A number of influential 
publications84 helped to disseminate ideas and was one of the instruments helping to 
connect this diffuse but interconnected network of ‘ecologists’.  
 
Although collective action is the more visible side of the PESM, individuals and 
groups within the movement are involved in a wide range of activities: some EMOs, 
and an increasing number of professional ecologists, are increasingly working within 
the system in their capacity as environmental experts (for example, they sit on 
advisory boards and lead educational projects, to name just a couple of areas they are 
involved in); others are working within political parties, trade unions or universities 
to promote a more ‘ecological’ viewpoint. For example, Red Economía Ecológica is 
an association of university lecturers and researchers (with 140 members) interested 
in environmental economics.  
 
In addition to working with the system, the PESM retains strong links with the 
grassroots movement. When cooperation with the authorities fails to produce results, 
the PESM is swift to mount campaigns to expose non-enforcement or infringement 
of the law or to organise a campaign on behalf of a particular issue.  
                                                
84 Three publications stand out for their contribution t  spreading ideas about ecologism:  Ecologista 
is a ‘social ecology’ magazine which appears about five times a year. It was founded in 1993, though 
in the early years it was called Gaia. When Ecologistas en Acción (EA) was founded, the magazine – 
published by EA – changed its name.  Ecología Política is the other best known publication which 
promotes political ecology. Whilst the first adopts a particular ideology, the latter – whilst 
recognisably ‘green’ -  includes writers who would c ass themselves as ecosocialists. The final – and 
most scholarly and prestigious publication – is M entras Tanto, which rigorously promoted and 






Although the Spanish PESM is predicated on its local r regional identity, a number 
of issues have taken on a state-wide significance ad h ve led to protests taking part 
all over the country at the same time. This was already the case in the 1970s when 
the protest against the nuclear programme was such that they reversed the decision to 
build more stations. However, a number of other protest issues, initially regional, 
have acquired national significance in recent years. One of these erupted in the wake 
of the Prestige disaster in November 2002, when the aforementioned oil tanker sank 
off the northwest coast of Spain spilling 20 million gallons of oil into the sea.  
 
The Galician and central governments’ failure to act appropriately in response to the 
crisis led to the creation of the Nunca Máis85 movement, a movement which gathered 
momentum extremely quickly, firstly in Galicia but later throughout Spain.  The 
protests attracted an unprecedently high number of supporters: the first 
demonstration in Santiago de Compostela on December 1st, 2002, gathered about 
200,000 people, and was followed by further large demonstrations throughout Spain. 
As the movement grew in strength and in its opposition o the PP government, the 
scope of the demands increased and began to include other issues such as calling for 
an end to the Iraq war and for Spain to pull its troops out of Iraq. The largest 
demonstration, attended by over a million people, took place in Madrid on February 
23rd, 200386.    
 
Aguilar Fernández and Ballesteros Pena’s study of the Nunca Máis movement  
(2005) provides a useful analysis of the spectacular rise and swift fall of a movement 
that ‘fell short of the widespread expectations of p litical change which it had 
created’ (2005: 106). They attribute this to the movement’s inability to frame its 
demands in a way that would strengthen the common ide tity of the movement. 
Nevertheless, the article was written shortly after the incident. Time has restored 
much of Nunca Máis’s symbolic value, demonstrating the potential that can be 
                                                
85 ‘Nunca máis’ means ‘never again’ in Galician.  
86 In addition to organising demonstrations, rallies, concerts and other performances to raise funds, the 
campaign helped to raise awareness of the problem and increased media attention on the issue, thus 
generating a wave of solidarity which saw over 300,0  volunteers helping to clear up the  oil from 





unleashed by mobilisations (this is particularly pertin nt given that Galicia is 
traditionally an extremely conservative and politically apathetic  region).   
 
The Nunca Máis movement is one example of short-lived but exuberant c mpaigns 
which are a feature of the Spanish PESM. Whilst limited in their long-term impact, 
they certainly help to give the issue media visibility and make it imperative for the 
government in question to take action.  
 
After PSOE won the elections in 2004, the size and frequency of protests abated for a 
number of years. Some have attributed this to a more favourable POS. PSOE was 
more open to the PESM, wanted to increase their expertise in environmental matters 
and was ready to dialogue. Others worried that a certain apathy had crept in 
(exemplified by the decreasing activity of the antiglobalisation movement, but also 
many others) or that the activism had left the streets and turned to social network 
sites. However, the Democracia Real Ya (Real Democracy Now) demonstrations in 
many of Spain’s cities in May 2011 show that the NSMs have recaptured some of 
their previous momentum (perhaps not unrelated to the dramatic fall from grace of 
PSOE since the 2008 election). The next sub-section examines one further example 
of an issue which acquired prominence in a particular region but was soon embraced 
by the PESM at state-wide level.  
 
4.3.2 The water wars    
Water is a key issue in Spain and ideological division  over its management abound. 
The ‘hydraulic paradigm’ (López-Gunn 2009: 375), or Franco’s technologically-
driven water policy, was perpetuated after the transition to democracy. New 
governments continued to build dams and to increase storage capacity with a twofold 
aim: to boost domestic electricity supply and to prvide farmers with the water they 
needed to irrigate the soil (McFall 2002; López-Gunn 2009; Font and Subirats 2010). 
The need to supply water in plenty was considered ncessary to boost economic 
growth. In 1993, the PSOE government put forward a white paper, the Plan 
Hidrológico Nacional (PHN, The National Water Plan) that proposed transferring 





to the south of Spain, the most ambitious of which was the transfer of water from the 
river Ebro in the north of Spain to the southern regions.  
 
The 1993 white paper, widely opposed by many, was rejected for a number of 
technical reasons. It therefore fell to the PP, which won the elections in 1996, to 
reintroduce the bill, which was enacted in 2001, despit  numerous protests 
culminating in ‘The Blue March’ to Brussels. This march covered the distance from 
the delta of the Ebro (in Catalonia) to Brussels. Many walked the whole way; others 
came on bicycles or in small convoys. The march through Brussels included 15,000 
protesters who had come from Spain, and is said to be the largest demonstration of 
people from outside Belgium. They presented a petition o the EP in which they 
denounced the new Act, the National Hydrological Pln (NHP) as contravening the 
European Water directive (El País 10/09/2001).  
 
The project to transfer water had been rejected from the start by many groups in 
Aragón and Catalonia, the two regions through which the Ebro flows: ecologists 
(scientists as well as political activists) were opp sed to the demand-based approach, 
and objected to the fact that much of the water destin d for the south of Spain would 
be used to fill up swimming pools, water golf courses and irrigate agri-business 
crops. They were also ideologically opposed to an instrumentalist view of water (and 
rivers) as a resource which could be plundered with li tle regard for the 
consequences. A number of different organisations fought the plan: Greenpeace, 
AEDENAT and CODA were instrumental in setting up COAGRET87 in 1995. 
Another important Catalan organisation, the Plataforma en defensa de l’Ebre 
(Movement in defence of the river Ebro), was particularly concerned about the 
negative impact of this river transfer on the river’s delta. Another example was the 
Fundación Nueva Cultura del Agua (FNCA or Foundation for a New Water Culture) 
set up in 1998 by about 100 scientists, and led by two academics from Zaragoza 
University in Aragón88.  
                                                
87 Coordinadora de Afectados por los Grandes Embalses y Trasvases ( Movement for People Affected 
by Big Reservoirs and Transfers)  
88 The academic in question was Francisco Javier Martínez Gil. Another economist from Zaragoza 
University, whose contributions have been key to inroducing a new water management approach, is 





The issue of water rights, in an increasingly decentralised but water-needy country, 
led to what have often been called the ‘Water Wars’ – yet another confrontation 
between the Two Spains. Aragón and Catalonia, repres nting the regionalist view, 
objected to ‘their’ water from the Ebro being used by other regions and maintained 
that the central government had no right to deprive them of water that was rightfully 
theirs – particularly as it was destined for ‘prosperous’ regions such as Murcia.  
Centralists maintained that the government must ensur  that everyone had an equal 
right to water in Spain.  
 
The ‘Water Wars’ put the issue of water management high on the agenda for many 
years to come and the debate and dissemination of iformation that was sparked by 
the Ebro issue spread to the rest of Spain. Althoug the PP enacted their bill in 2001 
the protest continued unabated. When PSOE won the elections in 2004 they fulfilled 
their electoral promise to repeal the river transfers and to amend the PHN 2001 Act. 
 
The mobilisations against the PHN exemplify how ecologists transformed an issue 
that might have remained a minority issue into a salient one by harnessing the 
nationalist dimension. The Water Wars acquired considerable media importance and 
ecologists consequently had a bigger audience when it came to propounding their 
demands for ‘a new water culture’, which they were able to demonstrate as being in 
line with progressive European and North American policy-making. As Font and 
Subirats state (2010), the issue also led to an advocacy coalition framework between 
two players – the  environmentalists and those representing commercial interests 
who wanted water to become a paying commodity.  
 
The new ‘culture’ has ostensibly gained considerable acceptance in mainstream 
society, although the ecologists’ radical aims have be n diluted into a somewhat 
hollow discourse. For example, the theme of the 2008 Zaragoza Expo was ‘Water 
and Sustainable Development’, a fitting theme given that Zaragoza is the capital of 
Aragón and that the Ebro goes through the city centre. However, this event was 
viewed critically by ecologists because of the inherent contradiction in building the 





widened in the Expo precinct and the riverbanks were tidied up (requiring the cutting 
down of hundreds of trees); one part of the riverbank, which was public land, was 
turned into a private club and golf course (Nodo 50: June 2008). 
 
Although the Zaragoza Expo organisers were guided by commercial rather than 
ecological interests, the event dedicated several exhibitions to the notion of careful 
water management, demonstrating the extent to which t e ideas of the previously 
marginalised ecologists have become central to  political discourse. In spite of this, 
little has changed. Some 20 new reservoirs are under construction, and the 
recommendations of the European Water Directive are flouted with the excuse that 
Spain has suffered from unprecedented drought in recent years (Ecologistas en 
Acción  19/02/2010). Since Cristina Narbona was removed from office as Minister 
for the Environment in 2008, environmental priorities have slipped down the agenda. 
The government has gone back on its pledge to abandon river transfers and has 
scaled down its plans for desalination plants. ‘Overall, developments both at the 
national and regional levels indicate that the water agenda is discontinuous and 
suggest that the path of policy change is anything but straightforward’ (Font & 
Subirats 2010: no page). 
 
The anti PHN movement may have ‘won’ one decisive battle against the 
government, but the struggle to introduce a ‘new water culture’ continues. Despite 
some apparently notable achievements, the PESM’s efforts to change the 
government’s water policy still have a long way to go but demonstrate the PESM’s 
ability to work within society and to seize opportunities to push for change.  
 
The following subsection will focus on EA in order to emphasise this organisation’s 
pivotal role as not just an ‘envioronmental’ movement (and ENGO) but as an EMO 









4.3.3  Ecologistas en Acción  
If the income and membership of EA is compared with that of Greenpeace89, FOE or 
other ENGOs, it is apparent that EA has, proportionately, a very substantial number 
of members in comparison with its income (see Table 4.5): EA has only about one 
tenth of Greenpeace’s income, but about one third of its members; similarly, EA has 
about 80% of FOE’s income but ten times their number of members. This 
demonstrates EA’s priorities: their foremost aim is to spearhead an active social 
ecology movement and they try to finance this expediently, avoiding becoming a 
‘protest business’ (Jordan & Maloney 1997) and reserving most of their time and 
energy to promoting social interaction at every leve .  
 
EA’s funding comes from a number of sources: they collaborate with the authorities 
whilst being extremely selective about which projects they take on, whereas 
WWF/Adena and SEO are much more pragmatic about money-raising (Interview 
with Oberhufer 2005). Otherwise, EA’s income is deriv d from the sale of 
membership dues and various commercial activities promoting social ecology (as 
shown in Box 4.3). Over the years, EA’s dependence on public sources of funding 
has increased but its topmost priority remains its  commitment to grassroots activism. 
EA’s emphasis on democratic participation is paramount and they appear to have 
managed to avoid personalism: their leading figure, Theo Oberhuber, avoids the 










                                                
89 Three Spanish ENGOs (Greenpeace, WWF/Adena and SEO/ Birdlife) have a substantial annual 
income of around €5 million. These figures are, however, proportionately far lower Greenpeace UK’s 





Table 4.5  Key Data on Spain’s leading EMOs and ENG Os 










Origin of income 
expressed as % of total 
Usage of income 
expressed as % of 
total 




744,096 82 Public funding 
4 Other income 
13 Private funding 




15 Admin costs 
4   Waste 
4   other projects 
4  Climate change 
2  Food and  
Agriculture 
 
Depana  1,405 
(200)  
306,000 Public funding 72   
Own income 28  
70 Campaigns    
and projects 





6,416,148  93.25 Membership fees 
4.71 donations 
1.59 Financial income 








































SEO/Birdlife 1954 11,000 
(4,000)  
5.500.000 55 public funds 
45 private funds 
77 Projects 
13 Administration 
10 Fund raising 






                                                
90 Latest figures for Ecologistas en Acción show thateir income for 2010 was €997,108 – a 






















Funding from authorities  
 Source: Ecologistas en Acción  2011 
 
EA was formally established in December 1998, bringing together 300 groups which 
had been increasingly working together but were organisationally fragmented and 
lacked the necessary visibility. The structure of the confederation was established to 
overcome regional imbalances and to integrate all the different Spanish regions on an 
equal basis (a feat which  CLV never succeeded in bringing about). EA fulfils all the 
criteria of an organisation founded along the principles of participatory democracy, 
with a bottom-up structure and total autonomy for the individual movements and 
federations91. For example, although some of the 300 groups within EA may focus 
on single issues (i.e. some are anxious to conserve turtl s or to focus on urban 
regeneration or cycle paths whilst others are committed to social ecologism and 
therefore pursue a broad set of objectives), they all share a similar ideological 
outlook (as defined in EA’s set of ideological principles – see Appendix G,1).  
 
The merger of AEDENAT and CODA has created an EMO which combines the 
characteristics of both previous EMOs: the first was more contestatory and radical, 
centred on urban issues whereas the second was more conc rned with rural issues 
such as diversity preservation. Unlike organisations like Greenpeace, the nationwide 
                                                
91 EA’s confederal structure means that each group is wholly autonomous when it comes to deciding 
its policies and actions; in order to belong to the regional confederation an association merely has to 
abide by a few common principles and pay a small subscription; the regional confederations are, in 





EA insists on its roots as a social movement and therefor  avoids strategies such as 
direct marketing and mail order techniques to recruit new members. In contrast to 
Greenpeace Spain, which is very much based in Madrid and functions on a top-down 
principle, EA groups typically start at local level and are based on grassroots 
participation and action at a local level.  
 
The organisational structure and founding principles of EA have led to a model 
confederal structure: the small, local groups maintain heir own identity (but carry a 
small EA logo), pursue their own interests unhindere   but enjoy economies of scale 
which make it possible to access legal advice, for example, as well as to benefit from 
the wider spheres of influence made possible by the Confederation. In short, the 
incentives available to the small groups (the ability to draw on legal expertise, to be 
associated to a well-respected organisation, and to receive financial assistance when 
possible) persuaded them to overcome any differences in order to fight more 
effectively. 
 
Both at regional and national level, EA has quickly become a byword for ecologism 
(their brand name is effective and leaves no room fr doubt about the purposes of the 
organisation). Above all, EA stands out because of its primary focus on Spanish 
problems, starting at local level and building up a campaign from all the different 
points in Spain. EA has federations in every Spanish region apart from the Balearic 
Islands, which opted to retain their own well established independent organisation, 
GOB (an ornithological and  environmental defence group).  
 
Within EA, there is great awareness and sensitivity over the issue of regional 
divergences and a real attempt is made to work withth s issue constructively.92 For 
example, the headquarters of EA is in Madrid, and sometimes the ‘Madrid’ executive 
 is perceived as making many of EA’s day to day decisions (Interview with Sosa 
Martín 2005). The small team in Madrid works hard to minimise these perceptions by 
drawing on activists from across the country. The annu l conferences are always held 
                                                
92 The author attended EA’s annual conference in Zarautz, Basque Country, in December 2006 as an 
observer. Sensitivity to regional issues and the need for all delegates to be listened to attentively was 





in a different venue and region each year. These conferences (attended by about 200 
delegates) are genuinely participatory and the moveent’s direction in the next year 
is decided on by polling all conference members. Debat  is encouraged, all are 
listened to, and decisions on policy are reached by a vote of all delegates.  
 
At a European level, EA is also part of several important European Union-wide 
environmental umbrella groups such as CAN (the Climate Action Network), 
Transport and Environment (promoting sustainable transport), ASEED (Action for 
Solidarity, Equality, Environment and Development in Europe)93. A member of EA is 
the single Spanish member of the executive committee of the  European Environment 
Bureau (Interview with Sosa Martín 2010) and makes a particularly weighty 
contribution on issues where EA has acquired considerable expertise (waste, air 
quality, mercury, chemical substances, water and bio iversity) (EA 2006). The EMO 
is also part of international organisations such as IUCN (International Union for 
Conservation of Nature), INFORSE (International Network for Sustainable Energy) 
and GENET (an association of ONGs opposed to  genetic engineering). EA produces 
a substantial number of comprehensive reports on many different issues (for example, 
air quality in Spain and in a number of different regions and cities) (EA 2009) The 
expertise acquired by EA in these fora subsequently enables EA to help local and 
regional authorities navigate and interpret European directives, and be more aware of 
new developments. 
 
Despite EA’s achievements, the movement is young and problems may arise further 
down the line. Activists fear that the increasing degree of cooperation with local 
authorities and regional departments will lead to increasing institutionalisation and a 
compromised position. EA is very aware of this danger and, to date, seems to have 
avoided this risk. Most political scientists consider this progressive 
institutionalisation or co-optation of social movemnts to be inevitable (e.g. Van der 
Heijden 1997), but Jiménez (2005: 7) argues that these conclusions are based on 
Northern European and American cases and may not apply to the Spanish situation.  
                                                
93  It is also a member of other European bodies suchas ANPED (Northern Alliance for 
Sustainability), EYFA (European Youth for Action) and OCEAN 2012. It is also on international 





4.4 CONCLUSION  
 
Chapter 4 has attempted to demonstrate that the PE movement in Spain is more 
vigorous than popularly supposed. Despite their disarray, individual Green parties 
have seized opportunities to influence policy and icrease voters’ awareness of 
Green politics. On the EMO/ENGO front, a number of organisations have managed 
to raise their profile substantially over the last ten years and now have a central role 
to play within society.  
 
PE as an ideology has also gained a substantial number of supporters or sympathisers 
to such an extent that Sempere, writing in the most influential red-green journal, 
Mientras Tanto, stated that Spanish society’s ‘goalposts have shifted towards 
sustainability but the government is still stuck with old mindsets and it is now civil 
society that is one step ahead of the game’ (*2005: 1 1). 
  
Spanish ecologists have, in conclusion, undoubtedly contributed to the ‘greening’ of 
Spain over the last 40 years although it could be argued that the efforts of  Spanish 
ecologists have simply helped to perpetuate the s atus quo by spearheading necessary 
changes to avert the worst consequences of the environmental crisis. Murray 
Bookchin was vehemently opposed to a piecemeal strategy arguing that ‘partial 
solutions [….] deflect public attention and will therefore fail to introduce the radical 
changes needed to avert disaster’ (1991: 3). The Spanish authorities’ recent 
conversion to sustainable water practices is an excellent example of the inadequacy 
of piecemeal solutions. However, from the activists’ point of view, a piecemeal 
strategy is preferable to doing nothing. Whilst pushing for change, raising people’s 
awareness and gradually shifting public attitudes in one area after another, there is 
always the possibility of eventually achieving the necessary critical mass.  
 
Chapter 4 has provided a brief overview of the Spanish PESM and in the course of 
this has stressed the importance of the regional or national issue as one of the key 
stumbling blocks that prevented the consolidation of a single Green party in Spain. 





Given the importance of the regional dimension, chapters 5 and 6 will focus on the 
PESM in Catalonia and Andalucía (respectively). They will examine the distinctive 
trajectory of the PESM in both regions, and will thereby help to demonstrate how the 
specific characteristics of each region have impacted significantly on the 






CHAPTER 5: THE POLITICAL ECOLOGY  MOVEMENT IN CATALONIA  
 
 
Figure 5.1 A Map of Catalonia showing its four prov inces 
 
               
              Source: Luventicus Website 1 
 
The previous chapter provided an overview of the main characteristics of Spain’s PE 
movement but argued that in order to understand ecologism in Spain, and in particular 
Green party politics, it is important to appreciate th  regional dimension of Green 
politics, namely the fact that the latter is predominantly organised at regional level, 
despite attempts to create statewide parties or projects. Chapter 3 argued that the 
territorial dimension of Spanish politics evolved as a result of each region developing 
its own political culture and party system (Pallarès et al. 1997). The latter in turn had 
a profound impact on the development of the country’s Green parties. A 
comprehensive knowledge of Spanish Green politics therefore entails understanding 
the PE movement in each region and appreciating the crisscrossing series of links and 











is beyond the scope of this thesis, the focus on Catalonia (the present chapter) and 
Andalucía (the next chapter), provides an insight into the PE movement in these two 
very different regions.  
 
Catalonia is one of the strongholds of the green move ent in Spain. The Catalan case 
is of interest for a number of reasons. Firstly, it will be shown that one of the most 
distinctive characteristics of PE in Catalonia is the influence of Catalan nationalism 
on the development of this nation’s Green movements a d parties. Secondly, the 
chapter will focus on the issue of ecosocialism versus ecologism. This is an 
ideological and strategic tussle over positioning that is constantly played out in Green 
regional parties across Spain but is particularly marked in Catalonia where the 
emergence of an ecosocialist party, ICV (Iniciativa per Catalunya Verds, Initiative 
for Catalonia Greens),  has been met with a mixed reception by ecologists.  
 
The first section of this chapter examines Catalanism (or Catalan nationalism) which, 
it will be argued, resulted in the emergence of the region’s very distinct political 
culture. The chapter will then provide an introduction to the Catalan PESM, will 
consider to what extent it differs from the Spanish PESM, and will briefly outline the 
contribution of the PESM to green politics in the region. The third section will  focus 
on Catalonia’s Green parties and will show how Green politics in the region has 
developed its own very distinctive Catalan variant whilst remaining linked to 
statewide politics. Catalan Green parties have been constrained by obstacles common 
to Green parties in other countries but have additionally contended with the 
nationalist and ecosocialist question.   
 
 
5.1 CATALONIA’S REGIONAL SPECIFICITY 
 
5.1.1 Catalonia: a nation  
Catalonia is Spain’s sixth largest region but the second most populated, with over 





region which, until recently, contributed most to the country’s GDP94. The region’s 
economic success is generally attributed to its traditional importance as an industrial 
and business centre;  much of this activity is concentrated in the ‘metropolitan 
region’ surrounding Barcelona which concentrates 70% of the region’s population 
(CIDEU: 2010).  
 
The region’s geographical closeness to France, its traditional cultural links with the 
rest of Europe (assiduously fostered to emphasise the region’s autonomy from 
Madrid) and its relative prosperity mean that, for at least a century, Catalonia has 
liked to think of itself as having more in common with other European countries than 
the rest of Spain. If Spain was, until recently, characterised as being a nation which 
was underdeveloped within the European context, Catalonia has been categorised as a 
forward-looking, prosperous and enterprising develop d ‘nation’.  
 
During the early years of the transition Spain’s political class was anxious ‘to 
accommodate the aspirations of regions with nationalist movements (Colino 2008: 
578).’ Foremost amongst these regions was Catalonia, which had long nursed a wish 
to reacquire the devolved powers it had been granted during the Spanish Second 
Republic (1931-1939). In addition, the desire to be recognised as a distinct ‘nation’ 
had begun to gather force from the middle of  the 19th century, which saw a growing 
interest in promoting the Catalan language as the princi al symbol of Catalan 
identity. The importance of Catalonia’s status as a nation was based on historical 
precedent: from 988-1714 Catalonia had been a quasi independent kingdom, loosely 
connected to the Kingdom of Castille but retaining its own laws, courts, government, 
royal mint, language and traditions (Castells 1997: 43). Catalans are keen to point to 
the legitimacy of their claim to be a ‘nation’ by citing not only their past history but 
by also pointing out that within the European Union there are numerous countries or 
nations that are smaller than Catalonia (for example the Irish Republic and Belgium). 
 
A majority of Catalans want more devolved powers for the region, but fall short of 
favouring independence (Castells 1997: 49; Guibernau 1999; Keating 1996). Both 
                                                
94 In March 2010 Catalonia was overtaken by Madrid which has now become the Spanish region with 





Guibernau and Castells talk of Catalonia’s distinctive culture and Castells refers to 
Catalonia as one of the most cited examples of successful self-government short of 
independence. The region has promoted a very distinct cultural policy and has its 
own television, radio and newspapers; it also has a health service that is substantially 
different from that of the rest of Spain. Furthermoe, in its business ventures and its 
relations with the EU, the Catalan government has insisted on  distancing itself from 
Spain wherever possible, to the extent that ‘Cataloni  almost seems like a separate 
state’ (Castells 1997: 49).  
 
Whilst most scholars agree with Guibernau and Castells’  assertions that Catalans do 
not want to secede from Spain, a recent study by Dowling (2009) argues forcefully 
that events over the last few years – in particular, the Statute issue (see Chapter 3.3.1 
which explains the issue surrounding Catalonia’s new Estatut or regional 
constitution) – have radicalised the region, which has therefore seen growing support 
for independence. After the Constitutional Court announced its verdict on the Statute 
in June 2010, La Vanguardia, a conservative Catalan newspaper, commissioned an 
opinion poll showing that, in July 2010, support for independence had reached 47% 
whilst 36% were against the proposal (La Vanguardia 18/07.2010); by September 
2010 this had fallen to 40% in favour of independence (with 45% against the motion) 
(La Vanguardia 07/09/2010).  
 
It remains to be seen whether events over the last few years will have a lasting 
consequence on Catalans’ position on independence. At the very least it demonstrates 
the depth of feeling which exists in the region over the issue of nationhood. A longer-
term perspective on the nationalist issue is expressed in regular surveys carried out in 
Catalonia by CIS (the Spanish Centre for Sociological Research). Results over the 
last 15 years (see Table 5.1 below) indicate that, by and large, Catalans are opposed 










Table 5.1  Percentage of people surveyed in Catalonia who agre ed with 
the following statements relating to national ident ity 
 
Year  
1995 2001 2005 2010 
1.The Spanish state should allow the 
regions to become independent 
nations if they wish to take this step. 
--- 18% 20% 23.6% 
2.I have a single identity as a 
Catalan 
12 15.4% 14.3% 13.7% 
3. I have a single identity as a 
Spaniard  
16.8 14.7% 7.7 7.8 
4. I have a dual identity as Catalan 
and Spanish (to a greater or lesser 
degree) 
69.6 67.9% 76.4% 69.7% 
5. Spain is my country --- 35.1% 34.1% 34.7% 
  Source: adapted from CIS Surveys 2137 (1995),  2410 (2001),  2610 (2005) and    
2829 (2010)   
 
Nevertheless, as the CIS surveys show, over the years there has been a slow, steady 
rise in favour of independence (see statement 1), and a decline in the number of those 
who do not identify with Catalonia (see statement 3). Although only a minority 
theoretically favour independence, this opinion remains in the minority, albeit  a 
sizeable minority. Similarly, only 34.7% consider Spain to be ‘their country’.  
 
In short, Catalanism means full independence from Spain for some, whereas for the 
majority it means greater devolved powers and a recognition of the region’s status as 
a ‘nation’. Since the setting up of the State of the Autonomies, the Catalan authorities 
have used Catalanism as the driver of a successful, modern, democratic and inclusive 
Catalonia. This image is reinforced by the regional media, the devolved education 
system and by the importance accorded to local festival  and celebrations. This 
nation building (Keating 1996: 129) has, according to some, fostered a moderate 
nationalism which is ‘thus almost a hegemonic ideology, while containing enough 
variants to encompass most of the active population’ (Keating 2001b: 225). Even 
PSC (Partit dels Socialistes de Catalunya, the Catalan variant of PSOE) has 





Constitution)95 was drafted and enacted by the so-called ‘Tripartite’ government. 
This government, which was in power from 2003-2010, was a left-wing nationalist 
coalition headed by PSC but also including ICV and ERC (Esquerra Republicana de 
Catalunya or the Republican Left of Catalonia, a left-wing nationalist party).  
 
Although the Catalan institutions have successfully established Catalanism’s 
‘ideological hegemony’ (Keating 2001b) within the rgion and have promoted the 
region’s distinct identity internationally, notions within the region relating to the 
degree of autonomy or independence which Catalonia should have are constantly 
shifting because nationalism ‘is more malleable than the primordialists would have us 
believe’ (Gunther, Montero & Botella quoted in Swend  2006: 275).  
 
Despite the institutional and cultural dominance of Catalanism, many inhabitants of 
the region have a dual identity, still speak Spanish (50% of the population), reject the 
notion of an independent Catalonia or are completely indifferent to it. The 
metropolitan area of Barcelona is markedly less natio list than the rest of the region, 
partly because many immigrants and Spaniards from other areas of Spain have settled 
in or near the city. Within the city, there are many who are quite hostile to 
Catalanism. In spite, therefore, of the open, inclusive society portrayed by academics 
such as Guibernau (1997), a more sombre interpretation recognises that there is an 
important cleavage within Catalan society. At present, the Catalanist view is 
politically dominant and dissent is viewed as treachery. These tensions, as has been 
mentioned, permeate Catalan politics and society and have impacted on the 
development of the region’s Green parties, as will be seen in section 5.3 of this 
chapter. 
 
5.1.2 Catalonia’s party system 
Catalonia’s distinct political culture and traditions have resulted in a meso-
government political arena which differs from that of other Spanish regions. Since 
                                                
95 A good example of official and prevalent Catalanist d course is provided by the recently passed 
new Catalan Statute of Autonomy (2006) – which was supported by all of Catalonia’s political parties 
apart from the PP and a small, new (anti-nationalist) party called Ciudadanos-Partido de la 
Ciudadanía (Citizens – The Citizenship Party). Much of this text resonates with Catalan resentment 





1980, when the first elections to the Catalan parliament were held, a substantially 
different party system has evolved, although it retains statewide processes such as the 
electoral system and a number of other institutional a d cultural traits which it shares 
with the rest of Spain.  
 
As previously mentioned, (see Chapter 3.3.3), a number of nationalist regions deviate 
from the statewide pattern of being dominated by the two hegemonic parties, PSOE 
and PP. Catalonia is a case in point. The two main p rties in this region are PSC ( the 
Catalan variant of PSOE) and Convergència i Unió (CiU, Convergence and Union), 
Catalonia’s centre-right nationalist party. In addition to these two parties, three other 
parties regularly win seats both in regional and general elections: PP, and also two 
non-statewide parties (NSWP), namely ERC and ICV. Table 5.2 sets out the election 
results of these parties both in the statewide and the regional elections in order to 
illustrate two related points: the NSWP’s share of votes obviously changes according 
to conjunctural factors but, by and large, PSOE and PP increase their share of the 
vote in the general elections whilst the NSWP attrac  more voters in the regional 
elections (Pallarés, Montero & Llera 1997: 167). 
 
 Table 5.2 General and Regional Election Results in  Catalonia  








 % Seats  % Seats % Seats % Seats 
PSC-PSOE 39.47 21 45.39 25 26.82 37 18.32 28 
CiU 20.78 10 20.93 10 31,52 48 38.47 62 
ERC 15.89 8 7.83 3 14.03 21 7 10 
PP 15.58 6 16.4 8 10.65 14 12.33 18 
ICV-
EUiA96 
5.84 2 4.92 1 9.52 12 7.39 10 
   Sources: Gencat (Catalan Government) Website 2011 
                                                
96 EUiA is Esquerra Unida i Alternativa (The United and Alternative Left), IU’s counterpart in 
Catalonia.  IC (before it was Green) started out as IU’s equivalent in Catalonia but gradually changed 
direction, alienating the communist elements and taking on a coalition with Els Verds. By 1997, 
several groups of disaffected communists founded EUiA. After a few years in which they competed 
against each other, the two parties decided to forman electoral alliance in 2003 and since then have  





As Table 5.2 shows, in the general elections PSOE wins by far the most seats; 
however, at regional level the smaller, regional parties (CiU, ERC and ICV) do 
significantly better resulting in a five-party system which  increases the likelihood of 
coalition governments. Until 2003, CiU controlled the Catalan regional government 
(although from 1995 onwards they didn’t have an absolute majority and relied on PP 
to be able to govern). From 2003-2010, although CiUcontinued to win more seats 
than PSC, the latter’s coalition with ERC and ICV meant that the Tripartit (or three 
party government) was in power for seven years (until CiU won the regional 
elections in 2010 with an absolute majority). Although ICV was the minority party in 
the Tripartit, it was therefore in government for seven years, a position that  has 
given ecosocialism a certain prominence within Cataloni , but also beyond the region 
(ICV has had an MEP since 2004 and  one or two deputies in the Spanish Congreso). 
Furthermore, although Barcelona City Council is traditionally a PSC stronghold, the 
socialist party has at times had to form post-electoral pacts with other left-wing 
parties. It governed with ICV97 and ERC between 1995-1999 and 2003-2011, once 
again giving the ecosocialists access to influencing policy98. ICV’s contribution 
whilst in government will be examined at a later point in this chapter.   
 
Catalonia’s five-party system deviates from the Spanish predominantly two-party 
system dominated by PP and PSOE. As we will see, a gre ter plurality has 
undoubtedly opened up  opportunities for ICV, particularly at regional level; 
however, the remaining ‘Green-Green’ parties in Catalonia remain excluded from the 
political arena and blame this in part on the unfair ess of the electoral system as well 
as on the extensive range of competing options. These issues will be tackled in 
Section 5.3; before that, the following section looks at PE in Catalonia, focusing 




                                                
97 At that time, the party had already incorporated most of the region’s Greens, but the latter had not 
yet been absorbed into a single party. The ‘coalitin’ at that time was therefore called IC-EV 
(Iniciativa per Catalunya – Els Verds).  
98 In the May 2011 municipal elections, the Tripartito was defeated by CiU which, with support from 





5.2 CATALONIA’S  ECOLOGISTS  
 
The ecologist movement that emerged in the early 1970s arose from local 
associations such as nature conservancy groups, ornithology clubs, a rambling club, 
choirs and neighbourhood associations (Mora i Ticó 2004). Many groups not only 
met regularly to pursue their particular pastimes but used these meetings to speak 
Catalan and to mobilise opposition to the dictatorship. Hostility to the regime was 
particularly fierce in Catalonia, because the the region’s distinct identity was not 
recognised and the speaking of Catalan was forbidden. Early ecologists were 
nationalists, anti-system, left-wing, pacifist, feminist and anti-nuclear.  
 
Catalonia was an important industrial centre concentrated around Barcelona, and, 
from the outset, the PESM was based on a rejection of industrialism and 
productivism. Catalonia, traditionally Spain’s most economically developed region, 
had experienced further industrial development in the 1960s; this benefited big 
companies and Spain’s economy, but clearly had a neg tiv  impact on the region. 
Barcelona’s industrial expansion required extra labour (immigrants from the south of 
Spain) who could only find accommodation in the city’s growing shanty towns, 
whilst the authorities ignored the plight of these incomers or the strain which this put 
on the city’s infrastructure and its social fabric (Miranda 1998). In the 1970s, the 
river Llobregat, which flows through Barcelona, was the second most polluted river 
in Europe (García, Reixac & Vilanova 1979: 160): this attests not only to the level of 
industrialisation taking place along its banks but also to the prevailing laissez-faire 
culture. It is against this backdrop of unregulated economic development (juxtaposed 
with a large rural area that still depended on the primary sector) that one has to 
understand the beginnings of the environmental moveent in Catalonia.  
 
However, the issue that did more to galvanise Catalan ecologism than any other in 
the early days was the anti-nuclear movement (García, Reixac & Vilanova 1979: 
222). The Spanish government had embarked on a nuclear programme, avowedly to 
provide energy but also for defence purposes. Catalonia’s first nuclear power station, 





Franco’s death in 1975 and the subsequent legalisation of political activity in 1976 
unleashed the strong opposition which existed to the nuclear programme. Collective 
action against the building of a nuclear power station in Ametllà (in Tarragona, in the 
south of Catalonia) led to that particular scheme being dropped in 1976. The anti-
nuclear campaigns continued unabated and the CANC ( Comité Antinuclear de 
Catalunya or Catalan Antinuclear Committee), a very influential organisation for 
many Catalan ecologists, was created in 1977.   
 
The Catalan PESM suffered from the same problems as it  counterparts in the rest of 
Spain. The movement was diffuse, with about 300 groups scattered throughout the 
territory (Userda 1977). Even so the movement could boast  many achievements. A 
weekly Catalan language environmental weekly magazine, Userda, was launched in 
1976 and the movement engaged in numerous demonstrations nd campaigns to try 
to change hearts and minds. The main campaigns, apart from the anti-nuclear ones, 
included sustained objection to a number of landfill sites and incineration plants as 
well as campaigns to protect rural areas destined for evelopment (CRES 2010). One 
campaign, centered around the village of Gallecs, a rur l area near Barcelona, 
surrounded by housing developments. When it was decided to build a new town with 
150,000 inhabitants in Gallecs in 1977, a movement was set up to fight the proposal: 
this resulted in numerous protests but, above all, in a long struggle that was to 
become a way of life for many activists. About a hundred activists took over a 
number of abandoned farmhouses in the area and squatted there for a couple of years. 
Numerous well-attended festivals were organised in efence of the area, and famous 
artists such as the theatre company Els Joglars performed there (Galdón 2006). By 
1983, the movement petered out but had by then managed to deflect interest in the 
development.99   
However, the aforementioned lack of structure convinced a number of ecologists of 
the importance of forming a Green party in order to have a coherent political 
platform. The Catalan green party, Alternativa Verda, was founded in 1983, a year 
                                                
99 When the development of the area was again proposed years later, a new environmental movement, 





before its Spanish counterpart. As in the rest of Spain, most Catalan ecologists were 
opposed to the creation of a Green party. As the next section will show, this was just 
one of many problems facing this new party.  
Over the years, the PESM has gradually changed. Although it is still made up of a 
large and diffuse network of environmental NGOs, associations and movements, 
these are now better connected to each other, not only because they have cooperated 
more efficiently with each other from the mid-1980s onwards but also, more 
recently, because of the constant networking facilit ted by the internet and by social 
network sites. Lists published by the Catalan government, and which are by no 
means exhaustive, cite about 220 different organisations in Catalonia, the main ones 
being Greenpeace, Ecologistas en Acciò Catalunya (EAC), Ecologistes de Catalunya 
(EdC)100 and DEPANA. The first two are statewide organisations whilst the wo 
latter operate solely within Catalonia. EdC, a confederation of groups which 
restructured itself in 1998, is effectively the Catal n counterpart to EAC101. Many 
ecologists in Catalonia perceive EAC to be a Spanish i terloper, preferring to belong 
to a Catalan federation (Interviews with Puig 2007 and Vilanova 2007; 
correspondence with EdC 2008). EdC often takes a very different position from 
EAC. For example, EAC supports wind power unequivocally, given the region’s 
present reliance on nuclear power – 60% of the region’s energy source is based on 
nuclear power and 40% of Spain’s nuclear capacity comes from Catalonia. EAC’s 
position is hotly contested by EdC who question EAC’s model of development 
(correspondence with EdC 2008). EdC is Catalonia’s main representative within the 
European Environmental Bureau (EEB). Catalonia’s largest EMO is DEPANA, the 
Catalan equivalent of WWF-Adena. 
These federations or large organisations support the work of single issue PE 
movements which also abound in the region. The main issues which are regularly at 
the centre of many campaigns emphasise the desire of ecologists to prioritise a 
                                                
100 This umbrella group of Catalan EMOs was previously called l'Associació d'Entitats Ecologistes de 
Catalunya (AEEC) 
101 Although Ecologistas en Acción has had considerable success throughout almost the en ir  Spanish 
state, there are two exceptions: in the Balearic Islands they already had an EMO called GOB and 
therefore decided not to join EA; in Catalonia, they are active in Barcelona and in transmitting Catalan 





different kind of society, one that values people’s wellbeing and the planet’s 
sustainability over and above the push for continuous economic growth. These issues 
include the following: ‘NO to the MAT’, a large campaign against the building of 
high voltage power lines intended to bring electricity across the Pyrenees from 
France to Catalonia; the need to build a sustainable transport system, to halt road-
expansion programmes and push for the bicycle as an optimal form of transport, 
particularly in cities (Puig i Boix 1999). Pollution levels due to car traffic in 
Barcelona regularly exceed EU limits and yet  40.6% of all journeys in Barcelona use 
the car (whilst 14.3% use public transport and 45.1% go on foot or by bicycle) 
(InfoCatalunya 2010). Other ongoing issues have been th  nuclear power issue – the 
region has three nuclear power stations (the fourth one, Vandellós I, was 
decommissioned after it suffered the second worst nuclear power accident in Europe 
in 1989). 
In addition to these organisations, Catalonia – and in particular Barcelona – has been 
at the forefront of movements such as ATTAC, the counterglobalisation movement, 
and a group called Temps de Re-Voltes, a movement promoting Serge Latouche’s 
(2004) contraction (or degrowth) economics. In the summer of 2008 this group spent 
78 days travelling around Catalonia on bicycles, on the ‘March for De-growth’, 
raising awareness of this issue wherever they set up camp.  
Catalonia’s ecologists have not, of course, achieved th ir goals but, looking back 
over the 40 years of struggle, there is no doubt that t e movement has been able to 
exercise some influence on policy makers. As well as slowing down the region’s 
nuclear programme, the efforts of ecologists have brought about a large number of 
policy changes. For example, the long battle to prevent the transfer of the river Ebro 
led to a campaign to promote a ‘new water culture’. Activists and scientific experts 
worked together and, with the help of the latter, presented a convincing case for 
policy change. After 2003, the Tripartite regional govenment (that included ICV and 
ERC) encouraged the Catalan water board to collaborate with the organisation 
promoting the ‘new water culture’, the  Fundación para una Nueva Cultura del Agua 






As a result of this collaboration, in September 2010, the Catalan Water Agency 
agreed on a new water management plan which has been hailed by a well-known 
Catalan ecologist and academic, Narcís Prat, as ‘an excellent plan, the best in Spain, 
without a doubt,and as good as any other European plan’ (*Prat 2010). Whilst in 
power, ICV also pushed for a number of other environmental measures. They were 
instrumental in introducing Spain’s first municipal bicycle scheme in Barcelona, set 
up many bicycle lanes, set up new nature reserves in the region and rejected the 
possibility of a nuclear waste site being installed in the region. ICV’s achievements 
will be revisited in Section 5.4, which looks at ICV in greater depth.  
 
The Tripartite government was also behind the banning of bullfighting in the region 
(in July 2010). The bill was presented to the regional parliament as a ‘popular 
legislative initiative’ (PLI) (i.e. the proposal was initiated by civil society, namely a 
number of anti-bullfighting NGOs as well as numerous ecologists, ICV and ERC), 
and was duly considered by the parliament which voted to phase out bullfighting in 
Catalonia by 2013 (The Guardian 28/07/2010). The results look like a victory for 
animal rights and PE but, in Colm Tóibín’s words, have more to do with satisfying  
 
… a deep need in the Catalan soul. Killing off bullfighting offers Catalans a 
lovely and easy revenge for various humiliations heaped on them by Madrid 
in recent times; it also fulfils their deep anxiety to be understood and 
appreciated throughout the world as a separate nation, a place with a different 
identity and a different sensibility from the rest of Spain (Tóibín 2010).  
 
However, despite Catalonia’s geographical and cultural proximity to northern Europe 
– and the assumption (of non-Catalans and Catalans like) that it is environmentally 
progressive – this is arguably not the case. Tello, a Catalan ecologist and economist, 
questions the assumption that Catalonia is an enviro mental leader within Spain by 
indicating a number of areas in which it lags behind (2010). The region emits more 
greenhouse gases than other regions and has been particularly slow in developing 
renewable energy. The latest regional Energy Plan hs agreed to maintain the 
region’s three nuclear power plants in operation (this plan was agreed by the 
Tripartite government which included ICV). Tello also points out that Catalonia 





for 80% of the EU’s GM crops and, in 2010, Catalonia grew more GM crops than 
any other region, about 25,000 hectares – Spain’s total GM production covered 
70,000 hectares (MARM 2010). Furthermore, because GM crops are incompatible 
with organic crops, since 2002 Catalonia has lost 95% of its organic maize (Tello 
2010). However, Tello’s critique has to be set against figures provided for organic 
farming in Catalonia between 2000-2010. These show an exponential rise in the 
number of organic producers during that period (327 producers in 2000 as against 
1247 in 2010) and in the number of hectares farmed organically (only 10,827 
hectares in 2000 as compared with 83,506 by 2010) (CCPAE 2011).  
 
In short, despite the activism and expertise of the PESM, with some very limited 
support from ICV in government, only piecemeal changes have been achieved, thus 
reinforcing the PESM’s determination to continue tofight for a radical 
transformation of the political system.  
 
Having provided a brief introduction of the PESM in Catalonia, the next section 
examines Catalonia’s Green parties. In order to distinguish between both the 
ecosocialist and ecologist variants of the region’s Green parties, the term Catalan 
Greens will be used to include all of the region’s Greens, including ICV; the term 
Green-greens will be reserved to refer to the small Green parties which remained 
outside the ICV coalition which was established in 1995. 
 
 
5.3 THE CATALAN GREEN PARTIES  
 
This section will provide a diachronic overview of the Catalan Greens and will divide 
the account into two discrete periods: the first ten y ars (1983-1993) followed by the 
period running from 1993 till the present. As this account will show, the Catalan case 
shows similarities to the overall situation of the Spanish Greens. Party fragmentation 
is clearly at the root of their problem. However, whereas it is almost impossible to 
separate out the multiple issues leading to the fragmentation of the Spanish Greens, it 






A bewildering number of Green parties (approximately 22102) have, at different 
times, stood for election in Catalonia since Alternativa Verda (AV, Green 
Alternative), the first Catalan Green party, was founded in 1983. However, this figure 
is misleading and is due to the constant re-grouping a d re-naming of a smaller 
number of relatively constant factions. In order to present a more manageable picture, 
this study has dispensed with the 22 different names and has simplified the 
information by sometimes maintaining the same name, where feasible, for each 
faction (for example, AV has been through a number of names but has returned to its 
original one).  
 
Eight distinct green formations have existed in Catalonia, and these are set out in 
Table 5.3. The identity of most of these parties is confusing, as they all include either 
the word ‘green’ or ‘ecologist’ in their name. A further confusion arises from the fact 
that some of these parties are statewide parties but appear under a different (Catalan) 
name. Table 5.3 provides a basic summary of each of t e Green parties that have 
contested elections in Catalonia. The red symbols help to identify each party simply 
so that when they appear later as part of a coalitin  is easier to understand which 
parties are included in that coalition (for example, s e Catalan Green election results 
in Appendix H).  
 
In order to appreciate the increasing fragmentation of the Catalan Greens, Table 5.4 
shows the year each party was created, provides a chronological timeline and notes 








                                                
102 This figure – which is approximate and likely to change - includes all ‘Green’ political formations 
registered as parties which have stood in either the national, regional or European elections. It does 













First Green party in spain. Founded in 1983. It 
Catalanist, econationalist  and bioregional in 
inspiration. Once the main party, it is now a 
tiny faction which only stands in a few areas. 
 
Els Verds103  
 The Greens  
 
EV   
The Catalan variant of the Spanish ‘centralist’ 
green party, Los Verdes. This has been 
through many changes but remains within the 







The Greens – The 




Against coalitions with mainstream parties. A 
Green-green party that is slightly 
conservationist. Tends to stand ONLY when 
there is no alternative pursuing the same lines 
as itself (in favour of a statewide party). 
 
Recently, is com only in alliance with EV 
and even, in 2011 elections, with EV-GV 
 
 
Els Verds- Grup Verd 
The Greens – Green 
Group  
 
EV-GP   
 
A statewide  Green party established in 1994, 
as a result of the creation of the 
Confederation. Always run by one man, 






Partit Ecologista de 
Catalunya VERDE  
 
The Catalan Ecology 
Party GREEN    
 
Impostor or rogue party: fiefdom of one man 
and died out in mid 1990s.  
 Els Verds Ecologistes: 
The Green Ecologists  
 
EVE   
 
Another rogue party, the political  
manifestation of a sect called SILO. Ceased to  
exist in 1993 
 
 
Els Verds – Esquerra 
Ecologista 
The Greens – the Left-
wing Ecologists  
 
EV-EE  ⌫ 
 
This group have operated within Els Verds, 
but for a time were also with  the Catal n  
Nationalist Republican Left party, ERC. They 
were then part of ICV but 
 have now left this formation. They are no 






Initiative for Catalonia 
– Greens 
 
ICV   
Originally IC, a left-wing coalition (largely 
composed of communist parties and without 
the green label), ICV officially became 
 ecosocialist in 1996. It is an important small 
party, one of three parties of the ‘left’ in the 
governing coalition at regional level in 
Catalonia from 2003-2010.  
Sources: adapted from Lozano 2008 and party websites  
                                                
103 Els Verds is Catalan for Los Verdes. All party names in Catalonia are in Catalan (and the same 
applies in other regions that have their own language). This makes the use of logos even more 





Figure 5.2 The fragmentation of the Catalan Greens 
  (For the identity of parties, see Table 5.3. Figures on the left show the year in which 
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5.3.1 The Catalan Greens (1983-1993)  
The first Green Catalan party, Alternativa Verda (AV), founded in 1983 and one of 
the founding members of LV, fell out with the latter at the very first LV conference, 
held in Cardedeu (Catalonia) in February, 1985. Their disagreement concerned AV’s 
insistence that Catalonia should be recognised in LV’s statutes as a ‘nation’ and that 
LV should be a confederation which embraced the principles of eco-regionalism. 
Although LV were ideologically in favour of adopting a decentralised approach and 
were in favour of creating a Green federation, they w re nonetheless committed to 
founding a single statewide party in order to consolidate their presence throughout 
Spain whilst, at the same time, avoiding an excessiv  emphasis on nationalism which 
ran counter to the Greens’ commitment to an internaio list approach (Viader 2010: 
30). By June of 1985, negotiations had broken down: AV had withdrawn from LV 
and had decided to stand independently at the general el ctions in June 1986. 
 
From then on, despite repeated talks and attempts to form strategic alliances at 
election time, the nationalist issue continued to rankle with AV’s leaders and they 
maintained their independence from LV, although negotiations between the two 
parties were constant (Viader 2010). AV’s secession meant that the Catalan Greens 
began to fragment almost from the outset, as some Catalan Greens remained with 
LV; furthermore, AV embarked on a course of action which affected not only the 
Catalan Greens but also had consequences for LV.  
 
This course of action was AV’s creation, in 1987, of the statewide Confederación de 
Los Verdes104,  an attempt to set up a rival Confederal Green party. The confederation 
was formed by four parties which had withdrawn from LV: it included AV, a splinter 
party from the Madrid Greens, and also the Basque and Galician branches of LV. For 
a couple of years, therefore, LV had no presence in the Basque Country or in Galicia 
and a weakened presence in Madrid and Catalonia; when t ese regional parties 
returned to LV, they remained recalcitrant, fuelling bad feeling within the party.  
 
                                                
104 This confederation should not be confused with the lat r Confederación de Los Verdes,  established 
by Los Verdes in 1995; although they are ‘legally’ the same party – i.e. the party was first registered 
with the Spanish Ministry of the Interior in 1987 – the first confederation ceased to operate in 1989 





Within Catalonia, AV’s decision resulted in the parallel existence of two ‘real’ Green 
parties, AV and EV (Els Verds, the Catalan name for LV). Whilst some activists 
prioritised the nationalist issue and were loyal to AV and its confederal principles, 
others favoured remaining within the LV federation. As the election results 
demonstrate (see Appendix H, A-D), the Catalan Green vote was fragmented because 
of the same two rogue parties (Els Verds Ecologistes105 and VERDE) that operated 
throughout Spain; however, it was further fragmented b cause the core Green vote 
was split between the radical ‘nationalists’ and the moderate nationalists (very few 
Catalan ecologists are not nationalists). Consequently, in the 1989 general election, 
when (as demonstrated in Chapter 4) support for Green parties was at its highest 
throughout Spain, the Greens in Catalonia achieved an aggregated vote of 2.53%. 
However, this was split four ways: AV obtained 0.82% of the votes; EV polled 
0.62%; the two rogue parties obtained 1.09% between th m.  
 
Because of the fragmentation of the vote, the Catalan Greens were therefore unable to 
harness effective support for a viable ecology party in these early years in spite of 
clear evidence of potential support for a Green party. This support was demonstrated 
by the results of the 1989 EP elections in Cataloni, where the aggregated Green vote 
came to 4.42% (see Appendix H, D). 
  
The Catalan Greens felt that, if they could only achieve unity and discredit the rogue 
parties, they would be certain to achieve some electoral success. Their optimism 
about future prospects was shared by a leading research institute in Catalonia, the 
ICPS (Institut de Ciències Polítiques i Socials or Institute of Political and Social Science),  
which in 1991 asked a team of political scientists to research the Greens in Catalonia. 
The resulting paper stated: 
  
 This study hypothesises that there is a ‘green political space’ in Catalonia, and 
also in Spain, which is very likely to grow in the not so distant future. There 
has been a little delay in its development, but this is understandable given the 
political system it is part of (Barás 1992: 2).  
 
                                                
105 This party is the same as the statewide rogue party Los Verdes Ecologistas, but going by its 





Barás’s study indicated that, in order to achieve their potential, the Catalan Greens 
had to overcome a serious problem, namely the prolife at on of parties and the 
ensuing confusion of the electorate. Her view was th t he fragmentation was not due 
to Catalanism, the fundi/realo dichotomy or strategic issues such as whether to ally 
with other parties or not. In her view  it was due to ‘personal problems between the 
different leaders, very understandable in a small, closed party which had been 
operating without much success for about ten years’ (1992: 3). Barás’s analysis of the 
situation in 1991 is corroborated by Cabal (1996), Karamichas (2004), by numerous 
articles in the press and interviews with green activists (Josep Puig; Santi Vilanova; 
Gustau Barbat; Antoni García). However, Barás’s analysis omits to mention why 
there were so many ‘personal problems between the leaders’, an issue that could 
largely be attributed to the tensions and clashes tat arose because of differing views 
on the importance of Catalan nationalism, as numerous sources have indicated in 
interviews, and as a Catalan Green makes manifestly clear in his account of these 
early years (Viader 2010). Similarly, Barás’s analysis discounts one of the key 
problems besetting the greens in the first 10 years of the party’s existence, namely the 
fact that the fragmentation was greatly aggravated by the existence of the two ‘rogue’ 
parties. The hostility between these two parties and the two ‘real’ Green parties (AV 
and EV) was by no means attributable to ‘personal problems between the leaders’ 
(the Catalanist issue is further explored later on in this section). 
 
In a bid to see off the rogue parties and to maximise their chances of winning a seat, 
four Green parties (including AV and EV) unified intime for the 1993 general 
election as Els Verds (Confederació Ecologista de Catalunya), and were predicted to win 
at least one seat. In the event, the Catalan coalition suffered the same fate as LV 
throughout Spain (see Chapter 4), despite the party’s unity and waning support for the 
rogue parties. Despite expectations, the Catalan Greens saw their s are of the vote fall 
substantially to 1%. Table 5.4 shows the falling interest in a Green option between 1989 
and 1993. At the first of these elections the Greens obtained an aggregated 2.53% of the 
vote whereas in 1993 they only obtained 1.57%. In short, after ten years, the Catalan 
Greens had proved incapable of winning a seat and hd seen their support peak and 






Table 5.4 General election results for Catalan Gree n-Green Parties 
Party     % 1989 %  1993 
Els Verds (Confederació Ecologista de Catalunya) 
⌫ --- 1.0 
Els Verds – Llista Verda ⌫ 0.62 --- 
Alternativa Verda –MEC   0.82  
Els Verds Ecologistes    0.77 0.32 
Partit Ecologista de Catalunya VERDE  0.32 0.25 
Total Green Votes 2.53% 1.57% 
Source: Spanish Ministry of the Interior Web-site 2010; (See Table 5.3  
which denotes each party and its corresponding symbol) 
 
There is no doubt that the Catalan Greens (like the Spanish Greens) were constrained 
by a number of different factors but  the issue which dominated the first ten years was 
that of Catalan nationalism. The ideological provenance of many activists within AV 
was uncompromisingly nationalist. One of the party’s leaders, Santiago Vilanova106, 
advocated eco-nationalism and bioregionalism in the 1970s (García, Reixac and 
Vilanova 1979) and his nationalist sympathies were evident: in 1980 he stood as an 
ERC candidate in the first elections to the regional parliament. In the early 1980s, AV 
party activists were also very close to other pro-independence left-wing parties such 
as the Moviment d'Esquerra Nacionalista (Movement of the Nationalist Left).107  
 
Viader, a leading founder of the Greens in Cataloni (but one who chose to retain his 
allegiance to LV, or EV as it is known in Catalan) highlights the tensions relating to 
the Catalan issue in two books which review ecologism in Catalonia until 1993 
(2005; 2010). According to these accounts and the opinions of a number of Green 
activists in Catalonia (Vilanova 2007; Puig 2007), the Green nationalists’ demands 
for a confederal party that recognised the full autonomy of the Catalan nation were 
never considered seriously, either by LV or, indeed, by the EGC (the European Green 
Coordination). AV’s leaders consequently became suspicious and hostile to LV. 
According to Puig and Vilanova (2007), the EGA failed to consider the Catalan 
Greens’ demands to be recognised as representatives of a distinct nation because of 
                                                
106 Vilanova now has an environmental consultancy as well as continuing to write as a freelance 
journalist 
107 Curiously, the Maoist leader of this party at that time, Joan Oms,  has been  spokesperson for the 





their policy of only allowing one Green party per nation (state); Viader’s account 
gives a different explanation, putting it down to EGA’s decision to defer discussions 
for a while (Viader 2010: 71). To this day, most Catal n Greens continue to apportion 
blame on the ‘European Greens’ for discriminating against Catalonia but, curiously, 
only one year after the Catalans were prevented from joining the EGA, the Scottish 
Green party separated from the English party and was immediately granted access to 
this European group of parties.  
 
EV were also committed Catalanists, as Viader’s account makes clear (2010), but 
believed they should remain part of LV. Their positi n was doubly difficult: their 
Catalanism led them to be viewed with some suspicion by many within LV whilst 
they were also ostracised by AV for remaining with LV.
 
5.3.2 Els Verds 1993-2010  
Shortly after their disappointment in the 1993 general lection, a faction within the 
recently constituted Catalan Confederation (the Confederació d’Els Verds) entered 
into dialogue with Iniciativa per Catalunya (IC). By 1995, a year of local and 
regional elections, the Catalan Confederation, Els Verds108, had agreed to form an 
electoral alliance with IC, which would allow the Greens to present candidates on 
IC’s lists. This alliance was not accepted by all Greens: some joined Alternativa 
Ecologista (AE), the only independent Green party to stand in the 1995 elections; 
others joined the ranks of ERC. The new IC-EV coalition secured the Greens three 
council seats: one seat, on Barcelona City Council, went to one of the founders of 
AV, Josep Puig. Two further Greens, Joan Oms and Miquel Masias, were made 
councillors in other towns which were part of the wider Metropolitan Area of 
Barcelona. Puig and Oms’s seats carried considerable weight because in their city 
councils the socialists needed the support of IC-EV in order to govern; consequently, 
a number of decisions depended on the position taken by a Green councillor. Puig 
became the ‘Sustainable City councillor’ for Barcelona, a new post created to fulfil 
an electoral promise (during the election, IC-EV were the only party who pledged to 
                                                
108 Confusingly, this was previously the name for the pro-Spain Catalan Greens; from now on, it 
would denote all or any Catalan Greens – in this insta ce, it denoted all, in theory, given that they 





introduce a Local Agenda 21 programme in Barcelona109). In 1995 there were also 
regional elections in Catalonia and, as a result of the IC-EV coalition, María Olivares 
was elected as Catalonia’s first Green regional deputy.  
 
Once in power, Olivares was unable to be effective at institutional level in her 
solitary position; at municipal level, the two councillors were able to be far more 
active and are acknowledged to have driven the city’s sustainability programmes 
forward substantially. In collaboration with NGOs and companies promoting 
environmental practices they were able to put their institutional power to good use. 
Puig drove forward policies to promote energy efficien y, to increase the use of 
renewable energies, manage water more efficiently and to reduce waste. Between 
1995-1999, a Sustainable City Resources Centre was set up and an ambitious Solar 
Thermal By-Law was introduced. This established that all new buildings and 
extensive renovations would have to set up solar thermal water systems to  provide at 
least 60% of the building’s hot water. Puig stressed that the many flat roofs in 
Barcelona could easily have solar thermal panels installed. In 1995 the city had 
700m2  of solar heat surface. By 2000, just after the introduction of this law, this had 
increased to 1632m2  (and by 2004 there were 24,000m2).  
 
Puig’s commitment to this project paid off. Barcelona became the first city in Spain 
to legislate in this respect, but other cities soon followed suit, and the by-law has by 
now become a statewide law. It is generally acknowledged that this development is 
attributable to Puig.110  
 
ICV’s environmental programme has played an important role during all these 
years, particularly between 1995-1999 when a pact with a Green party meant 
that the leader of Alternativa Verda became the Sustainable City councillor. 
Puig was responsible for really driving forward the city’s commitment to 
sustainability. (*Casanovas 2007) 
                                                
109 Agenda 21 is a plan to promote sustainable development,  introduced at the 1992 Rio de Janeiro 
UN summit where it was signed by all heads of state. A  a local level, the plan involves undertaking 
an integrated approach to ensure that a town or city can become as sustainable as possible.  
110 Puig was also responsible for introducing low-energy light bulbs in all  council controlled 
buildings, and, amongst other measures, launched an ffective paper-recycling initiative and a 
composting programme.  He also advocated reviewing the council’s position on the use of PVC and 






Meanwhile, Greens within IC-EV were increasingly disaffected with the coalition. 
They were frequently excluded from events and decisions and the Greens’ 
organisational openness was at odds with IC’s party st ucture, which remained very 
closed, in keeping with the party’s historical roots as the old Catalan communist 
party. According to a number of activists (Puig 2007; Vilanova 2007), Els Verds’ 
moment of crisis as regards IC was the day they came to an annual conference in 
1998 and saw that a new acronym, ICV, had been put u  in the hall without even 
consulting the Greens. The leaders of IC had decided to reconstitute as an 
ecosocialist party – having availed themselves of Els Verds’s expertise – and had 
created a new party and identity for themselves with no mention of this to EV. From 
now on, ICV, a party with a certain amount of standing in Catalonia, would be known 
as the region’s ‘Green party’.  
 
At this point, the majority of Greens voted to abando  IC though some Greens 
(namely the two councillors and a few others) stayed with IC. The remaining Catalan 
Greens dispersed into a number of different political formations and prepared for the 
1999 regional, municipal and European elections. As Appendix H shows, in each of 
these elections, the Greens presented themselves in different groupings.  Some of EV 
formed a coalition with ERC for  the municipal and European elections: one Green 
councillor, Roser Veciana, was elected for Barcelona City Council on the ERC list. 
Other Green activists joined LV-GV, AE–EE or AV.  
 
The two Barcelona city councillors, Puig and Oms, who had presumably remained 
with IC-EV for pragmatic reasons, failed to win their council seats in 1999 when the 
party suffered a substantial loss in the elections. The two ex-councillors immediately 
left and rejoined the Green-Green family. 
 
The numerous Green factions that emerged as a result of the EV’s terminal crisis in 
1998 continue to exist today but are effectively ‘proto-parties’ (Lucardie 2000) with 
little hope of winning any seats. Their main objective is to protest, continue to 
advocate Green-Green politics and act as a pressure group that condemns ICV for its 





Green party and the remaining parties battle on without making much headway 
although there seems to be a concerted effort towards re-grouping as many factions 
as possible into pre-electoral alliances.  
 
In the 2010 regional elections, nearly all the Green-Green parties presented a single 
list and stood in a coalition that included EV, AE and LV-GV (they got 0.5% of the 
vote). Interestingly, AV – now reduced to a groupuscule that usually only stands in 
one of Catalonia’s four provinces – aligned itself with a pro-independence, nationalist 
coalition, Solidaritat Catalana,  led by the previous CEO of Barcelona FC111, Joan 
Laporta. AV’s decision to align itself with Laporta was harshly criticised by other 
ecologists, given Laporta’s poor environmental recod. Nevertheless, their decision 
demonstrates the extent to which this party has broken its links with the other Green 
parties in the region. It also demonstrates the party’s commitment to independence. 
 
If the first ten years of Green politics in Catalonia was dominated by the attempt and 
failure to establish a single, strong green party (on the lines of European Green 
parties elsewhere in Europe but respecting the Catalan issue) then the post-1993 
period has been characterised by the emergence of a Catalan ecosocialist ‘Green’ 
party, ICV,  which is regarded as being Spain’s leading Green party. An ICV MEP 
has been in the EP since 2004, there are about 12 ICV regional deputies and there are 
usually one or two MPs in the Congreso. However, the continued existence of other 
Green parties in the region indicates that a number of cologists do not believe that 
ICV is representing Green interests; similarly, many within the PESM are deeply 








                                                
111 Barcelona FC is the region’s football club, although its influence also extends to other teams and it 





5.4  THE ‘FAILURE’ OF THE CATALAN GREENS  
 
In his foreword to Viader’s book about Green politics n Catalonia (2010), a leading 
Catalan ecologist and academic, Octavi Piulats112, describes the book as the ‘history 
of a failure’ in that it recounts the inability to create a strong, independent Green party 
in Catalonia. Given Catalonia’s history and political culture (a strong social 
movement and a region that would consider itself to be more postmaterialist than 
many other Spanish regions), as well as its distinctive party system which could have 
allowed for the emergence of a strong independent Green party,  the reasons for this 
failure cannot be imputed to the region being uninterested in environmental questions.  
There are multiple, interconnected factors that, toge her, constrained the development 
of a viable independent Green party. Some of these factors, including the nationalist 
question, party competition, party encroachment, and the issue of personalism will be  
examined in this section.  
 
5.4.1 The nationalist question 
The question of Catalonia’s status within Spain has long been contested and  there are 
increasing calls for a referendum on the region’s future. In an article entitled 
‘Independence?’, Castells supports the idea of a reerendum, using a discourse which 
highlights the depth of feeling surrounding this isue in the region.  
  
It is not just a question of identity but also of our social and economic welfare, 
just like the case of Flanders in Belgium. Catalonia knows that, within the 
European framework, it could be a productive and competitive country which 
is held back by a Spain which is largely dependent on a speculative economy 
based on finance and the construction business. Catalonia’s sense of […] 
solidarity towards a crisis-ridden Spain needs some kind of payback. We need 
the fundamental values of our nation to be respected, rather than seeing our 
nationhood denied and  vilified by those who are surviving because of us  
(*Castells 2010).   
 
The attitude he expresses towards Spain has been commonplace amongst many 
Catalanists for many years (Spaniards accuse Catalans of having ‘a chip on their 
shoulder’ on this very issue) and highlights an issue where great sensitivity and 
                                                
112 Piulats lived in Germany during the 1980s, joined die Grünen  and still remains a member of that 





tolerance should be shown by both sides of the divide. Unfortunately, in the early 
days of the Greens there was incomprehension and a little mistrust on both sides and 
this inevitably contributed towards constraining the fortunes of  the Catalan Greens  
(the phrase ‘Catalan Greens’ denotes all Catalan Green parties, whether ecosocialist 
or Green-green; when referring to the parties that are not ecosocialist, this chapter 
will refer to them as the Catalan Green-greens).   
 
The nationalist issue was divisive in the early days because the non-Catalan Greens 
would not appreciate how important the nationalist is ue  was for some of the Catalan 
Greens, and consequently their emphasis on calling for the setting up of a 
confederation of independent Green parties in every r gion. The issue led to AV 
pulling out of LV, only a year after the latter had been established.  But the matter 
was even more complicated because not all of the Catalan Greens held such radical 
views. Those who had come from left-wing nationalist movements were far more 
radically Catalanist than Greens who had been drawn to LV (or its Catalan 
manifestation) because of their affinity with pacifism, ecologism or feminism (in 
other words, Greens who were more in line with the Green party tenets as 
exemplified by the German Greens). The two camps’ irreconcilable differences split 
the Catalan party, were largely responsible for the early fragmentation of LV and 
were instrumental in sowing discord and fuelling enmities which have lasted until the 
present day and were also instrumental in exacerbating the big split in the Catalan 
Confederation This took place in 1995, after half the party formed a coalition with IC.  
  
Conflicts surrounding Catalanism have ceased to be a key issue for the Catalan 
Green-greens, largely because the demands of Catalan n tionalism have been voiced 
clearly and gained considerable recognition within Spain but also the rest of the EU.  
Within Catalonia itself, the different Green-green parties continue to have slightly 
different positions as regards Catalanism.  
 
Figure 5.3 sets out the ideological positioning of  Catalonia’s Green parties (alongside 





the most radically nationalist parties113 and many supporters of these two formations 
are ideologically close to ERC and favour independence.  
 
Figure  5.3  Catalanist position of the region’s ma in and green parties 
 
                                                        
 
 
 Source: adapted from data in CIS 2010, Question 12 and interviews with party 
activists  
 
Despite belonging to an ecologist party, the importance they attach to the nationalist 
cause may lead AV and EE supporters to vote for ERC. For example, In the run-up to 
the 2010 regional elections, all the Catalan Green-gr en parties, including AV,  
agreed to present a joint, single list. However, several months later, AV dropped out 
of this pre-electoral alliance to form a coalition with Solidaritat Catalana and 
presented a succinct, one-issue manifesto, calling for the independence of Catalonia.  
 
The remaining four Catalan Green parties are less Catalanist than AV and, to  a 
greater or lesser extent, are in favour of Cataloni remaining within the Spanish state, 
though ICV and EV would like this to be a federal state. As the Table shows, ICV 
and EV are firmly committed to nationalism: ICV describes itself as a ‘left-wing, 
ecosocialist, nationalist party’ whilst party literature (and interviews with party 
leaders) make it clear that EV is also a Catalanist par y as the following statement 
makes clear:  
 
                                                





 We are a Green Catalan party because our country is Catalonia, a country 
situated in the North-West part of the Mediterranean bioregion, a country with 
its own cultural and natural characteristics. (*Els Verds 2008) 
 
The two other main Catalan Green parties are AE, which is a Europe-centred Catalan 
party, and LVGV, a statewide party. Despite their divergent views on nationalism,  
this issue is not as divisive as it once was and does not prevent the Catalan Green-
green parties from sometimes presenting joint listsat election times. 
 
5.4.2 Party competition and encroachment 
Nowadays, the Green-green parties try to agree on presenting a single list for 
elections in order to improve their chances of winning seats, although internal 
disagreement still prevents them, all too often, from reaching an agreement (in the 
2008 general election, three Green-green parties prented lists in Catalonia, in 
addition to ICV).  
 
Even when the Catalan Green-greens present a single list, it is very hard for them to 
win any seats given that they have to compete with a number of other parties that are 
targeting the same group of voters. This situation pertains everywhere, of course, but 
is even more marked in a region such as Catalonia as the following paragraphs will 
indicate.   
 
Firstly, the Green-greens have to contend with two major parties, both of which 
would describe themselves as ‘alternative left’ Catalanist parties which prioritise 
environmental concerns and social justice. These two parties – ICV and ERC - are far 
more likely to attract tactical ecologist voters who do not want to indulge in gesture 
politics by wasting their vote.   
 
ERC, in particular, has in the past few years attracted the support of a number of  
radical nationalist ‘ecologists’. It is left-wing, has progressive social policies, and 
keenly defends the protection of Catalonia’s environment. Its focus on achieving 
independence for Catalonia also taps into Green interes  in eco-regionalism and 
politics on a human and local scale. EE, for example, a left-wing Green party which 





operating as a party and is now a social movement, whose members have nearly all 
moved over to ERC.  
 
However, ICV is the party which most directly competes with the Catalan Green-
greens. The fact that it is routinely referred to as Catalonia’s ‘Green’ party (both in 
Catalonia and the rest of Spain), and is recognised as such by the EP, gives it an 
authority which the Green-greens lack.  Furthermore, its ecosocialist position (which 
removes any suspicion that it might be right-wing – always a concern when 
assessing the Green-greens) works in its favour in a region where ecologism is 
clearly linked to the left. However, ICV’s position as Catalonia’s Green party is not 
unproblematic. It also has to face competition from ERC and the many Green parties 
that reject ICV’s legitimacy as a representative of PE (a question that will discussed 
in section 5.6).  
 
For all but the most dedicated Green ideologue, the tactical solution for a committed 
ecologist in Catalonia is to vote for ERC or ICV. Given the Spanish electoral system 
and the predominance of the two major parties, even voting for ERC or ICV is 
avoided by many supporters. A survey which questioned supporters of these two 
parties revealed that only 68% of ICV supporters voted for that party at the last 
general election (with almost all the rest voting for the Socialists); meanwhile, only 
64% of ERC supporters voted for ERC whilst the restvoted largely for the Socialists 
though about 7% voted for Catalonia’s largest natiolist party, CiU (CIS 2010: 
Survey 2829). In other words, at election times, quite a number of committed 
supporters prefer to vote tactically. If this is true even of ERC and ICV, it is easy to 
see why the Greens have always failed to obtain more than a sprinkling of votes, in 
spite of predictions to the contrary.  
 
Finally, the Catalan Greens (both ICV and the Green-gr ens) have to compete with 
new, single-issue or alternative parties such as PACM  (Partido Antitaurino Contra 
El Maltrato Animal or The Anti-Bullfighting and Animal Cruelty Party), which 





general election, PACMA obtained more votes in the Barcelona constituency than 
Els Verds (see Table 5.5).  
 
 
Table 5.5 PACMA and Greens’ results in 2008 general  elections in 
Barcelona  
 
EV-AE ELS VERDS - L'ALTERNATIVA ECOLOGISTA 12,561 0.45% 
PACMA PARTIDO ANTITAURINO CONTRA EL 
MALTRATO ANIMAL 
8,153 0.29% 
EV-LV ELS VERDS-LOS VERDES 7,324 0.26% 
AV ALTERNATIVA VERDA  2,028 0.05% 
Source: Spanish Ministry of the Interior Website, 2010 
 
Another party which, like PACMA, seems fresher, closer to the social movements 
and offers another possibility to ecologists who want to express their rejection of the 
major parties is Candidatura d’Unitat Popular (CUP or Popular Unity Candidates). 
This party is left-wing, in favour of Catalan indepence, anti-capitalist and in favour 
of participatory local government (it only stands in local elections where, in the 2011 
elections, it came in 6th place, obtaining 2.16% of the votes, a percentage that 
compares very favourably with any of the Green-green parties or, indeed, with the 
aggregated Green-green vote.  
 
5.4.3 Personalism 
The personal distrust which exists within Green politics in Spain is replicated in 
Catalonia. The bitter quarrels that centered around different nationalist positions in 
the early years established an atmosphere of conflit and mistrust that has never been 
overcome. Viader, who favoured remaining within LV in the early years, received 
threatening messages in his letterbox ‘warning’ him to ‘go back to Spain’ (Viader 
2010: 29) and eventually dropped out of green politics. Betrayals and mistrust 
continued to be commonplace but culminated at the tim of Els Verds’ alliance with 
IC in 1995, when many Greens left the party, and later when there were more  
departures in 1998. During the period 1995-1999, at the beginning of the IC-EV 
coalition, two leading figures within the Catalan Greens – Puig and Oms, both 
councillors at the time – chose not to leave ICV when the Greens voted to pull out of 





regional election in 1999)  and tried to rejoin EV, they were ousted as party leaders 
in a coup, whereupon they left the party and founded another one, Opció Verda 
(Green Option), a move which helped to fragment the Gr ens even further. Shortly 
after this, Puig fell out with Oms and re-founded AV. Since then, both men are 
routinely disparaging about ICV and their treacherous annexation of the Greens, but 
neither of them have accounted for their failure to leave the party at the time. 
 
As a result of the bitterness, the endless struggles for power and the fruitlessness of 
the enterprise, many founding figures of the Catalan Greens became disenchanted 
with Green politics: some moved over to nationalist politics whilst quite a number of 
prominent Catalan Greens from the 1980s and early 1990s continue to be part of the 
PESM but have removed themselves from Green politics. The following extract 
expresses the disenchantment felt by many Green activists:  
 
Many of those who supported the 1991 and 1993 process of bringing 
political ecopacifism to maturity – and I include myself in that number – 
left, frightened … by the many instances of atavistic hatred … The green 
groups continue divided and IC, which is trying to use a green political 
approach, is not getting the support of the traditional Catalan 
environmental groups … (Rius-Sant 2003).  
 
Amongst those who are still involved in Green politics, personal rivalries, animosity 
and a long history of betrayals make it difficult – though not impossible – for the 
different factions to collaborate. Attempts to build bridges between the factions are 
half-hearted and based on expedience. One leading Green candidate at the 2010 
Catalan regional election admitted that they really disliked a key candidate from the 
other Green party with which they were forming  a coalition platform (Interview 
2010: name withheld).  
 
Furthermore, in conversation with activists and Green leaders, it is clear that these 
ideologues have no illusions about winning, and despit  much hard work to improve 
their electoral chances (by forming alliances, producing publicity material and so 





not a real Green option, and to ‘keep alive the flame of the political ecology 
movement in Catalonia’ (Interview with Santiago Vilanova 2007). 
 
The staying power of these committed individuals, and the fact that the Greens 
continue to poll some votes at each election, leaves th  door open to the possibility 
that a sea change might occur, however improbable this seems. By now, the different 
Green parties do not always present lists in all the constituencies but choose the ones 
where they have the most local support (for example, AV only stands in the province 
of Girona whereas the other Green parties stand in the province of Barcelona. 
However, in the 2010 regional elections, the Els Verds alliance fielded candidates in 
all four provinces.  
 
Over time, key figures within the Catalan Greens have displayed a degree of 
pragmatism which contradicts the view that each faction is divided by irreconcilable 
ideological differences. For example, both Puig andOms (seduced by the trade-offs 
of power) have been  been prepared to stand with a ‘communist’ party (IC) and a 
socialist party (PSC).. To this extent, these Green parties appear to conform to the 
classic theory of party systems which ‘usually treat party organization as a black box 
in which actors adapt rationally to the constraints and opportunities offered by the 
electoral market (Kitschelt 1989: 401)’.  
 
However, as Kitschelt argues, this theory does not take into account the all-important 
fact that ‘a party’s past strategies and policies influence the recruitment of activists 
and the strength of intra-party groups (Kitschelt 1989: 408).’ The Catalan Green-
greens’ ‘past strategies and policies’, or rather their embattled and confused 
trajectory, have prevented these parties from renewing themselves.  
 
Nonetheless, there is no doubt that the major barrier to the Green’s electoral chances 
was the relaunching of ICV as an ecosocialist party. The following section will 
examine ICV – regarded by the EGP as the undisputed representative of Green 






5.5  CATALONIA’S  FLAGSHIP  GREEN (OR RED?) PARTY, ICV 
 
5.5.1 ICV, Catalonia’s legitimate Green party  
Previous sections have established the regional dimension as being a catalyst for the 
fragmentation of the Catalan Greens; they have alsosh wn how the range of 
competing options and intraparty conflict made it unlikely that the Catalan Greens, 
short on resources and poorly organised, would be electorally successful. This section 
will examine another potentially conflictive issue for all Green parties, namely the 
strategic question of whether they should remain independent from other political 
formations – i.e. resolutely ‘Green-green’ –  or maximise their chances of winning a 
seat or increasing their political leverage by allying themselves with progressive left 
parties or movements. As has previously been mentioned, this is what happened 
when EV entered into an alliance with IC. Although such alliances are regularly 
formed in a number of Spanish regions, the alliances elsewhere remain just that: 
provisional coalitions set up for pragmatic reasons. However, in Catalonia, a former 
IU-style party (predominantly communist), IC, has gradually evolved into an 
ecosocialist party which even refers to itself as ‘Green’ when describing itself in a 
non-Spanish context. In an article in E vironmental Politics that focuses on ICV, two  
ICV activists refer throughout to their party as ‘the Catalan Greens’ (Riera and Rius 
2009), making no mention of the term ‘ecosocialist’, the term used when referring  to 
the party in Catalan or Spanish.  
 
A number of Catalan ecologists (either Verds or from the PESM) have, however, 
questioned ICV’s right to define itself as Green, ad allege that ICV’s ecologism or 
ecosocialism is merely a greenwash which usefully al ows this communist party to 
acquire a softer and more  fashionable image. These arguments are probably 
outdated, as the next paragraphs will show, althoug they reflect valid concerns as to 
whether Green parties should retain their ideological independence as proponents of 
PE or settle for a broader compromise solution that includes the alternative left.  
 
ICV’s right to define the party as Green is legitimsed by the fact that the party has 





is a Vice-President of the Greens in the European Prliament. In short, despite the 
party’s origins,  over the last ten years or so ICV has gradually carved itself a niche 
as an eco-socialist or red-green party. Its transformation into a red-green party is 
evident, not only on account of the party principles as set out in the party’s successive 
manifestos and resolutions at party conferences but also because of the actions and 
positions adopted by some of its parliamentary representatives.   
 
Gomà and Rius, both ICV activists, define their party’s ideological position as having 
four principal tenets: it is Catalanist as well as socialist, environmental and 
feminist114 (Gomà & Rius 2006: 245). They also stress the party’s steady 
commitment to ensure the grass-roots, bottom-up appro ch of the party’s structure, 
which gives plenty of openings to activists and sympathisers to input into the party 
leadership. In the run up  to the 2008 general election, a newspaper article written by 
Herrera, who headed the ICV list, summed up the party’s positioning and also its 
discourse. For example, he set out the four main tasks that  needed to be tackled 
immediately: to work towards a plurinational state; o address the widening gap 
between rich and poor; to increase democratic rights and liberties such as abortion, 
euthanasia, and the right for immigrants to vote in local elections; and, finally, to 
improve and protect the environment by tackling a range of issues (nuclear power, 
sustainable transport, conventional railway, environmental taxes, energy saving). The 
article ended by stating that these issues needed a ‘Catalanism of the left, 
environmentalist and demanding’ (Herrera: 06/01/2008).  
 
The party’s strategies, policy and discourse (as can be seen by comparing the ICV 
2006 Regional election manifesto and the Scottish Green Party’s 2007 manifesto for 
the Scottish Parliament elections115) are fairly similar to those of a Green party; 
admittedly, ICV’s manifesto gives slightly more prominence to social justice and 
Catalanist issues, whilst the Scottish Greens place greater emphasis on recognisably 
Green issues. However, the differences are minor.  
                                                
114 In 2004, ICV initiated a very successful group called Dones amb iniciative (Women with 
Initiative), a group which has about 750 members involved in ongoing discussions and proposals to 
ensure that the party is driving forward a progressive gender agenda.  





ICV is regarded (see Karamichas 2004; Valencia Saiz2006) as a Spanish Green party 
which has managed to escape or overcome the problems faced by the Spanish Greens 
as a whole. The party may be classified (within theSpanish context) as being 
relatively successful in that it regularly returns a number of deputies to the regional 
parliament (12 in 2006 and 10 in 2010), has consistently had one or two MPs in the 
Congreso, is represented in the EP and, furthermore, has numerous elected 
councillors and mayors throughout the region – in 2007, 451 ICV councillors were 
elected, 25 of whom were mayors (Marcet & Bartomeus 2008: 21)116. During its 
eight year mandate as a minor partner in the Tripartit coalition (2003-2010) the party 
has demonstrated its ‘green’ credentials in some areas. At regional level, ICV 
consistently opposed a number of very controversial, environmentally agressive 
proposals117, even if their views haven’t prevailed due to their minority position 
within the three party coalition. As such, they were in a similar position to die 
Grünen, when they were in government with the SPD for two terms (from 1998 until 
2005)118. However, it is important to highlight the fact tha  many Catalan Greens, 
including members of ICV, actively participate in PESM campaigns or 
demonstrations; in this respect, although their party may be unable to deliver policy 
change, the individual party members remain part of the PESM.  
 
Nevertheless, in spite of their difficult position within the Tripartit, during its eight 
years in regional government ICV managed to introduce a few schemes which are 
consonant with its Green ideology. They introduced an 80 kilometre speed limit on 
many of the routes leading into Barcelona in order to calm the traffic and reduce 
pollution levels as well as a 30 kilometre per hour speed limit within Barcelona itself 
(El País 05/16/2011). They built 130 kilometres of cycle paths, doubled the number 
of nursery places, introduced a new ethical practice code for the police, ensured that 
all those entitled to free home care or free school meals receive them, increased 
                                                
116 Latest muncipal elections in the region show a downturn in the number of counsellors elected. 
There are now 398 councillors. However, this downturn was minor compared to the poor results of the 
remaining left-wing parties.  
117 E.g. the high-tension power cables bringing electricity from France and the building of a fourth 
ring-road outside Barcelona.  
118 In 2002, die Grünen won 55 out a possible 598 seats. In 2003, ICV obtained 12 seats out of a 






individuals’ tax contributions, and introduced a new inheritance tax (El País 
21/12/2010).  
 
The ecological commitment of the ICV deputies in the Congreso and the EP (one in 
each case) is acknowledged by all the PESM; even those who are critical of ICV have 
nothing but praise for Raül Romeva, MEP, who has tirelessly demonstrated his 
party’s interest in green issues. He predominantly i ervenes on subjects which affect 
human rights, arm sales, LGTB issues, female exploitati n, environment, 
sustainability, pollution and cultivation of genetically modified food (GMO) (EP 
2011). An analysis of all the questions Romeva has raised in the EP between August, 
2010 and April, 2010 shows that 45% related to enviro mental matters whilst 40% 
were human rights questions. Only 2.5% of the question  were ‘left’ issues and 5% 
were Catalanist issues (EP 2011).   
 
In the Spanish parliament, ICV’s representative until November 2010, Joan 
Herrera, was well known for his strong commitment to PE. Herrera has been very 
active in the Spanish parliament, and has raised many  green issues in 
parliamentary or extra parliamentary sessions, as well as presenting numerous 
early day motions/private members’ bills on ‘green’ issues. These included the 
following topics: nuclear power, bullfighting, using seal fur, in support of raising 
environmental taxes, promoting a more  sustainable transport system, introducing 
energy-saving measures, giving immigrants the right to vote in municipal 
elections, urging Spain to pull its troops out of Aghanistan and showing 
solidarity to the beleaguered people of Western Sahara (Congreso 2011). 
 
Herrera has stopped being an MP in the Congreso, but his replacement, Nuria 
Buenaventura, has continued to show the same ‘Green’ priorities as Herrera. 
Herrera stepped down in order to head the ICV list at Catalonia’s regional election 
in November 2010. He is now leader of ICV, and given his strong profile as an 
ecologist this is a clear indication that the Green tendency within ICV is no longer 






5.5.2 ICV: not a Green party?   
Although the evidence presented in the previous sub-section leads many to conclude  
that Catalan Green politics now has a legitimate and efficient party to represent its 
cause, many ecologists within the region dissent from this view – namely, the Catalan 
Green-greens as well as members of the Catalan PESM. The issue does not only 
concern Catalonia. Because ICV is considered a succe sful Green party with 
representation in the EP and the Congreso, the party represents a useful model for 
other aspiring ecosocialist parties. However, differing perceptions as to whether ICV 
should be considered a Green party point to the unrsolved question that continues to 
dominate Green political thought in Spain.  
 
The Catalan equivalent of IU, IC, was established in 1987 as a coalition of left-
wing/communist parties. The coalition was, however, problematic from the outset as 
it was composed of two communist parties and a left-wing nationalist party. The 
Catalan Communist Party (PCC, close to its Spanish counterpart), left (1989) and 
rejoined (1995) the coalition before its final exit in 1997, when it formed a separate 
party called Esquerra Unida i Alternativa  (EUiA, United and Alternative Left, IU’s 
Catalan sister party). During all these years IC was in internal turmoil over strategies, 
and constantly battling with IU; it was also genuinely open to some Green ideas, 
which is why it initiated talks with EV in the early 1990s. These talks culminated in 
the IC-EV alliance in 1995 and in IC-EV’s transformation, in 1998, to ICV (without 
consulting EV, as previously mentioned). Between 1997-2003, ICV and EUiA 
competed in elections but in 2003 the two parties formed an electoral alliance which 
has proved to be longlasting. Consequently, apart from a few years, ICV and EUiA 
have been in coalition. Similarly, ICV (partly because of its alliance with EUiA) has 
retained strong links with IU within Spanish politics whilst insisting on its 
independent status.  
 
These close links between ICV, IU and EUiA are the first argument used by 
ecologists who argue that, in spite of its environme tal discourse, ICV remains a 
predominantly ‘communist’ party. Josep Puig alleges that ‘the leopard cannot change 





who has been in AV, EV, ERC, ICV and is now in EE – was part of a group who left 
ICV in June 2007 because they felt that the internal organisation of the party still 
closely resembled that of an authoritarian communist party – with a very hierarchical 
and closed organizational structure- and that green issues were being relegated to a 
back seat (Interview on 06/12/07). In short, even though an attempt has been made to 
create a bottom-up party structure which allows for a f ee exchange of ideas in both 
directions, ICV’s communist tradition still predominates.  
 
ICV acknowledges it has a long way to go on this front and in 2000 committed itself 
to bringing its structural organisation into line with that of a participatory, open and 
democratic party: it stressed the importance of dialogue within the party and with the 
social movements, which it considers to be its natural allies (Gomá & Rius 2006). 
However, García’s departure from ICV in 2007 may be an indication that the internal 
restructuring of the party has still not been achieved. 
  
The second argument used by those who do not consider ICV a Green party is the 
fact that the party’s voters are predominantly socialist or communist rather than 
ecologist. A CIS survey (2010), which asked those who voted ICV in the 2008 
general election about their ideology, certainly confirms this allegation. Only 20.1% 
of ICV voters declared themselves to be ecologists whilst 12.6% and 17.1%  
respectively said they were socialists and communists (CIS 2857: 2010 Question 57) 
(see Table F showing the responses to this question in Appendix H) . The perception 
that ICV are ‘communists’ persists. Dowling refers to ‘the post-communists of IC-V’ 
(2009: 192), although he then admits to ‘a cultural and generational change within the 
party’, which is no longer ‘seen as essentially representing the PSUC (i.e. orthodox 
communism) by another name’ (2009: 193).   
 
Many critics of ICV have also argued that the party remains, essentially, left-wing 
rather than Green because many of the leading figures within the party (Baltasar, 
Mayol, Guillot, Saura) were originally in the Catalan communist party, the PSUC119.  
                                                
119 The PSUC is the Partit Socialista Unificat de Catalunya (the Catalan Unified Socialist Party), 
previously one of Catalonia’s two communist parties. PSUC was more Catalanist than the other party 





This reflects the predominantly ‘communist’ and authoritarian, closed structure and 
organisation of the party. Party members are anxious t  stress that they have moved 
away from this approach (Interview with Ernest Urtasun, of ICV Executive: 2007) 
but former activists have reported on an atmosphere of secrecy and business being 
done behind closed doors in spite of the party’s apparent attempts to be more 
deliberative. However, the fact that there is now a new generation of ICV activists 
who have never been part of PSUC, and the fact that Herrera is now the party leader, 
indicates that the party is definietly moving towards a line which is congruent with 
the party’s stated principles.  
 
The fourth issue which has, over the years, alienated many ecologists and Greens is, 
of course, the party’s unprincipled behaviour, as initially illustrated by IC’s 
appropriation of the Green brand in 1998, in an underhand gesture which showed 
little respect to a group of people who had been thir partners for a few years. Since 
then, there have been many further instances of unprinci led behaviour. During the 
2003-2010 Tripartit coalition government, many ecologists felt betrayed by the fact 
that this government (which included ICV) pressed ahead with a number of policies 
which ran counter to everything ICV stands for (for example, they approved an 
energy plan which agreed to keep the region’s nuclear plants open and to limit 
investment in renewables). Many ecologists thought they should have stepped down 
from government. Furthermore, the previous leader of ICV, Joan Saura, was the 
regional Minister of the Interior (2006-2009). As such, he was strongly condemned 
for his repressive tactics against demonstrators on a number of occasions. On other 
occasions (see Box 5.1) ICV was criticised for not taking a firmer stand against the 
government.  
 
Criticisms against ICV for its ecological position are therefore two-pronged: on the 
one hand, the party’s legitimacy as ‘ecologist’ is questionable, whilst on the other 
hand ICV is accused of abandoning its ‘ecological’ principles in a bid to remain in 
government.  The second criticism is one commonly faced by a radical party which is 







Box 5.1 ICV: the powerlessness of being a minor par ty in a government 
coalition 
Source: (Kaos en la Red 2009).  
 
limited leverage but ecologists may well be sceptical of a party that is prepared to do 
trade-offs on issues which are non-negotiable for a party that calls itself  ‘Green’. 
 
Whilst there is some truth in these criticisms of ICV’s record in government, a more 
realistic view would argue that their withdrawal would have served no purpose and 
that their position – to be openly critical from within the government benches – was 
perhaps more useful. Certainly, ICV had a reputation as being a pest. An anonymous 
politician from ERC was quoted as comparing ICV ‘to an annoying fly which just 
wants to make itself noticed because that’s the only thing that gives any meaning to 
its life’ (*El País 02/04/2006). Many of ICV’s regional MPs and local councillors 
continued to be actively involved in social movements, often opposing a policy 
which their party was officially responsible for in government. It was thought that the 
party’s inconsistent behaviour would lead to a dramatic decline in its popularity, but 
in the 2010 regional and 2011 municipal elections in Catalonia (both overwhelmingly 
won by the right-wing parties) ICV only suffered very small losses, unlike the other 
left-wing parties.  
 
5.5.3  Ecosocialism versus ecologism 
 ICV’s position as Catalonia’s Green party seems unassailable: it may have some 
ideological problems and adjustments to make but it is a well organised, established 
party which is accepted by the EGP as a Green party. Nevertheless, its position is not 
Som lo Que Sembrem (We are what we sow), a social movement calling for the 
ban on GM foods, gathered more than 109,000 signatures (more than twice the 
necessary number) in order to introduce a PLI (popular legislation initiative) 
demanding that GM crops stop being grown in the region, that GM foods are 
clearly labelled as such, and that an independent study is carried out on the 
environmental consequences of these crops. Numerous big demonstrations 
accompanied the handing in of the PLI and six people began a hunger strike next 
to the parliament buildings in June 2009. ERC and ICV initially supported the PLI 
but were powerless and passive in the face of their tripartite partner, the PSC, 
which was against the bill, and supported in this by the opposition parties, CiU 





as clearcut as it may appear at first and the party is poised to move in a number of 
different, contradictory directions depending on cojunctural factors.  
 
Firstly, the continuing existence of the Green-green parties and many ecologists’ 
rejection of ICV are clear signs that this party is not representing many who support 
PE. It is, of course, impossible to ascertain how many ecologists are opposed to ICV 
but the openly critical views of many ecologists are some indication. Further 
evidence comes from the CIS 2857 Survey (2010) which indicates that many people 
who classify themselves as ecologists actually vote f r other parties whilst a 
significant percentage voted for small, unelected parties (16%), spoilt their ballot 
(4.2%), did not vote (6.3%) or ‘cannot remember who they voted for’ (8.7%).  
 
ICV has made only one attempt to join forces with the Green-greens and this was an 
initiative which took place at statewide level when, in 1999, an incipient red-green 
and nationalist movement coalesced around ICV and the Spanish Confederation, 
CLV. The two parties presented a joint list for theEP 1999 elections and persuaded 
most Green parties to support them. The coalition just fell short of obtaining a seat in 
the EP (they obtained 1.42% of the vote while a Basque separatist party got 1.45% 
and a seat). On this occasion only one Green party stood against them, LV-GV, 
obtaining 0.66% of the vote. The Greens’ failure to reach an agreement on this 
occasion cost them a seat and prevented a historic opportunity for Spain’s Greens to 
present a united front and win their first seat in the EP as an independent Green party.  
 
Since then, ICV has always preferred to ally with IU and has rejected overtures from 
the Catalan Green-greens  (Interview with EV member 2010). Meanwhile, relations 
between ICV and IU appear to be becoming increasingly strained and if they 
deteriorate any further it is possible that EUiA will pull out of their electoral alliance 
with ICV. ICV might, in that case, be obliged to turn to the Green-greens in order to 
win a few more votes (but it might be impossible to forge an alliance between ICV 






Alternatively, and in keeping with similar moves els where in Spain, it is possible 
that an independent EUiA (which, paradoxically, is said by many ecologists to be 
more ‘ecological’ than ICV, despite its stronger links with the communist party) 
might reach an agreement with the Green-Greens and mount a stronger offensive 
against ICV (talks between the different parties concerned have been taking place).  
 
This potential scenario (and there are other possible outcomes) highlights the 
paradoxical situation that exists in Catalonia. At first glance, it seems as though there 
is a battle in Catalonia between the two variants of Green politics, the ecosocialist or 
the ecologist option. However, it transpires that the differences are really more to do 
with the past history of the Greens and with the personal conflicts that have arisen 
between party leaders. It would be too simplistic to say that the Green-Greens are 
ecologists rather than ecosocialists: in fact, the differences between these two 
ideologies, as played out in Spain, are very minor. In some Spanish regions, the 
Green-Greens (even those who in the past rejected ecosocialism) have recently 
formed electoral alliances with IU.  
 
On balance, it is probably unlikely that ICV will be negatively affected by such a 
scenario given that its stature affords it the necessary resources to weather a difficult 
patch and see off its opponents. Nevertheless, the status of its relation with IU will be 
significant in the near future. At statewide level, the new political Green formation, 
Equo, is being sponsored and aided – at a distance – by ICV, who are reluctant to 
show more support to an organisation that is a direct rival to IU (López Arnal 2011). 
However, if ICV officially severs all ties with IU then it is more probable that they 
will associate themselves openly with Equo. However, their relationship with the 
latter will not be problem-free because of the nationalist question. 
 
 Equo aims to found a statewide Green party, and Equo’s leader has spoken out 
against nationalisms. Similarly, one of Equo’s big sponsors is the EGP, and yet one 
of the leading MEPs, Dany Cohn-Bendit120 – who cooperates with ICV and regards 
                                                
120  Cohn-Bendit has been a Green MEP, is now a French Green MEP and co-president of the 






them as Spain’s only credible Green party – is quoted as saying that  ICV’s MEP, 
Romeva, is a ‘nationalist’ and that this is a ‘problem’ as far as ecologism is 
concerned (Público 02.07/2009). Given ICV’s commitment to Catalanism, the party’s 
consolidated position and its alliance with EUiA, Equo will need to prove its worth 
before ICV joins its project.  
 
In fact, ICV is playing a very complicated game in its relations with parties beyond 
Catalonia. As well as providing support to Equo, ICV is involved in another scheme 
called the Foro Espacio Plural (the Plural Space Forum) which aims to create a 
nationalist, ecosocialist group ‘across Spain’ (Iniciativa 2010). To date, ICV has 
helped to establish two new ecosocialist parties in the Balearics and Valencia,  
Iniciativa Verds and Iniciativa del Poble Valencià and aims to extend this model to 
other regions. Those hostile to ICV consider this move as ICV’s attempt to create a 
pan Catalanist ecosocialist alliance.  
 
 
5.6 CONCLUSION  
 
This chapter has demonstrated that, despite the pres nc  of a vigorous environmental 
social movement, Catalonia’s successful ‘Green’ party has failed to obtain the 
support (and votes) of many of the region’s ecologists. Nevertheless, ICV’s evolution 
from a communist to an ecosocialist party represents a small victory for PE in 
Catalonia. For ecologists who feel torn between supporting the left, the Greens or the 
nationalists, the existence of a red-green Catalanist party is a welcome addition to the 
range of available political parties. However, the many dissenting voices amongst 
ecologists testify to the problematic status of ICV, whose record in government has 
failed to convince ecologists of its credentials as a party committed to PE. A number 
of ecologists have moved over to ERC121 whilst a large percentage of the Catalan 
PESM, represented by EdC, are critical of ICV and, i  particular, of their work whilst 
in government between 2003-2010 in Catalonia (El País 20/03/2009).  
                                                
121  Within ERC there is a movement, Els Verds-Esquerra Ecologista,  which originated from the 
ashes of Els Verds in 1998 and started out as a party. It was part of ICV for a few years but left them 





Meanwhile, the Green-Greens have no chance of breaking the electoral barrier and 
gaining a seat in the regional parliament or even in a local council election at present. 
This is due to a concatenation of factors: weak, under-resourced parties, voter (and 
activist) confusion and disillusionment, and a wide range of competing options which 
allow voters to choose a party which loosely corresponds to their political beliefs and 
is likely to win a seat. In short, the plight of the Catalan ‘Green-Greens’ seems 
terminal: ICV – despite all its alleged shortcomings - is now internationally 
recognised as Catalonia’s ‘Green’ party and the remaining Green parties have 
become movement parties whose engagement with partyolitics is based on their 
determination to express opposition to ICV.   
 
The Catalan case is interesting because it demonstrate  how a particular set of  
opportunities – which did not come together in other regions –  led to a lasting 
change which altered  the political landscape and, u expectedly,  even the ideology of 
a party (ICV). As Hopkin states, parties have ‘lives of their own’ and, despite 
constraints, can surprise us (2009:196). In other Spanish regions, apparently similar 
coalitions between IU and the greens have ended acrimoniously (e.g. Andalucía) 
largely because the majority of the IU members were opposed to moving towards an 
ecoscocialist position. In the Catalan case, PE is now represented by a political party 
of some standing, even if the party’s ideological position is contested by many from 
the right, the left and by ecologists.  
 
Whilst this confused state of affairs concerns party ctivists and political scientists, 
the PESM – those involved in working towards a greener society – continue to work 
towards their long-term objective. ICV’s record supports the argument of those who 
question the need for Green parties (Vidal 2005), and their seven years in office 
demonstrated that whilst they were able to introduce small incremental changes they 
were powerless to introduce radical change (which is what PE calls for and what the 
PESM is fighting for).  
 
Ultimately, it is the PESM as a whole – made up of individuals from a variety of  





time or other - which offers the most vigorous oppositi n to a dominant sociopolitical 
and economic system which systematically works against the interests of the  
environment, in spite of paying lip service to environmental concerns. ICV’s 
piecemeal political gains are welcome, but play a sm ll part in the movement that is 
trying to change Catalan society.  
 
Despite the problematic nature of Green politics in Catalonia, it would be 
incorrect to affirm that Green politics is any less important in Catalonia than in 
other European countries. As this chapter has shown, ICV and a progressive 
regional government have raised the profile of institutional Green politics in the 
region. Their actions have invited criticism from different quarters. However, this 
controversy has, in itself, helped to keep green issue  at the forefront of the 
political agenda. Countless ‘green’ issues are given wide media coverage, there is 
constant debate on these and the EMOs continue to campaign vigorously for an 
alternative society. Whilst they are by and large unsuccessful on the large issues 
(and in this respect they are no different to similar movements in the so-called 
environmental pioneer countries), their constant vigilance and persistence is 
helping to bring about incremental changes in society.  
 
Above all, it is important to bear in mind an observation made by Tello, one of 
Catalonia’s ecologists. Thirty years ago, he stresses, ecologists message was ‘you 
don’t know what you are doing’. The ecologists’ message has now changed to ‘you 
are not doing what you know [needs doing]’122 (*Tello et al. 2006: 17). As he says, 
the ‘seed of delegitimisation’ has been sown, and the role of all the PESM is to 
nurture that seed (*Tello et al. 2006: 17).  
 
The following chapter will examine the case of the Andalusian PE movement and, in 
the conclusion to the chapter, will point to the principal differences and similarities 
between PE in Catalonia and Andalucia.  
 
                                                
122 The  Spanish sentences carrier greater resonance. Thirty years ago, the message was ‘no saben lo 





CHAPTER 6: THE POLITICAL ECOLOGY MOVEMENT IN ANDALUCÍA  
 
 
Figure 6.1  Map  showing the capitals of the eight Andalusian 
provinces of the same name 
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    Source: Luventicus Website 2
 
This chapter focuses on PE in Andalucía and, as in the case of Catalonia,  examines 
the origins, strengths and weaknesses of PE in another under-researched region 
which has also played a key role in the history of PE in Spain. The juxtaposition of 
the Andalusian and Catalan cases highlights the complex and regional nature of PE 
in Spain. As this chapter will demonstrate, Andalucía is a region that is politically, 
socially and economically very different from Catalonia and some of these 




6.1 ANDALUCÍA ’S REGIONAL SPECIFICITY         
 
Scholars generally contend that large parts of Spain, including Andalucía, are 





However, these views overlook Spaniards’ increasing identification with their region, 
as attested by the existence of established nationalist p rties in 11 Spanish regions. 
Andalucía is a case in point, and the present section will examine Andalucía’s 
distinctive regional identity   
 
6.1.1 The Andalusian regional dimension  
Andalucía is the second largest Spanish region, covering 17.2% of the country, and 
the most populated, with just under 8.5 million inhabitants out of a statewide total of 
45 million, or approximately 18% of Spain’s population123. In both respects it 
therefore accounts for almost one fifth of Spain. 
 
Despite Andalucía’s similarity to Catalonia in size, in most other respects the two 
regions are substantially different. Andalucía has long been, and remains, one of 
Spain’s economically weakest regions, in spite of the pockets of opulent wealth along 
the south coast. The per capita income of its inhabitants (74% of the EU average) 
makes it the country’s second poorest region (INE-CRE 2009). Since the early 1980s, 
the region has benefited from considerable financial help from the central 
government and from the EU but the region still lags behind, and regional disparities 
between Andalucia and other Spanish regions have in fact increased over the last 30 
years (Peña Sánchez 2005 & 2008).  
 
Nevertheless, the Andalusian PESM has been as active as its Catalan counterpart, 
thus challenging the assumption that environmentalism goes hand in hand with post-
materialist values and a comfortable standard of living. 
 
Andalucía’s low level of economic development is end mic in a predominantly rural 
region where the land was traditionally divided up into large estates (latifundios) 
owned by a small number of landowners. For several hundred years there was 
therefore a deep-rooted ‘class consciousness and coflict’ (Minahan 2002: 112) 
which still persists. There is, moreover, a distrust of authority born of a long tradition 
of resistance to those who wield power – the region had a strong anarchist movement, 
                                                





largely rural, from 1868-1936 (Brenan 1943). Although Andalusian ecologists 
acknowledge that the PE movement sprang from the int rnational movement 
sweeping the western world, few question the influence of the earlier traditions of 
anarchism (Fernández Reyes 2005: 64).  
 
Most Andalusians who lived in the countryside – thejornaleros or day-labourers, 
paid on a casual basis – lived a hand to mouth existence, and were left to fend for 
themselves when no work was available. Although democracy saw the gradual 
introduction of a welfare state and a transformation in the standard of living of many 
Andalusians, the cultural legacy of the jornalero tradition still persists. For example,  
much work in Andalucía remains seasonal or extremely precarious; many older 
people still eke a living off the land and the younger people, who are more likely to 
work in the services sector and in construction, nevertheless maintain the jornalero 
tradition:  their jobs are often casual and subject to he vagaries of the economic 
climate to a greater extent than elsewhere. Andalucía’s rate of unemployment is 
always higher than the rest of Spain’s124.  
 
Andalusians identify strongly with their own region a d, more specifically, with the 
province they come from (see Figure 6.l which shows the eight provinces of 
Andalucia). Despite a strong connection with the region, very few Andalusians would 
like to see an independent Andalusia, although many consider themselves to be a 
distinct ‘nation’. As the survey results show in Table 6.1,  about 85% identify 
strongly with Andalucía (statements 3 and 4) but only 1% adopt the radical 
nationalist stance (compare this percentage with the 13.6% of Catalans who identify 







                                                
124 In the wake of the credit crunch crisis, unemployment in Spain began to mount from 2008 
onwards. In the third quarter of 2010, unemployment in Spain stood at 19.4% whilst in Andalucía  the 






Table 6.1   Percentage of people surveyed in Andalucía who agre ed with 
the following statements relating to national ident ity 
 
  % 
1 I consider myself to be only Spanish 5.1 
2 I consider myself to be more Spanish than Andalusi n 7.1 
3 I consider myself to be Spanish and Andalusian in equal measure 68.9 
4 I consider myself to be more Andalusian than Spanish 16.1 
5 I consider myself to be only Andalusian 1.1 
  Source: CIS And. 2010: Survey 2829, Q.48 
 
Andalusian nationalism is based on a number of key signifiers: most Andalusians 
speak their own variety of Spanish125 and are conscious of  their region’s origins and 
history. The region’s name is said to be based on Al-Andalus, the Muslim kingdom 
which existed in Spain for seven hundred years (711-1492), and which was most 
firmly rooted in the south of Spain. Andalucía’s regional identity has long been 
reinforced by a sense of grievance against the central government, and by the 
movement inititated in the early 20th century by the ‘father’ of Andalusian 
nationalism, Blas Infante126, who founded a nationalist party to fight for the rights of 
Andalucía and to call for a federal Spain. The flag he designed and the anthem he 
wrote are omnipresent in the region but his party, the Partido Andalucista (PA, The 
Andalusian Party), has had scant success in recent years.  
 
6.1.2 The Political System in Andalucía 
Traditionally, Andalucía is regarded as the bastion of Spanish socialism: PSOE has 
always won the regional elections and regularly wins more seats than PP in general 
elections (seee Table 6.2). These results also demonstrate how the electoral system 
favours the two party system: the two other parties with considerable minority 
support, IU and PA, have failed to win any seats in the last two general elections127. 
                                                
125 Although this dialect is increasingly called andaluz (or Andalusian) and is recognised by the 
regional government as being a distinct ‘language variety’,  linguists are clear that it is, in fact, a 
variety of Spanish (see Pountain (2003) on his work on the Spanish Language).  
126 Infante designed the region’s flag, its shield andlso wrote the regional anthem.  
127 In the 2008 general election,   IU obtained a tenth of PSOE’s votes in Andalucía:  230,335 votes as 






Table 6.2  Andalusian seats won in the Congreso by the main parties  
Year PSOE PP IULVCA 128 PA 
 Seats % Seats % Seats % Seats % 
1993 37 51.45 20 29.8 4 12.08 0 2.41 
1996 32 46.66 24 35.38 6 13.48 0 3.12 
2000 30 43.86 28 40.57 3 7.82 1 5.11 
2004 38 52.86 23 33.69 0 6.39 0 4.04 
2008 36 51.93 25 38.18 0 5.11 0 1.52 
  Source: Adapted from the Spanish Ministry of the Interior website 2010  
 
PSOE, PP and IU are the only parties who continue to win seats at regional level129; 
the Andalusian nationalist party, the PA, is the fourth most voted party in the region, 
but in recent years has lost considerable support130.  Its original raison d’être is less 
attractive now that PSOE and IU have co-opted  PA’s moderate nationalist agenda.  
 
At municipal level, PSOE and PP continue to win the majority of seats but, as Table 
6.3 shows, local government elections provide an opportunity for the smaller parties, 
some of which enjoy good local support. One example of just such a party is the 
Colectivo de Unidad de los Trabajadores – Bloque Andaluz de Izquierdas (CUT-
BAI),131 a radical, nationalist, originally rural, left-wing workers’ party which is part  
                                                
128 This acronym stands for the Andalusian federation of United Left, which in Andalucía has been 
called Izquierda Unida – Los Verdes – Convocatoria por Andalucía (United Left – the Greens – 
Calling Andalucía) since 1993, when LVA joined the IU coalition.   
 
In order to iron out unnecessary complication, when referring to the pre-1993 IU, the acronym IU will 
be used. When referring to the post-1993 party, IULVCA will be used. If the period being covered 
crosses over both periods, the more usual IU will be used.  
129 In the 2008 regional election, PSOE obtained 56 seats,  PP  got 47 and IU secured 6 (BOJA 2010: 
Regional election  2008) 
130  Internal crises have led to splits in the party and regroupings under different names. PA split in 
2001 but has since converged once again in an electoral oalition called Coalición Andaluza or 
Andalusian Coalition.  This coalition is made up of PA, the PSA (or Andalusian Socialist Party) and 
Izquierda Andaluza (The Andalusian Left), a left-wing nationalist faction which broke away from IU 
in 1998 (Partido Andalucista 2010). For the sake of simplicity, the nationalists will be referred to as
PA throughout.  
131 The Workers’ United Group – the Andalusian Left-Wing Bloc. Founded in 1979 to stand in 
municipal elections, this group is headed by Sánchez Gordillo, a trade unionist who has been the 





     Table 6.3 The 2007 Municipal Election Results in Andalucía 
  % Seats  
PSOE Socialist Party 40.65 4, 394 
PP People’s Party 32.09 2,375 
IULVCA 132 United Left Greens-Calling 
Andalucía 
12.36 1,090 
PA133 Andalusian Party 7 609 
---- Numerous very local parties 5.78 500 
LVA Los Verdes de Andalucía 0.65 10 
    Source: Spanish Ministry of the Interior Website 2010  
 
of the IULVCA coalition. In the 2007 municipal elections, CUT-BAI secured 100 
seats and 9 mayors, thanks to a strong, well-publicised campaign which promised 
‘access to decent, affordable housing, respect for he environment, a decent job, an 
efficient health service – in a word, the defence of Andalucía’ (CUT-BAI: 2008).   
Another key feature of Andalusia’s political culture is its territorial division into eight 
provinces. Unlike Catalonia, demographically and culturally dominated by the 
greater metropolitan area of Barcelona – which includes about 60% of the region’s 
inhabitants – Andalucía’s provinces are geographically distant from each other and 
also culturally distinct. Although Seville is the official capital of the region, the 
historical, cultural and demographic importance of several other provincial capitals 
such as Granada, Malaga, Cordoba and Cadiz have resulted in a region with several 
distinct centres of power. On the political front, Seville does not dominate in the way 
that Barcelona does. Each province and major city is characterised by different 
patterns of voting behaviour and the various parties have their strongholds in one city 
or another so that the electoral map is by no means homogenous. This phenomenon 
makes it harder for a regional party to coalesce around shared objectives or leaders.  
The variations from one province to another have played an important role in the 
development of Los Verdes de Andalucía (LVA, the Andalusian Greens). Until 1993, 
                                                
132  Despite LVA leaving the IU coalition in 1997,  the latter has refused to change its name.  
133  This is a simplification. In a number of municipalities, another nationalist party (which often 
stands with PA) stood. In total, these two other  nationalist parties obtained about 80 of the seats 





there was no Green group in four of the provinces (Cádiz, Huelva, Jaén and Córdoba) 
and small  Green groups were restricted to Granada, Seville, Almería and Málaga.  
Having provided a brief outline of the situation within which Andalucía’s political 
parties operate, the chapter moves on to look at Andalucía’s PESM.  
 
 
6.2 ANDALUCÍA ’S ECOLOGISTS  
 
A comprehensive account of the history of Andalucía’s ecologism is provided by 
Fernández Reyes’s book (2005). Although this sets the emergence of the Andalusian 
ecologist movement in the early 1970s, it also alludes to events or situations which 
predate this period and demonstrate that ‘ecological’ issues have long been linked to 
the history of the region.  
 
6.2.1 The Andalusian environmental landscape 
There is a  level of concern about the environment in Andalucía which is not 
consonant with Andalucía’s economic situation (thus contradicting the postmaterialist 
thesis). The positive response to the following statements, extracted from a large-
scale survey on the social habits of Andalusians (IEA 2008) and set out in Table 6.4, 
go some way towards demonstrating that environmental concern in this region – even 
discounting a certain response bias as regards the first statement – is on a par with 
that shown elsewhere in Europe  (the statistics for Andalucía are, indeed, very similar 
to those registered in a parallel study carried out in Catalonia, the results of which are 
in brackets alongside the Andalusian results).  
 
Table 6.4 Andalusian (and Catalan) opinions regardi ng environmental 
issues   
I worry about the environment 96.4% (94%) 
I have taken part in an activity promoting the environment 
(unspecified)  
19% (18.7) 
I am involved in an environmental organisation 4% (2.4%) 
I have done environmental voluntary work 3% (2.4%) 
I have signed petitions in support of environmental causes 14% (13.5%)   





In short, although Andalucía is one of Spain’s poorest regions, the inhabitants, 
according to this survey, are slightly more ‘environmental’ than their Catalan 
counterparts. Another survey demonstrates that, on a scale of 1-10, 22.3% of 
Andalusians opted for 10, and considered themselves to ‘be very ecological’. The 
survey also demonstrates that the perception that environmental concern is restricted 
to middle-class, urban and university educated persons is far from being the truth (see 
Appendix L for further data on this survey).  
 
Finally, a study carried out in June 2010 asked Andalusians to list their three worst 
problems and 7.9% cited the environment (IESA 2010: 12). During the same month, 
a statewide survey carried out by CIS asked the same question and only 0.5% of 
Spaniards opted for the environment (CIS 2010: Indica ores).  
 
The reason for Andalusians’ above average preoccupation with their environment is 
undoubtedly due to the fact that the region’s major problems are on a scale that far 
suppases that experienced in other regions.‘Speculation, pollution, water, 
desertification and loss of biodiversity are the five main environmental problems in 
Andalucía’ according to a key figure in LVA (LVA 2007).  
 
As the early history of the PESM shows, Andalucía’s inhabitants were particularly 
attached to their natural heritage and anxious to preserve it, as well as remaining 
faithful to their traditional way of life. In the early 1970s, the EMOs focused 
predominantly on conservationism. One of the earliest arger-scale movements which 
brought together groups from all over Andalucía was a protest against the decision in 
1977 to build a major road through Andalucía’s emblematic national park, Doñana. 
Given its importance (it is considered the most important European national park for 
migrating birds, an important wetland, home to the endangered Iberian lynx, as well 
as numerous other fauna) a number of eminent conservationists and scientists, some 
of whom worked in the park, voiced their objections to the road-building project. 
Numerous demonstrations took place, the Andalusian ecologists brought their case to 






The commitment of many of the region’s environmentalists and conservationists 
meant that, according to Greenpeace, Andalucía was a pioneer in the introduction and 
enforcement of environmental measures about thirty years ago (Greenpeace 2010: 3). 
Certainly, numerous expert ecologists were appointed to sit on the many boards that 
had been set up to manage parks and forests. Thanks to their work, there was a 
growing awareness of the fact that ensuring a sustainable approach to rural 
development in Andalucía was the best way of benefiti g both the people and the 
countryside.  
 
Over the years, the regional government, working with the help of environmental 
experts, has introduced numerous environmental measur s. However, as elsewhere, 
although many of these have certainly shown a commit ent to ensuring the 
sustainability of an environment or a species, governm nt action in other policy areas 
has invalidated any partial progress. Consequently, in spite of a growing 
environmental awareness, battles continue on the environmental front. Nearly all of 
these stem from ecologists’ determination to defend the region’s natural resources 
which are always threatened by the imperative to pursue economic growth (the 
PESM argues that this growth primarily benefits the business sector and that there is 
little or none of the promised trickle-down effect).  
 
In Andalucía, the tension between environmental andeconomic needs has been 
particularly acute. As previously mentioned, the region is home to a highly polluting 
industrial sector and the consequences of depending on this sector came to the 
attention of the international press in 1998 when a tailings dam, owned by a Swedish 
mining firm, Boliden, broke at Aznalcóllar (Seville), with the spilling of 6.8 million 
cubic meters of acidic tailings containing pyrite waste sludge. The broken dam 
flooded huge swathes of farmland (4,500 hectares) and contaminated a  river flowing 
through the nearby Doñana National Park (Coleman & Perales 1998). Since the 
disaster, considerable work has gone into cleaning up this area. However, past 
lessons have not been learnt. A new open-cast copper min , the Mina Las Cruces – 
the biggest in Europe – was established very near Aznalcóllar in 2000. Since then, 





denounced the frequent contravention of regulations at this mine, leading to the 
company’s toxic waste polluting the nearby river. In 2009, a worker was killed when 
some sulphuric acid leaked out from a tank.   
 
Throughout Andalucía, examples such as the one above are common. The economic 
imperative, in the form of tourism, has also been rsponsible for the destruction of 
much of Andalucía’s coastline. It is calculated that over 60% of this coastline is now 
‘built up’ (60% of the two kilometres nearest to the coast are densely covered in large 
blocks of flats or housing estates). The construction  kept many in employment and 
brought wealth to developers until the housing bubble urst in 2008. However, 
ecologists argue that the construction sector in Andalucía routinely flouts building 
regulations (often with the tacit connivance of local government) and creates 
developments which are only inhabited for about twomonths of the year. In addition 
to homes, other money-making projects include motor-cr ss racing tracks in the hills 
and golf courses.  
 
Golf courses – and the plethora of swimming pools built in Andalucía – have come to 
symbolise one of the region’s most contentious issue , namely the extravagant use of 
water in a region that suffers from severe water shortage.134 Although plans exist to 
ensure that only treated water is used to irrigate the golf courses, these plans have 
been harshly criticised by ecologists on a number of fronts. Firstly, many golf courses 
are still largely irrigated with water taken directly from aquifers or rivers (Teleprensa 
2010); furthermore, even when the new plan is impleented, the irrigation of golf 
courses requires considerable quantities of treated water that ecologists say could be 
better employed elsewhere.  
 
Although Andalucía’s new Water Act (La Ley 9/2010 de 30 de julio de Aguas de 
Andalucía) employs a discourse that stresses sustainability and ecological 
modernisation, the reality is that the region’s water policy fails to implement a 
modern, demand-led water management system. Appendix J provides two examples 
of contrasting discourse (the text of the Law and Ecologistas en Acción’s objections 
                                                
134 Andalucía has 100 golf courses (28% of Spain’s courses) which attract around 250,000 foreign 





to the Law) to illustrate the gap – as the ecologists would see it – between 
‘greenwash’ and a plan that really promotes sutainability.  
 
Unlike Catalonia, Andalucía has no nuclear power stations but, as the region that was 
traditionally the repository of the most polluting industries, it is home to a nuclear 
waste site. Cabril is Spain’s only storage facility for all low and intermediate level 
radioactive waste. This site has existed near Cordoba since the 1950s but in 1987 its 
role was consolidated, thus requiring the site to increase its maximum capacity to 
unprecedented levels (there was nowhere to put the high level waste, which remains 
in the nuclear power stations). Over the years, the situation in Cabril and surrounding 
villages has resulted in numerous demonstrations and c mpaigns.  
 
As in the case of the early Catalan ecologists, an important percentage of pacifists 
joined the PESM in the early days, partly to protest against the Franco regime, but 
later on to create networks of conscientious objectors (who didn’t want to do military 
service) and to protest again Spain’s military programme. One issue in particular has 
always been the focus of much attention. There are two American bases in the region 
– an air base and a naval base135. These were two of the four American bases 
originally established during Franco’s dictatorship (in return for  Marshall Plan aid). 
When Spain applied to join NATO, its membership was conditional on the US 
maintaining a presence on Spanish soil and the bases became the focus of many 
demonstrations calling on the Americans to withdraw their forces. Since 1984 there 
has been an annual march in Rota, protesting at the presence of the bases which, 
together with the British naval presence in Gibraltar, are rejected on the grounds of 
constituting an unwarranted invasion of Andalucía, imposed from Madrid and 
potentially threatening to local inhabitants because of the nuclear capabilities of all 
three bases.  
 
Andalusian ecologists’ struggle to combat a variety of problems has been unremitting 
and has covered a range of issues: the unsustainable development of ski resorts, the 
building of huge marinas, the problem of forest fires, a town planning policy which 
                                                





increasingly favours sprawling suburbs (and consequently, the increased use of the 
car) rather than promoting the neat, compact Mediterran an-style city. Further 
campaigns have fought to ensure greater social justice both within Spain and in the 
developing world. At the time of Seville’s Expo ’92, for example, ecologists were 
ideologically opposed to this event and set up an anti-Expo summit (a precursor of 
the antiglobalisation movements): they protested against the unbridled capitalism it 
represented, the wastefulness of creating an extravagant, short-lived and poorly 
designed infrastructure in a region which needed to pri ritise local inhabitants, and 
they also rejected the exhibition’s theme, namely the ‘celebration’ of the fifth 
centenary of the discovery of the Americas (from the EMO’s perspective, this 
‘discovery’ resulted in the wholesale plundering of a continent for financial gain, 
with total disregard for its inhabitants). 
 
6.2.2 The Andalusian PESM: a fragmented movement 
Andalusia’s PESM has changed substantially since the 1970s and Fernández Reyes 
(2005) gives a very clear account of the three distinct phases of this movement. 
During the first phase (1975-1986) the movement washighly fragmented and most 
activity was carried out at a very local level by numerous small environmental 
groups, each defending a particular small district or addressing a specific local issue – 
although, as we have seen, the success in preventing the building of a road through 
the Coto de Doñana shows that these forces could join together and mobilise a wider 
group of people to obtain a specific objective. By the early 1980s, the Andalusian 
movement had begun to mobilise in order to combat social issues and the smaller 
groups increasingly began to join forces to form a ore effective common front at 
provincial and even regional level. The attempts to integrate the many different 
groups were fraught with difficulties at first but a few stronger umbrella groups 
began to emerge by the mid 1980s.  
 
During the second phase of the movement (1986-1998), the hundreds of disparate 
groups eventually consolidated into a few larger regional organisations, which 





Andalusian conservationist organisation)136, AEDENAT (a national ecosocialist 
movement which included clearly differentiated Andalusian provincial groups) and 
CEPA (the Andalusian Confederation of Pacifists and Ecologists). By 1989, the 
combined efforts of the PESM had resulted in the regional government’s enactment 
of the first regional law (Ley Inventario de Espacios Naturales, an Act listing the 
region’s nature reserves) which included already designated areas as well as creating 
many new ones. In total, these sites covered 17% of the region.137    
 
Finally, in 1990 about 110 environmental groups agreed to join a confederally 
structured CEPA which would include a good proportion of Andalucía’s ecologists 
(CEPA was the organisation that spent five years warning the authorities about 
Aznalcóllar and the dangerous condition of Boliden’s dam).   
 
The Andalusian PESM, initially a somewhat urban, middle-class movement, began to 
co-opt rural people, who had initially been wary of the ecologists (Fernández Reyes 
2005). By working with the people who had most to lose from the social 
consequences of the destruction of the countryside, the movement became quite 
influential, largely due to the enthusiasm and determination of a relatively small 
number of activists (Clavero 2004).  That outreach signalled a shift in strategy. The 
need to try to find solutions, rather than just to express dissatisfaction, led the 
ecologists to begin to sit on numerous boards where their expertise gradually began 
to win them some support or, at least, meant that tey began to be taken seriously 
(Ruiz Caparrós 2006: interview). Protest was no longer enough: the ecologists sought 
to seize some power and change society. 
 
Our campaigns changed as regards objectives, time span and methodology. 
Now, it wasn’t just a question of preventing a wood from being cut down; it 
was a question of drawing up a forestry policy in Adalucía which would 
generate the socioeconomic conditions which would help to conserve these 
forests (*Clavero 2004). 
 
                                                
136  The FAADN (the Spanish acronym for the Andalusian Federation of Associations for the Defence 
of Nature)  continues to exist but restricts its activities to protecting species  
137 Since then, a further number of sites have been established so that 28.7% of the region is now – 





6.2.3 Ecologistas en Acción Andalucía (EEA)  
Fernández Reyes defines the third phase of ecologism a  starting in 1998 when 
CEPA came together with a number of smaller Andalusi n EMOs to become 
Ecologists in Action Andalucía (EAA), a regional confederation138 which includes 
about 90% of the region’s EMOs.  
 
The principle behind the new structure was to allow l cal groups to retain autonomy 
and to initiate and sustain local campaigns whilst a o recognising the need to pool 
resources, draw on wider expertise and create an organisation with the necessary 
visibility and influence at regional, national and international level. Quite a number 
of the local groups are based in a particular city or province, have existed for many 
years and are very active in working to fight on behalf of the environment in their 
own locality. In total, there are now just under 100 EAA groups in the region,  
although 80% of these have fewer than 20 paid-up members.  
 
EAA, like EA, defines itself as a social ecology movement and therefore works to 
retain the characteristics of a grassroots movement. Much emphasis is put on the 
importance of participation, and the organisation attracts a number of extremely 
dedicated active members as well as a number of less involved members who at least 
pay their dues: latest figures for EAA (2010) state that there are 4,000 members. 
They can also count on a far larger number of supporters and sympathisers who 
become involved in a particular issue and may play an extremely important role when 
it comes to mobilising large-scale campaigns and demonstrations on that issue. 
EAA fulfils all the criteria of an organisation founded along the principles of 
participatory democracy, with a bottom-up structure and total autonomy for the 
individual movements and federations. For example, a though the various groups 
within EAA may pursue very different interests (i.e. some are committed to conserve 
turtles, whilst others focus on urban regeneration, promote cycling or denounce 
illegal construction), they are all broadly committed to the goals of social ecology and 
can call on help from other groups within the federation, whilst using the EAA logo 
to give their campaign more credibility and visibility.   
                                                






EAA has a confederal headquarters in Seville which employs four people (two of 
them part-time). It is otherwise entirely reliant on voluntary support. It finances itself 
through selling merchandise, membership dues and throug  cooperating with the 
regional government and other bodies on preparing specific campaigns relating to 
environmental matters.  
 
EAA has a fivefold function: it works with government bodies, engages in 
consciousness-raising activities, acts an environmental watchdog and mounts 
campaigns and protests (Its role – partly liaising with government, partly in 
opposition to government – is comparable to that of Friends of the Earth in the United 
Kingdom). Its final function is to liaise between the different autonomous 
associations and groups which are part of EAA.  
 
As Andalucía’s leading EMO, EAA collaborates with regional and local government 
bodies in a variety of ways. Members of EAA sit on 90 different local or regional 
official bodies (such as, for example, the Forestry Commission, the Water 
Commission and regional and national parks), and their acknowledged expertise is 
such that their advice as interested social partners is highly sought after whenever 
environmental considerations are in question. EAA works with countless bodies 
trying to push for good environmental practice, as well as working on educational 
programmes financed by the government. An example of its cooperation with the 
regional authorities was EAA’s important role in helping to put together Andalucía’s 
Agenda 21 which was approved in January 2000, well before the Catalan or Spanish 
Agenda 21 were ready.  
 
In conjunction with the authorities it produces publications on a wide range of topics, 
such as encouraging Andalusians to grow organic olive trees, abandon cruel hunting 
practices (putting down traps and poison), and use bicycles in cities. At the same 
time, EAA is involved in numerous programmes, including the following: providing 
environmental education to young people; working with the Junta (the regional 





of a ‘solar caravan’ which travels round the region, giving workshops to schools and 
communities. Another project initiated by EAA and supported by Seville City 
Council is the setting up of allotments in the city centre (huertos urbanos) which are 
mainly available to pensioners and the unemployed. These are farmed organically, 
and help and advice is provided to the allotment holders.  
 
EAA’s educational work provides it with the necessary funding to carry out its 
remaining activities, where its role is to question, admonish or oppose businesses, 
individuals, and regional as well as local authorities. In order to enhance people’s 
critical awareness of practices which are ‘un-ecological’, EAA has initiated a host of 
consciousness-raising campaigns such as, for example, the ‘black flag’ campaign. 
This campaign is an ironic response to the European Union’s Blue Flag awards 
(which, from the environmentalists’ point of view, use questionable criteria to 
determine which beaches merit this award) and gives black flags to beaches which 
are considered to be environmentally unsound. The list of black flags is published (58 
such flags were ‘awarded’ in Andalucía in 2010), and demonstrations are routinely 
planned on these beaches to highlight the problems (EAA 2010).  
 
EAA’s work as an environmental watchdog is varied. One of its most effective tactics 
is to monitor compliance with environmental laws. For example, EAA reported 5 
cases to the EU in 2003 as well as 260 cases to the Andalusian courts; it also reports 
thousands of cases to SEPRONA, the environmental unit which is part of the Guardia 
Civil, the Spanish police force (Ruiz Caparrós 2006).  
 
However, in addition to its role as environmental advisor or watchdog, EAA is also 
fundamentally committed to working towards an environmentally sustainable and 
socially equitable society EAA therefore mobilises opposition to plans which run 
counter to the organisation’s raison d’être. It has organised countless demonstrations 
against, for example, building a plethora of new power stations; the expansion of the 
port of Seville; the setting up of a tyre incineration plant in Aznalcóllar; the building 
of new roads rather than improving rail services; the presence of the Tireless 





cities; voting ‘yes’ to the European constitution ad, most recently, the Junta’s 
decision to allow construction work (financially driven developments) to be 
undertaken in protected areas. Their campaigning has been so successful that the 
Andalusian appeal court revoked the Junta’s decision to change a planning law.  
 
 EAA does not shy away from being conflictive and ra ical, and on many occasions 
is at the forefront of demonstrations which pit it against the establishment. Because of 
this, there is a conflict of interest in that some of its funding comes from the 
authorities and the EMO acknowledges that the question of collaborating with local 
and regional authorities is a persistent and conflictive issue raised at meetings. The 
issue is potentially problematic in that EAA’s appeal at present lies in its coherent 
image, its apparent sincerity and commitment to particular causes. If the social 
cohesion of the movement were seriously undermined, it is hard to see how the 
organisation could continue to attract supporters, as EAA is only too aware.  
 
The organisation also admits to needing to increase its membership. A comparison 
between the membership of EAA and Friends of the Earth Scotland demonstrates the 
low membership of the Andalusian organisation (see Table 6.5) in comparison to its 
Scottish counterpart. FOE Scotland has proportionally twice as many members as 
EAA and appears to confirm the commonplace view that Spain has a deficient civic 
culture (Subirats 1999) and, by inference, a weak environmental movement; however, 
as previously discussed such an interpretation overl oks Spaniards’ reluctance to join 
associations and the PESM’s ability to galvanise considerable support for specific 
occasions. 
 
Table 6.5  Comparative membership of EAA and FOE (S cotland) 
 Total  
members 
Population of  
Region/country 
Members per  
total population 
EAA 3,100 7 000 000 1 per 2258 
FOE 
Scotland 
4,600 5 000 000 1 per 1086 






Many EAA activists have been with the EMO for 20 to 30 years and are conscious of 
the need to sign up more young people (Ruiz Caparrós 2006); it appears that they 
have being successful in doing so according to figures provided for the last few years. 
These show that membership is rising: the number of EAA members in 2006, 2008 
and 2010, respectively, are 2,500, 3,100 and 4,000. Given Andalusians’ reluctance to 
becoming  paying members of an organisation (as stated repeatedly at the 2007 
Annual EA Conference), these figures represent a modest success.  
 
There is no formal link between EAA and LVA. At first, this was based on EAA’s 
mistrust of the party but in more recent years the separation is principally expedient. 
EAA is keen to emphasise its apolitical status, but unofficial cooperation between 
these two formations (as well as between sections within the trade unions and IU) is a 
regular feature of ecologism in the region. Many of the region’s green party activists 
belong to the EMO and some ecologists (for example, Andrés Sánchez, one time 
spokesperson for EA in Almería, then spokesperson for LVA) have been active in 
both at one time and another. 
 
There is no doubt whatsoever that, as far as PE is concerned, an EMO such as EA is 
actively living and working to implement its philosophy on a daily basis. EA 
members demonstrate their commitment to political change by attending weekly 
meetings and by trying to create a social ecology network.This is in sharp contrast 
with the Spanish Green parties or ‘proto-parties’ (Lucardie 2000) who, until recently, 
tended to lapse into inactivity between one election period and the next (although 
social networking has changed this previous trend). The next section analyses the 
development and fortunes of the region’s Green party, LVA.  
 
6.3 THE ANDALUSIAN GREENS 
This section provides a diachronic account of LVA, the region’s undisputed Green 
party, and will examine the chain of events and strategies that have led to 
Andalucía’s Greens being substantively different from the Catalan Greens. Unlike the 
Catalans, LVA has not suffered from intraparty fragmentation and yet the party, in 





factors which will also be examined. The case of the Andalusian Greens is of interest 
for two main reasons in the present study. Firstly, i  allows one to compare the 
development of Green party politics in two of the ‘strongholds’ of Spanish PE. 
Secondly, the Andalusian Greens were for many years the most dominant regional 
Green party in LV, and subsequently in CLV. Consequently, until recently they have 
been largely responsible for steering Green party policy and strategy in Spain.  
 
6.3.1  LVA: The early years 1989-1993 
LVA was legally registered as a party in September 1989; until then, the Andalusian 
Greens were simply part of Los Verdes (LV), established in 1984. The first 
election139 LVA contested was the 1989 general election. Since then, LVA has 
pursued a range of electoral options which have an underlying logic if one applies 
Müller et al.’s (1999) theory that parties are eithr office-seeking, policy-seeking or 
vote-seeking.  
LVA has clearly pursued an office-seeking strategy. At times, it has stood alone as an 
independent Green party whilst at other times it has m de pre-electoral coalitions or 
alliances with other parties. In some cases, these alliances have been carried out at a 
statewide level and have included much of LV; other alliances have just restricted 
themselves to the regional level. Table 6.6 (below) presents an overview of LVA’s 
electoral history by listing the elections contested, whether LVA stood alone or in an 
alliance and what the outcome was. When LVA stands alone, this is indicated by a 
red star (). When it is in a coalition, the star is in a purple box () which contains 









                                                
139 In 1986, Los Verdes stood in the general election in Valencia and Madrid only.  
In 1987, The Andalusian Greens fielded one list in the municipal elections in the city of Seville. 





Table 6.6  Diachronic table providing overview of L VA’s electoral 
history, alliances and outcomes 
 
Year Elections /alliances (also indicated by 
 in 1st column) 




1987 Local elections: Presented one list only in 
Seville and got 0.6% of vote 
   
1989 General election:      
   
1990 Regional election:        
1991 Local elections: 4 green councillors elected: 3 
standing on IU list and one 
‘independent ecologist’.  




General election:   
LVA joins IULVCA in December 




Regional election:    in IULVCA 
coalition 
2 green regional MPs elected 
on IULVCA list. One 




Local elections:   in IULVCA coalition 5 green councillors elected  




General and regional election: 




Local elections:  
LVA allied with Izquierda Andaluza 
10 councillors    
2000 
 
General and regional election: 
LVA allied with PSOE-A (the 
Andalusian federation of PSOE) 
1 regional MP (on PSOE list) 





Local elections:  
LVA stood independently  
NIVA got 11 councillors 
LVA got 1 councillor  
   
2004 
 
General and regional election:   
LVA continues PSOE-A alliance  
For general and regional elections 
Did not want regional MP.  3 
posts in regional government. 
1 MP in national parliament  
  
PS 
2007 Local elections:  
LVA stands alone in local elections 
10 green councillors; 7 NIVA 
councillors 
   
2008 General and regional elections:     
2009 
 
European elections: LVA is on Europe 
of the People-Greens (EP-V) list 
EP-V = left-wing, nationalist 
alliance. Wins one seat 
  
 
Source: based on a number of different sources 
 
 = LVA  
 =  Los Verdes Ecologistas (‘silo sect’) 
  = VERDE  
 = IULVCA retained its ‘green’ acronym after departure of LVA in 1997  
  =  Izquierda Andaluza  
 = NIVA – a new left-green alternative, which regards  itself as the Andalusian  ICV 
 =  Europe of the People 
  = Purple box indicates that LVA has presented joint lists with another party at election 
time.  
 





In the first few years of its existence (1989-1993), LVA suffered the same problems 
as its counterparts in other Spanish regions, namely voter confusion caused by the 
two rogue parties, LVE and VERDE. In spite of this, in  the 1991 municipal elections 
LVA obtained a respectable (if insufficient) percentage of votes in the major cities 
where it stood – about 2.3% – and won a few seats where the local Green candidate 
had negotiated a place on IU’s list. This strategy gave LVA their first seats on local 
councils (4 seats) and was an early harbinger of the direction the party would soon 
take.  
In the early 90s, throughout the Spanish state, some f the regional Green parties – 
foremost amongst them LVA – increasingly recognised the impossibility of winning 
a seat as an independent party. One possible solution, particularly important in 
Andalucía given the importance of IU in the region, was the option of negotiating an 
alliance with this party140. The interest was reciprocal in that some IU activists 
(particularly non-PCE, alternative left members of the IU coalition) were increasingly 
sympathetic to the ecosocialist approach or were aware of the desirability of greening 
IU’s image. There were personal, historic links between alternative-left groups and 
the Greens and, although the two parties were rivals, unofficially the militants from 
both formations inhabited similar social networks and were often involved in the 
same political and social movements, particularly the PESM (Larios 2008; Garrido 
2006). These informal deliberations took place in private and did not resurface until 
after the Greens’ failure to make any inroads in the 1993 general election.  
LVA played an important role in this election as its spokesperson, Francisco Garrido, 
was also spokesperson of LV at statewide level. As the Greens’ leading candidate, it 
was thought strategically necessary for him to stand o  a list for Madrid, where the 
press was confidently anticipating that the Greens would win a seat. Garrido’s 
decision was an interesting one: despite his championing of regional politics, at this 
stage he opted to head a Madrid list, a decision which was unpopular with many 
Madrid activists and also alienated some Andalusian upporters. In the event, Garrido 
secured only 1.1% of the vote.  
                                                
140 There were also rumours that some Green leaders were involved in talks with PSOE (Cabal 1996; 





6.3.2 The IULVCA coalition 
Following on from this disappointment and despite pr -election assurances that LV 
was not contemplating a coalition or alliance with another party, at the end of 1993 
LV became CLV. LVA renewed negotiations with IU and decided to join IU’s 
Andalusian Federation, forming a coalition called IULVCA (Izquierda Unida Los 
Verdes Convocatoria por Andalucía, United Left The Greens Calling on Andalucía). 
A number of Spain’s regional green parties opposed th  Andalusians’ decision, thus 
weakening the Confederation which became a somewhat hollow structure: whilst 
some of the regional parties remained within LVA’s sphere (a few also opting to 
reach an ad hoc flexible accommodation with IU) others steered away from any 
involvement with IU. LVA pursued its own pragmatic strategy: at regional level, they 
were subsumed into IULVCA whilst at the same time th y continued to play a 
leading role within the statewide confederation where they maintained a high profile.  
The main instigator of this approach was Francisco Garrido (Larios 2008; Cabal 
1996; Puig 2007), the most visible Green in Andalucía (and in Spain).  
 
The party’s attempts to make political headway were initially successful. In the 1994 
Andalusian regional election, IULVCA won 20 seats as against 13 in the previous 
election, and two members of LVA – Francisco Garrido and Alvaro Martinez – were 
elected as regional MPs. The latter, moreover, becam   regional senator in the 
Senate, the Spanish upper house of parliament (some of th  Senate seats are assigned 
indirectly to regional elected representatives). In the municipal elections in the 
following year LVA won a number of seats thanks to being on the IULVCA lists (4 
seats in the major 4 cities, 3 further seats in sizeable towns and a number of other 
seats in small towns throughout the region). 
 
Although the election of two LVA politicians as regional MPs gave the party a 
welcome visibility, its incursion into government proved to be a very uncomfortable 
one. In 1994 the Andalusian parliament was rendered inoperative due to PSOE not 
having a majority (see Table 6.7), thus being unable to pass any laws or have its 
budget approved due to the infamous ‘pincer alliance’ which saw PP and IULVCA 





Table 6.7  Results of Andalusian 1994 and 1996 Regi onal Elections 
 Seats 1994 Seats 1996 
PSOE-A  45 52 
PP 41 40 
IULVCA 20 13 
PA 3 4 
     Source: Valencian Government Web-site 2008 
 
After two troubled years, PSOE had to call another regional election and IULVCA’s 
political manoeuvres were shown to have backfired when it lost one third of its seats. 
PSOE made a post-electoral alliance with PA and obtained the necessary majority to 
govern. Meanwhile, the loss of so many IULVCA seats meant that none of the LVA 
candidates won a seat in the regional parliament, thus unleashing an internal crisis 
within LVA.    
 
The period between 1993-1997 demonstrated LVA’s determination to seize some 
power at any cost. Garrido, who early in 1993 had denounced IU as adopting a 
greenwash merely to improve its electoral prospects and had denied any prospect of a 
IU/LV coalition (El País 17/04/1993), repeatedly asserted his loyalty and faith in 
IULVCA once they were part of the coalition. During the years in which LVA was 
part of the IULVCA coalition, they were fully integrated into the coalition’s 
organisation: there were 30 LVA members on IULVCA’s ndalusian council (out of 
a total of about 200 delegates) and two  LVA activis s on  IULVCA’s regional 
executive (Larios 2008). 
 
LVA’s official account of this period is that it decided to leave the coalition in 1997 
because the Greens had been sidelined and subjected to the uncompromising 
organisational structure of what remained essentially a communist party, governed  
from the centre, lacking green policies and with a democratic deficit (Garrido 2006; 






However, this version of events obscures a more complex explanation. After 
IULVCA’s downturn in the 1996 regional elections inMarch, recriminations 
abounded within the coalition and there were calls for the party leader to stand down. 
By July 1996, Francisco Garrido had been chosen by four different factions within 
IULVCA as a candidate to lead the coalition, with the idea of  bringing about a 
change of direction or renewal of IULVCA – to form a pluralist, more democratic 
party in which no one group – i.e. PCA, the Andalusi n communist party – 
dominated (Larios 2008). However, when the members of IULVCA met to choose a 
new regional leader, 66% of the votes went to the communist candidate and only 9% 
to Garrido. In spite of these figures, however, the communist candidate’s support was 
tenuous: there had been many abstentions, much machination, and only last minute 
changes of allegiance deprived Garrido of a far better result. For a few months, 
therefre, LVA continued to battle within the party, hoping to unseat the new regional 
coordinator (in a meeting in September the leader’s position was ratified but with a 
significant downturn of support). Once it became clar to LVA that IULVCA was 
unwilling to countenance a renewal of the party andthat the Greens had become a 
marginal and irrelevant presence within it, they left the alliance.   
 
6.3.3 Towards a new alliance with PSOE: 1997-2007  
Between 1997 and 2000, during which time the party still maintained close contact  
with IULVCA dissenters whilst at the same time holding exploratory talks with 
PSOE , the party remained independent for a while, but in 1999 formed an ad hoc 
alliance with a left-wing coalition called Izquierda Andaluza (Andalusian Left – 
formerly a tendency within IULVCA) and contested the 1999 municipal elections 
with them, winning 10 seats in Andalucía (5 of these in a small town, Puebla de Don 
Fadrique141, which became the first town in Andalucía to have  green mayor).  
 
In 2000, a year of both regional and general elections in Andalucía, LVA signed a 
pre-electoral alliance – for the regional elections alone – with PSOE-A (namely, the 
Andalusian federation of PSOE). Sánchez and Cervantes, two members of the LVA 
executive, stated that an electoral  alliance with PSOE was essential at regional level 
                                                
141 The council in this town consists of only 11 seats and, on this occasion, other parties of the left 





in that ‘a political option which has no institutional presence simply doesn’t exist 
(2000)’. In return for LVA’s endorsement of PSOE-A, the latter agreed to place a 
Green candidate high up on their list as well as ensuri g that LVA would be given 
some posts in the regional government. PSOE-A also greed to increase its 
commitment to environmental measures, enshrined in a 50 point programme in which 
PSOE-A committed itself to the environmental modernisation of Andalucía. During 
the 2000-2004 Andalusian parliament LVA duly had one MP, Inmaculada Gálvez,  
who was part of the governing PSOE group, whilst a member of LVA’s executive, 
Angel Ramírez Troyano142, was given the post of Director General of Environme tal 
Education in the regional government, a department within the Regional Ministry of 
the Environment.  
 
LVA renewed their electoral alliance with PSOE-A for the 2004 regional election but 
negotiated a different deal. It decided to waive the right to Green representation in the 
Parliament as this was judged to have brought no benefits at all. The party alleged 
that the Green parliamentarian, Inmaculada Gálvez, had been a bit of a maverick, 
causing considerable problems to the socialists and embarrassment to LVA. This is 
the official version but, according to other sources, Gálvez was ill-advised by the 
LVA leadership to plead illness and abstain from voting in a motion where her vote 
was essential to PSOE; when attacked by PSOE for making them lose the motion, 
LVA’s leaders allowed Gálvez to take the blame (Interview with party activist 2008).   
 
Instead of seeking parliamentary representation, therefore, and in a move to optimise 
their ability to impact on policy, LVA bargained for, and obtained, three posts in the 
regional government. From 2004-2008 there were three Greens heading departments 
of Sustainability, Environmental Education and Organic Farming, the first two in the 
Ministry for the Environment and the third in the Agriculture Ministry.143 
 
                                                
142 The post was initially given to José Larios in 2000, but he only held it for one year when forced to 
resign by Garrido, who stated that he was making too many compromises.  
143 Andrés Sánchez was the  Junior Regional Minister for Sustainability in the regional Ministry of 
the Environment; Francisco Oñate  was Director General for Environmental Education and 
Sustainability (in the Ministry of the Environment) and  Manuel González Molina was the  Director 






The decision to put Greens in important administrative positions initially paid 
dividends for both parties. LVA played an important role as a catalyst for 
environmental progress within the regional governmet and Andalucía certainly 
made significant progress in environmental policy-making during the two legislatures 
in which LVA contributed to policy making (2000-2004 and 2004-2008). The 
socialists capitalised on the expertise of ecologists they had enlisted (including LVA) 
to maximise the incorporation of new, environmentally-friendly policies which put 
the region in the environmental vanguard whilst at the same time securing EU 
funding. However, the regional government – despite early promises – failed to 
tackle a number of the issues it had undertaken to address in its electoral agreement 
with the greens. LVA distanced itself increasingly from PSOE and, at a party 
conference in late 2007, decided not to renew its alliance with PSOE. However, the 
designated administrators continued to run their respective departments until the 
2004-2008 government came to a close.   
 
At statewide level, in 2004 LVA also signed a pre-el ctoral alliance with PSOE for 
the general election that year. It was thought thate fight between PSOE and PP 
would be a very close one, particularly in Andalucía where, in 2000, PP had won 
only two seats less than PSOE. The socialists’ list for Seville included Francisco 
Garrido who won a seat in the Congreso, thus becoming the first elected Green MP.  
 
However, LVA’s decision to contest the general election on the PSOE lists caused 
serious problems within the CLV. The Confederation (led by Garrido, supported by 
most of the LVA faction and by Greens from a few other regions) decided that all the 
parties within the Confederation would stand on the PSOE ticket (according to the 
statutes of the Confederation, regional federations are free to draw up their own 
strategy about local and regional elections; however, d cisions as to general elections 
fall to the Confederal central committee). However, many regional Green parties 
refused to follow this strategy and opted to stand independently, ally with IU or form 
an alliance with other local groups. In retrospect, the 2004 general election marked 





in the Congreso (later two) and a Green MEP on the socialist list, the party became 
increasingly fragmented largly because of CLV’s decision to stand with PSOE.  
 
LVA’s decision to strengthen their understanding with PSOE was never anything but 
a pragmatic move: at national level, it was designed to give the Greens greater 
visibility, to allow Garrido to champion Green causes from within the parliament, to 
bring some money into LVA’s coffers and serve as a launching pad for future 
elections (Interview with Garrido 20/07/07). Initially, it was intimated to Garrido that 
he would be given a post within the Ministry for the Environment, but this failed to 
materialise. As his term in office progressed the joint programme signed by LV and 
PSOE revealed itself to be entirely irrelevant (PSOE/green electoral programme 
2008); Garrido became increasingly disengaged from PSOE, although he didn’t 
resign his seat in parliament and continued to use it as a platform to disseminate 
Green ideas. However, he also made it clear that he would not be renewing the LVA- 
PSOE alliance.  
 
6.3.4 In search of a new direction: 2008- 
In 2007, there were municipal elections144 and LVA, which had announced that the 
Greens would stand alone (El País 14/05/2006),  made a determined effort to break 
the party’s electoral ceiling. The party fielded more candidates than ever before, 
reaching 49% of the region’s electorate. One of the key issues on LVA’s agenda was 
the question of unbridled property speculation, andthe party was confident that it 
would gain quite a number of seats on this highly contentious issue which other 
parties were failing to tackle.  
 
The party secured just 10 seats: five of these went to LVA145, and five seats were 
won by an LVA-worker’s association146 coalition in one small town of 3,470 
inhabitants (Villanueva del Rosario, Malaga) where the coalition mounted a 
                                                
 
145  Three LVA councillors were elected in the Alpujarras, a region of rural mountain villages in the 
province of Granada, where Gerald Brenan once lived and which now has a big influx of foreign 
residents. These include Chris Stewart, once drummer with the British band Genesis and a long-time 
resident of  this area, who stood for councillor on the Green list for his local town of Órgiva but failed 
to secure a seat.  





particularly effective campaign to fight the previous council’s approval to build a 
large development (including a golf course and 1,000 new homes). As Villanueva del 
Rosario’s town council consists of 11 councillors, LVA, with the backing of 
IULVCA, was able to take control of the council. This case has given LVA a green 
mayor, and is the second time the Andalusian Greens have controlled a town.  
 
After these disappointing results, the party maintained a low profile. Garrido stepped 
down as LVA spokesperson in 2007, shortly after the municipal elections, and was 
replaced by a younger spokesperson, Andrés Sánchez, originally an Ecologistas en 
Acción activist. The party stood alone at the 2008 general and regional elections 
obtaining 0.32% and 0.58% of the votes respectively (see Appendix B for an 
overview of general and regional election results).  
 
The most recent elections contested by LVA have been the 2009 European 
Parliament elections. Despite the need to form statewide alliances, LVA rejected the  
Hondarribia ecologists’s call to form a single Green statewide candidacy including 
ICV. LVA could not agree on details with ICV and was suspicious of the latter’s 
connections with IU. Relations between LVA and IU have become increasingly bitter 
as a result of the IULVCA alliance between 1993-1997; predictably, also, it would 
not create an alliance with the other green group of parties, Los Verdes-Grupo Verde. 
Consequently, LVA, heading a reduced group of Green parties under the CLV 
banner, opted to stand on a left-wing, nationalist list called Europa de los Pueblos–
Verdes (EP-V, or the European Peoples Party – Greens, an alli ce that included 
ERC, CHA, BNG (Galician), Aralar and EA (both Basque) and a Majorcan party (the 
coalition did not include the Andalusian nationalist party, PA, which opted not to join 
the coalition becaue LVA was part of it). As already outlined in Chapter 4, EP-V won 
one seat which will be rotated amongst the first four names of the list. LV-GV – 
which until recently has not done well in Andalucía, obtained 0,31% as opposed to 
LVA-EP-V’s 0.22%.  
 
In the latter half of 2009 and throughout 2010, LVA has gradually changed direction 





by Juantxo López de Uralde, the former president of Greenpeace Spain. LVA has 
publicly stated its support for Equo and in June 2011 was one of 30 groups that came 
together to put together a manifesto and joint programme for the 2012 general 
election in Spain, by which time Equo’s new ‘party’ will have been founded. 
However, the Andalusian Greens seem to have lost their regional identity over the 
last couple of years. In the 2011 municipal elections, various Green parties loosely 
supporting Equo stood under different names. Two further left/ecologist/nationalist 
foundations have also emerged, one statewide (Espacio Plural or Plural Space) and 
one Andalusian (Paralelo 36, P36). Francisco Garrido, the former LVA spokesperson 
and MP, now defines himself politically as representing P36. All of these groups 
collaborate with each other but, and many activists belong to all three of them. The 
impression this gives is that the activists are hedging their bets to see which 
formation will emerge as the contender for the 2012 general election. If it’s a 
manifestation of LVA, then the party will remain predominantly Green, with the 
addition of some IU defectors. If P36 and Espacio Plural prosper, then a new 
coalition including the Greens might also include PA.  
 
This section has chronicled the history of LVA (1989-2010) and has shown that, 
despite their poor electoral performance, coalition with two different parties (IU and 
PSOE) has given the party access to office and an opportunity to influence the policy 
agenda from within the institutions; however, this tactic has increased the division 
within CLV at statewide level and has, in the long term, weakened LVA’s position. 
The following section will further examine this issue as well as further barriers that 
have prevented the party from achieving electoral success, highlighting the 
differences between the Andalusian and the Catalan cases. 
 
6.4   LVA: ENDOGENOUS AND EXOGENOUS BARRIERS  
 
LVA’s electoral results (see Appendix B) over the last 20 years demonstrate the 
party’s inability to achieve even a modest electoral success. The factors which 
militate against LVA are manifold but certainly cannot be attributed to a lack of 





examined in turn: the region’s political culture; party competition and encroachment; 
party strategy, and LVA’s failure to establish a distinct identity. Although these 
constraints are identical to those faced by the Catalan Greens, regional circumstances 
have resulted in a very different outcome. 
 
6.4.1 Andalucía’s political culture 
As previously discussed in Chapter 4, Spain’s electoral system makes it very difficult 
for small parties to achieve electoral success in ge eral elections and, to a slightly 
lesser degree, in regional elections. However, the constraints of the electoral system 
are less dominant at municipal level, where a strong, e thusiastic and well-targeted 
campaign allows smaller parties – such as IULVCA, P and CUT-BAI – to secure a 
large number of seats on councils. For example, in the 2007 municipal elections, the 
nationalist parties together obtained roughly 1,000 seats on councils, largely the same 
number as IULVCA (as opposed to PSOE’s 4,300 seats and PP’s 2,300 seats)147.  
 
LVA’s only electoral ‘victories’ (i.e. occasions on which it has won a seat as an 
independent Green party) have been at municipal level and have been attributable to 
dedicated and well-liked local individuals who have managed to secure one seat; on 
just a couple of occasions, a small town has unexpectedly become a green stronghold 
as a result of a particular set of circumstances. The small town of Puebla de Don 
Fadrique (in the province of Granada) is a case in po t (Interview with activist 2009) 
and the story of the Greens’ rise and demise in this town also serves to illustrate the 
difficulties faced in the region due to the prevailing political culture. 
 
In the 1995 local elections (when LVA was in IULVCA) one LVA candidate 
belonging to the aforesaid coalition was elected onto the local council and was a 
vocal opponent of the governing PSOE: after a couple of years of terrible 
mismanagement and corruption, the Green councillor presented a plan to the council 
to get it out of debt and help to manage the town’s affairs more efficiently. The 
council agreed and the single Green councillor becam  mayor of the town in mid-
                                                
147  In the May 2011 municipal elections, PSOE lost considerable support. It won 3840 seats as against 
PP’s 3148; IULVCA secured 1104 seats but the nationl sts’ support fell back considerably and they 





term. In the subsequent local elections of 1999, the same green councillor (now LVA, 
given that the IULVCA coalition had ended) and four other greens won five seats 
(out of 11) on the council and, with the support of a IULVCA councillor, were able to 
continue at the head of the town hall. During these four years, the town’s debts were 
paid off, services improved substantially, and the local government was run without a 
trace of corruption (local governments in Spain are notoriously prone to cronyism). 
For example, none of the five green councillors awarded themselves a salary for 
being councillors.  
 
However, at the next local elections in 2003, LVA didn’t win any seats at all and for 
a number of reasons: having cast their protest votes nce, many of the town’s 
inhabitants felt it was time to return to ‘their’ party, PSOE; moreover, the green 
mayor had put a stop to illegal construction – a very unpopular move because it 
created jobs in the town – and had scaled down the local fiestas in order to pay off the 
town’s overdraft. PSOE mounted an ostentatious election ampaign which promised 
largesse and more benefits for the citizens whereas the Green mayor (without a 
powerful party to provide support and exhausted from holding down a day job as a 
teacher as well as his post as town mayor) hardly mounted a campaign at all. 
Consequently, in spite of his proven record, in 2003 he wasn’t re-elected and the 
town returned to ‘normality’. In 2007, LVA stood once again but, despite a 
convincing campaign intended to rout out the corruption which was once again 
becoming endemic within local government, failed to win any seats. This account  
exemplifies the difficulties for a small party like LVA to break into the Andalusian 
party system where the traditional left-right cleavage is dominant. 
 
The concept of the ‘Two Spains’ is extremely important in Andalucía where there is 
little middle ground between a very traditional bourgeoisie and the left-wing workers.  
Consequently, in spite of Andalucía’s reputation as the heartland of PSOE, the party’s 
position in the region is by no means hegemonic. Support for PSOE is more prevalent 
in the rural areas than in the major cities, most of which are PP strongholds (since the 







Smaller parties win more council seats in rural areas, where PSOE is the dominant 
party, followed by IU and PA. Whilst the example of Puebla de Don Fadrique148 
illustrates that the system does not prevent the Grens from winning a council 
election, it also highlights just how hard it is for LVA to make any headway given the 
prevailing political culture. In more rural areas, where voters are more likely to vote 
for the left, local government is dominated by a clientelism which is considered 
acceptable because of the material benefits it supposedly brings to the district and to 
individuals. Ecologists continue to be viewed as a hort-term, protest solution and 
have to contend with very difficult conditions when they run for power. They are 
routinely threatened: in previous electoral campaigns an Andalusian ecologist’s house 
was set on fire, others have received threatening letters, and one had superglue 
poured into all the locks of his car. Above all, in small towns – where everyone 
knows everyone else – life can be made very uncomfortable for Green candidates 
who put themselves up for election against the prevailing party in power. 
Furthermore, the Greens also have to contend with the popular perception that they 
are ‘ecologists’ (i.e. alternatives), lack the dignity and standing required of a local 
councillor and are therefore not a serious option. Traditional loyalty to PSOE is also 
deeply ingrained amongst older people who see this party as responsible for the 
dramatic social and economic improvements in the region over the last 30 years. 
 
In urban areas, where LVA expects to find most of is voters, the problem is different. 
Because of the preponderance of PP votes in the cities, left-leaning voters are nervous 
of ushering in the right by ‘wasting’ a vote on LVA and therefore adhere to the 
prevailing political culture of the left which stresses the need to keep faith with the 
traditional left-wing parties.  
 
There is, of course, a core group of alternative left voters in the region, but these vote 
for IULVCA, a coalition comprising the PCA as well as a number of alternative left 
parties and independent groups that cater for those who are disaffected with PSOE’s 
politics. Once again, the case of the Puebla de Don Fadrique’s ecologists serves to 
                                                
148 See also the case of Villanueva del Rosario (on page 270) where LVA obtained the majority on a 





illustrate this point. The ecologists in this town are determined to fight the local 
council in whatever way possible (they belong to EAand previously held council 
seats as LVA) and prior to the 2011 municipal elections discussed whether they 
should present an LVA list. In the end, they opted to present an IULVCA list, largely 
because the latter were able to offer more practical support and because the ecologists 
felt that the IULVCA logo carried more weight than the LVA one (Interview with 
activist 2011). In fact, IULVCA’s position in Andalucía, in spite of its declining 
popularity, is particularly important. In the 2011 municipal elections, IULVCA won 
1,104 council seats in Andalucía while, at statewid level, IU won a total of 2,230 
seats. In other words, half the party’s council seats are held in one region, Andalucía.  
 
6.4.2 Party competition and encroachment  
At first sight, LVA would appear to inhabit a more hospitable political climate than 
its Catalan counterparts given that LVA has always been Andalucía’s dominant (and, 
for the most part, only) Green party, and certainly has not faced the constant 
fragmentation besetting the Catalan Greens. This is quite a feat given that the 
considerable rivalry and tension that has always exi t d between the provincial 
subparties in each of the Andalusian provinces could have resulted in the 
fragmentation of LVA. However, the party has also had to face competition from 
other parties.  
 
Rogue parties 
As previously outlined, LV spent the first few years of its life competing against 
VERDE149 and LVE, a situation which also affected LVA. In the last ten years there 
has been a further instance of another ‘rogue’ party, namely NIVA (Nueva Izquierda 
Verde Andaluza or Andalusian New Green Left) which has won a number of seats in 
local elections since 2003.  
 
NIVA’s leader is a former IU councillor who broke aw y from IU in 2003. The party 
stands in just a few small towns, where it has won a number of seats (10 in 2007 and 
7 in 2011). However, its record in local government has been thoroughly inconsistent 
                                                





with that of a green party and its discourse is not tha  of a green party. For example, 
in a document congratulating Zapatero on his electoral victory in 2004, it exhorts 
Zapatero to finish major road and rail works in Andalucía, a proposal which runs 
counter to PE policy (NIVA 2004). Given NIVA’s very reduced sphere of influence, 
the party does not really compete with LVA, although it does help to fuel confusion 
as to what the Greens stand for.  
 
Small protest parties 
There are also new statewide protest parties that fulfil a role which the Greens played 
in their early days: disaffected voters can register th ir disenchantment with politics 
or focus on a single issue rather than opting for the major parties. Whilst the level of 
support these parties receive in Andalucía is small (the party which performed best 
out of these ‘protest’ parties in the 2008 general lection was the anti-bullfighting 
party, PACMA, with 0.15% of the vote), the aggregated vote of all these small parties 
came to about 0.3% of the vote in the general election, only slightly less than LVA’s 
share of the vote in the same elections.  
 
The nationalist parties 
Although nationalist parties in Andalucía are presently facing their own crisis, they 
still attract some votes which might otherwise be cast for LVA. PA (the largest of the 
nationalist parties) is in direct competition with LVA as it, too, is a left-wing party 
which is less left-wing than IU (LVA’s own position); in addition to working towards 
creating a federal state (also one of LVA’s objectives), PA ‘guarantees the 
conservation of  the cultural and natural heritage of the region so that it can be 
enjoyed by future generations’, ‘believes in the absolute priority of building a more 
just and egalitarian society’, and of ‘promoting peac  and solidarity’ (PA 2009)150.   
 
Like the Greens, PA predominantly appeals to middle class, university-educated 
voters who are mostly urban but identify with oppress d rural labourers and consider 
rural Andalucía to be of key importance. Moreover, cultural symbols connect the 
nationalists with ecologism. Foremost amongst these is the figure of  Blas Infante 
                                                





(1885-1936), the founder of Andalusian nationalism and ‘father of Andalucía’: 
Infante has become central to legitimising the notion of Andalusian nationalism: he 
wrote the Andalusian national anthem, and designed th  region’s flag and coat of 
arms. His green credentials are well-established: h is well-known as a pacifist as 
well as for his love of the Andalusian countryside – in his garden, he planted every 
variety of local tree. He was also a great animal lover who was vehemently anti-bull-
fighting and kept a tame fox which accompanied him everywhere.  
 
There is further common ground between LVA and PA. In 2007, when LVA was 
considering whether to renew its strategic alliance with PSOE, some Greens and 
nationalists were keen to re-launch a nationalist, left-wing party, Izquierda Andaluza, 
which briefly existed in 1999.  In the 2009 EP elections, LVA again demonstrated its 
affinity with left-wing nationalism when it led CLV in forming an electoral alliance 
with EP-V. However, the LVA-PA affinity is a double-edge sword: there is also 
much rivalry between LVA and PA. Once it had been an ounced that LVA would be 
part of the EP-V list, PA opted to present its own list rather than sharing a platform 
with a ‘rival’ Andalusian party.  
 
The rival parties previously mentioned (PA, NIVA and PACMA) undoubtedly catch 
some of the votes which might otherwise go to LVA but are not considered a serious 
problem to the party unlike the case of IULVCA, whic  will now be examined. 
 
Izquierda Unida  
LV and IU were both part of the anti-NATO social movement and were created in 
great part due to the impetus of the movement. LV pre-dated IU by about 18 months 
and, as already mentioned in Chapter 4.1, was invited but declined to form part of the 
IU coalition when the latter was founded. As a result, LVA and IU shared the 
alternative left political space and were consequently directly in competition with 
each other. However, the IU coalition could count o the organisational skills of the 
PCE and was an immeasurably bigger and more credible party, particularly in 





the 1990s – when the Greens were trying to establish themselves as a party – IU 
attracted many voters in Andalucía as shown in Table 6.8. 
 
Table 6.8 Seats won by Izquierda Unida in the Andal usian Parliament  
Year Seats won by IU out 
of total 109 seats 
1990     IU 11 
1994     IULVCA 20 
1996     IULVCA 13 
2000     IULVCA 6 
2004     IULVCA 6 
2008     IULVCA 6 
    Source: Valencian Government website 2011 
 
Given these circumstances, and after LV’s high profile general election campaign 
failed to produce the anticipated electoral gains for the party in 1993, LVA opted to 
become part of the IU coalition in Andalucía. It could be argued that the 1993-1996 
IULVCA alliance sounded the death knell of LVA largely because the Andalusian IU 
federation continued to call itself IULVCA after LVA abandoned the failed coalition 
in 1997; by retaining the ecosocialist label, IULVCA has thereby explicitly continued 
to compete for the green vote. Only the most committed green activists are aware of 
the history behind IULVCA and LVA and the average voter is therefore likely to see 
IULVCA as the Andalusian counterpart of the Catalan ICV, though this is far from 
being the case.  
 
IULVCA can certainly lay some claims to being an ecosocialist party. The party 
includes a sizeable faction of committed ecologists who work from within the party 
to promote a more environmental agenda. Environmental campaigns in Andalucía 
nearly always include EAA activists, trade unionists and two parties who invariably 
lend their support, namely IULVCA and LVA (and clearly, the former is often far 
more visible, given its considerably greater resources).151  
                                                
151 One small but typical example of IU’s environmental commitment is demonstrated by a plan in the 





However, IULVCA’s ecologism is dependent on the individual members of discrete 
local groups and is not a core ideological principle of the party (see Appendix N for 
IULVCA’s definition of its defining objectives and contrast the discourse with 
Appendix O which includes ICV and Scottish Green Party discourse). There are 
therefore many instances where IULVCA is revealed to be a socialist, rather than an 
ecosocialist, party. In Cordoba, for example, previously controlled by IULVCA, the 
council gave some developers the go-ahead to build a large number of houses and 
industrial developments which flouted regulations and ran counter to prevailing 
notions about sustainable housing. Similar actions have taken place in other cities and 
towns controlled by IU (LVA, 10/08/2006).   
Whereas the ideological gap between IU and LVA was initially clearly defined by the 
latter’s very different positions on economic growth, the difference between the two 
parties in the last 10 – 15 years has become increasingly less clear cut (although LVA 
activists argue that, whilst the ecosocialist credentials of some individual IU members 
are undeniable, the IU party organisation is still very closed, and continues to be 
rooted in its communist past). However, as far as voters are concerned, the fact that 
the Andalusian IU retains the ecosocialist label (IULVCA) validates its claims to be 
the region’s most effective ‘Green’ party. 
The issue of IULVCA’s ‘appropriation’ of the Green name and logo (see Figure 6.2) 
is probably the single most contentious issue for LVA who have repeatedly, but 
unsuccessfully, taken IULVCA to court in an attempt to prevent the latter from being 




                                                                                                                                
councillor in charge of environmental affairs is from IU (IU and PSOE and governing the city in 
coalition) and finally agreed to the cutting down of the trees, in exchange for a series of concession 
(including the planting of new trees elsewhere).  The councillor in question had to face the 
opprobrium of all the local IU activists, who protest d against the felling of the trees.  The newspaper 
article which reports this incident refers to the councillor in question as a councillor for IU-Los 
Verdes, emphasizing the confusion which persists in the mind of the public.  










   Source: IULVCA Statutes 2011 
 
Karamichas (2004) argues convincingly that it is hard for a Green party to be 
politically successful where it is competing with an lternative left party. This 
situation clearly pertains in Andalucía, but only goes some way towards explaining 
LVA’s failure. After all, although Karamichas’ theory holds true for many cases, 
there have also been examples of two alternative left parties concurrently enjoying a 
measure of success. For instance, the 2003 Elections  the Scottish Parliament  
returned seven Green MSPs and 6 Scottish Socialist Party (SSP) MSPs (Scottish 
Parliament 2003). In the Scottish case, although bot parties could define themselves 
as being of the alternative left, there were clear ideological differences which made it 
easier for the voter to choose one rather than the ot r. In Andalucía, differentiating 
between the two parties is less clear because IU’s logo, name and some of its actions 
have persuaded the voter that they are also a party with Green values 
 
6.4.3 Weak party strategy and  organisation   
The following section will turn to examine endogenous factors that contribute to 
LVA’s difficulties in consolidating its position.   
 
One of the party’s key problems has always been its organisational structure. Many of 
the party’s early activists came from left-wing, Maoist or Marxist groups and were 
immersed in the world of small politics (Larios 2008). Although the party statutes 
established that LVA would operate through ‘grass-root, open democracy’ (LVA 
1989), the reality was very different, with leading activists being surrounded by their 
own coterie of followers and an atmosphere of intrigue: as in many green parties, 






pragmatists (realos) have held sway until now. Party meetings are fraught and 
disagreement is routine; in the build up to election campaigns the core activists take 
decisions without consulting the party, thus increasing internal tension within the 
party. To compound these problems, LVA only counts on small groups of 
factionalised activists, and lacks the resources to ge  their message across.  
 
The party has failed to build up its membership. In 2006, LVA had a paid-up 
membership of 800, a low figure which, however, should not be used to assess the 
party’s following. In keeping with the traditional Spanish tendency for low 
membership of political parties (Padró-Solanet 1996; Ramiro & Morales 2004), most 
LVA membersonly join up officially to present themselves for election on LVA lists 
(the local elections alone require at least about 600 people to put themselves on a 
list). Consequently, party members are usually involved in activity during the 
electoral campaigns but the rank and file is otherwise largely dormant and inoperative 
– unless groups convene for a particular PESM campaign (Larios 2006: 277).   
 
The party’s organisational structure is further complicated by the different spheres of 
influence which exist, above all, in Granada, Sevill , Malaga and Cordoba. Relations 
between the different factions and their key activis s are often difficult and there is 
considerable distrust, backstabbing and the carrying out of underhand operations. 
Operating within such a context has squandered much of the initial energy and 
enthusiasm of the party’s most steadfast supporters. In this respect, LVA are similar 
to the Catalan Green-Greens.  
 
One of the issues that has alienated potential supporters and the PESM relates to 
LVA’s highly pragmatic strategy of  forming alliances with other parties. In this 
respect, LVA has changed directions more often than other Spanish Green parties. 
The potential advantages of this strategy are clear but there are also disadvantages. 
The party has frequently  not stood under its own name at election time, thus perhaps 
preventing it from being considered an established player in the regional party 





transparency contradict the party’s claim to be democratic, participatory and not 
given to the political manoeuvring of other parties.  
 
These endogenous factors have undoubtedly prevented the party from attracting more 
members or voters for a number of reasons. Firstly, LVA’s propensity to swing from 
one electoral alliance to another means that the party h s never given itself a chance 
to establish a really strong identity as Andalucía’s Green party. This problem has 
been exacerbated  by the periodic changes in the party’s name, a desire to reflect 
subtle changes of direction but confusing for the voters. For example, in the 2007 
local elections LVA called itself Los Verdes 2007. In the 2011municipal elections 
LVA stood as part of a Green coalition called Los Verdes Andalucía Ecológica (P36 
Andalucía 2011). Although this new formation (influenced by Equo) is trying to 
reach out to all those who identify with PE – including social movements, the 
alternative left and the nationalists – it is difficult to understand why LVA has opted 
for yet another change of name and image. On the otr hand, it is easy to see why 
the electorate is confused about who the Greens are.  
 
6.4.4 LVA: a party with a weak identity  
Another barrier to success for LVA is the party’s poor image. Press coverage is 
minimal or for many years focused primarily on the eccentricities of the party. LVA 
have always felt that the press is swift to misrepresent them – perhaps with some 
justification – but the party’s determination to be‘different’ has sometimes played 
into the hands of a regional, conservative press. LVA’s previous spokesperson, 
Garrido, once held a political meeting for dogs (Larios 2008), a gimmick which 
backfired when it played into the hands of the press. 
 
The media, as a reflection but also a shaper of public opinion, has also played a role 
in fuelling mistrust towards the Greens. In 2006, LVA’s Francisco Garrido, then an 
MP, was mocked by the press for his early day motion calling for gorillas to be 
accorded human rights. Ridicule was heaped upon the Gre ns but there were few 
apologies about a misunderstanding instigated by the press. The press also 





excluded in reports providing information about other parties that have performed 
less well than the Greens.   
 
However, LVA behaves like an ‘alternative’ or movemnt-party in that it is 
dismissive of attempts to neaten its image and persists in engaging in gestures and 
actions which further feed the image of LVA as being less than a serious party. The 
emphasis that this is not politics as usual may attract a few people but looks more like 
the provocative gestures of an SM rather than an attempt to win  seats.  
 
For example, one of the posters for the 2003 municipal elections showed images of 
naked people, namely workers at the LVA headquarters.  The slogan accompanying 
this poster was: ‘Desnudos de intereses, libres por naturaleza’152 and their stated aim 
was to use a fresher, less bombastic and more ironic approach (LVA 2003). Despite 
confident assertions that they would win a seat on Seville City Council (i.e. at least 
5% of the vote, in accordance with electoral regulations) on that occasion, LVA only 
obtained 1.34% of the vote even though it emerged as the fifth most voted party in 
Seville.   
 
LVA’s playful approach is also distrusted by many alternative-left voters who 
subscribe to the left’s perception that the Greens’ ideology is suspect and that the 
party is middle-class and essentially pursues life-style issues. Although party 
literature and manifestos over the years contradict th s perception, media reports on 
electoral campaigns sideline LVA or pigeonhole it as a niche party with a narrow, 
lifestyle agenda. Consequently, over the years the press has highlighted LVA’s call 
for the legalisation of cannabis, the introduction f more cycle lanes, and the 
provision of organic food in schools, hospitals and u iversities.  
 
The media’s sidelining of LVA means that most voters a e largely unaware of the 
Greens. In a television interview on local television prior to the 2011 municipal 
                                                
152 An impossibly difficult idea to translate but whic literally states: ‘naked of all interests, free (or
independent) by nature’. The reference here was to the fact that LVA was the only Andalusian party to 
have resolutely denounced all the speculation taking place with the connivance of many town halls 





elections (all candidates who are number one on a list re given a 30 minute slot), the 
interviewer asked an LVA candidate about his party’s ‘recent’ split with IULVCA – 
so recent, the interviewer said, that they retain the ‘Green’ element in the party name 
(http://www.unacadiz.tv/video/entrevista-a-ivan-can/673). The interviewer’s 
ignorance about LVA reflects a widespread lack of media interest in the Greens. 
 
Any attention given to LVA by the media focuses on the party as a single issue party.  
This view of the Greens does not, in fact, do justice to the party’s activities and 
documented output. By and large LVA’s documents – such as its election manifestos 
– give a clear account of the party’s comprehensive ag nda, showing that their 
ideology is in line with that of mainstream Green parties and that their attention to 
specific policies is well thought through and coherent with their principles. However, 
as most studies show, this level of detail is rarely accessed by the voter, and is not 
reported by the media. The summary of LVA’s programme for the 2007 municipal 
elections in Cordoba is provided in Appendix P, and demonstrates very clearly that 
the party has a coherent set of policies which, if implemented, would mark the start of 
a more ecological society. 
 
6.5  ENVIRONMENTAL GAINS IN ANDALUCÍA  
 
Until now, this chapter has focused on the constraints which have prevented the 
development of a stronger PESM and Green party in Andalucía. Despite these 
barriers, however, Andalucía’s ecologists have made some piecemeal progress over 
the last 30 years. Admittedly, their goal – to bring about an ecologically just and 
sustainable society –  is less attainable than it was hen the ecology movement 
started. However, the expertise and passion which the region’s ecologists have 
employed in raising awareness and advocating the introduction of cleaner 
technologies and more sustainable practices (in other words, ecological 
modernisation) have brought about a change in attitudes and policies. A few 
examples of this limited progress will be cited befor  moving on to examine, more 
specifically, how LVA – only a small part of the region’s PESM – has been able to 





6.5.1 Andalucía as an environmental pioneer 
Andalucía’s PESM (including ecologists from EMOs, IU trade unions and LVA) has 
been instrumental in disseminating Green theory and praxis, and the expertise, active 
campaigning and commitment of many ecologists has ensur d that Andalucía has 
become what Andersen and Liefferink (1997) call a pioneer in the implementation of 
environmental policy. A few examples will illustrate he region’s leading position in 
some policy areas 
 
In the year 2000, Andalucía generated only 146 megawatts (MW) of electricity 
through wind power; by May 2010, Andalucía had a wind power capacity of 
2,863.71 MW and 130 wind farms (AAE 2010) –  to putthese figures in context, it is 
worth noting that in the same year Sweden generated 1,021 megawatts of electricity 
from wind power while the UK’s capacity stands at 5,203.795 MW (UKWED 2011).  
Given that Andalucía has a population of 8.5 million as against the UK’s 62.5 
million, Andalucía’s commitment to wind power is remarkable. In 2007 it increased 
its investment in wind power by 112% and 2008 and 2009 saw increases of  47% and 
75% respectively. The 2007-2013 PASENER153 Plan (Andalucía’s Sustainable 
Energy Plan) aims to generate over 4,000 megawatts of wind power by 2013 and to 
double that by 2020. At present, wind power supplies the region with 10% of its 
electricity needs (AAE 2010).  
 
The PASENER Plan seeks to cut energy consumption by increasing efficiency as 
well as moving over to the use of more renewable enrgy sources such as solar 
power which, until a few years ago, was almost non-existent in the region. Since 
2004, when solar photovoltaic only generated 8.4 MW per year in Andalucía, it has 
grown exponentially and in 2009 its capacity increased to 1,407MW in the region 
(up 232% on the previous year) (AAE 2010; GWEC 2010).  
 
The Andalusian government’s second measure to green th  region was the expansion 
of the region’s organic farming sector. In 2001, 107,0 0 hectares (ha) were given 
over to organic farming; by 2006 this had risen to 537,000 ha and, in 2009, 866,000 
                                                





ha were farmed organically. Andalucía accounts for 54% of Spain’s organic 
farmland and this sector continues to expand: in 2009, and in spite of a recession, the 
sector in Andalucía increased by 10.55% on the previous year (in terms of the 
growing number of producers and of commodities) (Consejería de Agricultura y 
Pesca 2010).  
 
The renewable and organic farming programmes exemplify the confluence of the 
ecologists’ demands and government interests: the first provided the expertise and 
enthusiasm to drive these two policies forward, while the government drew financial 
benefit from generous EU funding awarded to encourage sustainable development 
and ecological modernisation schemes.  
 
Another discrete example of the gradual greening of Andalucía is the increasing use 
of bicycles as a means of public transport. There has been widespread pressure from 
different organisations and EMOs since the late 1980s, but it is only in the last few 
years that measures have been introduced: it is estimated that the use of bicycles 
trebled between 2006 and 2009 in Andalucía. Successful municipal bicycle loan 
schemes have been introduced in Seville and Granada, and other cities are shortly 
following suit. Furthermore, the regional department responsible for energy saving 
measures, the Agencia Andaluza de la Energía ( Andalusian Energy Agency) has 
also provided a further 2,000 free bicycles in different university towns and other 
small towns to promote the use of the bicycle as a sustainable, pollution-free and 
economical form of transport. The Andalusian scheme was in the vanguard of a wave 
of similar projects being implemented across Europe; th  region’s speed in seizing 
upon this new initiative is linked to the fact that the ecologists had already sown the 
seeds of this project.  
 
The ecologists’ message has, in fact, been so succesful that, in 2011, a number of 
PP-governed Andalusian cities have renewed their commitment to an ambitious 
sustainable transport scheme and have secured financing from the European 





(thereby implementing the 2007-2013 PISTA Plan154 which was drawn up when 
LVA had three representatives working in the Andalusian government).  
  
In short, the ecologists’ input to the process of ecological modernisation over the last 
years has undeniably helped to promote a ‘greener’ Andalucía. However, the 
underlying principles behind ecologists’ reasons for advocating particular  measures 
(renewables, organic farming, water efficiency, etc) have largely been sidelined and 
the material improvements have been used to perpetuate a quality of life which is 
unsustainable. Furthermore, the ecological measures outlined above have been 
introduced to generate economic wealth and consequently have proved to be 
unsustainable in practice. This is case of organic farming in Andalucía. Because most 
of the organic produce is exported, it is heavily packaged before being driven 
hundreds of miles to feed northern Europeans who value quality food in order to 
enhance their health.   
 
Although the ecologists’ radical ideas are being subverted by mainstream economic 
imperatives PE has at least secured a new respect for he region’s resources. 
Furthermore, Andalucía’s success in exporting organic foods has increased 
awareness in the value of the region’s own products. The regional government has 
introduced the first Ecoplan to promote organic farming in Andalucía. One of its 
aims is to encourage Andalusians to buy organic, local produce.    
 
6.5.2 LVA: working within and beyond the institutio ns 
Despite LVA’s inability to achieve electoral significance, there are two compelling 
reasons for arguing that LVA has played a key role in driving forward the green 
agenda in Andalucía: on the one hand, its alliances with bigger parties, and indeed its 
foray onto the political stage, have enabled the party to become a part of the 
administration – albeit in a minor capacity; on the other hand,  LVA’s political 
campaigning has constituted an important part of the activity undertaken by  the 
political ecology movement as a whole. LVA has therefo e been able to influence 
policy from within and beyond the institutions as the following paragraphs show.  
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Until 1994, LVA remained an unelectable anti-system party-movement, and as such 
its influence was limited to the dissemination of Green ideas and to activists’ 
engagement with the region’s environmental causes. By 1994 the party’s leaders 
were determined to be part of the polity and therefore formed an alliance with IU. 
Although this coalition proved to be short-lived, it provided LVA with its first 
opportunity to break into local government as well as exercising some influence on 
the Junta’s policy agenda. 
 
The presence of two greens in the regional parliament enabled LVA to promote a 
number of environmental policies. LVA was instrumental in setting up a committee 
on renewable energy: this led to the expansion of a renewal energy programme called 
PROSOL (Larios 2006: 280). The programme’s success wa limited because it 
proved impossible to lift the ban on building wind parks at this stage. A further 
consequence of LVA’s presence in the parliament was its greatly enhanced capacity 
to network and to access influence – this encouraged th  social movements to 
strengthen their ties with the party which was able to act as an intermediary on 
occasions (Larios 2006: 280).   
 
At local government level, LVA won five seats in 1995 (because of their alliance 
with IU) in big towns and cities and was also able to raise the profile of Green ideas 
by bringing new ideas and knowledge to the negotiating table in those five councils: 
they pushed for better water management, the setting up of local energy agencies, 
greener transport policies and town planning. Because they sat on many committees, 
they were able to influence the outcome of proposals and work towards a greening of 
some policies (Interview with party activist 2004).  
 
LVA’s next political opening took place in 2000, after the party had signed up to a 
pre-electoral alliance with PSOE at regional level. This resulted in the election of an 
LVA MP, Inmaculada Gálvez. In order to form a regional government, PSOE had to 
form a coalition with PA, which gave the ruling coalition a majority of just one seat: 





Directorate General for Environmental Education, which was headed by a Green. 
This department started out as small and underfinanced but grew substantially, and 
introduced an ambitious programme. It involved the trade unions in environmental 
education, and supported initiatives and conferences on renewable energy and 
organic farming. It spearheaded a new approach to water management and also 
pushed for a comprehensive environmental tax which was to include ‘polluter pays’ 
taxation but also an environmental tax for tourists (based on a model introduced in 
the Balearic Islands by the greens). It also initiated a government-funded 
volunteering programme on environmental projects as well as introducing 
Ecobarometer, an annual comprehensive survey assessing the environmental 
attitudes and behaviour of people living in Andalucía. Finally, the Directorate 
General took on the task of trying to ensure that sustainability underpinned the 
policies of all regional government departments.  
 
Before the general and regional elections in 2004, LVA renewed its regional alliance 
with PSOE but also signed up to an alliance for the general election. LVA elected not  
to be represented in the Andalusian parliament but instead bargained to be given 
control over two further additional Directorates: Sustainability and Organic Farming. 
Between 2004-2008, the LVA incumbents worked tirelessly – and with some success 
– to advance green policies in these areas. Their expert knowledge on prevailing 
environmental trends made them eminently suitable appointments and allowed them 
to promote policies which, though in keeping with EU best practice, would otherwise 
have been sidelined. Being fully conversant with the European Union’s 
environmental discourse, they were able to focus on prioritising ‘ecological 
modernisation’ or the notion that economic progress and the protection of the 
environment are compatible and are best achieved within a climate of dialogue, 
partnership and shared responsibility. LVA leaders are certain that many of 
Andalucía’s Green initiatives and socially progressive initiatives (for example,  
passive euthanasia) would never have been passed without the unceasing 
commitment shown by the Green departmental directors during these four years 






However, the LVA-PSOE pre-electoral pact also committed the Junta to implement 
a number of further policies which, in the event, were abandoned. One such case was 
the proposed environmental tax, elements of which were introduced although the 
idea of taxing tourists to the region was removed. Other measures which were part of 
the LVA-PSOE pact and which were abandoned included introducing a moratorium 
on GM crops, drawing up laws to prevent greenbelt land from being built on without 
rigorous planning procedures and the enacted of a new law to prevent more golf 
courses from being built. The LVA proposals which were abandoned were ones that 
prioritised sustainability rather than economic growth.  
 
By 2007, tensions between LVA and PSOE at regional level were evident, although 
the Greens working in government departments continued to work tirelessly at their 
jobs. At the party conference at that end of that year, LVA voted against renewing its 
pact with PSOE for the 2008 elections, alleging that ‘PSOE had only implemented 
35% of the LVA proposals it had undertaken to introduce (El País 08/10/07). 
 
At statewide level, the 2004-2008 PSOE-LVA alliance gave the Greens another 
substantive asset. In the 2004 general election LVA’s spokesperson, Francisco 
Garrido, was on the PSOE list for Seville, and was elected to the Congreso. During 
his four years there he made the most of his status as a parliamentarian to introduce 
private members’ bills and to campaign on behalf of green causes indefatigably. His 
presence in the parliament raised the Greens’ profile, largely because his activities 
were more likely to be reported in the media. In 2006, for example, Garrido appeared 
in 61 different articles in El País. 
 
Halfway through his term of office, it became clear that his relations with PSOE had 
foundered (the socialists did not need his vote, and he obviously had no bargaining 
tool) but he hung on till the end, largely to maint a green presence in the 
parliament but also, as has been acknowledged, to draw a salary that permitted him to 
continue his activism. Garrido’s election was symbolically important and, moreover, 
his position increased his opportunities to network among national parliamentarians, 





unofficial  groups were set up within the parliament to raise awareness and campaign 
on ‘Green’ issues – such as the abolition of bullfighting.  
 
At local government level, the party’s influence has been slight, given the low level 
of representation which they have achieved. As previously indicated, on a couple of 
occasions a small town has even had a green mayor, but these occurrences do not 
imply that the towns in question have embraced politica  ecology. The ‘green’ ad hoc 
parties in question have, until now, not translated their support into more long-term 
support in the municipality in question.   
 
Since the 2000-2008 period when there were Greens in the Junta, much has changed. 
According to the Director General for Organic farming during that period, since the 
Greens have left the Regional Ministry for Agriculture, the organic programme has 
been significantly downsized. The budget for organic farming was reduced by 40% in 
2010, a plan to promote organic farming has been abandoned, research in this area 
has come to a standstill, a programme to provide organic food to schools has been 
reduced by 80% and a similar project for hospitals ha all but disappeared (Garrido 
Peña 2010). Even the IULVCA executive – commenting o  an attempt to stop the 
building of a new oil refinery in 2008, after the Greens had left government – 
acknowledged that they could no longer rely on the Junta to scrutinise the project 
with due care. They stated that the Ministry concered (and the central government) 
had completely changed their position. Whereas before they were demanding and 
vigilant about meeting environmental requirements ad dopting sustainable policies, 
they had become suspiciously silent (IULVCA 2008). 
 
6.5.3 A more environmental, but not an ecological, society  
The years 2000-2008 undoubtedly witnessed the ecologi al modernisation of 
Andalucía. The collaboration of the Greens helped to rive a more environmentally 
proactive policy shift on a number of fronts; at the same time, the Greens’ expertise 
was disseminated amongst government departments and, according to an LVA 
activist working in a ministry, initial cynicism about the Greens gave way to 





LVA team within the ministries also relied on numerous ecologists (unconnected 
with LVA) who helped to implement the new policies.   
 
Since then, environmental concerns have been given less priority by the Junta but it 
would be perhaps incorrect to attribute this shift to he end of the LVA-PSOE pact. 
Since 2008, the region has been hit particularly badly by the effects of the credit 
crunch, with unemployment in the region registering 28.36% in December 2010 
(INEM) and austerity measures which have undoubtedly led to cutbacks for 
sustainability and ecological modernisation (EM) measures. 
 
Nevertheless, because of the investment of the past ye rs, Andalucía’s environmental 
policies have taken root. Attitudes towards the enviro ment have shifted, the region 
continues to lead the field in the number of green jobs it has created – 91,517 
(Andalucía Ecológica 2010) – and  remains a pioneer as regards ecological 
modernisation. At the same time, the PESM’s vigilance and readiness to denounce 
illegal practices has served as a check and has contained the worst excesses of a 
system which continues to prioritise economic growth – and therefore prefers to 
condone ‘infringements’ if they bring short-term economic gain. Consequently, 
although Andalucía can claim to have become a more environmentally-aware, 
greener society (bicycle schemes, numerous wind farms, ecycling schemes, organic 
produce etc), this definition of a ‘greener’ society responds to a very shallow view of 
environmentalism. In fact, over the last 25 years, Andalucía’s natural habitats have 
been aggressively encroached on, despite their alleged y protected status: for 
example, more ski resorts have been built on the Sierra Nevada mountains, the 
coastline has been covered in swathes of new housing depvelopments (many of 
which are only occupied two months of the year) andhousing developments and 
farms have been established, for example, within the Doñana national park. One 
specific example of the dominant ‘developmentalism’ is the region’s ‘Sustainable 
Transport Plan 2007-2013’ (Plan de Infraestructuras para la Sostenibilidad del 
Transporte en Andalucía) which intends to build 1,614 kilometres of motorways (a 
further 70% than exist at present), and three new airports in the region (at present 





signs of improvement: the risk of nuclear accidents because of the American military 
and naval bases as well as the British base in Gibraltar; water management, which – 
despite EU directives – has not implemented a rigorous tariff and continues to favour 
big business over the needs of the region’s citizens.  
 
In short, as Ortega (spokesperson for LVA since 2009) has stated, EM was part of the 
second phase of PE, when Green parties joined the syst m and collaborated with left-
wing parties, rolling out programmes which included a focus on sustainability and 
EM. This phase, in which the Greens envisaged the EU as being the only body which 
could intervene to mitigate the effects of globalisation, proved to be ineffective 
because, by and large, patching up problems in a piecemeal way does not advance PE 
(Ortega 2010 a: 4-5).  
 
According to Ortega, since 2008 the Greens and LVA are in a third phase that points 
to only one possible way forward: ‘a programme focused on de-growth and a drastic 
reduction on social inequality and injustice (Ortega 2010 b: 3). In other words, the 
Greens’ attempt to push for EM and sustainable development had a very limited 
success: it encouraged a cleaner technology but did not question the premise that 
economic growth was desirable and necessary. Inadvertently, ecologists helped to 
make green consumerism fashionable but without bringing about any radical 
transformation in society.   
 
Ortega further states that LVA and Greens elsewhere in Spain will only be successful 
if they work together with all like-minded people, the PESM and left-wing ecologists, 
who share their objectives. He is clearly anticipating he setting up of Equo, which – 
at the time he was writing – was in discussion. It remains to be seen whether it is 




Chapter 4 provided an overview of Spanish Green parties and the PESM and 





circumstances and differ so much from each other that one can only define ‘Spain’ by 
considering all the different Spanish regions in turn. This principle also applies to the 
different Green parties and movements in each region. As such a study was clearly 
impracticable, the study has instead examined two regions which are particularly 
important because of their demographic importance and size. They are also regions 
with a strong PE movement.  
 
The analysis of the Andalusian and Catalan Greens has demonstrated the impact that 
nationalism, a different political culture and a distinct party system has had on the 
evolution of the Greens in those two regions. These in ights allow one to appreciate 
that similar but region-specific influences apply in Spain’s remaining regions.  
 
The previous two chapters have shown that, in many wa s, the Catalan and 
Andalusian PESM share a number of characteristics which Chapter 4 has also shown 
to be applicable across Spain. For example, althoug the large EMOs and NGOs have 
taken on the role of representing the PESM at statewide and European level, the core 
of the movement continues to be focused around numerous small, local groups. 
Furthermore, these local groups – when they seek collaboration with others –  tend to 
belong to regional EMOs. In short, the regional dimension is very important within 
the PESM, although it has by and large managed to avoid the inter-regional tensions 
which prevail in the Green parties.  
 
Chapters 5 and 6 also demonstrate that the perception that Spain is still a materialist 
country and therefore less concerned with the enviro ment is clearly incorrect. 
Firstly, a distinction has to be made between the two regions: whereas Andalucía is 
economically backward and could therefore meet the conditions to be considered 
‘materialist’, Catalonia certainly does not fall within the same category. Nevertheless, 
both regions have a determined minority who are committed to furthering PE – in this 
sense, they are not any different from PESM in other European countries, who are all 






It is only when one turns to look at the Spanish Greens that regional differences 
become very marked. Chapters 5 and 6  have shown, in turn, how regional factors 
have set the Green parties on a path which has resulted in the establishment of two 
main parties, LVA and ICV, both of which began to collaborate with IU in the early 
1990s: LVA’s collaboration was short-lived but has re ulted in a bitter feud between 
IULVCA and LVA which does not augur well for future conciliation. ICV, on the 
other hand, has gradually become an ecosocialist party which is recognisably 
‘Green’, particularly if compared with IULVCA, the putative ecosocialist party.  
 
However, in the process of becoming Green, ICV dispen ed with all the original 
Greens who now belong to a number of proto-parties whose very existence questions, 
perhaps, whether the ICV model is, in fact, as Green as it likes others to perceive it to 
be. Although this question could, at first sight, appear to only concern Catalonia, it is 
of course central to much that it happening in Spain within Green parties who have to 
choose whether to go forward as a Red-Green party or join the new party that is being 









CHAPTER 7:   CONCLUSION   
 
The present thesis established two main aims: the first was to provide a detailed 
account of Spain’s Green parties, including the broader PESM to which they are 
symbiotically linked, in order to correct or question scholars’ interpretation of Green 
politics in Spain. The second aim was to demonstrate that Spanish Green politics 
merits inclusion in comparative studies on Green politics and movements because of 
its distinctive characteristics.   
 
Sections 7.1 and 7.2 of this concluding chapter will, in turn, address the two research 
questions set out in Chapter 1 and will discuss howthese have been answered in the 
course of the thesis. The third section will reflect on how this study on the Spanish 
PESM could fruitfully feed into the study of Green politics in general by confirming 
some findings, revisiting some issues and highlighting a few areas that have been 
under-researched to date. The final section will draw on the analysis provided in this 
thesis to examine the likelihood that the latest ‘most serious attempt in decades to 
create a Green party’ (*El País 15/08/2010) will lead to a metamorphosis of the 
Spanish Greens.  
 
 
7.1 WHICH KEY FACTORS HAVE HINDERED THE CONSOLIDATION OF THE SPANISH 
GREENS? 
 
There is no doubt that the Spanish Greens must workto consolidate their fragmented 
position if they are to strengthen their legitimacy, visibility and hence increase their 
chances of capturing votes. Chapters 4-6 detailed a number of factors that have 
hindered the consolidation of the Spanish Greens, firstly by providing an overview 
of the Spanish Greens throughout the Spanish state (Chapter 4), and subsequently 
(Chapters 5 and 6) by examining Green parties in Catalonia and Andalucía, two 
regions that have both played a key role in the evolution of PE in Spain. I will 
briefly review these key factors, beginning with exogenous factors that have 






The first key factor that has constrained the Greens is the Spanish electoral system. 
Although it is supposedly proportional, it is in fact strongly weighted in favour of 
the main parties in each district (Keating & Wilson 2009). Over the years, this has 
encouraged an increasingly polarised system. In the general elections, votes are 
predominantly cast for the two dominant parties, PSOE and PP, with most of the 
remaining votes going to nationalist parties in the various regions. The same pattern 
applies in the regional elections, although the natio list parties tend to fare much 
better in these elections. There are therefore very few opportunities for a small party 
such as the Greens to win a seat. As previously indicated, however, this factor offers 
an imperfect explanation for the Greens’ failure to make greater electoral inroads in 
circumstances where the electoral system is favourable, such as the EP elections. It 
also overlooks the fact that, if the party could capture the voters’ interest, they would  
win a few seats, despite the unfavourable electoral system. For example, a new 
statewide party called Unión, Progreso y Democracia (UpyD, Union, Progress and 
Democracy) was founded in 2007155. The next year, it won a seat in Madrid in the 
general election. In the 2011 municipal elections UpyD won 152 councillors 
throughout Spain and obtained 8 seats on the Madrid regional government.  
 
A second exogenous factor that has been a barrier to the Greens’ success is party 
competition. The Greens are competing in a crowded political arena (98 parties 
stood in the 2008 general election) in which there a many other small parties 
hoping to attract voters who are disaffected with the main political parties. More 
importantly, the Greens have to compete with other new left parties, namely IU and 
the left-wing nationalist parties. As Karamichas demonstrates (2004) it is very rare 
for a country to accommodate two successful ‘alternative left’ parties. Certainly, 
Spain has proved to be no exception in this respect. But if we turn to sub-state 
politics, for example to Catalonia,  there is evidence that the same rules do not 
always apply: ERC and ICV have both achieved electoral success in spite of 
occupying a similar (if differentiated) party platform.  
                                                
155 The party, most of whose founders are Basques, rejects the two main parties and defines itself as a 
progressive party which rejects the traditional cleavages (left-right; nationalist-centralist). One of its 
strengths is that it has attracted the support of a number of influential people such as a well-known 





The final external factor preventing the consolidation of the Greens has been the fact 
that most ecologists have preferred to live their ecologism by ignoring Green party 
politics and being active within the PESM. According to da Cruz (1995), 50% of 
PESM activists questioned said they did not vote at all whilst nearly all of those who 
voted routinely voted for a left-wing party.  
 
In addition to these exogenous factors, the Spanish Greens have also been beset by 
numerous endogenous problems which have prevented th ir ‘consolidation’, or 
coming together as one, single party. Undoubtedly, territorial loyalties have played 
an important part in this fragmentation. LV was set up by a handful of people (with 
little or no grassroots support) who then went back to their disparate regions and 
tried to canvas support for LV. Party activists and members worked and identified 
primarily with their own region which meant interregional encounters were fraught 
with disagreement (Campomanes 1994). The party leaders in each region or 
province were more responsible to their supporters than to the central executive, 
which was seen to be dominated by a few self-seeking and ambitious would-be 
politicians. This pattern has persisted and the accumulated slights and antagonism 
have aggravated interparty tensions.  
 
In addition to the personalism and fragmentation caused by regional loyalties, a 
further very important factor has exacerbated the Gr ens’ failure to form a single, 
united party, namely the relationship between Greens a d other left libertarian 
parties. The regional Green parties have historically had a complex and close 
relationship with other left wing parties at regional level. This arose because left 
libertarians of all persuasions move in the same circles, are involved in the same 
campaigns and, depending on local circumstances, may have good relationships. 
Consequently, in some regions or provinces the Greens have been able to cooperate 
or even form electoral alliances with IU or a nationalist party whereas such alliances 
would be impossible in other regions. Regional variation on alliance-building has 
divided the Greens and has led to the existence of more than one Green party in a 





IU may lead to defections on ideological grounds and to the setting up of a rival 
Green party.  
 
The outcome of all this fragmentation is that, as Frankland et al. state, the Spanish 
Greens ‘do not really exist as an autonomous party at he national level’ (2008: 259). 
Over the years, there have been repeated attempts to unify the party at statewide 
level, but these have all come to nothing. Observers such as the EGP emphasise the 
need for a single, statewide Green party but ignore the regional tensions that have 
existed since the party was created. Their ‘solution’ overlooks an organisational 
model which might have more chances of succeeding, given the regional dimension 
of Spanish Green politics. I am, of course, referring to the confederal model, such as 
that succesfully adopted by Ecologistas en Acción. The different autonomous 
regional parties would share a common but differentiated name and identity and 
would pursue their own strategies whilst abiding by a common set of principles.  
 
Section 7.4 will return to this question in the light of recent developments which 
may, or may not, transform Green party politics in Spain.  
 
 
7.2 DOES THE SPANISH GREENS’ WEAK ELECTORAL PERFORMANCE INDICATE A 
LACK OF INTEREST IN POLITICAL ECOLOGY IN SPAIN?  
 
Scholars (for example Mair 2001;Carter 2007; Frankld et al. 2008) have assessed 
the Spanish Greens’ electoral performance by looking at general election results in 
which the Green-Greens have, on average, obtained about 0.5% of the vote over the 
last ten years. Based on these results, it is assumed that the Spanish Greens are an 
extremely weak political force and that there is little interest in PE in Spain. Both of 
these assumptions are understandable but flawed as this thesis has shown.  
 
In the first place, whilst it is undeniably true tha  the Greens’ general election results 
demonstrate a very low level of voter support, these results are misleading: they do 
not include ICV, one of the Spanish Green parties, which  regularly wins one or two 





results also misconstrue the Greens’ real status becaus  they focus on the 
government tier which is most problematic for the Greens. At regional level, 
however, the Greens have made their mark in a number of regions, either through 
pre-electoral alliances with IU which have allowed them to obtain a seat, or through 
alliances with PSOE (in the case of Andalucía) which has not only given them a 
regional MP but also a number of government posts. At regional level, ICV usually 
wins 9-12 seats in the Catalan parliament and, as was demonstrated, was part of a 
ruling coalition, the Tripartit, from 2003-2010.  
 
 Chapters 4-6 provided ample evidence that the Spanish Greens are more significant 
than is generally assumed. These chapters demonstrated, for example, that the PSOE-
Green alliance resulted in two Green-Green MPs and one MEP. The Greens have 
continued to make slow but steady progress over the years and there are now more 
Green-Green councillors than ever before. Moreover, the Greens’ status as an 
established party ensures that the ideas of PE reach a wider audience through the 
media. Surveys significantly overestimate the number of Green voters which 
presumably indicates that there are more potential Green voters who switch 
allegiance and opt for a tactical vote on the day. Finally,  the fact that other parties 
(PSOE, IU, ERC for example) are interested in forming pre-electoral alliances with 
the Greens is a clear indication that, whilst the latter may be electorally weak, their 
message (i.e. PE) is seen as a way to attract voters.   
 
In short, this thesis has established that the Greens’ lectoral presence is more 
complex and less negligible than commonly portrayed. However, it has also 
demonstrated that the real protagonists of PE in Spain are the PESM, in other words 
all ecologists who belong to EMOs, numerous other associations (trade unions, IU to 
name a few) or, indeed, don’t ‘belong’ to anything but actively support the activities 
of particular groups or in other ways belong to the movement. The ongoing activities 
of this collective demonstrate that there is no lack of interest in PE in Spain.  
 
The broader notion that Spain is particularly resistant to the ideas advanced by 
political ecology has also been shown to be incorret in the course of this thesis on a 





the Spanish PESM is weak because Spaniards have a weak civil society has also 
been shown to be based on a method of measuring civil society which overlooks 
some of the strengths of the Spanish movements (for example their ability to 
mobilise large numbers on behalf of a cause, thus sending out a very clear message 
to the authorities and to the rest of society).  
 
Spaniards’ interest in PE is also demonstrated in the surveys which repeatedly 
show similar, if not more, citizen concern for environmental matters than citizens 
of other countries. Critics are quick to point out, with some reason, that Spaniards 
are rhetorically committed to PE but fail to act on their beliefs:  
 
This is the difference … between expressing a moral  concern and a political 
preference. In this respect the environment is still far from being a real social 
priority (*Valencia Sáiz 2010: 71).  
  
Although Valencia Sáiz’s point is borne out by the minority position of PE in Spain, 
he is perhaps being excessively negative: his study never fails to indicate that this 
situation pertains in other European countries as well; he also fails to accord the 
PESM the attention it deserves. He underplays the role of the broader movement 
and, makes no mention of Jiménez’s seminal study on the PESM (2004).  
 
This thesis has suggested that the efforts of Spain’s ecologists have contributed 
significantly to the piecemeal greening of Spain.  They have raised environmental 
awareness, contributed to policy change and have gradually brought about a lasting 
change in the values of Spanish society which has impacted on government bodies. 
A further example of this impact  is the attitudinal change in the Spanish judiciary. 
Whereas, in the past, judges were dismissive about cases brought before them by 
ecologists, the situation has changed markedly, thanks to the number of well 
prepared cases brought before the courts by the larg r EMOs. In the last few years, 
ecologists have managed to halt work on a major new port in the Canary islands, 
have prevented the building of a new ski resort, and halted a number of important 






Another form of piecemeal progress is the extent to which ideas usually associated 
with PE have been adopted by the remaining parties. For example, after the 2008 
general election, when Garrido (who introduced a bill calling for the recognition of 
the rights of the great apes in 2006) was no longer in power, ERC, IU and ICV 
reintroduced the abandoned bill which was passed with the support of all the parties 
apart from PP (El País 25/06/2008). More surprisingly, in an environmental about-
turn, the PP has seized on the environmental potential of the bicycle and, for 
example, has promised to create 575 kilometres of cycle paths in Madrid by 2016 
(MCC 2011)156. This is an electoral promise which may fail to materi lise157 but 
shows that even the PP has absorbed some of the messages of the ecologists’ 
arguments.  
 
Some would argue that these changes are primarily the result of EU influence. But 
PE actors in Spain have been instrumental in taking that influence forward.  Jiménez 
(2005) makes a convincing case that the PESM has driven this change in attitudes;  
without the help of informed experts and the pressure from civil society, the 
environmental directives and policies  originating from the EU would have been 
enacted but not implemented.  
 
 
Establishing a country’s commitment to political ecology is an invidious 
undertaking because it relies on comparing discrete indicators which do not present 
a holistic representation of PE in that country. However, the information presented 
in the course of this thesis presents sufficient proof that, although Spains’ Greens are 
‘electorally weak’ they should not be viewed in isolation:  they are regularly 
accompanied by  a very active – and at times influetial – PESM.  
 
 
                                                
156 Since the first ‘naked bike ride’ in Madrid in 2004, a large and spontaneous group of cyclists - on 
average, about 2,000 - has met in the centre of Madrid once a month to ride round the city for a couple 
of hours. The number of people riding bicycles around Madrid has risen substantially in the last few 
years, possibly encouraged by pro-cycling events. The causality is difficult to ascertain). 
 
157 Before the previous regional elections the PP leader, Esperanza Aguirre, promised to build 1,400 
kilometres of cycle tracks. The one that is now ready is a long track going round Madrid which is 






7.3 A USEFUL CASE FOR COMPARISON  
Spanish politics has received less attention from scholars than other European 
countries of comparable size and importance for reasons that were outlined in 
Chapter 1. This neglect is particularly the case in an area such as environmental 
politics. However, this study has shown that the Spanish case could be used to 
inform debate on a wide number of issues. Firstly, the study asks which aspects of 
the Spanish case might be expected to conform to chara teristics and tendencies 
common to ecologism elsewhere. Secondly, this study re-examines and re-evaluates 
some issues that continue to be crucial to Green parties and movements but have 
ceased to be of much interest to scholars. Finally, the Spanish case will be shown to 
have wider applicability in that it raises some general  issues which have been 
insufficiently studied by scholars. 
 
7.3.1 The Spanish Case: one amongst many  
This sub-section will use the Spanish case to examine –but also offer an alternative 
perspective on – three issues affecting all Green parties.  
  
Government coalitions  
In the last 20 years, a number of European Green parties have been part of a coalition 
government. The best known case is d e Grünen, who were in power from 1998-
2005, though there have been other instances of Green parties in government, 
amongst them the French (1997-2002), the Belgians (1999-2003), the Irish (2007-
2011) and the Finnish Greens (1995-2002; 2077-). However, as Müller-Rommel and 
Poguntke (2002) observed in their analysis of Green parties in national governments, 
the parties all had to face the powerlessness of being a minority partner in a coalition 
government, confronting the reality that there was a ‘big difference between being in 
government and being in power’ (2002: 134). As Rüdig has observed (2006), this 
position has usually led to loss of electoral support. Blühdorn concurs that the die 
Grünen became ‘paralyzed in government’ (2009:46), an argument that is fleshed out 






The case of ICV is interesting in this respect. Although operating at subnational 
level, this party is another instance of a Green party which was a minority partner in 
a governing coalition. It is perhaps too early to gau e whether the party will lose 
support because of its years in government, but early indications show that it has not 
suffered any such reverse. In the 2010 regional elections in Catalonia, when the 
Tripartit coalition lost resoundingly to the centre right nationalist CiU, the Tripartit 
party which was least punished by its terms in governm nt was ICV (see Table 7.1). 
In the circumstances, ICV perceived this small downturn in their support as 
validation of the party’s standing. 
 
Table 7.1 Tripartite Results in 2006 and 2010 Catal an Regional Elections  
 2006 2010 
 % of votes Seats % of votes Seats 
PSC (PSOE) 27.90 25 18.38 18 
ERC 14.03 21 7 10 
ICV 9.52 12 7.37 10 
  Source: Gencat 2011 
 
In the subsequent municipal elections of May 2011, ICV won more seats than in the 
2007 municipal elections and, for example, won another seat on Barcelona City 
Council – however, as ERC and PSC both lost a number of seats on the council, the 
latter is now controlled by a CiU and PP coalition. ICV has embarked on a new stage 
as, in the words of Ricard Gomà (number one on ICV list for Barcelona council), 
‘the only left-wing party with increased support’ (*La Vanguardia 23.05.2011).  
 
At first sight it appears surprising that, unlike other Green parties in coalition 
governments, ICV has not been punished by its voters for having reneged on their 
commitment to green issues (as outlined in Chapter 5). However, if their failure to 
meet ecological imperatives has not led to a sharp downturn in their fortunes, this 
suggests that most ICV voters are less worried about the party’s commitment to 
green issues and continue to see them as an embodiment of the left in Catalonia 






The second question addresses the ‘piecemeal conundrum’ which is frequently 
alluded to in this thesis: Carter, for example, states that many Greens have begun to 
accept the fact that liberal democracy is here to stay and therefore see ecologism as a 
potential force for reform, as long as it can get its strategies right (2001: 76). Carter 
further argues that this piecemeal strategy is perhaps better than none, a view which 
is reluctantly shared by Dobson (2000).  Bookchin, on the other hand, disagrees: 
 
Nor do piecemeal steps however well intended, even partially resolve 
problems that have reached a universal, global and c tastrophic character. If 
anything, partial `solutions' serve merely as cosmetics to conceal the deep 
seated nature of the ecological crisis. They thereby deflect public attention 
and theoretical insight from an adequate understanding of the depth and scope 
of the necessary changes. (Bookchin 1982: 3)  
 
Spanish parties and movements embraced the piecemeal approach by advocating the 
virtues, and the economic benefits, of ecological modernisation. Rather than 
presenting themselves as ‘the prophets of doom’ they wanted to demonstrate that 
there were win-win ecological solutions to many problems. As we have seen, their 
advocacy was successful and Spain now has one of the most advanced renewables 
sectors in Europe (second only to Germany) as well as a flourishing trade in organic 
agriculture.  
 
However, Bookchin’s point is a valid one: did their fforts advance the cause of PE 
or simply distract from the ecological crisis?  This d ssertation has wrestled with this 
question which it revisits below.  Bookchin’s position may be an extreme one but is 
worth reflecting on when analysing Green parties and movements. Earlier chapters 
noted that the piecemeal conundrum is closely linked to the reformist-radical (or 
ecologist-environmental) dichotomy. The tension is illustrated by the case of the 
Spanish PESM but has wider applicability.   
 
The tenets of  radical political ecology remain a utopia and the environmental reforms 
introduced in recent years amount to little more than the efforts of the comfortably-
off to live in cleaner, healthier surroundings. For example, there is evidence that 





increase in the number of environmental cases brought before the courts testify) 
whilst, at the same time, embracing green consumeris . However, Spanish PE 
provides a good opportunity to question the connection between the reformist 
approach (sustainable development, ecological modernisation and green 
consumerism) and radical ecologism. Although the first is considered the reformist 
version of the second, it may well be that the two have little in common. 
Interestingly, for example, fair trade products arep dominantly sold in Catalonia 
(along with five other economically prosperous Spanish regions) whereas the fair 
trade market in Andalucía is poor (Jiménez Herrero et al 2010: 208). This finding 
contradicts other data that suggest that Andalucía is as ‘ecologist’ as Catalonia (see 
Chapter 6). The reason for the high sale of fair trade products must therefore be 
attributed to Catalonia’s greater prosperity and confirms Alier’s contention that much 
western ecologism is in fact linked to a very ‘materialist’ (rather than postmaterialist) 
desire for the ‘good life’ (2004: 318). These ideas are further elaborated by Blühdorn 
who talks about the new rivals of the German Greens, LOHAS (Life of Health and 
Sustainability), an extremely influential consumer movement whose ‘supporters are 
contented if through their consumer behaviour at lest “their personal life becomes 
better” (Blühdorn 2009: 54).’ 
 
 One way of resolving the ‘piecemeal conundrum’, or the tension between radical 
and reformist ecologism, is to welcome the diversity offered by the various groups 
that make up the PESM. To this extent,  Bookchin’s objection could be regarded 
as miguided. One of the strengths of the PESM, from a (dis)organisational point 
of view, is that it is made up of so many different strands: whilst those who 
collaborate with government bodies necessarily becom  the movement’s 
‘compromisers’, the movement also includes radical thinkers and activists who 
ensure that the movement’s radical message continues to be disseminated – a 
good example of this is LVA’s 2011 local election manifesto which called for de-
growth (Ortega 2010: 3). 
It is frequently said, with some truth, that Spain prioritizes economic growth so that 
‘movements advocating post-industrial demands are not very likely to appeal to broad 





this assessment of Spain: Spanish PE has always been a countercultural, radical 
movement which only appeals to a minority of the population. In spite of its 
radicalism it has, however, acquired some legitimacy by proving that some of its 
proposals represent the right way forward.  
7.3.2 Re-visiting old debates 
This section looks at three themes which have been discussed for as long as Green 
parties have existed and have ceased to be of interest. However, the Spanish case 
demonstrates that these themes are still core Green th mes and merit being revisited 
in a new guise.  
 
The first theme is the old question as to whether Gr en parties are needed to promote 
PE. Given that ecology parties or movements are at best effective as pressure groups 
that can gradually bring about a shift in values and policies,  does it really matter 
whether that work is done by a party or a movement?  The Spanish case can shed an 
interesting light on this question precisely because the Spanish Greens are less 
important environmental actors than the PESM. And yet, even in these difficult 
circumstances, it is evident that – despite their controversial and contested position  
PE needs a party political presence in order to legitimise its message. As Jiménez 
states, ‘The political action of social movements should not be viewed as an 
alternative (for example, to political parties) but rather as complementary to 
institutional political action’ (2005: 150).  
 
Even though the Spanish Greens are disadvantaged by the Spanish party and 
electoral system, their continuing efforts to consolidate their presence demonstrate 
their conviction that there is a need for a political force that represents the positions 
and proposals of PE within the party system.  In particular, if PE is to assert its 
legitimacy as a political option, there is a perceived need for this option to be 
expressed through the ballot box.  
 
The second theme relates to Green parties and movements. This thesis has 
demonstrated that Green politics, or ecologism, is not the preserve of either the 





the broader PESM are working to bring about a politica  change in Spanish society. 
This is a truism but nevertheless one that bears repeating because most studies focus 
on either parties or movements thus creating a division which perhaps distorts the 
reality of the situation. This dissertation has revisited the issue by examining to what 
extent the traditional division of both groups has been overcome or rendered 
irrelevant.   
 
Another theme which was endlessly debated in the late 1980s and 1990s was whether 
the Greens should declare themselves to be ‘of the left’ or ‘neither right nor left’. 
This particular debate divided the French Greens for a number of years (in the early 
1990s) until the party decided unambiguously to declar  itself left-wing. In Spain, 
elements of this debate have existed since the early 1990s but have still not been 
resolved. I would argue that there are two main reasons for the lack of resolution to 
the problem. Firstly, IU – despite tendencies for sme of its federations to operate 
like a closed, communist party  is an immeasurably more open party than the 
French communist party, and contains an influential if minority ecosocialist tendency 
within its ranks. This tendency within IU, known asIU Abierta (Open IU), means 
that the party could be described as a left-libertarian party and, as such, has always 
shared the same constituency of voters as the Greens. Co sequently, the dividing line 
between the two parties is very unclear, as is the diff rence between the Red-Green 
and the Green option. Secondly, the autonomy of the different regional (and 
provincial) federations (both in the case of IU and the Spanish Greens) has meant 
that there are about 50 different nuanced ideological positions to choose from, so that 
deciding whether to opt for a Green or a Red-Green solution becomes logistically 
impossible.  
 
The Spanish case provides insights into this debate, qu stioning the assumption that 
choice between one of the two options is based primarily on ideology. The Spanish 
situation demonstrates that choices are only tangentially related to ideology. In fact, 
nearly all Spanish Greens are of the left and broadly gree with most of IU’s policies. 
The failure to find common ground is more likely due to strained interpersonal 





organisation. Ultimately, Spanish Greens opt for the Red-Green or Green-Green 
option for political or strategic – not ideological – reasons. ICV’s journey from 
communist party to ecosocialist party is an interesting one that, again, deserves more 
attention. Its position as a Green party is uncontested by the EGP or by 
commentators and there is incontrovertible evidence pointing to an ideological shift 
within the party. However, within Catalonia, the party is not seen as a Green option. 
Most ecologists do not vote for ICV, as we have seen, and its support comes from 
progressive, Catalanist left-wing voters.  
 
Despite this anomalous situation, individual elected ICV representatives work 
actively from within the institutions to promote PE. In short, in spite of Catalonia 
having a ‘Green’ party that is arguably not green at all, individual members within 
that party are using the party’s access to the institutions to make a difference. This is 
just another instance of the pragmatic piecemeal appro ch. 
 
7.3.3 Spanish ecologism: new themes uncovered 
ICV’s transformation from a communist to an ecosocialist party presents an 
interesting model of a Green party and yet has been given little attention by 
environmental politics scholars because it is a sub-state Green party. An exception 
to this is an article in the journal Environmental Politics by Riera and Rius (2009), 
which examines the 2006 Catalan regional elections and ICV’s performance in these 
elections. However, the article is written by party activists and simply describes, 
with no critical objectivity, the election campaign a d results. Apart from this one 
article, there is little mention in the scholarly literature of ICV as a Green party, 
though a number of articles have dealt with it as a co lition partner or a left-wing 
partner. By examining ICV’s role as a Green party, and as one that has made the 
journey from socialism to ecosocialism, this thesis ha  made an attempt to initiate 
study on the question.  
 
At the same time, of course, this thesis has emphasised the importance of sub-state 
politics, particularly in the regional elections. Although this is an area which has 
become the subject of much research in recent years (Wil on 2009; Hough & Verge 





politics in a few key countries such as Germany or Belgium. Elsewhere, the Greens 
as regional parties in decentralised countries remains under researched. This thesis 
has argued that the regional dimension of Green parties in Spain is crucial; 
highlighting its role has helped build a more holistic and accurate explanation for 
Green parties’ specific fortunes. At the same time, as Frankland et al. note (2008), 
situating the study of a party firmly in a specific context makes it far harder to 
answer questions about causality. 
 
The final subject area potentially of interest to all those interested in Green politics, 
is the role of the EGP. This study has illustrated how, for many years, leaders of the 
EGP (or its earlier manifestations) appear to have behaved in a rather high-handed 
way with the Spanish Greens. They have prevented some parties from joining the 
EGP and welcomed others (e.g. ICV) who ostensibly weren’t Green at all. Since the 
2009 EP elections, the EGP has been closely involved in a process which started 
with seminars, summer schools, the coming together of many Green parties and 
groups (the Hondarribia initiative), progressed to the setting up of Equo and will 
culminate in the founding of a new statewide Green party. EGP spokespersons – 
including Daniel Cohn-Bendit – have been at the ‘launches’ for Equo (in Madrid 
and also in a number of other regions), and have app ared on radio and television a 
number of times. Their function as a legitimising deus ex machina is, however, 
questionable. Instead of leaving the Spanish Greens to try to work through their own 
problems, the EGP is pushing for the solution which it considers most appropriate 
and has therefore alienated the Greens excluded from this process. The EGP thinks it 
is ‘helping’ the Spanish Greens, but this thesis ha questioned whether it is 
appropriate for this group to be playing such an active part in the foundation of a 
new Spanish Green party.  
 
The concluding section of this thesis examines the unfolding changes in the Spanish 
Greens and, in the light of the parties’ past history, assesses the likelihood that the 








7.4 THE SPANISH GREENS: AT A CROSSROADS  
 
In Madrid, on September 24th, 2010, a number of158 Green parties signed an 
agreement giving their support to the Equo159 project (LVA 2010). Since then, four 
further regional parties, as well as a few more local Green parties160 (Coordinadora 
Verde 2011b), have committed themselves to the project. On June 4th, 2011, they 
signed a manifesto to found a party that aims to work t wards a society ‘based on 
environmental sustainability, social equity and participatory politics’ (*Equo 2011).  
 
7.4.1 Equo’s strengths 
Although the Greens have reinvented themselves on a number of occasions, this new 
project has more potential to succeed because it has several factors weighing in its 
favour. Firstly, López de Uralde – who will probably head the list for Madrid in the 
2012 general election (although this must be decided by the party, when it is 
founded)  is a very well known and respected figure. He was president of 
Greenpeace Spain (2001-2010) and has commanded much edia attention since his 
arrest in Copenhagen at the Climate Change Summit161. Although renowned for his 
activism, he is measured and thoughtful when interviewed and has, to date, avoided 
alienating the right-wing media. In addition to López de Uralde, a number of well-
regarded people have also joined Equo. These include the former president of SEO 
(the Spanish Ornithological Society), three regional IU deputies and the head of 
environment of the communist trade union, CC OO. There are rumours that Baltazar 
Garzón, Spain’s most internationally renowned judge, may join the new party.  
 
                                                
158 Seven regional Green parties signed the agreement: LVA, and the Green parties of Asturias, 
Aragón, the Basque Country, the Canary Islands, Extremadura and Madrid. A further three sub-
regional or provincial parties also signed the agreem nt, namely the Majorcan, Minorcan and 
Segovian Greens.  
 
159 Equo is a foundation or think tank whose aim is to et up a new Spanish Green party in September 
or October, 2011 
160 These additional Green parties represent the following regions: Valencia, Navarre, La Rioja and 
Murcia.  
161 On December 18th, 2009, López de Uralde and another Greenpeace activist infiltrated the 
Copenhagen Summit royal gala dinner, attended by the Queen of Denmark, and unfurled two banners 
which said ‘Politicians Talk. Leaders Act’. They were imprisoned for 20 days, leading to numerous 





Additionally, the party is receiving considerable moral support from the EGP and 
ICV as well as some financial support from both (Público 07/01/2011). As a result of 
López de Uralde’s past record and Equo’s connections with the EGP the party has 
received considerable attention, with regular appearances in the media. For example, 
Uralde appeared twice in one day on national television in two discussion 
programmes, one of which interviewed him about Equo for 30 minutes (Al Rojo 
Vivo 24/06/2011)162.   
 
Equo’s programme is similar in its objectives to other Spanish Green-Green party 
programmes, though the party’s catch phrase – Ecology and Equity – foregrounds 
social issues more explicitly than the Greens. Their goals are no different from those 
set out by previous Spanish Green parties. They want to attract a wider constituency 
of voters: the social movements, ecologists, those who have become disenchanted 
with other parties and those who have been previously uninterested in voting. The 
party wants to position itself between PSOE and IU, is left-leaning but wants to 
‘transform the left’ (Al Rojo Vivo 24/06/2011) but create a strong, independent 
Green party, rather than relying on coalitions with IU or PSOE.  
 
Equo has seized the opportunity offered to them by the EGP, and further opened up 
by a number of favourable conjunctural factors: PSOE, for example, has seen its 
support drain away because of the way it has tackled th  economic crisis, whilst a 
weakened IU has been sharply divided into two camps for the last three years (a 
progressive camp and the PCE). Equo is hoping to found a party modelled on the 
successful French coalition, Europe Ecologie, which includes the left, ecologists and 
left-wing nationalists.  
 
The final factor in their favour is that, as a new party, they can already count on 
numerous longstanding networks of ecologists. They have also benefited from social 
network sites which have been effective in promoting Equo. For example, on 
October 31st, 2010, ICV had 1,000 followers on Twitter whilst Equo had 354. By 
                                                
162 The interview took place shortly after his first appearance in court in Copenhagen, which partly 






May 28th, 2011, ICV’s followers had dropped to 567 whereas Equo had 4468. this is 
a small indication of the foundation’s ability to generate interest.  
 
7.4.2 Equo’s challenges 
Although Equo is confidently predicting that it will tap into the nationwide support 
there is for their proposals, and is hoping to win at least five seats in the 2012 general 
election (epsocial 21/01/2011), the new party is likely to inherit many of the 
constraints that have held back the Greens, as outlined in this thesis. The first one is 
fragmentation and a perpetuation of intraparty conflict given that Equo’s arrival on 
the scene has not led to the demise of all other Gren parties.  
 
Nevertheless, CLV’s position as Spain’s official Green confederation has been 
undermined by the withdrawal of all but three parties n the confederation163. Over 
the last three years, a preservation instinct has terefore led CLV to see the 
advisability of forming regional or local alliances with other Green-Green parties that 
would otherwise compete directly with them. These alliances have worked well in a 
number of regions which have seen joint lists combining all or two of CLV, LVGV 
and Los Verdes Europeos.  
 
When the Hondarribia initiative started in 2008, some of the parties close to CLV 
took part in a number of seminars and negotiations but gradually withdrew for a 
number of reasons. Above all, there was considerabl resentment at the fact that the 
Hondarribia ‘re-founders’ of the Greens presented themselves as the first serious 
attempt to establish a Green party, implicitly dismissing the previous 25 year struggle 
to consolidate the Spanish Greens. They also alleged incompatibility, but most of all 
felt that they were being sidelined by an operation hat had been mounted by the EGP 
and was being masterminded within Spain by ICV (Interview with Catalan Green 
October 2010).  
 
ICV’s influence on Equo is evident. In the regional elections held in May 2011, the 
Greens presented two lists in Valencia. The first was a Green-Green coalition of 
                                                





three Green parties called Verds i Ecopacifistes (ViE, Greens and Ecopacifists). The 
other Red-Green party, Iniciativa del Poble Valencià  (IdPV, Initiative for Valencia, 
modelled on ICV) stood in a left-wing coalition, Compromís (Commitment). The 
first obtained 1.28% of the vote and no representation whereas Compromís won six 
seats, one of which went to a Green candidate.  
 
The head of the ViE list, Kerstin Lesage (previously a conciliatory Green who took 
part in the Hondarribia initiative) is now vehemently opposed to Equo because – 
contrary to an undertaking previously given by Equo – López de Uralde and his team 
campaigned in Valencia for IdPV and urged ecologists to vote tactically for the 
Compromís coalition. In sum: despite Equo’s declared objective to found an 
independent Green party, in the short term it has chosen to support a party that is 
predominantly not ‘Green’.  
 
From a different perspective, Equo has also alienated some ecologists because of a 
perceived reluctance to proclaim itself firmly of the left. Riechmann – an eminent 
Spanish ecologist who usually votes for IU but is an active member of Ecologistas en 
Acción (EA) – remains ‘unconvinced by Equo’, because he dosn’t ‘believe in an 
ecologism that transcends the right and the left’ (*Correspondence 2011). His 
reservations will most probably be shared by many EMO activists who consider 
themselves to be unambiguously ‘of the left’. The commitment of many PESM 
activists to the left was evident in the two day Encuentro de Ecología (The Ecology 
Assembly), organised by IU and which took place in Madrid (16-17/10/2011). The 
event was attended by over 150 ecologists, many of them representing EMOs but 
also a number of IU activists who are ecologists. There were no Equo 
representatives.  
 
There are further problems which may undermine Equo’s credibility. For example, 
the foundation has not specified how the new statewide party will be structured and 
yet the Greens’ previous history shows that this is a key question. Some of the parties 
that have joined up to the Equo project – for example IdPV and the Basque Greens  





The obvious solution would be a confederation. However, López de Uralde has made 
it very clear on numerous occasions that he is opposed to ‘nationalism’ (El País 
09/09/2010) and the EGP has also criticised – for example – ICV’s excessive 
nationalism. The negotiations to reach a settlement on his issue will be extremely 
delicate given sensitivity on this subject. Past history, and the personalities of a 
number of Equo activists, suggest that sensitivity and tact will not be to the fore and 
that a unanimous agreement on party structure and organisation is highly unlikely. 
 
The new project has further obstacles to face in its quest to create a single party. The 
anti-Equo Greens are determined to continue to present eparate lists and, in the 
latest bid to increase their chances of winning a se t, in the 2011 regional and 
municipal elections a few LVGV (and one CLV) parties presented joint lists with IU. 
This was the case in Madrid where there were two competing Green lists to choose 
from in the municipal and regional 2011 elections, Ecolo164 Verdes de Madrid and 
IU – Los Verdes. The new party has immediately succumbed to the same pattern as 
previous Green parties (unsurprisingly, given that e same leaders are in place).  
 
The existence of two competing Green lists led to both groups launching accusations 
against each other. Ecolo Verdes de Madrid protested that, once again, IU had 
‘stolen’ the Green logo in order to provide a cosmetic greenwash to their left-wing 
agenda. They registered a formal complaint with the Madrid electoral commission in 
an attempt to prevent IU-Los Verdes from presenting a list, but their complaint was 
not upheld (Insurgente 2011).  
 
 Ecolo Madrid’s personalist attack was disingenuous, nderhanded electoral 
campaigning because Ecolo was well aware of the fact th t IU had, indeed, signed an 
agreement with LVGV and Gira Madrid (the CLV party) o present a joint list. This 
particular style of attack was launched in all the ar as where Ecolo stood against a 
IU-Green list. It illustrates that the ‘new’ Green party is continuing to use the same 
                                                
164 A number of Green parties who had signed up to the Equo project registered their support for this 
new foundation by renaming their party or electoral alliance. In most cases, the name chosen was 
Ecolo (followed, perhaps, by a regional variant). It seems probable, therefore, that this will be the new





strategies as the ‘old’ Greens, whose proclivity for intraparty conflict has been one of 
the Spanish Greens’ barriers to establishing a credible party.  
 
7.4.3 ICV: an unknown factor? 
ICV has been involved in the initiative to found Equo from the outset and a number 
of its high-ranking officials are part of Equo’s executive. However, the party has 
made it very clear that it cannot make any decisions about joining Equo until ‘later 
on’, once the party has been launched.. There are two reasons for ICV’s hesitation: 
the party has always made it clear that it is only i terested in joining a political group 
that includes all the Greens165 so it is prudently keeping its options open. More 
importantly, if it were to join Equo, ICV would have to sever its links with IU and 
would therefore be unable to maintain its electoral alliance with EUiA, which has 
helped to boost support for ICV. Until now, the party’s strongest support for Equo 
has come from its vice president, Jordi Guillot, who declared that ICV ‘has 
similarities, sympathy and is in negotiation’ with Equo (Publico 21/02/2011).  
 
Meanwhile, ICV has been pursuing a parallel course which makes it clear that any 
move to join Equo will not take place in the short term. In June 2010, ICV was 
instrumental in setting up another umbrella group of alternative 
left/nationalist/ecosocialist parties called Espacio Plural (Plural Space). Although 
this group includes an Andalusian and a Canary Island  contingent, it is dominated 
by parties from the Catalan speaking regions (Valencia, the Balearic Islands, 
Catalonia). Espacio Plural has agreed on a strategy of ‘mutual support’ and ‘putting 
together a common programme’ whilst retaining their regional, differentiated 
identities and coalition strategies. ICV has stated that it will remain in coalition with 
EUiA (Público 26/05/2011).  
 
ICV’s decision to retain its alliance with IU means that, despite amicable relations 
between Equo and ICV, the status quo of the Spanish Greens remains the same, but 
with a few name changes. Many regions will continue to present two Green lists, and 
many Green parties will continue to form alliances with IU. ICV’s apparent decision 
                                                






to stand with EUiA probably precludes the party signin  up to Equo (although, given 
IU’s internal division, nothing is certain). Without ICV it is unlikely that Equo will 
be able to capitalise on the window of opportunity to create a new, statewide party.  
 
7.4.4 Much ado about nothing? 
The analysis of the previous sections raises doubts a out Equo’s chances of 
achieving its objective of becoming a new, statewid Green party able to win five or 
six seats in the 2012 general election. Similar statements have been made before by 
previous Green parties, all of whom were, in their time, equally enthusiastic and 
optimistic the right moment had come. In spite of the EGP’s support, the media 
attention, the change in the party names and the change of personnel in these parties, 
the situation looks set to continue as before, with the same barriers constraining the 
consolidation of the Greens.  
 
On a more positive note, the changes have renewed debate about the desirability or 
not of a Green party, and have led a number of regional parties to redefine their 
positions. The coalition process continues to gather pace in some regions where a 
number of ecosocialist coalitions are growing in strength. Given that the real 
protagonist of Spanish ecologism is the PESM, Spain’s problematic status in the eyes 
of the EGP is less of a concern than it might at firs appear to be.  
 
The dissertation concludes by reiterating that the relative weakness of the Spanish 
Greens is not an indication of a lack of interest in PE but is due to the troubled and 
complex history of the Spanish Greens. Furthermore, given that Green parties who 
achieve a modicum of power fail to deliver the transformation of society, the 
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• Josep Puig, then Barcelona City Sustainability Councillor and in IC-EV 
coalition.  Barcelona, July 1996 
 
• Santiago Vilanova, a founding member of AV who had t this point 
withdrawn from politics. Barcelona, July 1996  
 
• Gustau Barbat, a founding member of AV who had at this point left the 
Catalan Greens and had joined ERC. Barcelona, July 1996  
 
• Francisco Garrido, a founding member of LVA and later Green MP. 
Granada, April 1997 
 
• Francisco Garrido, then Green MP as part of a PSOE-CLV alliance. Cádiz, 
20/08/2005 
 
• Theo Oberhuber, the Coordinator of Ecologistas en Acción. Madrid, 11/11/ 
2005 
 
• Samuel Martín Sosa, then an activist employed by Ecologistas en Acción. 
Madrid, 11/11/ 2005 
 
• Ruiz Caparrós, in charge of the Ecologistas en Acción Andalucía 
headquarters. Seville, 13/08/2006 
• Montserrat Baras, political scientist at the Universitat Autònoma de 
Barcelona. Barcelona, 19/09/2007 
 
• Josep Puig, (second interview). Catalan Green politician, academic and 
renewable energy expert. Barcelona, 19/09/2007 
 
• Santiago Vilanova, (second interview) Catalan Green politician, journalist, 
Green entrepreneur. Girona, 21/09/07 
 
• Antoni García, leader of Els Verds- Esquerra Ecologista. Barcelona, 
17/09/20072007 
 
• Ernest Urtasun, responsible for international relations in ICV. Executive 
member of ICV. Barcelona, 18/09/2007 
 
• José Larios, LVA councillor for Cordoba from 1995-1999. Subsequently 
worked in Andalucían government ministry. Córdoba,16/08/2008 
 
• Joan Oms, one of the founders of the Catalan Greens, with a long and varied 






• Teresa Rubio, a Catalan Green who is regularly number 2 on various lists for 
Els Verds-Opciò Verda (CLV) Madrid,17/10/2010 
 
• Pedro Castillo, ecologist. Candidate in local elections. An enthusiastic 
supporter but not member of Ecologistas en Acción Andalucía. Once a 
member of LVA (in order to stand on party list), now with IULVCA (who 
did not require him to become a member in order to use their name to present 




I also attended two conferences bringing together many Spanish ecologists, in the 
course of which I had the opportunity to listen to many views, see the organisations 
from the inside, and ask many informal questions of different people. These two 
events were as follows: 
 
• Ecologistas en Acción Annual Conference held in Zarautz, Basque Country, 
8-10/10/2006 
• Encuentro de Ecología (The Ecology Assembly), Madrid, 16-17/10/2010.   
 
I have also corresponded or facebooked quite a number of people. I do not have a 
record of all of these, as sometimes I just wanted to verify a small point. Amongst 
the more useful e-mails were: 
 
• Ecologistes de Catalunya representative.  
 
• Angel Ramírez Troyano, a Green who has been in the Andalusian regional 
government and has been a councillor for Cordoba.  
 
• Jorge Riechmann, ecologist, academic and well-known exponent of 
ecosocialism and ecologism 
 
• Josep Lluís Freijo, the Catalan leader of AE-EV, a Green party that usually 
reaches an electoral alliance with CLV and LVGV 
 
• Esteban Cabal, leader of LVGV 
 
• Ramón Linaza, a long time Madrid Green party member. Was number 1 on 
the Ecolo list for the 2011 Madrid municipal elections 
 







• Florent Marcellesi, previously worked at the EGP headquarters and now very 




APPENDIX H :  A) Results of General Elections in Ca talonia: Green Parties  
Party 1986 1989 1993 1996 2000 2004 2008 
 % seats % seats % seats % seats % s % s % s 
Els Verds (Confederació 
Ecologista de Catalunya) 
⌫ 
--- --- --- --- 1.0 0       




 --- --   
Els Verds            0.2 0                
Els Verds – Grup Verd          0.44 0     
               
Els Verds Europeus – Alter. 
Ecologista de Catalunya   
--- --- --- --- --- --- 0.2 0  -- ---    
Els Verds – L’Alternativa 
Ecologista     
--- --- --- --- --- ---    -- 0.76 0 0.34 0 
               
Alternativa Verda –MEC  0.72 0 0.82 0           
Els Verds-Alternativa 
Verda  
        0.34 0 0.05 0 0.06 0 
      
         
Els Verds Ecologistes    0.77  0.32          
               
Partit Ecologista de 
Catalunya VERDE   
0.37 0 0.32  0.25  0.11 0  -- --- -- --- -- 
               
Iniciativa per Catalunya-
Verds  (IC-V)    
      7.64 2 3.54 1 5.84 2 4.93 1 
(Source: Based on Catalan Government Website’s Election Results)                       
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B)  Results of ‘Green’ Parties in Elections to the Regional Parliament in Catalonia 
 
Party 1988 1992 1995 1999 2003 2006 2010 
 % seats % seats % s % s % s % s % s 
Els Verds   0.3 0 --- --- --- --- -- -- -- --- --- ---  ---- 
Els Verds-Unió Verda  --- --- 0.53 0 --- --- -- -- -- --- --- --- -- --- 
Els Verds (Confederació 
Ecologista de Catalunya)   
--- --- --- --- ---- --- 0.73 0 -- -- --- --- -- -- 
               
Alternativa Ecologista de 
Catalunya   
--- --- --- --- 0.45 0    ---- --- --- -- --- 
Els Verds-l'Alternativa 
Ecologista   
--- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 0.56 0 --- --- 0 -- 
Els Verds - Ecologistes i 
Verds de Catalunya    
--- --- --- --- --- --- -- -- --- --- 0.6 0   
               
Alternativa Verda-Moviment 
Ecologista de Catalunya   
0.61 0 0.39 0 In IC ---    --- ---    
Els Verds-Alternativa Verda  
 
      0.26 0 0.06 0 0.11 0   
               
Els Verds Ecologistes    0.32 0 --- --- --- ---    --- --- --- -- --- 
Los Ecologistas    ---- --- 0.32 0 --- ---    --- --- --- -- --- 
               
Els Verds - Grup Verd                0.5  
VERDE  0.22 0 0.29 0 0.17 0    --- --- --- -- --- 
PACMA           0.46 --- 0.45 --- 
               
Iniciativa per Catalunya 
Verds -    ICV  
-- -- -- -- 9.71 11 2.51 3 7.28 9 9.52 12 7.39 10 
 (Source: Based on Catalan Government Website’s Election Results)                       
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C)  Results of ‘Green’ Parties in  Local Elections in Barcelona 
 
Party 1987 1991 1995 1999 2003 2007 2011 







Barcelona Verda (coalition)  
 
--- --- 0.75 0 --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 
Els Verds – Grupo Verde Europeo              1.01  
               
Alternativa Ecologista de Catalunya (AEC-
EVE)  
--- --- --- --- 0.37 0 --- --- --- --- ---- ---  -- 
Els Verds -  L’Alternativa Ecologista     --- --- --- --- --- --- 0.78 0 --- --- ---- ----   
Els Verds – Ecopacifistes de Catalunya  --- --- --- --- --- ---   --- --- 0.82 0   
               
Els Verds i Mès  ⌫           0.52 0   
ERC – Els Verds ⌫ ---- --- --- --- --- --- ---- ---- 6.52 3 (1 
G) 
---- ---- ---- ---- 
               
Alternativa Verda-MEC   0.43 0 --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 
Els Verds-Alternativa Verda   ---- --- --- --- ---- ----   ---- ---- 0.42 0   
               
Els Verds - Grup Verd   --- --- --- --- --- --- ---- --- 0.67 0 --- --- ---- --- 
               
 Lista Ecologista-Humanista    ---- --- 0.8 0 --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 
               
VERDE  0.34 0 --- --- --- --- --- --- 0.16 0 --- --- --- --- 
               
 ICV       7.61 3  9.54 4 6.34 2 9.35 4 10.39 5 
 (Source: Based on Catalan Government Website’s Election Results)                       
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 D)     Elections to European Parliament and votes c ast in Catalonia  
 
Party 1987 1989 1994 1999 2004 2009 
 % seats % seats %   seats % seats % seats 
Los Verdes   0.77 0   ---   ---    0 
Llista Verda     1.22 0         
             
Els Verds – Grup Verd       0.57  1.27 0 0.6 0 0.97 0 
             
Confederación de Los 
Verdes  
0.77 0           
Alternativa Verda – MEC     1.45 0         
Els Verds (Confederacio 
Ecologista de Catalunya)  
 
    0.99   0     
             
Els Verds Ecologistes     1.28 0         
             
Partit Ecologista de 
Catalunya VERDE  
  0.47 0        --- 
             
Iniciativa per Catalunya-
Verds  (IC-V)   
      5.43 0 7.17 1 6.1 1 
             
ERC – Els Verds ⌫       6.06 0 11.08 1 9.21  
ERC Entesa Nacionalista y 
Ecologista ⌫ 
    5.52   0     
(Source: Based on Catalan Government Website’s Election Results)     
 
Table E   A diachronic picture of the percentage of  the vote obtained by 
all the green parties from 1986-2008 in the General  (Gen), European 















Gen EP L Reg EP Gen L Reg Gen EP L Reg 
1.09 1.54 0.77 1.45 4.42 2.53 1.5
5 
1.53 1.57 1.56 0.37 0.45 
 














Gen EP L Reg Gen L Reg Gen EP Reg L Gen 
0.32 1.27 0.83 0.99 0.77 1.76 0.62 0.81 0.64 0.71 0.78 0.59 




Table F   Comparing the ideology of ICV and IU vote rs (or those who 
voted for these parties at the 2008 general electio n)*  
 
 ICV  %  IU  %  
Socialist 12.6 18.9 
Communist 17.1 25.7 
Progressive 16.9 NA 
Ecologist 20.1 10.2 
Nationalist 4.6 4.9 
Feminist 3.6 1.6 
Liberal  5.4 9.9 
Social democrat 2.7 6.8 
  Source: CIS Surveys 2829, Question 51: 2010; Survey 2857, Question 57: 2010 
 
* It is important to note that the ideological differences between IU and ICV are 
greater than those reflected in this table because the percentages for IU include, not 
only IU voters but also ICV voters. If these were removed from the IU data (and ICV 
accounts for 18.9% of  ‘IU’ voters) the results would doubtless differ even more.  
 
 
                                                
166 The figures provided in Table 5.8 refer to the percentage polled in Catalonia because the table is 
measuring the percentage of Catalans who chose the green option. However, it should be borne in mind 
that the electoral constituency for the European elections is the whole country.  
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APPENDIX B    
 
Table A      Results of General Elections in Andalu cía: Green Parties 
 
Party 1986 1989 1993 1996 2000 2004 2008 
 % seats % seats % seats % seats % seats % seats % seats 
Los Verdes de Andalucía 
(LVA) 
--- --- --- --- 0.58 0 With IU   With 
PSOE 
0.32 0 
Los Verdes-Lista Verde 
(LVA) 
  0.76 0           
               
Lista Alternativa Verde  0.07 0             
               
Los Ecologistas      0.24 0         
Los Verdes Ecologistas    0.46            
               
VERDE   0.05 0 0.04            
               
IULV-CA         13.58 6 7.8 3 6.4 0 5.11 0 








Table B:   Results of Green Parties in Elections to  the Regional Parliament in Andalucía 
 
Party 1986 1990 1994 1996 2000 2004 2008 
 % seats % seats % seats % seats % seats % seats % seats 
Los Verdes      --- --- --- --- --- --- -- --- 0.58 0 
Verdes de Andalucía    0.51            
               
Los Verdes Ecologistas       0.46  --- --- --- --- --- --- -- --- --- --- 
               
IU-CA 17.91 19 12.73 11           








6 7.13 6 
NIVA           -- -- 0.1
1 
0 --- --- 
(Source: Based on the Valencian Government’s Online Archive of lection results  2009)  
 
NIVA = Nueva Izquierda Verde Andaluza 




APPENDIX C: ELECTION RESULTS FOR THE SPANISH GREENS 1984-1993 
 
1. Green Votes cast in Spain in  European Parliamen t Elections 1987 
and 1989   
 
For the sake of simplicity, generic names are given to each faction to distinguish it 
from other factions. In fact, a party such as Los Verdes, for example, sometimes 
presented itself under a different name. These different names are listed in the 
footnotes 
 
Party 1987 1989 
 % % 
Los Verdes167  0.56 1.04 
The Catalan Greens168  
 
0.34 0.3 
Los Verdes Ecologistas  1.02 
VERDE  0.37 
Total Green vote 0.9 2.73 
  (Source: MIR Website 2010)  
 
2. The Greens’ statewide general elections results for 1986, 1989 and 
1993 
  
 1986 1989 1993 
 Votes % Votes % Votes % 
Los Verdes 31,909 .16 157,103 0.77 185,940 0.79 
Alternativa 
Verda 
29,567 .15 25,978 0.13 With Los Verdes 
Los Verdes 
Ecologistas 
---- --- 136,335 0.67 68,851 0.29 
VERDE 28,318 .14 21,235 0.1 --- --- 
2 Other Green 
regional parties 
-- -- -- -- 13,990 0.07 
Aggregated 
Green vote 
89,794 .45 342,950 1.58 268,781 1.15 
  (Source: The MIR Website 2010)  
 
                                                
167 Los Verdes (87) ; Lista Verde (89), coalition of LV + others 
168 Confederación de Los Verdes (87); Alternativa Verda -  Movimento Ecologista de Catalunya  (89); 
Els Verds (Confederacio Ecologista de Catalunya) (1994) 
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3. The Green vote in the 1989 general election in M adrid 
 
 Votes % 
Los Verdes 30,495 1.14 
Los Verdes Ecologistas 23,996 0.89 
VERDE 4,963 0.18 
Total Green 59,454 2.21 




APPENDIX D: AN EXTRACT FROM CHA ’S OPENING STATUTE 
 
The following opening Statute of CHA, an Aragonese left-wing ‘nationalist’ party 
founded in 1986 (like Izquierda Unida, in the aftermath of the NATO vote) 
demonstrates how CHA’s discourse overlaps with that of the Greens.   
 
CHA is a group of men and women who believe in the values of democratic 
socialism, and who are part of a historic struggle in the quest for freedom, 
democracy, tolerance, plurality, peace, dignity, solidarity and equality 
between individuals and different peoples. We reject any dogmatism and 
draw upon a number of movements - the socialist move ent, movements for 
social and national emancipation, ecopacifist, feminist and humanist 
movements – to put together the basic components which will allow us to 
define our strategies and programmes.  (CHUNTA, no date specified).  
 
Although CHA failed to gain representation in the regional parliament in 1991 
(obtaining 3.9% of the votes) it obtained a number of seats in the local elections of 
the same year and subsequently gained momentum in the succeeding years.  The 
ascendancy of left-wing nationalist parties further increased competition for the 
Greens in other regions such as the Basque Country, Catalonia, the Balearics, 
Navarre and Galicia.   
 
Source: CHA website – no date.  
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APPENDIX E  - ELECTION RESULTS FOR THE SPANISH GREENS 1994-
2010 
 
1. ‘Green’ vote in General elections 1993-2008: Bre akdown showing 
fragmentation of vote and of Green parties  
 Votes 
total 




Includes all parties with a Green or ecology lable (includes 
‘impostors’).   
1996 93,310 
0.4% 
Includes Green parties who presented separate lists 
including three LV factions, one impostor party and a 
short-lived ‘red-Green’ party.  
The following are not included in the total:  
• ICV, the ecosocialist coalition which absorbed 
most Catalan Greens 
• LVA, the Andalusian Greens,  who had joined the 




Includes 4 state-wide and one Catalan Green party. LV 
obtained about half of this vote, but did not present 
candidates in a number of regions, because of PSOE pact. 
Not included:  
• votes for the Catalan IC-V coalition (which won a 
seat);  





Includes 9 Green parties, some regional but 5 statewide. 
LV did not stand statewide as the 2000 agreement with
PSOE was strengthened. Despite this, a number of 
regional LV parties pulled out of the confederation a d 
stood in their region. 
Not included:  
• votes for ICV (which won 2 seats)  
• the Balearic red-Green coalition;   
2008 98, 679 
 
0.45% 
Breakdown of LV pact with PSOE.   
The majority of the Green votes polled were divided 
between three state-wide formations: the LV 
Confederation, Los Verdes Europeos and Los Verdes-
Grupo Verde. The designated ‘official’ Green party, the 
Confederation – recognised by the EFGP – polled only 
41.531.  
Pacma obtained 44,795 votes  
Vote registered does not include red-Green parties or 
alliances.  
  (Source: Data based on MIR Website 2009) 
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2. ICV’s Results in the General Elections 1996-2008  
(Results are for Catalonia, the only place where ICV presents a list) 
 
Year No. of votes Seats 
1996 296,985 2 
2000 119,290 1 
2004 234,790 2 ( one elected MP, Joan Herrera, is an 
ecologist) 
2008 183,338 1 (Joan Herrera is elected) 
  (Source: MIR Website 2010) 
 
 
3. European Parliament election results 1994-2009: Spanish Green  
party results 
 
Year Party % Green 
MEP 
1994 Los Verdes - Grupo Verde 0.59  
 Els Verds 0.23  
 Total Green vote for ‘94 0.82  
1999 Los Verdes – Izquierdas de los 
Pueblos 
1.42  
 Los Verdes - Grupo Verde 0.66  
 Total Green vote for ‘99 2.08  
2004 Los Verdes - Grupo Verde 0.44  
 ICV (with Izquierda Unida) --- 1169 
 Nueva Izquierda Verde (New Green 
Left) 
0.04%  
 Los Verdes (in PSOE  alliance)  ---- 1 
2009 Europa de los Pueblos – Verdes 
(Europe of the People – Greens)  
2.49% 1/10th 
 ICV (with Izquierda Unida) 3.71% 1170 
 Los Verdes - Grupo Verde Europeo 0.56  
 Partido antitaurino contra el maltrato 
animal  
0.26  
 Por un mundo más justo 0.15  
 (Source: MIR Website 2010)  
 
 
                                                
169  IU-ICV obtained 2 MEPs. Only 1 is listed here – the ICV ecologist Raul Romeva  
170  IU-ICV obtained 2 MEPs. Only 1 is listed here – the ICV ecologist Raul Romeva 
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4. Number of  Green Party Lists per  Province for M arch 2008  
General Election 
 
Number of Green lists per electoral district (i.e. per province)
0 list in 1 province 
1 list in 22 provinces 
2 lists in 24 provinces 
3 lists in 5 provinces 
   (Source: MIR Website 2010)  
 
 











Los Verdes de 










Animal      
Pact against 
bullfighting and 
cruelty to animals 
0.32  
 
Izquierda Unida - 
Bloque por Asturies – 
Los Verdes de 
Asturies    
United Left- Asturian 
Bloc – The Asturian 
Greens 
10.3 4 (0 
Green) 
 
-Los Verdes Grupo 
Verde)  








Animal      
Pact against 
bullfighting and 
cruelty to animals 
0.31 0 
 
PSM-IV-EXM A Majorcan left-wing 
coalition  
8.61     4 (1 
Green) 
 
Eivissa pel Canvi     Ibiza for Change  





Animal      
Pact against 
bullfighting and 



















Berdeak Los Verdes     Greens 0.54 0 
 
Els Verds - Ecologistes i 
Verds de Catalunya (EV-





0.6%  0  
 
P.Antitaurí contra 
Maltractament Animal      
Pact against 
bullfighting and 
cruelty to animals 
0.45 0 








ICV - Esquerra.Unida i 
Alternativa  
(ICV – United and 
Alternative Left)  
7.37 10 (4 
Green) 
 
Los Verdes de Canarias   The Canary 
Islands Greens  





Maltractament Animal      
Pact against 
bullfighting and 





IU-IA Izquierda Social 
y Ecologista  
The Social and 
Ecologist Left  
3.31 0 
 
Ecolo Verdes      Ecolo Greens 0.14 0 
 
Los Verdes – Grupo 
Verde 











Maltractament Animal      
Pact against 
bullfighting and 
cruelty to animals 
0.35 0 
 
Los Verdes de Salamanca The Salamanca 
Greens 
 
0.19  0 
 
Los Verdes – Grupo 
Verde 








Maltractament Animal      
Pact against 
bullfighting and 



































Ecolo-Verdes       1.23 0 
 
Los Verdes(LV, LVCM y 
LV-GV)     
Greens (a coalition 









Maltractament Animal      
Pact against 
bullfighting and 
cruelty to animals 
0.53 0 
 
Izquierda Unida + Los 
Verdes     
United Left + 
Greens 





LV-Ecolo  1.18 0 
 
Ecolo –Verdes de 
Navarra 





IU and LVGV 5.7 3 
 
Verds i Ecopacifistes 
(coalition of 3 Green 





Iniciativa del Poble 
Valencià y Els Verds in 
Coalició Compromís 
‘Valencia 
Initiative and the 
Greens’ in a wider 
left Coalition  






Maltractament Animal      
Pact against 
bullfighting and 
cruelty to animals 
0.37 0 





6. Votes polled by Green parties in the 2008 genera l election 
 
 


















7. Statewide General Election Results for Izquierda  Unida 
 
Year % Total Seats 
1986 4.63 7 
1989 9.07 17 
1993 9.55 18 
1996 10.54 21 
2000 5.45 8 
2004 4.96 5 
2008 3.77 2 
 (Source: MIR website 2008) 
 
 
Parties Total votes 
Los Verdes (Confederation)  49,355 
Los Verdes – Grupo Verde (LVGV)  41,119 
Los Verdes Europeos (LVE) 20,419  
All parties including a Green 
component in their name 
621,981 
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APPENDIX  F  - TEXTS ACCOMPANYING CHAPTER 4 
 
1.  Extract from an article in El Pais on political  ecology in Spain  
  ( Source: *Pastor & López de Uralde in El País, 01/04/93)  
 
2. Key Points in 1993 Green Manifesto Published Before  General 
Election  
 
 Source: El País 03/06/1993) 
Although Spain’s PESM started out in the early 1970s and, since then, has been 
extraordinarily active and diversified,  the fact is that its electoral impact as a political party 
has been rather poor until now.  What are the reasons for this apparently contradictory state of 
affairs? Firstly, there’s no doubt that the vast majority of PESM leaders and members have 
never been in favour of giving up their daily struggle in order to become involved in setting 
up green parties. Moreover, the political situation during the transition made it advisable for 
ecologists to keep out of the electoral process in order not to divide the left even further, 
particularly given that a high percentage of ecologists still pinned their hopes on the left at the 
end of the 70s and in the early 80s.   
 
As these hopes began to fade, the appearance on the scene of a whole raft of divided green 
parties, sometimes led by opportunists and sometimes parties of a rather dubious green 
pedigree,  increased the voters’ confusion and contributed to splitting the green vote and the 
progressive vote. The issue of the historic ‘nations’ and the reluctance of the nationalist-
ecologist parties to join a ‘state-wide’ party has done nothing to make matters easier. 
Fortunately, the recent conference for unification and the creation of a confederation of green 
parties seem to have brought an end to this divisive period.  Moreover, unlike other countries 
where the Greens are the only progressive alterna ive to social democracy, in Spain it is 
possible that some of the potential green vote willbe shared between United left and the 
progressive nationalist parties, as the latter all tend to incorporate an environmental angle to 
many of their ideas.  
1. Close all nuclear power plants in 10 years 
2. Draw up new Water Plan, prioritising water-saving measures, recycling 
etc 
3. Reduce greenhouse gas emissions 
4. Support rail travel 
5. Introduce a solidarity pact to reduce working week and share out jobs.  
6. Apply an ecotax on goods with environmental impact; use income to 
create environmental jobs.  
7. Free those in prison for refusing to do military service; reform laws on 
conscientious objection, work towards doing away with military service. 
8. Reform electoral laws and the financing of parties.  
9. Introduce a law against sexual discrimination 
10. Make abortion law more liberal 
11. Scrap anti immigration law. 
12. Set aside 0.7% of GDP for Third World development.  
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New Green- Green Left federation launched in Madrid  
Over 600 high-spirited delegates … the most serious attempt ever to put 
Green politics on the map in nation-wide Spanish politics on May 19.  
Federación Los Verdes-Izquierda Verde (Greens-Green left)  
Greens and regional Green-left parties like Iniciativa per Catalunya-Verds, 
Izquierda Democrática Cántabra and Izquierda Madrileña, among 
others*, have come together to put forward a viable Gr en political option 
differentiated from the Socialist Party and the neo-communist Izquierda 
Unida. The new Green federation is already represented by hundreds of 
local council members, over a dozen regional parliamentarians and one 
member of the national parliament.  
This new broad-based Green-left federation, in which the Confederación 
de Los Verdes plays a key role, is by far the most serious, feasible and 
innovative political proposal put forward by the Spanish Greens. Until now 
the regional and linguistic divisions of Spanish politics, added to the 
generally difficult context for Green Parties in southern Europe, have 
meant fairly hard times for Los Verdes. The consolidation and the 
emergence of the new Green Federation in the coming onths may well 
mean a very positive turn of the tide.  
This is an alliance of the Greens with “renovated left” parties that clearly 
identify with the European Greens. With time we hope this federation will 
become a clear reference point for all those seeking a serious and possible 
Green option that is badly needed on the Spanish political scene.  
David Hammerstein, International spokesperson for Ls Verdes 
* The Federation also included the Valencian party Esquerra Verda-Esquerda 
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4. Letter from Monica Frassoni, EGP Co-Spokeperson  to Joan Oms, 
spokesperson of CLV  
 
Dear Joan Oms,  
 
As you know, a notice has gone out announcing that two Confederal Councils are to take 
place this coming Saturday, at the same time but in different places. The meetings have 
been set up by two different lots of people. I’m sure you will agree with me that this situation 
signals an important problem with the day to day operation of the Confederation as well as 
going against the EGP’s Road Map for Spain which we agreed upon in March when we met 
in Barcelona.  
Having analized the situation, it seems to me that your actions do not demonstrate a 
constructive wish to enable the process agreed upon with the EGP: it was only after a legal 
representative announced that there would be a Council meeting in Madrid – given your 
reluctance to hold this meeting, as established in the Statutes and in previous agreements – 
that the Secretary of the organisation set up an alternative meeting in Barcelona on the 
same day and at the same hour.    
 
This decision has taken place in a context in which you have refused, for reasons that we 
don’t understand at all, to take part in organising this summer’s ‘Green University’ weekend 
in Navarre. 
 
Most of the parties within the Confederation have made it clear that they will be going to the 
Madrid meeting to set up a process of re-establishing the Confederation, by naming a 
representative management body. We believe the Madrid meeting could provide the right 
framework to move forward as far as establishing a new understanding and regeneration of 
the Confederation as a political body in Spain.  
 
This is why the EGP is requesting that you immediately and irrevocably call off the Barcelona 
Council meeting, and instead take part in the Madrid meeting set up for Saturday 12th June. 
Furthermore, we would like to make it clear that if you do not follow the EGP’s proposed 
course of action then we will understand that you are cutting yourself off from the road map 
agreements we agreed upon. I would therefore urge you to reconsider and sign up to the 
convergency process.  
  
I would also like to stress that, if you decide not to respond to this call for unity and for 
working together – something which should be a priority for you as Spokesperson for the 
Confederation, then the EGP is going to propose that, to avoid any legal comeback, the 
Madrid meeting is an informal preparatory meeting to set up an extraordinary council.   
 
However, I would like to specify that any legal recourse – with a view to obtain or hold on to 
a possible legal control of the party – will be seen by the EGP as a backward step that is 
highly counterproductive to the green project in Spain as it would only prolong a process 
which has up till now been in its death throes.  
  
The EGP can only see one political solution, an agreement that would be fair to everyone 
concerned, including those who are presently outside the Confederation,  and that would 
establish a solid and democratic foundation for a common project which prioritises the aim of 
defending political ecology in Spain, leaving all personal ambitions to one side.  
 




Source: Coordinadora de los Verdes: june, 2010 
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APPENDIX G:  
1. The Ten Ideological Principles of Ecologistas en  Acción  
(Source: EA 2005) 
 
1. The well-being and diversity of our environment is so important that it 
should condition our ideas about economic development. We must 
prioritise human development and the equitative satisfaction of our needs  
 
2. We are opposed to the dominant economic model of constant 
development and the notion that growth can be limitless. We are therefore 
opposed to capitalism, productivism and consumerism. 
 
3. We must put in place adequate policies to preserve our natural 
environment (land and species). We are, however, opposed to the 
conservation of isolated areas. All of our natural environment needs to be 
part of a planning policy which favours sustainable development which 
does not further undermine the survival of  this natural environment.  
 
4. We call for clean industries which do not pollute seas, air, land, food, 
and therefore endanger human health - ‘end of pipe’ technology is 
inadequate.  
 
5.- We are wholly opposed to nuclear power – as a means of generating 
electricity or as a weapon. We favour the development of alternative 
energies, particularly those produced locally 
 
6.- Animals have rights and we have responsibilities towards them.  
 
7.- The present economic world order is unacceptable: the huge disparity 
between the developed countries and the Third world countries is 
unacceptable as is our economic colonisation and exploitation of these 
countries.  We are in favour of the international  
free movement of people.  
 
8.  Information and knowledge should be free: we are against the patenting 
of genetic information and the development and use of genetically modified 
crops.  
  
9. We believe in a participatory democracy which is as decentralised as 
possible. Within this democracy information should be accessible to all. We 
are against the manifpulation of the media by government and the big 




Article which appeared in El Mundo  (12/01/2004) explaining the 
controversy surrounding the greens’ decision to ent er into an electoral 
alliance with PSOE  
 
 
Most green parties reject an alliance which would see them standing on the same 
ticket as  PSOE at the next elections. 
 
Most of the regional green parties will stand alone at the general election on March 14th rather 
than as part of PSOE, despite the Green Confederal Executive Committee’s decision last Saturday 
to sign a pre-electoral pact with the socialists. Josep Lluís Freijo,  spokesperson for Els Verds–
L’Alternativa Ecologista (a Catalan green party called the Greens-the Environmental Alternative) 
and one of the founders of the green political movement in 1983 … last night sent the executives 
of PSOE, IU and ICV a communiqué in which he stated that ‘the Greens’ putative statewide pacts 
with the socialists fly in the face of reality’.  
 
Freijo made it clear that the Greens’ Confederal Committee is dominated in an ‘anti-democratic 
way’ by the Andalusian branch of the party, which was responsible for the agreement with the 
socialists. According to Freijo, only the Andalusian and the Valencian greens voted in favour of an 
agreement with the socialists while the other green parties in the confederation either abstained, 
voted against, didn’t attend the meeting or else couldn’t vote for procedural reasons’.  
 
Present at the meeting were representatives from Andalucía, Valencia, Castille and Leon, the 
Balearic Islands, Madrid, La Rioja, the Canary Islands and Extremadura, as the spokesperson for 
the committee was able to confirm.  Freijo pointed out that the greens in Extremadura, Murcia, 
the Canary Islands, Catalonia and Madrid will stand alone at the election whilst in Aragón the 
greens will either stand alone or forge an alliance with IU. Asturias and La Rioja will decide on 
their course of action next Saturday at a regional party conference whilst the Balearic Islands 
have already agreed to enter into a multiparty coalition.  
Use of the Green label.  
In his statement to PSOE, IU and ICV, Freijo added: ‘It must be made clear that most of the key 
founding members of the Greens are not going to allow anyone to use the Green name in order 
to feather their own nest’.    
‘If these kind of set-ups are approved, then all of us – NGOs, trade unions, social movements, 
the media and society in general - are going to expose parties who sign up to such a scam’.   
PSOE highlights the importance of the agreement reached 
The spokesperson for PSOE, Carme Chacón, highlighted ‘the electoral importance of the 
agreement reached with the Greens’, arguing that the elections are going to be ‘very  tough’ and 
that in some districts you can win or lose a seat by just a few votes. She also stated that different 
green parties usually get about 200,000 votes in general elections. 
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APPENDIX I  
 
The Daimiel Proposal – A Declaration of Ecological Principles      
 
 Source: A summary translation of the original Manifesto. Adapted  from Cabal 
(1996: 131) 
 
The Federation of the Spanish Ecology Movement   1978 
 
 
1. We cannot dominate nature, or save just a few isolated spots. We must 
collaborate with nature 
2. Progress implies greater solidarity and improved living conditions. We are 
opposed to economic growth per se and to the progress of the dominant 
social classes 
3. We are therefore in favour of people’s enjoyment of  life and each other in 
a way that is anticonsumerist. We don’t want more material things, but a 
better relationship between people 
4. Work is necessary but should be a freely entered into activity in which 
there is no explotation.  
5. We are anti capitalist production, opposed to bureacratic socialism and 
the accumulation of  power. 
6. We are against nuclear power and nuclear weapons 
7. We are in favour of  the regions enjoying more devolved power – however 
that is organised – and generally favour a plural approach to life and self 
regulation in the workplace.  
8. WE are opposed to our patriarchal and phallocratic society’s  oppression 
or exlusion of anyone who isn’t a so-called standard male.  
9. We want to manifest our solidarity to all of the earth’s inhabitants and 
particularly to the Third World. We deplore the fact that these countries’ 
natural resources are exploited and that our governm nts exploit these 
countries by setting up their filthiest industries n them. 
10. We are opposed to the territorial imbalance which exists between the 
different regions of Spain and deplore the desertifica on, poverty and 
mass emigration from some of these areas. We call on the imbalances 
between the different nationalities and regions within Spain to be 
corrected.   
11. We call on the right to have free information and opp se the interference 
of capitalist interests in the media 
12. Popular debate must be the basic tool to transform society.  
 
The following points still need to be covered: Revoluti n and ecology, whether 
we should be anthropocentric or not as regards nature, o r relationship with 
political parties, non-violence, the army, imperialism, multinationals, encouraging 
demographic growth or otherwise.  
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APPENDIX J 
Two contrasting texts demonstrating the gap between theAndalusian 
government’s EM and SD discourse and EA’s objections t  the 
hollowness of this discourse.  
 
a) THE ANDALUSIAN WATER ACCORD   
INTRODUCTION TO THE  WATER BILL AND ACCORD 
(Published on the Andalusian Government Website) 
This bill is the outcome of a process of dialogue and concensus which was 
embarked upon in June 2008 by all stakeholders in order to reach an agreement 
about Andalusia’s long-term strategic water policy. The Andalusian Water Accord, 
which was unanimously passed by the Andalusian Water Council at its meeting on 
December 5th (the only abstention came from Ecologistas en Acción) was officially 
approved by the President of the Andalusian Governmnt in February 2009.  
The Andalusian Water Accord represented a broad social consensus about a new 
water culture that was based on sustainability, guarantees, responsability and 
solidarity. Its starting premise is that water is considered to be an indispensable and 
irreplaceable common good and a finite and very vulnerable resource that must be 
conserved and protected.  
The process of dialogue initiated by the Accord continued during the process of 
disseminating information to the public during the drafting of the law. This resulted 
in 1,300 queries or objections being raised on the matter, more than 80% of which 











b) WE DID NOT SIGN THE ANDALUSIAN WATER ACCORD 
Reasons why EAA  did not sign the Andalusian Water Agreement on February 3rd, 
2009 (a prelude to a new Water Law being introduced in the region).  
1. There is no control over water demand 
2. Town planning regulations are still allowed to favour unsustainable levels of 
growth and therefore an increase in water consumption, thereby contravening 
the recommendations set by Agenda 21 and  Andalucia’s Spatial Plan.  
3. Permission continues to be given for golf clubs to irrigate the land with water 
from aquifers and rivers.  
4. Illegal water extraction is still not controlled.  
5. There are no specific measures to control water demands in new housing 
developments, particular in areas where there is very little water.  
6. any tax on water is limited to urban users. 





APPENDIX K:  Extracts from a document approved at the 2009 
Conference of the Partido Andalucista.   
 
CHANGING TIMES , NEW IDEAS; THE RENEWAL OF ANDALUSIAN 
NATIONALISM AS AN ANSWER TO THE PROBLEMS OF ANDALUC IA IN THE  
21ST CENTURY  
 
 
AN IDEOLOGICAL DEFINITION  
 
Andalusian nationalism is a renewed, progressive and ecologist force. 
 
1. The PA is a revitalised nationalist party, adapted to present circumstances 
which are determined by globalisation. It is fighting to obtain the greatest 
power possible for the people of Andalucia and it defends democracy and 
cooperative federalism as basic principles to achieve the territorial 
organisation of Spain, Europe and the rest of the world. 
2. We defend the historic values of the democratic and progressive left: 
freedom, equality and personal and collective autonomy.  
3. We want to bring solutions and hope to 21st century Andalucia, as a nation 
within a global context. We want to achieve an economic activity that ensures 
the greatest wellbeing to the people of Andalucia and we want to ensure that 
this is compatible with looking after our natural resources so that progress is 




We include the key principles of political ecology 
 
The present patterns of production, distribution and consumption, inherited from a 
model of industrialisation with a very high environmental impact, are the clearest 
proof of the inviability of the present globalised capitalist system which ignores the 
limits of the planet’s biophysical system. Global warming and climate change, the 
fact that our energy model is outdated, the lack of basic foods and the destruction of 
our resources are not only endangering the future of humanity  but are a hidden 
factor in the system’s present state of crisis.  
 
The kind of development that has been dominant in Andalucia since the 1960s has not 
just shown a lack of responsibility but has constituted an unprecedented attack on our 
land, one that that has sometimes caused irreversibl  or very long-term harm. Political 
practice, although it has been disguised in the last few years in high-flung rhetoric about 
sustainability, has produced an environmental disaster in our region. It has spoilt our 
shores, has destroyed the heart of our cities, has threatened the survival of our 
countryside, has destroyed much of our biodiversity and has contributed to the process of 




The key to changing this model consists in internalising environmental costs within the 
economy.  Physical capital is a productive factor that needs to be assessed and replaced 
like any other assets. Our prices should give the real environmental costs. Wasting our 
natural resources and destabilising the world’s climate cannot continue to be done at no 
cost. We must prepare a transition to another model f production and consumption that 
respects nature’s limits. We must move towards another model of progress which 
ensures the present and future of Andalucia, and thus contributes to our world and to the 
planet’s sustainability. We must opt for a model of progress that guarantees the 
conservation of our defining cultural and natural heritage so that it can be enjoyed and 
valued by forthcoming generation, and a quality of life that allows the people of 
Andalucia to have a quality of life which ensures them the greatest possible happiness 
and wellbeing.   
 
 
(26/05/09   CAMBIO DE ÉPOCA, NUEVAS IDEAS: 
LA RENOVACIÓN DEL ANDALUCISMO COMO RESPUESTA A LOS 
PROBLEMAS DE ANDALUCÍA EN EL SIGLO XXI.  
(Definición ideológica y estratégica del Partido Andalucista.)  





Appendix L  
          
 
Data taken from a survey in which Andalusians were asked to 
categorise themselves as ecological or not, on a sc ale from 1-10. This 
data focuses on those who defined themselves as 10,  or very 
‘ecological’.   
 
 Total % Total number   
Andalusians who classed themselves as 
‘very ecological’  
22.3 1,406,497 
  
        
Age of this group       
18 - 24  13.5 100,564  
 25 - 44  23.6 629,516   
45 - 64  27.3 480,763   
Over 65  17.3 195,655   
        
Work Status       
Employed 24.4 741,416   
Unemployed  24.6 120,608 
Of working age, not seeking employment 19.6 544,473   
        
Occupation (categorised according to Spanish 
system)       
Group A  (professionals, managers) 25.2 171,512   
Group B (white-collar workers) 25.8 348,847   
Group C (blue-collar workers)  24.2 159,110   
        
Number of persons in the home       
1 person 19.1 79,382  
2 people  18.7 257,944   
3 people 21.8 331,873   
4 people 25.2 472,819   
5 or more people 23.6 264,479   
        
Location       
Capital city of a province 25.4 495,051   
Towns with over 10,000 inhabitants 20.3 565,278   
Municipality with less than 10,000 inhabitants 22.0 346,168   
        
Education        
Illiterate/No education/primary education only 18.5 381,299   
Secondary school until 14 24.4 441,486   
Secondary school until 18 22.0 214,548   
Further education 23.9 87,843  
University education 26.1 281,321   
        
 
Source: Adapted and translated from IEA 2008: 4.1 
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APPENDIX M:  A summary of the CIS 2680 Survey (2007) on Spaniard s’ 
attitudes to the environment  
 
How informed are you on environmental 
matters?     
Fairly well 
informed  37.1% 
Poorly informed  
50.9% 
(You are well informed) Where do you get 
your information from? 
Media  82.3% EMOs 10.7% 





What are the two worst environmental 




Who is most responsible for tackling 




Do you always use low-watt lightbulbs? Yes 33.9% Sometimes 
29.4% 
Do you regularly get around on foot or by 
bike?  
Yes 47% Sometimes 
27.4% 
Do you take part in activities to protect the 
environment (cleaning up, tree planting 
etc) 
Yes 3.2% Sometimes 
12.2% 
Do you try to save water? Yes 49.4% Sometimes 
24.2% 
Do you avoid using a car for 
environmental reasons?  
Yes 5.5% Sometimes 
17.6% 
Protecting the environment is: Urgent  69.1% A problem for the 
future 23.5% 
Do you try to do your bit for the 
environment, even if it costs time and 
money?  
Yes  43.3% No 29.9% 
When shopping, do you try to buy 
packaging that can be recycled (jars etc)? 
Yes 22% Sometimes 
39.7% 
Do you buy organic products or products 
that do not damage the environment?  
Yes 11.6 % Sometimes 
43.6%  
Which source of energy is most risky for 




Is global warming a fact?  Yes 82.9% No  5.7% 
Should we protect the environment even if 
it slows down economic growth?  
Yes 65.9%  
Are you in favour of the ‘polluter pays’ 
principle?  
Yes 90.7% No 3.2% 
Who should protect the environment? Government and 






APPENDIX N: ARTICLE 48  OF THE IULVCA STATUTES . 
 
IULVCA defends a left-wing vision of Andalusian politics as one element of our 
federal and republican vision of the Spanish state; we also seek to achieve the 
greatest degree of self-government for Andalucía.   We aim to establish this within 
the framework of a project that promotes solidarity, within a Europe of the workers 
and the peoples, advocating a new internationalism approach which goes beyond a 
Eurocentric approach. This Eurocentrism is all too d minant in the face of our 
present circumstances: migratory flows, cultural expoliation, economic exploitation 
and environmental disaster in the poor areas of the planet.  
 
IULV-CA is committed to Peace, to demilitarising our security, in favour of a 
democratically governed world in which the UN is ret uctured to respect 
international law. We are also committed to cooperation and conflict prevention.  
 
 IULVCA will continue to demand an Andalucia which is free of foreign military 
bases and non-nuclear. In this way, we will contribute towards an autonomous, 
alternative and antinuclear European security programme.  
 
IULV-CA is fully aware of the fact that today, more than ever, the alternative, 
anticapitalist society that we are fighting for is being built at world level.  
 
IULV-CA makes a strategic commitment to the development and strengthening of 
the antiglobalisation movement  by through the Andalusi n local social for a or any 
other kind of organisations that might be set up.  
IULV-CA activists should take part in these fora in order to build bridges between 
the antiglobalisation movement and traditional movements such as trade unions or 
neighbourhood movements.  
 




APPENDIX O: A COMPARISON OF ICV AND THE SCOTTISH GREENS’ 
ELECTION MANIFESTOS . 
 
The following document juxtaposes these two manifestos to indicate that they share 
fairly similar objectives. However, as the colour-coding indicates (approximately), 
the Scottish Greens are certainly more Green than ICV whilst the latter has clearly 
defined socialist objectives. Both parties advocate policies and an approach in line 
with progressive democratic values.  
 
   Discourse that is socialist                                           Green discourse 
   Discourse that is democratic                                              Nationalist 
discourse 
    
ICV-EUiA Manifesto 2006 
 
 
1. Social justice for Catalonia. Good 
social services and fight .v. exclusion 
and poverty. Promoting people’s 
autonomy and providing support to 
all families 
Commitment to children specially 
those at risk. Commitment to the 
elderly and the disabled and their 
right to independence and dignity.  
Right to proper housing/good health 
care 
Promote responsible consumers and 
give rights to consumers 
Integration of immigrants and 
recognition of diversity.   
2. CATALUNYA, promoting a new 
model of production: competitive 
and sustainable 
Competitivity must be linked to 
quality jobs. More stress on social 
economy and self employed. Talk 
about service sector, tourism and 
commerce 
Developmnet of rural areas and 
fisheries.  
Regional financing, tax policies etc.  
 
3. CATALUNYA, moving towards 
sustainability 
 Town and country planning; 
countryside, biodiversity etc./ 
Scottish Green Party Manifesto 2007 
 
 
1: An economy for people and planet  
Sustainable communities  
Supporting local business  
Fair, clear and Green taxation  
Poverty  
Public services in the public interest  
A revolution in the food economy  
Tackling waste  
Green jobs – fair jobs  
Strengthening rural livelihoods  
A sustainable tourism industry  
Science and technology  
2: Healthy communities and a good 
quality of life for all  
Decent housing for all  
Education  
Schools  
Further and higher education  
Outdoor education and eco-schools  
Health  
Prevention better than cure  
Public and community health  
NHS Reform  
Carers and caring  
Mental health  
Sexual health  
Complementary and 
alternativemedicine  
Drugs, alcohol and tobacco  
Children, young people and families  
Pensioners  
 386 
sustainable transport; new water 
management; new energy policies; 
better waste management; 
protecting animals; preventing 
climate change and pulltion 
More sustainable production and 
consumption. Environmental 
taxation; environmental education 
and citizens’ involvement.  
 
 
4. Education system : universities, 
research. Information and 
knowledge society 




5. A radical democracy and different 
approach to globalisation 
 
5.1 A radical democracy and 
citizens’ participation.  
Equal rights for all minorities (GLBTs 
etc); peace promoters; international 
solidarity and promoting third world 
development.  
 
6. INSTITUTIONS THAT SERVE OUR CITIZENS 
More home rule ; better public 
safety, justice ; Catalonia and 
external relations with Europe ; more 
independent and plural 
broadcasting system.  
7. Helping young people to become 
more independent from their parents 
at a younger age 
8. Real equality between the sexes.  
 
Sport and green spaces  
The arts  
Crime  
Justice for young people  
Liberty  
Equality and diversity  
3: Stopping the Supertanker: Energy 
and Climate Change  
 
 
Decentralised energy  
Nuclear power? Still no thanks!  
Adapting to climate change  
Innovative measures  
 
 
Energy policy  
Energy efficient, warm homes  
Serious about renewables  
 
4: Transport: moving Scotland in the 
right direction  
Road safety and social exclusion  
Walking  
Cycling  
Buses and trams  
Affordable, reliable rail services  
Freight and ferries  
Roads  
Air travel  
5: A healthy and productive natural 
environment  
Reconnecting people with the land  
Farming  
Treating nature and wildlife with 
respect  
Protecting the marine environment  
Supporting sustainable fisheries  
Ending animal cruelty  
 
6: Scotland:A Responsible Global 
Citizen  
Peace and security  
Trade, aid and debt  
Independence  
Governance, parliament and 
democracy  
Asylum  
Source: ICV-EuiA 2006 ; Scottish Green Party 2007 
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APPENDIX P: LVA Manifesto for 2007 Municipal elections in Cordo ba  
(summary) 
      Source: * LV-Cordoba 2007                    
Town planning: Respect Cordoba’s traditional character and avoid inappropriate new buildings. 
Keep city compact and Mediterranean.  
 
Climate change: More solar panels. Sign up to become a sustainable city 
 
Employment:  Support the social economy and create more green jobs 
 
Economy: Support local businesses, prevent building of huge hypermarkets and promote 
environmental businesses to promote ecological  modernisation policies 
 
Tourism and trade: Promote sustainable tourism. Improve networks of paths in the countryside 
 
Housing: Tax on unoccupied houses (30% of total housing) to encourage renting; build more 
social housing; do up houses in city centre using ecological criteria 
 
Transport :  Promote measures that favour the majority (e.g. trains and public transport); 
priority to pedestrians, cyclists and public transport. Reduce parking spaces in city centre and 
increase bus lanes. Ban cars in city centre 
 
Environment:  Prevent the indiscriminate cutting down of trees, both in the city and in private 
gardens. Extensive tree-planting programme required. Set up two new parks and some 
allotments. Strengthen the role and resources of local government department in charge of 
environmental matters. 
 
Nuclear Waste: The Cabril nuclear waste site must be shut down in 2009.  
 
Environmental health: Noise abatement needed; set up a department for consumers, 
environmental health and food safety. Strongly promote organic food. 
Measures needed to enhance status of botanic gardens and to protect the river. 
 
Cordoba Capital of Culture 2016. Ensure involvement of all society and ensure that 
companies taking part are socially responsible.  
 
New technologies:  Reduce social chasm by providing free IT, software and ccess to databases 
of local museums and libraries.   
 
Social questions: Work to avoid exclusion; ensure all companies and public sector bodies set 
aside 0.7% of income to provide aid to developing countries.  
 
Security: Prioritise protection of  countryside, animals and city centre itself.  
 
Festivals: Reduce noise and street lighting during festivals. Provide no money towards 
organisation of bullfighting festivals.  
 
Sport: Promote non-competitive sport for all. Encourage the use of open-air facilities. 
 
Participatory democracy: Have representatives on town council representing d fferent sectors 
of society. Employ referendums for big issues; Create the role of  an ombudsman.  
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